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A B S T R A C T
The causes of the diminished volume of Portuguese-African 
trade in the interior of the kingdoms of Manyika, Butua and Makaranga 
at the beginning of the 16th century are to be sought in Portuguese 
commercial methods. The Portuguese were not adequately prepared to 
compete with the Arab traders whom they found there.
They learned from the Arabs, but very slowly. However,
i
Arab trading methods and institutions provided a basis for Portuguese 
mercantile activities in Manyika in the following centuries.
The Portuguese started at a disadvantage because the Manyika 
used subtle methods to resist Portuguese penetration into the interior. 
However the Portuguese achieved their aim, for during the 17th Century 
they established themselves firmly at various points within the kingdom 
of Manyika. The situation changed considerably during the 18th Century.
The Manyika successfully defied both Changaraire who claimed 
suzerainty over the kingdom of Manyika, and the Portuguese who wanted to 
trade anywhere they liked within the kingdom. Ultimately, Manyika 
compelled the Portuguese to concentrate their trading activities north of 
the Zambezi. Other factors, of course, such as the resistance of Barwe, 
and the profitable nature of the ivory trade also accounted for this 
shift in trade.
During the 18th Century the feira of Masekesa (trading post) 
became a very important place. Manyika princes fought over it and this 
made it easier for the Portuguese to intervene in Manyika political 
activities. Portuguese intervention came to an end when the Landins 
appeared in Manyika in the late 1820’s and early 1830's. The Landins 
were interested mainly in raiding cattle at the feiras. But the
devastating blows which destroyed the feiras were dealt by the 
Barwists and Quitevans who, like the Manyika, resented Portuguese 
aggression on their soil*
The Landin attacks, Portuguese administrative inefficiency, 
confusion of weights and currency and clandestine commercial competition 
rendered Portuguese trade at the feira of Masekesa unprofitable*
The Landin attacks compelled the Portuguese to re-examine their 
administrative machinery, and to make belated attempts to reform it.
They failed. The Landins drove them out of the feira in 1835. In 
spite of their expulsion, the Portuguese maintained trade links with 
the Manyika at an unofficial level. ’ The period 1835-1854 was taken
up by the question of the re-establishment of the feira at Masekesa0
i
I In the wake of Landin invasions followed another wave of 
'intruders’ - the Amatshangana of Manukuse. Unlike the Landins, the 
Amatshangana exercised some sovereignty over the kingdom of Manyika.
The relations between the Amatshangana and the Manyika were 
cordial. Some Amatshangana settled in Manyika and identified themselves 
with the local inhabitants. Portuguese political eclipse partially 
came to an end in 1854 when both Chikanga, King of Manyika, and the 
Governor of Rios de Sena agreed to have a capitao-mor re-established at 
the feira of Masekesa. This arrangement failed to wor.; because the 
basic defects of the institution of capitao-mor had not been considered. 
Many of the men appointed lived far away and often did not know the 
language etc.
The appointment of Manuel Antonio de Souza in 1863 as 
capitao-mor of the feiras of Quiteve and Manyika ushered in a new era of 
Portuguese reassertion of their former authority at the feira of Masekesa.
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2I N T R O D U C T I O N .
The proper name of what the Portuguese, and later the English, 
called Manica was Manyika; but, either due to a corruption of Chimanyika 
or to an attempt at stylistic elegance, the Kingdom ccsme to be known as 
Manica, a name by which it is known to date.
The Kingdom of Manyika could be cfelineated in the following 
manner during its first three and a half centuries of contact with the 
Portuguese. It was bounded to the North by Maungwe, to the East by 
Quiteve and Barwe, to the South by Quiteve and Vumba and to the West by 
the Odzi River. The land extended obliquely from the East to the North, 
and, measured in walking days, which was the fashion among the Portuguese 
travellers of the 16th to the l8th Centuries, it was four days in width.
The country was traversed by plenty of perennial streams. The main rivers, 
the Mutari, Nyamukwarara, Budzi, Revue, and Ruenya, descended from a series 
of metamorphic rocks, consisting of quartzites and schists, which are crossed 
over by numerous veins of auriferous quartz. A description, even a short one, 
of the river system can be significant when it is realised that panning for 
gold constituted an important aspect of the Manyika economy during the late 
19th Century, as well as during the period under review.
Manyika1s outside contact with foreigners did not begin with the 
Portuguese. The accounts of the Arab writers of the 10th and 11th Centuries, 
which deal with the export of gold and ivory from Sofala, clearly demonstrate 
the existence of commerce between traders from the area of the Manyika Kingdom 
and elsewhere in the interior with the Swahili traders at the Coast. The 
paucity of sources on the organisation of this early trade leaves us with 
little but the information provided by early Portuguese observes at Sofala
5.
and, in particular, Antonio Fernandes during his journeys into the interior 
of Manyika, Makaranga and Butua between 1^1^ and'1515*
From these sources it would appear that the Swahili traders 
conducted their commercial activities in the auriferous areas of present- 
day Penhalonga, the Revue and Piingwe Rivers, and in the vicinity of Masekesa, 
They operated bazaars (markets), which provided a means of trading, using 
gold as a medium of exchange. Thus the Portuguese retained a system to 
which the local population had grown accustomed.
The Kingdom of Manyika was famous with the Portuguese in South- 
East Africa for its gold mines and it was partly to obtain possession of 
the gold mines of Manyika that Francisco Barreto was sent from Lisbon in 
15^9* It was because of its allegedly inexhaustible gold potential and 
convenient position as an outlet to the sea that the English and the 
Portuguese fought over it in 1890, Of crucial importance was, and still 
is, the port of Beira as a trading outlet. To the Portuguese, the Kingdom 
of Manyika was of strategic value as a springboard from which they mounted, 
or hoped to mount, expeditions into the interior.
A study of the history of the Manyika Kingdom is no less important 
from an African point of view. The important Kingdom of Manyika represented 
a very sophisticated, though embryonic, prototype of African resistance to 
foreign penetration. It was able to establish a modus vivendi with the 
Portuguese in matters of trade without losing its independence. Trade 
opportunities were controlled by the Chikangas and their princes or 
Councillors.
Manyika polity emerges clearly during the l8th and 19th Centuries . 
But it would seem that the main institutions of King, Newanji, Semukadzi
1. See letter from the capitao-mor of Manica, Fortunato Ciriano da Silva, 
to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 5/10/1830. Maco 11. A.H.U. See 
Chapter V supra. For l8th Century examples see following footnotes.
and binga were similar to those which the Portuguese found, in existence 
when they arrived in Manyika in the early 16th Century.
I |
The King was the supreme ruler of the Kingdom. In his duties the
I
King was assisted by a newanji who in the case of a death, assumed the reins 
of government as a caretaker King. Next to the newanji was a semukadzi, the 
King’s celibate sister, who lived within the royal court and was an intermed­
iary of Nyamandoto, the Manyika ancestral spirit, through whom the Manyika 
people collectively communicated with Mwari, the creator of Mankind. She 
was an effective means by which the King exercised control over his people, 
since it was she who predicted and provided answers to national disasters 
such as famine, epidemic diseases and wars.
The King had other means of governing his Kingdom. He had
specialist spirit medium like Sahumani, the custodian of the Kings*
3survival spirits, which existed in the nude , or the rain-maker who,
£f
during a drought period, led King and councillors to Mbire , the ancestral
5
home of the Manyika, to offer sacrifices to Muti usine zita (nameless tree) •
2. The terms Newanji and binga are fairly scattered throughout the 18th Century 
as shown in, subsequent Chapters. See: anon. Descripcao Corografica do reino 
da Manica, seus custumeis e Leis. Cxa,17* Moc. A.H.U. In this account the 
terminology used for the spirit medium is Nyabeze.also see: Galvao da Silva, 
Manuel. 'Diario das Viagems, feitas pelas terras de Manica* in Carvalho 
Dias, Luiz Fernando de. Fontes para a Histdria, Geografia e Comercio de 
Mozambique. (See XVIII) Lisbon, 193^» P*329.
3* Shropshire Denis. ’The Story of Sahumani* in Man. Nos.6-7* 1939* P»6.
Shropshire Denis. ’The Mifanidzo of the Mutasa Dynasty.* Man.No.^,5* 1930, 
pp.^ f-3.
*f. David Mutasa. Personal communication.
5. Ibid. This tree was situated in the present day Marandellas district and 
could be seen from a long distance. See Posset,t, F.W.T. ’The Tree in the 
Religious Ritual cf the Bantu of Southern Rhodesia’ in Man. Nos. 109-110. 
August,1939* p.126.
The King was also assisted by his sons and daughters in
administering the Kingdom, His sons and daughters, together with their
husbands, became special ministers who worked in conjunction with the King’s 
7
three councils , namely the council of Makorokota, which was comprised of 
influentially important men who lived in distant parts of the Kingdom and 
the council of Makotsi, alternatively known as Machinda (princes of royal 
blood). These two councils, together with the King, decided matters of high 
policy.. A third council consisted of six ministers. Their function,was to 
make pronouncements on matters connected with royal funerals and successions 
to the throne.
i
i
It is the methods which the Manyika Kings and their councillors
i
adopteji to circumscribe the tra-ding activities of the Portuguese which 
constitute the main theme of this investigation. I shall be concerned 
also to answer particular questions which are fundamental to an under­
standing of the history of the region which once constituted the Mwene- 
Mutapa confederacy. Did all the gold which passed through the port of 
Sofala come, as the Portuguese chroniclers of the early l6th Century
6. Machiwenyika J. ’The History of the Manyika People and Their Customs.* MS. 
lVl/l.Sby.
’Manyika Headwomen* in NADA No. 17.19^0 pp.3~5
Compare the Teves (Quiteves). See Rita-Ferreira, Antonio. 'A Grupamento e 
Giaracterizacao Etkhica dos Indigenas de Mocambique.’ Lisbon 1958. p»**6. 
Also, Joao dos Santos, ’Ethiopia Oriental1 Book 1, Ch.l. in Theal, G.M* 
R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. Cape Town. 196**, p.192.
7* David Mutasa. Personal Communication. The dynastic titles of the Ministers 
were Seroukadzi, King’s celibate sister, Sakupwanya, the first-born of the 
King, who was traditionally addressed as baba (father), Muponda, a 
representative of the original owners of the land, who were ousted by the 
Nyamubvambire dynasty. This was done in order to placate and solicit for 
cooperation of Muponda’s ancestral spirits, Mukoyi, literally means a 
trusted man. He married a muzvari (princess) and both lived in Jenya, one 
of the regions of Manyika, given to them by the King. He represented all 
the Nehandas (sons-in-law of the King) at the royal court. Saraushonga, 
(mushonga - medicine) a doctor for the royal family, Samusewe (musewe- 
arrow), minister of defence, and the sixth one was (curu, who was concerned 
with selection of a new King. Curu also acted as a court drummer. An 
account of Manyika Kingship is found in Herbert Chitepo’s Soko Risina 
Musoro. Oxford, 1958. (Available at SOAS).
6.
claimed, from the Kingdom of Manyika? How was gold trade organised between 
the Manyika and the Portuguese traders? Was it the civil wars which made
/ 't,trade, in particular the gold trade, less remunerative than the Portuguese 
expected? What was the role of the feiras and of the vashambadzi, and how 
were they adapted to the African way of life?
The orthodox view of the Ngoni, as the Huns who devasted the 
Kingdom of the former empire of Mwene Mutapa, has been revised in the light 
of new evidence. Other factors have been isolated as being primarily, but 
not solely, responsible for a decline of Portuguese influence during the 
first half of the 19th Century.
In the following account, Shona terminology has been introduced 
where appropriate, instead of the Portuguese imitation. But certain 
Portuguese words like feira or capitao-mor have been left in the original, 
because an English equivalent does not bring out the concept clearly. I 
have retained the use of the terms emperor and King, because the Portuguese 
distinguish in their documents emperador and rei, and there are no clearly 
distinguishing terms in Shona, both being denoted by Mwene Mutapa and 
Changamire on the one hand and the Chikangas on the other. Indeed the 
power and influence of the Mwene Mutapas and Changamires appear to have been 
impressive, not only to the Portuguese. Dionizio de Melo e Castro, Antonio 
Pinto de Miranda and the author of the'Descripcao Corogrd^fica..all bear 
testimony to the hegemony of Mwene Mutapa and Changamire. The term King 
has been retained to denote feudatories of Changamire and Mwene Mutapa. The 
Portuguese administrators were consistent in their use of the term rei for 
Manyika potentates during this period and emperador for Mwene Mutapas, but 
as far as the Changamires were concerned, it would seem that the Portuguese 
discriminated between emperador and rei. A Changamire was an emperador, 
sometimes even poderoso, only when the Portuguese either dreaded his might
7*
or asked him a favour, such as they did when they implored him to intervene 
in Manyika-Portuguese trade disputes during the late l8th Century.
I have neither attempted to trace the origin of the Manyika, 
nor have I speculated on the antiquity of the Kingdom of Manyika and the 
ethnic origin of the people. These facts, interesting as they are, fall 
outside the scope of this investigation. Furthermore, this field is 
better investigated in the oral tradition which persists. I have preferred 
to attempt a reconstruction of Manyika trading and political relations with 
the Portuguese from documentary evidence.
C H A P T E R  I
EARLY PORTUGUESE CONTACTS WITH THE 
KINGDOM OF MANYIKA 1506 - 1575.
There are three main points to noteabout early Manyika- 
Portuguese contacts. First, the civil wars among the kingdoms of 
Madanda, Quiteve, Manyika, Butua and the lands actually .controlled 
by the Emperor Monomotapa became a scapegoat for Portuguese commercial 
ineptitude and lack of diplomacy in dealing with the potentates of this 
region in general and, in particular, the successive rulers of the 
Kingdom of Manyika for a greater part of the 16th Century, Gaspar Correia, 
who was himself in Sofala at one time, saw the Portuguese in this region
behave as sovereigns, haughty and defiant of the Emperor, Monomotapa.
i
I
His comment was that they ‘treated the people of the land
worse than captives* and whenever the Emperor, or any of the Kings for
that matter, complained to the Captain-General of Sofala about the
behaviour of Portuguese traders, the Captain-General put forward 'many
1
excuses explaining his inability to deal with them.*
This was the main cause of hostility between Inhamunda, King of 
. Madanda and the Portuguese. It is possible that Inhamunda*s actions, 
which restricted trade from the Kingdom of Manyika and its neighbours to 
Sofala, were directed mainly against the Portuguese offenders. It is again 
quite possible that the wars between him, on the one hand, and Monomotapa 
and Chikanga on the other, were a result of a complete misunderstanding 
of Ihiiainunda1 s motives.
The second point to note is that the Portuguese advance inland 
as far as the Kingdom of Manyika was not a preconceived scheme. It was an
1. Correia Gaspar. Lendas da India. Tomo I. Lisbon 1858, p
£.
outcome of three decades of frustration at Sofala. Thirdly, this 
disappointment led to two important developments; a crystallisation of 
the institution of Mushambadzi (hawker), known to the Portuguese as 
mussambazes, on which Portuguese trade for four centuries or more 
depended, and, secondly, a gradual Portuguese control of the Swahili 
trading posts - bazaars.
The civil wars, which the Portuguese found being waged in this 
region when they arrived in 1506, were limited and conventionalised 
affairs which did very little to alter, let alone destroy, the pattern
of Manyika politics, agriculture, gold industry or trade. Gold mining
1
and trade in general had been carried on under similar conditions in the
1
past and were certainly carried on under worse circumstances at one point
!  i  2
during (the l8th Century . Soares, in his letter of 30th June, 1513 to the
King of Pprtugal, reported that the Captain of Sofala lived in peace with
nearly all the neighbouring Kings; the land could not be safer than it 
3
was • We also learn from Almada*s letter of 1516 that the relations between
the Portuguese community and Inhamunda, on whom the diminished flow of gold
4
to Sofala was blamed, were cordial . This, therefore, means that the 
restricted nature of the gold trade was caused by factors other than the 
civil wars.
2. See Chapter III - supra.
3* Letter from Pero Vaz Soares, factor at Sofala, to the King, 30.6.1513 
ANTT CC.l 18-27 in Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Mocambique e na 
Africa Central l497-l84o vol.III Doc.No.465 p.3&5. National Archives 
of Rhodesia, Lisbon 1962.
Theal G.M. Records of South East Africa Vol.I.p.75*
Lobato A. A Expansao Portugugsa em Mocambique de 1498 a 1530 Livro III. 
Aspectos e Problemas da Vida EconOmica", de 1505 a 1530 published by the 
Centro de Estudos Historicos Ul'traraarinos. Lisbon i960, p.112.
4. Letter from Joao Vaz de Almada to the King. Sofala 26/6/1516 TT-CC 
1-2-64. Cited in Lobatot A. A Expansao Portuguesa em Mocambique de 
1498-1530 Livro II. Politica da Capitania de Sofala e Mocambique de 
1508 a 1530. Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon,1954.p.49.
Tracey Hugh. Antonio Fernandes. Descobridor do Monomotapa 1514-1515 
(Portuguese translation and notes by Caetano Montez) Lourenco Marques. 
1940, p.36. J
Very little, other than that they were civil wars, is known about 
the causes, course and outcome of these wars before the beginning of the
16th Century; even then, in most cases, it is a matter of inspired guess
j
on the part of a researcher. The arrival of the Portuguese further 
complicated an element which the Swahili had already introduced into these 
wars. Traders from the interior, notably from the lands which were effectively 
controlled by the Emperor, Monomotapa and the Kingdom of Manyika, had to pass 
through the Kingdom of Madanda in order to sell their merchandise to the 
Portuguese at a Portuguese factory in Sofala. The number involved in all 
this was probably not large. The Emperor, Monomotapa and Chikanga, the King 
of Manyika were joined together by fate in mutual interest to promote and 
expand the Portuguese market for the gold production of their lands.
It would appear that Inhamunda on the other hand wanted to control
this trade between the Portuguese and Monomotapa lands and the Kingdom of
Manyika which, he felt:, could only result in augmenting the striking
capacity of his enemies. The Portuguese adventurers and ship-deserters
exploited this and hired their services to Inhamunda as advisers and 
. 5mercenaries •
Several battles, whose details and dates are unknown are mentioned 
in the Portuguese records as having taken place between Inhamunda on the one 
hand and Chikanga and Monomotapa on the other. Inhamunda, so it is related, 
was victorious, probably with the help of the Portuguese mercenaries, in one
5* Letter from Joao da Silveira to the King, Mocambique, lk/2/1517 TT CC 1-21-35* 
This letter is summarised on pp.145-7 of Lobato, A. A Expansao Portugu^sa 
em Mozambique de 1498 a 1530 Vol.II. op.cit. Also see pp.81-84.
11*.
of the wars against the Monomotapa-Chikanga combination. This was probably
a war which broke out in 1518-1519 and whose consequences were exaggerated
£
by a factor of Sofala, Francisco de Brito •
In his letter to the King, Cristovao hardly mentioned any wars.
On the contrary, he referred to ambassadors he had sent to the neighbouring
lands, those of Inhamunda not excluded, and as far as 'Ynhambre' (Mbire)
7•where merchants go and come' • Evidently they went to the lands of the 
Emperor Monomotapa. Traders could travel 300 to -^00 leagues inland 'with 
greater safety than from Alhandra to Alverca'; the trade routes were open 
and Inhamunda, the Monster King of Francisco de Brito, was described as 
tame. He, however, expressed apprehension about the duration of the peace,
especially as the people at the factory were wont to break it 'more than is
I II
necessary.*
i
The evidence given by Soares, Almada and Tavora, people who had
lived in Sofala much longer than Francisco de Brito, tends to suggest that
the impact of the civil wars, in particular those between the period 1518
8 9
and 1519» has been exaggerated by historians like Axelson and Lobato •
In spite of that, the skirmishes which broke out between 1518 and 
1519 are episodes which best illustrate the politics of the time. King 
Inhamunda instituted an economic blockade, the details of which were sent ■ 
to the King of Portugal in 1519 by Francisco de Brito at Sofala, The 
effectiveness of this economic blockade, according to Axelson, is 
revealed by the fact that the factor, de Brito, was able to sell only a small
6. Letter from Francisco de Brito, factor at Sofala, to the King. 8,8.1519 
in R.S.5.A, Vol.l, Cape Town, 196^, pp.103-107*
Also see Documentos Sobre... Vol.VI.(1519-1537) op.cit. ANTT CC1 25-7 
Doc.No.2 pp.ll-19. ^  Also see Lobato A, A Expansao....Vol.Ill,pp.321-322 
7* Letter from Cristovao de Tavora to the King 1518-19* ANTT Cartas dos 
Vice-reis No.1^3 in Documentos Sobre.... op.cit. Vol.VI. (1519-1537)
1969 P*5*
8. Axelson E. South East Africa lA-98-1530 Longmans 19^0 pr.150, see also 
p.15^. '
9* L o b c L t O j  f j  L i s b o n . ?3j 9 A
L, O JoCctOj A t  A & X P<* rtSO*o—'Vof, i ' t ' j  p  P  1 3 V 3  .
i2*
quantity of the merchandise and none at all of a ship that was unloaded 
on the bank of the Pirn^we river, not far from the Kingdom of Manyika^*
The merchants from the Kingdom of Manyika, Butua and^the lands
/
which were effectively controlled by Monomotapa, could get to/sofala only 
through well-known routes. Deviations often resulted in robbery and some­
times death at the hands of pickets which Inhamunda had set up in the 
thickets. It would seem that King Inhamunda was not opposed to trade 
between Manyika traders and the Portuguese through his land as long as he 
was able to control its volume. Notwithstanding, Manyika traders 
occasionally found their way to Sofala. It is not possible to get an 
accurate idea of the volume of trade at this time, mainly because the key 
sources, the diaries of the factor and store-keeper, have not been located
in the Lisbon archives and probably do not exist. There is, however, some 
11statistical data , probably not very accurate, but significant insofar as
it indicates an existence of *an important market whose movement is to a
large extent still unknown in its entirety but can be conjectured by partial
12references and episodes which took place.1
10. The various items of the cargo of this ship are listed on page 150, 
footnote oneof Axelson's well-known South East Africa 1^88-1530
(Longmans 19*+0) as britangis, 19*000 pieces (costing in Cambay 66 reis 
each, worth in Sofala 2)4 miticals, with the mitical worth reis); 
macaceres, 808 pieces (costing 111 reis and worth 2 miticals); dimity,
198 pieces (costing 151 reis and worth k miticals); trados, 795 pieces 
(151 reis and worth k miticals); sabones, 42*f pieces (39 reis worth 1 
mitical); tin, zG^k lbs. (900 reis the faracola, worth 30 miticals); red 
beads, 4^7 lbs. (8h0 reis the faracola); 28,223 tangas of silver (each 
worth 60 reis). The fact that this cargo was unloaded on the banks of 
the Pungwe river suggests that it was intended for the gold mining and 
trading centres of the Kingdom of Manyika mentioned in this chapter.
Infra.
11. Letter from Francisco de Brito: to the King. Sofala 8/8/1519* In R.S.E.A. 
Vol.I. op.cit. pp.103-107.
12. A great deal of statistical data and tables has been collected from the 
documents and letters in the Torre do Tombo (Lisbon) and published by 
Lobato in his A Expansao  Vol.III. (i960) Lisbon.
I?.
The struggle between the Emperor, Monomotapa, and Chikanga on the
one hand, and Inhamunda on the other, seems to have reached its climax bet-
13 l^ f
ween 1525 and 1527 y when Monomotapa warned the Portuguese against 
supporting Inhamunda, whom he still regarded as his rebel provincial
15governor •
16
The civil wars between Monomotapa and Torwa (lA-9^-1512) and 
between Monomotapa and Chikanga on the one hand, and Inhamunda on the other, 
although by no means a significant factor, very partially explain the 
diminished flow of gold from Manyika and the interior in general to the 
Portuguese factory at Sofala. This, as will be noted later, forced the 
Portuguese to change their tactics in trade.
| The other factors, more important and responsible for the shortage
I
of gold, were the limited business acumen of the Portuguese, Swahili cland­
estine commercial activities in the interior and along the Zambezi from
17their base at the island of Angoche , lack of proper preparation, the
15* Lobato A. A Expansao..... Vol.III. i960. passim
1*K Letter from D.Lopo de Almeida to the King. Sofala. 27/8/1527* TT-CC-1-37-57 
cited on p.8o and quoted on pp.83-8^ of Lobato A. A Expansao..... Vol.II. 
Lisbon,195^* Also see Lobato A. A.Expansao....♦ Vol.Ill, Lisbon,i960. 
Footnote 260,^p.383*
Guerreiro Alcantara. ’Quadros da Historia de Mozambique, VIIIy Mozambique 
dos Ultimos anos de Manuel a Morte de Joslo III, 1515-1558’ in Mocambique 
DocumentarioTrimestral No.62. 1950. pp.163-75*
Letter from D.Lopo de Almeida to the King. Sofala. 27/8/i527 ANTT-CC I 
37-57*
Documentos sobre..... Vol.VI. (1519-1537) Doc.No.23* p.277*
15. Ibid. This was implicit in his threat to march his soldiers down to 
Sofala to take possession of the factory if support to Inhamunda was 
continued.
16. Von Sicard H. 'Tentative Chronological Tables* NAPA 19^6, P*31*
17. Letter from Pero Vaz Soares, factor at Sofala, to the King.
30/6/1513.
ANTT-CC-I-I8-27 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.Ill Lisbon,196 .^
Doc.No.76 p- 6^5
, utp.
1 O
proverbial corruption of Portuguese officialdom at the time , administrative
19inefficiency and errors of judgement , as well as Portuguese inability to
20adapt themselves socially in the new circumstances •
The Portuguese did not bother to study the nature of their
consumer market, neither did they have the expertise and necessary capital 
21
outlay • What was worse, they ‘failed to appreciate* the fact that the
gold trade, and not agriculture, was the backbone of the Swahili economy of
22
the South East African Coast . It took the Portuguese six years to confront
their enemy militarily and nearly twenty-five years to establish their supremacy
over the Swahili traders. These traders, who, since their military defeat in 
23
1512 , had been trading largely as middle-men between the Portuguese supply
market and the African consumer market, employed every manner of trickery,
and in some cases direct attack, to out manoeuvre the Portuguese in the
• + . 24interior .
l8. For examples see Letter from Cristovao de Tavora, Captain and Governor of 
Sofala, to the King,
Mocambique 20/7/151$* Documentos Sobre Vol.V, Lisbon, 1966,p S"'S~
AlmMJC-I, 22-85 in Documentos Sobre,.,,, Vol.V. , Lisbon,1966,Doc.No.*73
AJVTP^C-II, 12-98 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.V.,Doc.No,45, Lisbon,1966 ff7S"
19* Letter from Alfonso de Albuquerque to the King, Feb.1507* ANTT-CC-I,
6-8. PATO (R.A.B.) Cartas de Alfonso de Albuquerque Tomo I, parte I, Doc.
No.37 in Documentos Sobre  Vol.II. Lisbon,1963, p.127.
20. See Summers R. ‘Notes on the economic bases of S.Rhodesian Iron Age Cultures* 
in The History of the Central African Peoples. Papers presented at the 17th 
Conference of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for Social Research. Lusaka,
1963. P.5.
21. See list of maintenance payments for the month of Feb.1506 which gives an 
idea of the nature of the personnel at the Sofala fortress. ANTT-CC-II,
10-30 D0c.N0.5~5 in Documentos Sobre  Vol.l. Lisbon,1962, p.445*
Most of these people were degradados and not traders See Documentos Sobre.... 
Vol.III., Lisbon,1964. pp.8l,121,149,159,173,195,Vol.V.,Lisbon,1966. 
pp.215 and 335*
22. Axelson E. South East Africa, 1488-1530 Longmans 1940, p.l62.
23* See statement by Pero Sobrinho and Diogo Homem, clerks of the factory at 
Sofala, 15/3/1512, regarding the defeat and death of Maulide, then King 
of the Swahili community at Sofala.
ANTT-CC-11,31-38, Doc.No.37 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.Ill, Lisbon 1964. 
p . 2 3 ? - ^ ^ ^
24. Anon. ‘Description of the situation, customs and produce of Africa (C1518)* 
DocoNo.4$ in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.V. Lisbon,1966,p.3St7*—
Lobato A., A Expansao..... Vol.III. p.103 
Lobato A. * A Expansao. Vol.II. p.19
)
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It was a sense of desperation which compelled the Portuguese to
send a degradado, Antonio Fernandes, to explore the possibilities of
increased trade with African Kings and the sources of gold^. He was
the first Portuguese to report the gold-mining activities at Penhalonga,
the Mutari, the Revue valleys and the Manyika side of the bank of the
Pungwe river. He also reported that this trade was dominated by the
Swahili who held fairs every Monday at certain points. We do not know
whether or not he had an audience with the King of Manyika; neither do we
know how much of his goods - muskets, cloth and beads - he sold or gave as
presents. However, this reconnaissance tour, as it were, paid dividends
because the Portuguese knew where to gp and obtain gold when they^established
themselves at Sena and Tete. The dates of these two trading stations are
controversial and conjectural. It is not unreasonable to accept G.McCall
Theal's view that both Sena and Tete came under effective Portuguese
26
influence in 1530 and 1531 respectively . The 1530*s, as will be 
27
demonstrated later , saw a marked shift in Portuguese trading activities 
from the South, at Sofala, to the North along the Zambezi. It is also 
recorded that, when Francisco Barreto and his expedition tried to conquer 
the mines of Monomotapa in 15^9i they found 'two fortresses or factories'
28
on the Zambezi river, with people living there • It was this 'discovery*
25* Tracey H., Antonio Fernandes, Descobridor do Monomotapa. Lourenco Marques
19 0^ , pp.20-30.
Also see Gaspar Veloso's Report in Documentos Sobre Vol.III. p.l8l—
Godlonton, W.A.,'The Journeys of Antonio Fernandes' in P.R.S.A. Vol.XL.19^5* 
Scholfield J.F., 'The Journeys of Antonio Fernandes', Transactions of 
R.S.A.,Vol.XLII, 19^9.
Quiggin A.H., 'Trade Routes, Trade and Currency in East Africa', in Occ.Pap. 
Rhodes Livingstone Museum No.5« 19^9» p.l6.
26. Theal G.M., The Portuguese in South Africa, Cape Town,l896, Footnote l,p.l33*
27. See this chapter, Supra.
28. Rivara J.H. da Cunha. Arquivo Portugu&s Oriental, Doc.No.Jh, 28/1/1588.
Nova Goa 1857* p. 12*1-.
'Records of the Orders carried with them by the captains of the fortress 
of Mozambique and Sofala. To the Governor-General, Manuel de Souza 
Continho from the King, 138?.'
Theal G.M., R.S.E,A. IV, 30.
I6-.
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which aroused the interest of the King of Portugal a decade later . He 
wanted to know whether these ‘fortresses or factories' could be Maintained
/ - I
or not# It is most likely that the fortresses referred to were Sena and
Tete, both of which were later declared to be very important in the defence
30
system of Rios de Cuama • Barreto's victory possibly enhanced the prestige, 
and tightened the control, of the Portuguese over Sena and Tete#
The main role of these two trading posts during the first half
of the 16th Century must have been to control the Zambezi trade route, which
\
had long since the second decade of the l6th Century, become a main loophole
31through which Swahili traders smuggled merchandise into the interior • The 
control by the Portuguese of these two points on the Zambezi consummated 
Swahili dependence on, and their commercial alliance to act as agents,of, 
the Portuguese traders at Sofala# This alliance laid down a basis on which 
most Portuguese trade, in alliance with the Swahili, was done in the interior 
for centuries. It also formally institutionalised the role of the Mushambadzi. 
It must be pointed outy however, that Africans had been acting as middle-men 
long before the advent of the Portuguese in this region.
29# Rivara J.H.da Cunha. Arquivo Portugu^s Oriental, Nova Goa 1857, p.12*+. faS£30
30. Rivara J.H.da Cunha. Arquivo Portugu^s Oriental, op.cit. p.927* •Ase.i*
31. See summary of the letters of Ahtonio de Saldanha, Captain of Sofala
and Mozambique to the King. Doc.No.3 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.Ill,
196**, pp. 13-15.
Lobato A., Colonizacao Senhorial da Zambezia E Outros Estudos. Junta de 
Investigates do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1962, p.7*+.
Tracey H., 'Vias Comercias Arabes de Sofala no Monomotapa antes do
estabelecimento dos Portugueses' in Mozambique. Documentario Trimestral 
26, 19*+1, Lourenco Marques, pp.33-35* This article confirms that this 
was not a new route of the Swahili traders.
Axelson E., South East Africa 1*{88-1530. Longmans, 19*+0, pp.121,125.
Lobato A., A Expansho Vol.III. Lisbon I960,p.22
Lobato A., A Expansao Vol.II. Lisbon 195*** pp.53,101,117,120,
129,13**, 139,157*
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It would seem that shortly after they had defeated the Swahili
in 1512, the Portuguese relied on the Swahili traders to take their merchandise
to the market places which had grown up near and around the gold mining centres
during the halcyon days of Swahili commercial hegemony. This Portuguese-
Swahili commercial alliance was beginning to crack by the end of the first
quarter of the l6th Century. This is clearly shown by D.Lopo de Almeida’s
letter of August 27th, 1527 to the King, in which he pointed out that, although
Inhamunda had made an exception to his economic blockade of Sofala by allowing
the Swahili traders resident there to trade, the King should not expect much
improvement in revenue because the Swahili were ’so long drawn in their
affairs that the greater part of those who traded at the factory* during the
tenure pf one captain’s office (normally three years) would not come back 
I ' 32
until that of another • In fact the Swahili were, at this time, suspected
I
of inciting Inhamunda in particular, and other African potentates in general, 
against the Portuguese.
The Swahili traders relied on Manyika middle-men, as well as those 
from Makaranga, Butua and Barwe, to take whatever had remained unsold in the 
bazaars, as the market places were then called, to remote villages for sale. 
This practice gradually gave way to the credit system on which much of the 
trade was done during and after the 17th Century. The Swahili died out as 
middle-men and their place was taken by Manyika middle-men. This probably 
took place during the first half of the 17th Century because it is at this 
time, and shortly afterwards, that Portuguese travellers and traders speak 
highly about the fidelity of an African mushambadzi.
The crystallisation of the institution of mushambadzi, and the 
establishment of Tete and Sena in the north, greatly reduced the role of 
Sofala as 8X1 operating base during the first three or so decades of the
52. Letter from D.Lopo de Almeida to the King. Sofala 27.8.1527* ANTT-CC
I, 57-57. Documentos Sobre  Vol.VI. (1969) pp.277-279*
18'.
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16th Century. This decline in importance was so rapid that in iSkO a
Viceroy of India, Don Filipe Mascarenhas, suggested to the King of
Portugal that the Portuguese fortifications at Sofala should be
dismantled altogether. The King rejected this plan because he felt
that the fortress was still useful insofar as it inspired awe and
respect for the Portuguese from the neighbouring or even distant African 
3^rulers • Besides, it was his duty to protect a remnant Portuguese
35community of Christians and traders alike .
Traders who werb settled in Sena either went to Manyika and 
Barwe themselves or sent their agents. In this way the Portuguese, in 
absent-mindedness as it were, penetrated the Kingdom of Manyika, notably 
the gold-producing centres, and eventually supplanted their Swahili pre­
decessors. There is no evidence in the literature of this period as to how 
the bazaars were organised. But it would seem that both Sena and Tete had 
capitao-mors as soon as they were established. These capitao-mors 
distributed merchandise, at a price, to the residents who then took it 
to Manyika and the neighbouring kingdoms to exchange it for gold. This 
form of trade was not strange to the Portuguese because it was operated 
in much the same way as Portuguese feiras in Portugal. We do not know at 
this stage the amount of protection and the privileges the traders might 
have received from the King of Manyika. It is probable that all who went 
to these feiras were under the protection of a territorial prince.
33* Letter from the King to the Viceroy 25.11.l6*tO. Bol.F.U.P. Vol.IV. 
1959. pp.317-318.
Ibid
For Fortresses and Garrisons as a source of respect see Newitt M.D.D., 
The Zambezi Prazos....* (Ph.D.Thesis,London 198?) p.l?6.
35* Letter from the King to the Viceroy, Boj. F.U.P., op cit. pp.317-318.
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It is more than likely that the King occasionally sent for gifts. 
The various princes probably did the same and demanded passage money from 
individual caravans of merchants who passed through their lands.
It would seem that by the middle of the 16th Century and certainly
by the second half of the Century, the Portuguese traders, settled mainly at
Sena, had effectively penetrated the gold-mining regions visited by Fernandes
in 151^-1515 at Penhalonga and around the Mutari and Revue Valleys. A mining
area, which was surrounded by an amphitheatre of mountains SO leagues in
36circumference, possibly at Penhalonga, was commonly known a# Matuca • Gold
prospecting was done by experts who recognised gold-bearing reef by the dry-
1 37ness and poor herbage of the area where it was found • It is not known when
these mines were operated but, according to sin investigation which was
38conducted in 1573 * among some of the Portuguese traders, who claimed to
know the Kingdom of Manyika well, the most important mines during this period 
were Venguo Shibide, Arouva, Carahgua, Quicina, Macarara (on the Mukwarara 
River), Shipondo (probably Machinpanda, near Umtali), Botare (on the Mutari 
River), Shevide, Droa (probably Dora - a branch of the Odzi River), Macequece 
and the Revue valley. The majority of these place-names cannot be traced to­
day. The mines were possibly called after brooks which have now disappeared.
56. de Barros Joao., ’Extractos da Asia dos Feitos que os Portugueses 
Fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimento das Terras e Mares do Oriente1 
in Theal,G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.VI.p.266. The word Matuca appears Mas 
the only city in the interior" on a map of the early l6th Century.
This points to the existence of the region as a mining centre to 
Swahili trade during the 13th and l4th Centuries. Caetano Montez 
thinks that the word is associated'with the Vatonga who worked in 
the Matuca mines. This may well be, for there is no Cimanyika 
derivative for it. For the map and discussion of the word see 
Tracey H. Antonio Fernandes, Desobridor do Monomotapa. L.M.19^0» PP«58-59* 
37* de Barros Jo&o., 'Extractos da Asia.... 1 Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.VI.
p.266.
38. Guerreiro Alcantara, *Inquerito em Mocambique no Ano de 15731 in Studia 
No.6. Lisbon i960, pp.7-17*
The fact that food supplies had to be imported from the
39neighbouring Kingdoms of Quiteve and Barwe suggests that the gold- 
mining industry had attracted large numbers of people. In fact some of
I
I
the miners were outsiders - the Vatonga who lived between the Budzi and 
40
Save rivers .
It is evident that by the third quarter of the l6th Century the
Portuguese foothold in the Kingdom of Manyika, as well as in the lands
4*1
effectively controlled by the Emperor Monomotapa , was more than tenuous.
The anecdotes, contained in a contemporary document of this period, show 
that the King of Manyika and his vassal princes had been sufficiently alarmed 
by the uncontrolled movementsof foreign traders.
^ 42 ^The Inquerito of 1373 clearly shows that the relations between
the King of Manyika and the Portuguese were strained. It is not uncommon to
come across such references as "the King of Manica and his vassals are thieves;
they robbed and killed Portuguese Christians who had been in the said Manica
J
safely" and as a further warning to the Portuguese merchants, the Inquerito 
raised a scare that the Manyika would always rob "the cloth of whoever went 
there." In one instance Chikanga is reported to have ordered the death of 
one Rui Vaz, a store-keeper, probably from Goa, "who fled with two or three 
a r r o w I n  another instance he ordered the ’robbery* of a 'Moorish1 cafila 
to Sofala where the Swahili were taking their merchandise to the Portuguese, 
when a fugitive Indian sought shelter in it. The King ordered a general
39* Supra.
40• This region has been identified by Caetano Montez, see Hugh Tracey.
Antonio Fernandes op.cit. p. 48.
Also see Alberto Manuel Siraoes, 'Tongas do Sul' in Bol.Soc.Sstud.Moc.
LM ano XXV. No.92, 1933»PP*165-66•
4l Machado Carlos Roma, 'Resumo dos Principals Territorios, locais, ilhas,
regios descobertos, conquistados ouoCcupados, visitados, ou sob a influencia 
dos Portugueses na Africa, Asia, America e Oceania.' In Bol.S.G.L. 
serie 52, Nos. 1 and 2,1934. P»31*
42. Guerreiro Alcantara, 'Inquerito  de ano 15731 Studia No.6. Lisbon,
I960, pp.14(8), 17(11).
arrest of all Christians in his land, and confiscation of 'the cloth* which 
they had refused to give him* This was followed by a general 'molestation'
/ lf3
of the Portuguese community in general .
It is evident from the above-mentioned episodes that the 
Portuguese and Goanese traders, to whom the word Christian must have 
applied, had denied the King of Manyika his due levies on their commercial 
transactions in his lands. It is not clear whether the Swahili traders, who
were still in Manyika, had any hand in this* It should be remembered that this is
\
almost i*1® time when the Swahili traders sire supposed to have instigated 
Monomotapa to kill the first Portuguese missionary, Father Goncalo da Silveira*
The frequent use of the word Christian and the lack of incidents between 
Chikanga and the Islaraized Swahili traders would suggest a trial of strength 
between Christianity and Islam, and a triumph of the latter*
It would, however, seem that all the King of Manyika wanted was that 
the traders should conform to Manyika law and customs. He did not want to 
drive them away. The business man in him prevented this. He could have 
expelled most, if not all, the Portuguese traders, had this been his desire.
His military strength was perhaps at its highest during the l6th Century* He 
could afford anything up to 2,000 soldiers whenever he fought outside his
44
territory, but J>)000 or more whenever he fought an enemy within his borders •
However, it was the mountainous nature of the country which made it difficult
for any of his neighbours to conquer Chikanga, including the Emperor 
45
Monomotapa . A certain Mpango or Sampango, generally described as both 
his friend and vassal, used to help Chikanga with 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers
43. Guerreiro Alcantara, 'Inquerito * in Studia 6, pp.12-17, I960.
45". Monclaros. 'Relacao da Viagem.....* R.S.E.A. Ill, p«££7*
44-. Guerreiro Alcantara, 'Inquerito de ano 15731 Studia No.6. Lisbon,
I960,pp.l4(8),17(11).
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or more* He could bring more than 70,000 men into the field . Manyika 
soldiers used bows and arrows, assegai and adzes* However, guns1 were notI . I
entirely unknown. Inhamunda of Madanda, Chikanga*s neighbour and enemy,
is known to have asked the Portuguese for two bombards on two occasions
kl
earlier in the century • Perhaps a belief that guns were a cowardly 
method of fighting weighed against their use. Even with his traditional 
armoury, Chikanga was a sufficiently potent military factor to reckon with,
but he did not use his military superiority to expel Portuguese and Goanese
\
traders who apparently disregarded his orders. They had only themselves to 
blame for expanding a chapter of complaints, about civil wars, which was
b8
started by Alcacova in 1506 .
The weak position of the Portuguese traders improved considerably 
between 1572 and 1575» due to a development of new circumstances* The 
Portuguese were not slow to exploit a confusion which resulted from 
Chikanga*s death and its coincidence with the ^dvent of Homem*s expedition 
at this time.
^6. Monclaros *Relapao da Viagem ’ R.S.E.A*III,p*g#7»
^7. Lob at o A., A Expansao Vol. II* pp i‘£TCL-S'S
b8o Letter from Diogo de Alcapova to the King. 20.11.1506 Cochin. 
ANTT-CC I» pp.5-18. Gavetas XX, pp.^-5« PAT0(R.A.B.) Cartas de 
Alfonso de Albuguerque Tomo II Doc.no.in Documentos Sobre..... 
Vol.l. Lisbon 1962, p.38?^- 3  99  
Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.l. pp.62-68.
Freeman-Grenville G.S.P. The East African Coast. Clarendon Press. 
1962, pp.120-124.
49* Von Sicard H., *Tentative Chronological Tables* in NAPA,19^8, p.52.
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C H A P T E R  II,
THE ERA OF PORTUGUESE AGGRESSION 1573 - 1693.
•i
The encomiums and justifications of Joao dos Santos, an adulator
of the court, of Francisco Barreto's expedition of 1569-1575 have become a
standard history of what happened between these twodates in Manyika and her
neighbours. The substance of the Portuguese official version of the events
of 1575 is that Chikanga was pleased to see an invader in his country; he
2gave him provisions and a present as a sign of friendship . Much is made
about a stgte of war which allegedly existed between the Kingdom of Manyika
i
and that of Quiteve^. The reason advanced for this is that the King of 
Quitejve did not want his enemy, Chikanga, to prosper by means of trade
I |I i
carried on through his land with the Portuguese. This would render him 
a danger to Quiteve.
4
To take the first point. The deception* which was accorded 
to Fernandes Homem.is deliberately drawn out of proportion in order to 
justify a blatant aggression of a small principality whose only misfortune 
was that it was opulent. What is more important, Joao dos Santos and his 
contemporary chroniclers gloss over the fact that this ‘reception* was 
possibly dictated by internal, political developments. It is easily forgotten
1. Santos Joao dos.,’Ethiopia Oriental* in Theal G.M., Records of South East 
Africa, Vol.VII. Cape Town,1964 pp.282,217-220. Monclaros. Relacao da Viagem, 
.... in R.S.E.A. Vol.III. Cape Town 1964,p.227. *
2. Ibid
]>Td<fo;.d Q Cow fro, Decade IX R.S.E.A. Vol. VI. p. 567* Carta de Vasco Fernandes 
Homen p.a. Luis da Silva era lhe da conta de tudo o sucedido na Empreza de 
Monomotapa. 15.2.1576. MS 51-VIII-40 fls.212-214 (Biblioteca da Ajuda) 
Miscelanea Ultramar 1517-1701.
Salt Henry, Voyage to Abyssinia and Travels into the Interior of that 
Country, Executed under the Orders of the British Government, in the"* 
years lo09 and lBlO; in which are included an Account of the Portuguese 
Settlements on the East Coast of Africa visited in the Course of the Voyage.. 
... London l8l4. p.6l. Theal G.M., The Portup^uese in South Africa Cape 
Town,1896, p.151.
5. Santos Joao dos., 'Ethiopia Oriental' in R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. Cape Town,1964. 
p.217.
J>fojo doCcuio'Decade IX' Ch.XXIV in R.S.E.A. Vol.VI. Cape Town,1964, 
p.387.
Theal G.M. The Portuguese in South Africa, op.cit.p.151.
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that the Manyika were otherwise opposed to this expedition. It could not
locate the rich gold mines largely because it lacked co-operation and 
/  j
sympathy froni the Manyika at large. The question of trade through Quiteve
j
is not valid. The Manyika did not have to depend on the port of Sofala for
their external trade because the Zambezi trade route had already become
5
popular by the 1530's • If Quiteve had believed that trade with the 
Portuguese would make Chikanga his enemy rich and powerful, should not this
have been all the more reason why he himself would have welcomed Fbrnandes-
\
Homem and his expedition and shown him the famous mines of Bandire? Dos
Santos' explanations are most unconvincing to say the least. In any case
there is no evidence to show that Manyika-Quiteve relations were always
strained. On the contrary, the fact that Quiteve's Zimbabwe was close to
the Manyika border^ would suggest that the relations were probably cordial
although occasional clashes could not be ruled out in an age when boundaries
were in a state of flux and alliances easily changed. Quitevan opposition to
Portuguese advance was not motivated by hatred for the Kingdom of Manyika.
It was dictated by Quitevan interests, the desire to preserve the Kingdom
intact. The King's fears were confirmed during the 17th Century when
Portuguese prazo-holders took advantage of Quitevan political disunity to
carve out land for themselves • Quitevan opposition to Portuguese commercial
3 o 9activities was maintained during the 17th , loth and 19th Centuries. Quiteve 
became a haven for anti-Portuguese elements from Manyika in 1890^. What
L ( CcLr-tCLs d e* F e .rn a  n d e-S  H  Orv\e-nr, » m  / W - e J s s o ,  /c.
* tif 3 O  * 0< p£362-17+
5. See Chapter I. Infra. ~
6. R.S.E.A. Vol.VI... p.339*
Also see Map of Southern Africa by John Senex (fl.1690-17^0) dated 1720.
7. Por a discussion of prazos in this region see the pioneering and lucid 
work of Newitt M.D.D., The Zambezi Prazos in the l8th Century,(Ph.D.Thesis, 
London).
8. Antonio Gomes. 'Viagem que fez » Studia 3 Lisbon 1959iP*193*
9. Andrade A.A., Relaqoes de Moyambique Setecentista. Agencia Geral do 
Ultramar, Lisbon 1935* P*155»
The Quiteves attacked the feira of Bandire in 177^ - and burnt the houses 
of the Portuguese feirantes, See Baptista R.J. Caminho de Ferro da Beira.... 
1891, p.l^.
10. Rezende's Diary in Revista de Manica e Sofala, Series 1-11,1905*
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happened, in 15-75 was a real manifestation of Quitevan national policy#
There were exceptions here and there throughout Quiteve's contact with 
the Portuguese when, more due to internal political divisions orj military 
weakness than desire, concessions were made and friendship feigned.
The attitude of both Manyika and Quiteve rulers towards 
Fernandes Homem's expedition was influenced more by politics than trade.
11It has been suggested that an unknown Chikanga died between 1572 and 1575 •
If this is so it may explain why Fernandes Homem's expedition received
\
little opposition from Manyika. It is known that the deaths of most
Chikangas were followed by an uneasy period of disputes, intrigue and
12quite often civil wars • It is very likely that there were more than
two factions at this time and that each of them decided to look for help,
one from the Portuguese and the other from the King of Quiteve who was
already up in arms against the Portuguese. The fact that the King of
13Manyika is described as ’half a moor and half a wizard” ** suggests that 
possibly a delegation, which took provisions to Fernandes Homem and 
conducted negotiations with him, was most probably headed by one of the 
Swahili traders.
Secondly, a war, the only one recorded, which broke out between 
the Kingdom of Manyika and Quiteve, at this time, may also be explained in 
terms of Manyika rival factions. It was in the interest of Quiteve to
11. Vonsicard H., 'Tentative Chronological Tables' NAPA, 19^ -6, P*52*
12. See Chapters IV and V. Supra.
/3* Lobato A*, 'Viagem a Abyssinia com a pescripcao do Interior dos Paises, 
Executada l809-l8l0, Parte II' in Mocambique. Documentario Trimestral 
No.38 19 p.95.
Salt H., Voyage to Abyssinia  op.cit. London,1809-1810. p.61.
26*
support one of them, opposed to the Portuguese, against the Portuguese and 
their puppet Manyika faction. The fact that the Portuguese did hot get 
much help in/locating the rich mines soon after their arrival in jthe 
Kingdom of Manyika would seem to suggest that the anti-Portuguese faction, 
which probably had a majority of supporters, triumphed. The faction which 
was led by a Swahili must have offended Manyika national sentiment by its 
external connections.
In the final analysis, both Chikanga and Quiteve were militarily
\
defeated and they suffered the fate of the vanquished. Two separate 
treaties’ were imposed on each of them whereby Chikanga was required to 
allow the Portuguese traders or their agents to trade freely in his Kingdom. 
The Captain of Sofala would make him an annual present of 200 rolls of cotton. 
The ’treaty1 seems to have been in the nature of a gentleman’s agreement. My 
search for it, or references leading to it, in the Lisbon archives was in vain. 
Nor does it seem that anybody knows anything about its existence besides Joao 
dos Santos. However, a similar ’treaty* was signed by the King of Quiteve 
in the same year, 1575*
15The searches which were subsequently carried out were held not
to justify state participation in the venture, although the mines were said
to be better than those of New Spain and Peru. There are several possible
reasons for the failure of Francisco Homem’s expedition to locate worthwhile
mines in a Kingdom where ’every palm of land' was described as goldferrous 
16fifty years later • We also know from the witnesses who were interviewed in
l*f. R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. pp.218,219-220.
15. Carta de Vasco Fernandes Homera, MS.51 VIII 40 fls.212-2lk. Also see 
Appendix V in Axelson, South East Africa, 1^88-1530. Longmans 19^ +0,pp.268- 
27k.
biO$Qido„.&Oi4.ta ’Decade IX* R.S.E.A.Vol.VI. p.38?.
Santos Joao. ’Ethiopia Oriental' R.S.E-.A. Vol.VII, p.2l8.
16. See Report by Cristovao de Brito de Vasconcellos 20.8.l633» Doc.Aulso No.9« 
Caixa 1, Hoc. A.H.,U. Axelson E., 'Portuguese Settlements in the Interior 
of South East Africa in the Seventeenth Century' in Congresso Intemacional 
de Historia Dos Descobrimentos. Actas Vol.V. II parte 1981, p.11.
27.
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1573 that there were a number of profit-yielding mines and that despite 
the restrictions placed on the gold mine industry by the King of;Manyika, 
the gold tracle was lucrative.
The first reason for the lack of success of Homem's expedition 
was possibly Manyika's reluctance to reveal where the rich mines were 
situated. Judging from a list of mines which was obtained from some of 
the traders in 1573? the Portuguese traders knew where some of the rich
mines were located. There was much gold in Manyika, even though Homem
\
believed otherwise, but the Portuguese traders feigned ignorance in order
to discourage state interference with their lucrative trade. There was
l8
another reason after 1580 . It has been pointed out that as a result
of the occupation of Portugal by Spain in 1580, the Portuguese in India
'felt no obligation in filling the coffers of a Spanish King  heinous
offences were condoned  trials indefinitely postponed..... gross mis-
19appropriation of money went unpunished ' .
20This also explains the failure of a settlement scheme of 163^ ,
whereby the Kingdom of Manyika was to be militarily conquered, made a seat 
of the governor of Rios de Sena and a base from which to mount expeditions 
to the neighbouring Kingdoms of Makaranga and Butua, 'the mother of gold.1 
About three or four Sena prazo holders, with 7*000 to 8,000 'slaves' to
17* Alcantara Guerreiro. 'Inquerito em Mozambique no ano de 15731 Studia No.6. 
i960, pp.12-17. Note a similar situation in 1633* See 'Petition 
presented by Don Andres de Vides e Albarado' in 1633 in Memoria e 
Documentos  I89O. Lisbon, pp.142-1^7*
18. The Voyage of Francois Pyrare/of Laval to the East Indies, the Moluccas 
and Brazil. Translated into English from the Third French Edition and 
edited with notes by Albert Gray and H.CjP.Bell. Vol.II. Part I. Hakluyt 
Society (1887-90) London, pxxviii.
3.9. Ibid.
20. Axelson E., 'Portuguese Settlement ' op.cit. Actas V 1961,p.11*
Axelson E., Portuguese in South East Africa 1600-1700. Johannesburg,
1964, pp.97-ll^« Bol.F.U.P. p.285 (193&) Vol.Ill Livro das Mon (joes, No.17. 
El Rei a capit^o de Mozambique. Report by Cristovao de Brito de 
Vasconcellos 20.8.1633* Doc. 9- Cxa I.Moc. A.H*U.
2$.
work in the mines, were supposed to initiate the scheme. Other prazo 
holders in Rios de Sena were to be persuaded in time. The scheme failed 
because it met strong opposition from the capitalists, the miners, essayers 
and a new Viceroy of India. A judge, who had been sent there to carry out 
a judiciary inquiry, was murdered by the prazo holders. This attitude was 
not a new development. It is traceable as far back as 1575*
The vested interests of the estate holders of Rios de Sena, their 
hatred for Spain and Manyika unwillingness to expose their rich mines to 
foreign exploitation lie behind the failure of the two schemes, of 1575 and 
l63^i which have much in common.
Manifestly the period 1575-1629 was a high watermark of Portuguese
aggression and exploitation of the Kingdom of Manyika. These twin evils,
I
aggression and exploitation, expressed themselves in two forms: in a growth 
of the feiras (markets) in several regions of Manyika, and secondly, in a 
lucrative trade which was being carried on in the interior.
Most of this trade, as pointed out earlier, was carried on at the
feira, whose status as an institution must have been greatly enhanced by the
•treaty' of 1575* There is still little information as to how the feiras
were organised before the second half of the 17th Century. But a few features
21
have been identified by archaeologists with regard to their structure, e.g.
extensive areas were enclosed by low wal]s,the walls were made of timber
palisades, a few residential huts made of pale and mud, they were situated
at a distance from one another, they were near gold mining areas: some were
jointly administered by the government of Rios de Sena and others were
privately owned. It is known that in some cases the Portuguese adapted
22
ancient ruins for their own purpose • The common featuressuggest that the 
feiras fulfilled a similar function.
21. Garlake P.S.,'Excavations of the site of Dambara^Rhodesia)' in Proceedings 
and Transactions of the Rhod.Sci.Assoc. Vol.5^. Part I. 1969
22. Pires de Carvalho. 'Velha Macequece1 Mozambique No.^7* 19^6, PP-7-17*
'I
29.
Archaeological excavations done by Freire Andrade, Director of 
the Mines in Mozambique in 1900, brought to light what the feira of Masekesa, 
the most important one in Manyika, looked like in its completed form.
These archaeological discoveries are corroborated by 17th and l8th 
Century literature relating to the feira.
The feira of Masekesa was situated between the rivers Muza and
• . 23
Chimeza, on the left bank of the Muza River . Its entrance was built on
a steep bank of the river; the circumference was 120 metres and it was flanked
by two rectangular bastions which also flanked the two lateral sides and there
. 2kwas a similar bastion built on the front side. The walls, probably 2# to 3
metres high and 90 centimetres thick, were built with stone and granite taken
from the locality. The stones and granite were cemented with mortar made from
1 i
sand and clay. Two drawplates with loopholes opened inside, one 50cm. from 
the ground while the other, 1.30cm.high, allowed the use of fire arms. In 
each of these drawplates, the loopholes were 1.80cm. apart. In the two 
flanks of the bastions were loopholes for the use of small cannons.
The arrangements for artillery and cannons, which appear from
archaeological and literary descriptions, were most likely a later development,
because it was still being felt in 1633 that it was not necessary to introduce
artillery. Rocheiras (small guns) and falcoes (ancient artillery cannons)
25
were recommended as defence precautions at this stage • The King had
i
23* This roughlyQfalls within Bordalo's approximation of l8° 50 longtitude 
South and kk 20 Longtitude East. See Bordalo, Francisco Maria.
Ensaios Sobre Estatistica da Possessaos Portuguesas na Africa Occidental,
Oriental na China e na Oceana" Vol.IV. Lisbon,1859» P*231*
2k• For comparison of measurements see Pedro Barreto de Rezende. *Extractos 
do Livro Chamado Do Estado da India* in R.S.E.A. Vol.II. ^ Cape Town,196^.
pp.^11-^12. B.M. MS. Sloane 19^. Anon ’Descrip^ao Corografica *
Cxa.17 Moc.A.H.U.
25. Report by Cristovao de Brito de Vasconcellos to Conde Viceroy. Cxa.I. 
Mozambique A.H.U. 20.8.1633*
30.
written several letters, both to the Viceroy of India and the Captain of
26
Mocambique, about the need to fortify Rios de Cuama . He had a; fear that
l !
the Dutch, who were aware of the proverbially rich gold mines of; Monomotapa, 
might order a full-scale invasion of Rios de Cuama, either from Sofala or 
Quelima^e or both, which led him to issue repeated orders to the Viceroy to 
anticipate such an invasion. The feiras of Makaranga, Bueva (Butua?) and 
Manyika were to be fortified. The problem of Portuguese defence in kios
de Cuama must be studied under the background of Portuguese-Dutch rivalry
\
27during this century in the Indian Archipelago • This will not be dealt
\
with here.
It is not known when the fortress at the feira of Manyika was
built. It was probably started shortly after the King of Portugal had
23
made enquiries in 1585-88 and the structvreswere likewise gradually
added, especially in the 1590's as defence against the Hungwe-Dzimba who
29
invaded the Kingdom of Manyika at this time • Evidence for this is very 
scanty. It may be sought in the very origin of the Zimba themselves. The 
nomenclature Zimba was used indiscriminately by both the Africans and the
26. Bol.E.tJ.P. Vol.III. 1958 Lisbon (C.E.H.U.) p.285. 12 31 s/d Carta de
El Rei para o Vice-rei. Feb.1633• l/4
Bol.F.U.Po Vol.III. 1998. p.264. Livro das Moncoes No/7 80 19 Carta de
El Rei para 0 Vice-rei. 27 Feb.1633* * 9
Bol.F.U.P. Vol.III. 1998. p.278. Livro das Monroes No/7 26 Carta de El
Rei para o Vice-rei. Feb.1633* 9
Bol.F.U.P. Vol.III. 1998.pp.285-6. Livro das Monqoes  ^ 32 s/d Carta de El 
Rei para o Capit'ao de Mozambique. Feb. 1633*
27. Boxer C.R., 'Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry '
1641-1661' in Studia No.2, 1998. pp.7-42.
28. Rivara J.H. da Cunha, Arquivo Portugues Oriental 1857 Nova Goa. Doc.
No.34. 28.1.1588, p.124. 'Records of the orders carried with them by 
the captains of the Fortresses of Mocambique and Sofala1. R.S.E.A.
IV, 30.
29. Von Sicard H., 'Tentative Chronological Dates' NAPA, 1946, p.34.
31.
30Portuguese to describe any 'bellicose1 group of peoples ; therefore, the 
suggested invasion of the kingdom of Manyika need not necessarily be directly
related to the historical Zimbas who allegedly snowballed and rampaged along
31 ■the East African coast • The Zimbas have been identified with the people
of a Malawi King, Lundu, otherwise known as Tondo, Rundo, who established
32his hegemony over the Kingdom of Bororo with the sword . The suggested 
invasion of the Manyika Kingdom by Rundo in the 1590's, though a remote
possibility, was not altogether improbable. The activities of Rundo in
\
35the region of Rios de Cuama alarmed the Portuguese in 1598 . Dom Pedro de
Souza, then captain of Sofala, sustained a serious defeat, in which he lost
both men and artillery, in an attempt to drive Rundo out of Rios de Cuama
in the same year . It is also possible that this invasion might refer to
fugitives from what later became the Bororo Empire. Contact between the
Empire of Bororo and the Manyika Kingdom is known to have existed since the
1530's to the l660's when a lucrative trade in machira was conducted between 
35
these two places • There is no evidence as to when exactly this trade began 
or how long it lasted. It is possible that Rundo's conflicts with the
30. Alpers E.A., 'The Role of the Yao in the Development of Trade in East 
Central Africa I698-CI85O' (Ph.D.Thesis, London),1966, p.56.
31. Ibid.
32. See Tradition collected by E. de. C. Lupi. Angoche - Breve Memoria sobre 
uma das capitanias-mores do Distrito de Mocambique. Lisbon,1907. pp.llb, 
119-123»162-91 cited on p.34- Alpers E.A., 'The Role of the Yao in the
development of trade ' op.cit. Also see pp.33-36 loc.cit. Alpers
E.A.» 'The Kutapa and Malawi Systems' in Ranger T.O., (ed.). Aspects of 
Central African History, London,1968. pp.21-22. Alpers dates the 
appearance of the Zimbas on the map of S.E.Africa to 1560, ('The Role of
the Yao trade ' p.30) but actually the activities of the Zimbas in
the region of Rios de Cuama dates back a decade or so earlier. The 
conflict with the Portuguese feegan in 1550 when a . capi^ao-mor of Sena, 
Andre Santiago, intervened in Malawi internal politics. See Rita- 
Ferreira A., 'Os Azimba: ' Monografica etnografica in Bol.Soc.Estud. de Mog' 
ambique,24 (84) 1954,p.53• For an authoritative account of the Zimbas, 
see dos Santos,Joao. 'Ethiopia Oriental* R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. pp.291-299*
For Zimba activities in Rios de Cuama in general see Couto, Diogo do. 
Decada XI Chaps.XV. pp.76-79» XVI, pp.80-83* XVII, pp.83-86.
33. Rivara J.H. da Cunha, Arquivo Portugues Oriental Doc. No.364,20.11.1598. 
p.918. -f^Sc-30
34. Ibid.
Couto Diogo do., Decada XI da Asia, Idsbon pp.135-40.
35. Monclaros. 'Rela^dTo da Viagem $ Fizerao ospes da Corapanhia de Jesus..... 
no ano de 1569 in Theal G.K., R.S.E.A. Vol.III. pp.234-35*
Gomes A., 'Viagem que fez ' (1648) Studia 3* 1959? p.296.
Barreto Manuel, (1667) 'Informacab » R.S.E.A. Vol.III. p.475.
32;
Portuguese in Rios de Cuama were to some extent motivated by his desire to 
capture, control and expand the Manyika market for his machira. In his 
report in 1667, Manuel Barreto refers to the fact that Rundo deliberately 
raised the price of machira which were sold to the Portuguese.
The Portuguese were obviously not interested in defending the
Kingdom of Manyika but their own trade. The problem of defence became more
urgent because Chikanga had rebelled against the Emperor, Chunzo Monomotapa 
36
in 1599 • It is possible that this rebellion was linked with the civil war
which had broken out between Chunzo Monomotapa and Gatsi Rusere, which later
involved other feudatories of Monomotapa. It seems that Chikanga was defeated
!
and continued to pay tribute. The real reasons for the cause of the rebellion
I
on the part of Chikanga are not mentioned but it is very likely that the
I 1
Manyika in general never forgave the Monomotapa for not coming to their aid
when they most needed succour in 1373* They used to pay regular tribute to
the Monomotapas as their overlords. Another likely cause of irritation was
the fact that Monomotapa signed a ‘treaty’ with the Portuguese, the
implications of which affected Manyika interests and the interests of the
37other vassals who rose din rebellion in 1597 •
The almost uncontrolled movements of the Portuguese traders, the 
official protection accorded to them and their feiras, especially that of
36. Von Sicard H., ’Tentative Chronological Dates' NAPA, 19^6, p.3^*
37* Botelho J.J.T., Historia Militar e Polxtica dos Portugueses em Mocambique 
da Descoberta a 1833 Coimbrg. 19331 p.275«
Botelho de Souza Alfred. Subsidios para a Historia Militar Maritima. Vol.l. 
(1585-1605) Lisbon,1930, p725T
Braganca Pereira A.B.de., Arquivo Port. Oriental Tomo IV,Vol.II. 1937» Nova 
edi^ao. pp.26-28.
'Report made by the Governor-General, Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, by 
the command of the Viceroy, that His Majesty be informed of the progress 
of the Conquest of the silver mines in the state of Cuama1 in Theal G.M., 
R.S.E.A., Vol.IV. p.155. For the results of this war see treaty of
capitulation by Gatsi Rusare. D0c.N0.l6 in Memorias e Documentos....
1890. Lisbon, pp.69-70.
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Masekesa which was partly maintained at official expense, must have been 
blamed on the Emperor, Monomotapa. j
k j  for the Hungwe-Dzimba invasion, it does not seem to! have had 
any impact, whatever its origin was. It does not feature in Manyika tradition, 
which such afi event would.
The slow development of the fortress at the feira must be seen in 
the larger background of the defence arrangements of the fstado da India.
Mozambique, where defence was even more urgently vital, was not garrisoned
\
38 39
until 1583 and was still not complete in 1607 when the Dutch attacked
it. The soldiery was not properly constituted. Its units, quarters and
rations were not organised on a permanent basis in the State of India by
l±Q
the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th Centuries •
4-1
The position was slightly different in Manyika and other king­
doms where the Portuguese had settlements. The garrisons and Churches were 
already in existence by the end of the l6th Century as part of the feira life.
38. Montez Caetano. 'Fortifica<joes de Mozambique * in Mozambique No.31,1942. p.45
39. For the details of the Dutch attack and Portuguese defence see Durao A., 
'Cercos de Mozambique1, Lisbon,1937. This is a 1633 edition which was 
republished with a preface by Edgar Prestage . and notes by C.R. Boxer.
40. Botelho de SOuza A., 'Subsidios para a Historia.. . '  op.cit. p.l9»
Pyrard F., The Vogage of Francois Pyrard of Laval 1601 a l6ll To the 
East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil. Translated into 
English from the 3rd French edition and edited with notes by Albert 
Gray and H.C.P. Bell. Vol.II. Part 1, Hakluyt Society 1887-90 pp.123-131
Rivara J.H. da Cunha., ♦Viagem de Francois Pyrard  as Indias Orientftes
....♦ 1601 a l6ll♦ Tomo II. Nova Goa 1838-62, Ch.8. pp.101-114.
Van Linschoten J.H., 'His Voyage to Goa and Observations of the East 
Indies' in Purchas flis Pilgrimes. London 1623. Ch.VIII p.175^*
BoxbiC.R., The Portuguese Sea-borne Empire 1415-1825 London,1969 p.297* 
Ficalho Conde de. Garcia da Orta E —  0 Seu Tempo, Lisbon,
1886. p.169.
41. The feira of Masekesa probably had a garrison by the last quarter of 
the 16th Century. See Chapter I infra.
34' •
There was no mention of a Church in connection with Mocambique in an important 
Z|_2
document of 1^ 82 which gives information about the different posts, their
function s,the (ionour and importance attached to them, and the various classes
of people suitable to occupy them in Sofala and Mogambique. But a: list of
twelve Churches, among whichwas that of the feira of Manyika, appears at the
43
end of the l6th Century • A correspondence between the King of Portugal and 
his Viceroy in India concerning payment of Dominican friars in Rios de Cuama
would seem to suggest that Churches were in existence during the last quarter
44 \
of the l6th Century . It was piobably in this Century that garrisons at the
feiras came into existence. Certainly the feira of Manyika was a fully developed
institution by the first half of the 17th Century. Antonio Colaco is mentioned
~ 45as capitao-mor of this feira in 1634 . He accompanied a small team of gold
prospectors to the top of a mountain range where the miners carried out several
experiments. The fact that there was a capitao-mor suggests the existence of
a garrison. There is no extant contemporary account about the size of this
garrison, whose actual strength must have varied from time to time', but
theoretically it was ten soldiers. The capitao-mor of the feira of Manyika,
like the capitao-mors of the feiras in Makaranga during the 17th Century, was
46
paid from government revenue • It is not known when this system of paying 
him and other capitao-mors began, neither do we know how much they were paid.
But this system was stopped when the Count of Linhares became Governor of India
42. ’Relagao das plantas, e descrigaos de todas as Fortalezas, cidades e 
povoagaos que os Portugueses tem no estado da India Oriental* A 
Manuscript published by A.Botelho da Costa Viega in Studia 6, i960.pp.H-l6. 
Alcantara Guerreiro J.de., *A accao Missionaria'e a sua organizagao 
canonica em Mogambique no penodo filipino (1581-1640) * in Congresso: 
Internacional de Historia dos Descobrimentos Actas Vol.V.II parte 1961
pp.179-193.
43. Ibid. p.183
44. ’Records of the orders carried with them by the captains of the Fortresses 
of Mogambique and Sofala* in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.IV. p.90.
See page 72 loc.cit. concerning the fact that there was already a Church
at the feira of Massapa by 1608.
45. Report by Brito Vasconcellos to the King. 20.8.1633 Cxa.l Moc. A.H.U.
46. Rezende Pedro Barreto de., *Extratos do Livro chamado do Estado da India*
in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.II p. 404..^
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(1629-1635)* His argument was that since the region of Rios de Cuama
was leased to a captain of Mocambique Mhe ought to pay the salaries to the
captain of Sena, , Sofala and the other ports of the Rivers." The post
of capitao-mor was generally given to one of the wealthy moradores of Sena for
k?
a period of three years . His privileges included taxation, control of prices,
preference of buying and selling • He exercised administrative and judicial
powers. He resolved conflicts which arose between any of the moradores and
any Manyika trader, prince or the King himself. Other duties involved the
granting of licences, handling of orders within the jurisdiction of his
captaincy, protection of cafilas, ihe raising of soldiers and distribution
if 9
of presents to the King and his princes . . The post of capitao-mor was very
much sought after because of these privileges, quite often costing many
presents, not only to those who proposed the names of the candidates for the
50post, but also to those who were nominated .
Evidently the prosperity of Portuguese commerce at the feira, the 
harmony or lack of it between the Portuguese who lived and traded at the feira 
must have depended on the capitao-mor1a tact and sense of duty# The functions
and powers of a capitao-mor. as will be noted later, were greatly modified by 
such factors as the nature of the King with whom he had to deal, the state of 
the country, for example civil wars, and his success in most cases depended 
oh the amount of co-operation he received from the moradores in contributing 
presents for the King or princes.
^7* ,Dqcumentos Referentes a Soberania Portuguesa,na Manhica e Quiteve* in 
Arquivo das Colonias* Vol.III. Coimbra 1918, p.99* 
b8. Ibid. Also see Codice 1^60. Moc. A.H.U.
Newitt M.D.D., *The Zambezi Prazos in the l8th Century* (Ph.D.Thesis 19&7) 
London, p.ll^ f.
Braganca Pereira A.B.de., Arquivo Portugues Oriental Nova edi^ao. Tomo IV# 
Vo}.II.l600-l699 (1937) p. 22. Extracts from the book entitled *0f the 
State of India* in R.S.E.A. Vol.II, p.4l6.
^9* Cot/tinho Joao de Azevedo Manuel Antonio de Souza. Urn capitao-mor da Zambezia, 
Pelo Imperio No.2. Lisbon 193b, p.6.
50. Ibid.
3 6*
As noted earlier, a capitao-mor at the feira of Manyika was not 
necessarily a military man. He was an ordinary civilian with great influence 
among the Sena residents.
The garrison at the feira of Manyika consisted of a detachment of
51ten to twelve soldiers from Sena . This seems to have been the officially
stipulated figure when the garrison was first constituted. To start with the
soldiers did not live at the feira all the time as they did in the subsequent
centuries. They came from Sena in April, stayed until the end of May when they 
52
returned • This was the peak of the gold raining season, first, because it was 
53after the harvest , and secondly, the rains were sufficiently moderate to
j
render both alluvial and reef gold mining lucrative. Evidently the fortress
i
was frcjm the start not an effective means of defence and the feira existed
i i
largely 'because the king of Manyika also benefitted from it by way of presents 
in return for the favours he granted to the moradores.
In his excavations at Dambarare, Garlake did not find indications of
prolonged residence. This seems to have been the case at the feira of Manyika
in the 1630*s where only about twenty-five residents lived at any one time,
5*f
including Portuguese and African Christian couples • The fortress had neither
31. Colonel T.P.Cardoso Casado Giraldes MS.6^ 8 Azu^Serie, Esboso de Alguns
Artigos Relativos a Capitania de Mozambique MS.No.17, Fls.l8. (Academia
Das Sciencias, Lisboa).
Castro Dinizio de Mello E., *Noticia do Imperio Marave e dos Rios de Sena.
20.1.1763, in Carvalho Dias, L.F. Fontes Para a Historia..... * in Anais
Vol.IX To M0.1 Lisbon,195^, p.130.
' ’• v • • • • - ' ■ - * •••••- •• ■ V
Botelho Sebastiao Xavier. Memoria Sobre os Pominios Portugueses na Africa
Oriental. Lisbon,1935* P»295»
53* The perennial nature of most of the rivers in Manyika made alluvial gold
collecting an all-year-round activity, whereas in the neighbouring regions
alluvial gold digging was largely confined to the three months of August,
September and October, known to the Portuguese as *do crimo.1 I suggest that
this was a corruption of a Shona expression nguva yokurima - the ploughing
season. See *Report on the State and Conquest of the Rivers to the
Viceroy, Joao Nunhes da Cunha' by Barreto in R.S.E.A.Vol.Ill, pp.^9-90.
3^. Rezende. *Do Estado da India.* R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.4l2.
3?.
artillery nor any other form of defence except guns which individual traders 
55possessed • The captain of Mocambique supplied 'them with gun powder and 
bullets. It is not clear whether or not the gun powder and bullets were 
given free as part of the Captain’s obligation to defend Rios de Cuama. This 
situation changed as will be seen later, when some attempts were made, with 
varying success, to have an armazen and a permanently resident garrison.
There were other minor feiras such as that of Matuca, whose fort-
56 ^ress was built by one Joao da Costa • The feira had no capitao-mor. This
is an example of a proprietary feira. -Its busy nature is shown by the fact 
that it was never without a passer-by. The fact that feiras had developed to 
this extent was an indication of how Portuguese aggression had successfully 
advanced.
A third important feira was that of Vumba which had ten or twelve
57Portuguese and African Christians in 1651 • Apparently the Village settlement
extended into Quitevan land. There was a Church but, unlike the other two, 
there was no priest. There were many small villages subject to the King of 
Quiteve. This feira served both as a meeting place and trading post for 
merchants to and from Quiteve. Unlike the feiras of Chipangura and Matuca,
there was no fort at the feira of Vumba, an indication that the Portuguese
58believed that they had nothing to fear .
55* Braganpa Pereira A.B. de. Arquivo Port. Oriental Nova .edipab. Tomo IV. Pt !•
Vo;.II. 1600-1699. 1937,P.22.
Also see B.Mus. Sloane, MS.194. N
56. Ibid.
R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.4l2. . '
57* From an anonymous ’Ethiopia Oriental 28.6.1651’ in R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.456;
II pp.412, 459; Vol.III.p.486. , _
Braganpa Pereira A.B. de., Arquivo Portugues Oriental Nova edccao. Tomo IV»fi£lt 
Vol.II. 1600-1699. 1937. p.23^ ~ 7_T"
Also see Sloane MS.194 B.Mus.
It is incorrect to say, as R.N.Hall does in his Prehistoric Rhodesia (p.455 
London, 1909) that the feira of Vumba was not established until 1667, 36 the 
above references prior to 1667 show.
58. Bragan^a Pereira A.B. de., Arq. Port.Oriental, op.cit.p.25. ’Ethiopia 
Oriental' in R.S.E.A. Vol.II, p.459.
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The second point which shows, that Portuguese aggression was at its
height from the last quarter of the l6th Century to the end of.the 17th Century
is the extensive and interlocking network of Portuguese trade between the feiras
in Makaranga, Butua and Manyika. Manyika-Butua trade connections were first
suggested by Joao dos Santos at the end of the 16th-Century, when he saw a
59blanket in Sofala which had been b-ought by a merchant in Manyika • The 
merchant was told that it had come from Butua via Angola:.from Lisbon. In his
60 "V
report to the King of Portugal in 1635 % Cristovao de Brito Vasconcellos
referred to merchants from the feiras of Makaranga and Butua, and that the 
Butuans spoke of their land as stretching as far as the sea of Angola.
A Vicar at the feira of Manyika, Fr.Gaspar Macedo actually spoke to
61some of the Butuans at the feira and they told him exactly the same story • 
Evidently the Butuans must have confused Angola with some other place. But 
Manyika-Butua trade links were maintained and developed.
<znd
Archaeological excavations at the feiras of Luanze^ Dambarare ’ .
... by Peter Garlake , at Masekesa by Freire Andrade and at the Khami 
6k
ruins by Robinson indicate that the Indian red beads were preferred in all
59. R.S.E.A..Vol.VII. p.Z7k.
60. Report from Brito Vasconcellos to the King 20.8.1633 Cxa.l Moc.A.H.U.
61. Report by Fr.Gaspar Macedo Vicar of Riod de Manica (Livro das Mon9oes No.^ fl.
2 parte, fls.13 Arquivo da India) in Memoria e Documentos  Lisbon 1890
pp.1^1-151.
62. Garlake P.S. *Excavations of the 17th Century Portuguese Site of Dambarare* 
in Proceedings and Trans. R.S.A. Vol.5^ Part 1,1969* pp.23-60*
Garlake P.3. ’Seventeenth Century Portuguese Earthworks in Rhodesia’ in
S.Arch.Bull. Vol.XXI, No.6k (Part IV) 1967. pp.157-170. *
63. Pires de Carvalho. ’Velha Macequece* Mozambique No.*+6 19^6, pp.5-6^.
6*t. Robinson K.R. Khami Ruins, Cambridge University Press 1959* PP* 1^*-1^5•
Also see Laidler P.W. ’Beads in Africa - South of the Zambezi' pp.35-^0 
in Proceedings and Trans.R.S.A. Vol.35* Part 1, 1957*
Conto Diogo do. 'Extracts from Asia1 in R.S.E.A. Vol.IV. pp.367-368.
There are samples of agate beads in Caixa 3* Moc. A.H.U. For source and 
method of manufacturing them in India see Arkell A.J., 'Cambay and the 
Bead Trade* in Antiquity Vol.X. 1956, pp.296-298.
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the kingdoms of Rios de Sena. The popularity of the yellow, green and blue 
beads varied from region to region. Imported ceramics from China, Persia 
and Europe in that order have been unearthed at every one of the above 
mentioned feiras.
The preference enjoyed by the Indian red beads, alternatively known 
as Cambay beads, was determined by a set of beliefs prevalent among the 
Manyika and their neighbours in Butua, Quiteve and Makaranga.
65l It was believed that the Portuguese plucked these beads from trees . 
The black had been left in the trees for such a long time that they petrified 
and turned black, the green had been plucked before they were ripe, the yellow 
had been plucked just before they ripened, the red, which struck the happy 
medium, were plucked in time before the sun burnt them very much and before 
they had turned black. These anecdotes were bandied about by the Portuguese 
at the time to explain the general popularity of the red beads. It may well 
be that the Africans at the time preferred a bright colour and red met their 
taste. Cloth:was another important item of trade, especially the bright 
coloured cloths. These were measured by arm lengths.
The most important mining centre during the 17th Century in the
Kingdom of Manyika was still Matuca, which was then estimated to be 30
66 67
leagues in circumference, as compared with 50 leagues in the previous
century. The difference of 20 leagues could be either a genuine error of
calculation or it may mean that some of the mines had been exhausted and
\
65* Gomes Antonio. *Viagem que fez » Studia 3» 1959i p.196.
A relevant English summary of this important travelogue is contained on 
pp.5-8 of Boxer C.R. An African Eldorado: Monomotapa and Mocambique 1^98- 
1752* Central African Historical Association. Local Series. Pam.No.2.
66. Macedo, Gaspar. Report in Memorias e Documentos....• Lisbon,1890, pp.1^8-
151.
67* See Chapter I. infra.
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people gathered together at the most profitable ones, or that these leagues 
constituted the forbidden mines of the region of Mbeza. This is most likely • 
As many as 200 Manyika used to go to a certain place to mine gold and stay 
there until it was the ploughing season. It would seem that about 10-12 gold 
tfflines were in operation in Matuca.
There was^  sufficient gold from these mines to justify an increase
68
in the quantity of bars of cloth • There was still plenty of room for an 
expansion of the gold industry, especially what Macedo called the "90 extensive 
virgin mountain ranges" which all contained "large quantities of gold."
| This gold trade was dominated by the Indians, about whom the
Portuguese complained. The Portuguese blamed the Indians for a practice,
I 69 70which had then developed,of adulterating gold with silver . There were 50
'f
resident Indian and Portuguese traders in Manyika in the 1630*s. The majority
i
of these were Indians from Goa.
The Manyika mining activities were also extended to crystals and iron.
71 72
They used the crystals to make weights and iron to make small hoes which
68. A bar or fumba de fato (cloth) or fazenda de lei (monopolized merchandise) -
See Boleo 0. '0 regimento 1 Studia 3* 1955»P»95) consisted of 98
pieces of ordinary cloth from India assorted as 4 pieces of Zuarte 
and 4 pieces of capotins. These 98 pieces corresponded theoretically to 
400 panos (clothes - 352 x 66cm) and each piece of cloth - pano, chuambo 
or braca (arm-length) was equivalent to a portion of cotton cloth whose 
length was equal to two outstretched arms. In practice a bar of fazenda 
de lei consisted of 291 panos and rarely 4-00 panos and its assortment was 
very arbitrary. This often resulted in scandals because the functionaries 
were paid in cloth and willy-nilly they did some trade even though this was 
against the lav/.
See footnote 1. pp.49-50 of Filipe Gastao de Almeida de Eca. Gamitto 
(1806-1866). Noticias Biograficas Acerca do Grande Explorador com 
Subsidios Ineditos para a Historia de Moqambique. Lisobon 1950.
Pissurlencar, Panduranga, S.S. Regimentos das Fortalezas da India. Bastora. 
Goa.1950,pp.206-208•
69* Gomes Antonio. *Viagem que fez ’ Studia 3- 1959»PP»239-240.
70. Macedo Gaspar, report in Memorias e Documentos  op^cit;pp.148-151.
71* Macedo Gaspar, report in Memorias e Documentos  op.cit.pp.148-151.
72. Braganqa Pereira A.B. de. Arquivo Portugues Oriental, Tomo 4. Part I, 19
37. Bastora, P.22.
served as a currency.
The attitude of Chikanga to all this hustle and bustle of trade was
one of caution. He maintained that only he had the right to decide which mines
were to be operated. A Manyika who struck a mine had to report to the King
and failure to do so often resulted in a confiscation of his property, family 
73or death .
The Mbeza region, south of Penhalonga described as twenty leagues in
circumference and ’famed for gold more abundant than can be obtained anywhere
in the whole world because of its pure gold which was found in nuggets of one
74
arratel or two arreteis1 , was a preserve of the King. The Portuguese and
Indians were not allowed to live there and the ostensible reason for this was 
that the King did not want to be embarrassed by requests to open gold mines.
The King probably needed the gold for himself. Despite the prohibition order, 
much gold was traded. There is a case of one Joao da Rocha, a merchant in
75
Manyika, who took to Sena a piece of gold weighing nine or ten ounces •
The restrictions put on the Portuguese and Indian trade by Chikanga 
manifested his resentment of this new situation whereby foreign traders and 
travellers penetrated deep into his kingdom. This was basically the cause of 
his rebellion against both the Portuguese and Monomotapa in 1629-32. It would seem 
that the Chikangas did not miss any opportunity to break away from or discomfit
73. Gomes Antonio., ’Viagem que fez * Studia 3» 1959» P*195*
74. 1 arratel was equivalent to lib. (16 ounces).
75* Macedo G., Report in Memorias e Documentos..... op.cit. pp.148-151.
Monomotapa whenever an occasion arose. A civil war broke, out between an
76 !
uncle, Mavura, and his cousin, Kapranzine Monomotapa • The former was
I !
pro-Portuguese but the latter resented Portuguese interference in Monomotapa's
j
affairs. The Portuguese extorted promises from Mavura, after which they made
a common cause with him against Kapranzine. These promises involved a treaty
77of vassalage and a cession of the silver and gold mines •
Chikanga fought on the losing side of Kapranzine. Both he and
Kapranzine carried on sporadic attacks on the Portuguese until 1632 when Diogo
78
de Souza de Menezes attacked and killed him . The Portuguese immediately 
raised his brother to the throne of the kingdom of Manyika, converted him to 
Christianity and imposed a 'treaty' upon him. The treaty required him first, 
to pay three pastas^ of Botongas^, worth 150 Xerafins^, secondly, to visit
76. Botelho J.J.T., Historia Militar  a 1853* Lisbon,193^» pp.295-30*f.
Axelson E., 'Portuguese Settlements in the Interior of S.E.Africa in 
the Seventeenth Century.' in Congresso Internacional de Historia dos 
Descobrimentos Actas V. 1961, p.8.
Axelson E., Portuguese in South East Africa l600-1700tJohannesburg,196*f. 
pp.69-77-
77. For the provisions and implications of this treaty see 'Livro das moncoes' 
No.13*13 fls. Ordens Regias No.2 fls.5 cited, in Bragan^a Pereira A.B. de 
Arquivo Port.Oriental Nova edi^ao Tomo V. Vol.II, Parte II, pp.99-101. 
'Treslado das capitula^aos que fixeram os Portugueses com el Rey do 
Manamotapa' 28.6.1629» Tete, Joao Coelho in Memorias e Documentos..... 
Lisbon, 1890,pp.71-72. fa  Tnd\cu
Pissurlencar Panduranga S.S., Assentos do conselho do EstadoxVol.I. 
(1618-1633) 1953, Bastora. Doc.No.l27,pp*396-zKX)* Conselho de 9 Janeiro 
de 1632 s&bre conquista de Monomotapa.
Ibid. Doc.No.25. 31.^.1631. PP*5^2-Mf. Sobre o Contracto. que se fez com D. 
Numo Alz Pereira para conquistar Manamotapa e ordenar S.Mage, que nao tenha 
effeito o tal contr^to. See original in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.Ill,
Cape Town, 196^, pp.277-280, 367-370. No trace has been made of the 
famous and legendary silver mines of Chikova.' Old abandoned workings' 
on a galena bearing vein rich in silver' have been located. Probably these 
were the mines referred to. See Spence C.F. Mopambique. East African 
Province of Portugal, London,1963, p.69. About efforts to locate these see 
Bol.F.U. P.VD1.II, 1936,Lisbon. (C.E.H.U.) p.301. Livro das Moncoes No/7 
132 15 Carta l8l 13.11.1630 Goa.
1
Antonio Bocarro, 'Decade 13 da Historia da India' Doc.No.18.pp.76-78 in
Memorias e Documentos 1890 Lisbon .Ibid. Docs.No.53*pp.l38-lifl, No.55
pp,151-153i No.571PP* 155-137,<juerred.ro C.J. de Alcantara and J.de Oliveira 
f§s minas de prata da Chicova em relatorio de s£culo XVII' in Mozambique. 
Documentario Trimestral No.39» Lourenco Marques,19^*pp.7-91.
78. Letter from Diogo de Souza de Menezes to. the King 17.2.1635. in Theal 
G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.LV,p.278/ (Barreto)R.S.E.A. Vol.IT. p.*Ul.
Bragan^a Pereira A.B. de. Arq. Portugiies Orient'alTomo IV. op.cit. p.22 f i t .
the Captain of Mozambique at the beginning of his office, thirdly, to 
recognise Monomotapa and to pay him regular* tribute, fourthly, to disclose 
the mines in his kingdom and to keep the trade routes open and secure. The 
last clause of the treaty clearly indicates the grievance of the Portuguese 
traders. In return Chikanga would be given a cloth out of every bale brought 
into the feira. In fact he paid for everything he received from the Portuguese. 
As a Portuguese official pointed out at the time, this was far less than what 
his predecessor used to get, but the Portuguese conveniently remarked that he 
was contented. He had to appear to be contented since he owed the throne 
to them.
02
numbers of Africans, about 300-500 whom the Portuguese used to send
This treaty further advanced'Portuguese aggression as shown by
large
out carrying packages on their backs up country, and the- way in which both 
Indians and Portuguese used to recover their debts. This figure, which is 
given by Gomes, of course, relates to Manyika as well as to her neighbours.
79* Gold which the Portuguese obtained from Rios de Cuama was cut into weights
' known as pastas (thin plates). Each pasta was worth 100 miticals.
Chikanga was required to pay 300 miticals.
80. This type of gold is difficult to identify but possibly it referred to 
alluvial gold. See Costa Lobo A*de S.S. Memorias de Urn Soldado, 1585-98 
Lisbon,1872. Compiled from Portuguese MS in B.Mus.by Francisco Rodrigues 
da Silveira B.M., Add MSS,25^19*
81. Bragan^a Pereira A.B,de., Arq. Portugues Oriental Nova edi^ao Tomo IV.
p.22. A Xerafin was an Indian coin worth 3 testoons. A testoon was worth
6 pence in 1555* See Nunes, Antonio. ♦Extracts from the Book of Weights, 
Measures and Coins* in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. VI, ^53« For the history of 
currency in Portuguese India see Rivara, Cunha L.J.H., Arq. Port.Oriental 
Nova Goa 1857* (Fasc.) 2 Livro das Privilegios da cidade Goa Doc.No.54V 
pp.174-187.
82. Gomes A.*Viagem que Fez.....’ Studia 3 1959 p.192.
The credit system operated in this way; that an African would get merchandise
from an Indian or Portuguese on credit and offered himself, his property and
family as a security. In case of default, a Portuguese creditor sent 20-30
83
men to confiscate his debtor's property and family . This led to a neglect 
of agriculture as Manyika vashambadzi were busy trading and the debtors fled 
away from their pieces of land to new ones. The King of Quiteve expressed 
the feelings of many neighbouring kings when he implored his people to 
concentrate on agriculture, which he considered was a source of wealth and 
security.
The Portuguese policy of aggression was not limited to the Kingdom
84
of Manyika only. The defeat of Barwe by Antonio Lobo in 1659 * the attempted
85 86
conquest of Butua in 1644 , the conquest of Quiteve in 1644 and the
87
resuscitation of the feira of Dambarare between 1673 and 1684 are cases in 
point of further Portuguese incursions at the end of the 17th Century. This 
policy received a set-back in and after 1684, when Dombo Changamire initiated 
and continued his military attacks on Portuguese sources of wealth - the feiras.
83. Ibid.
Macedo Gaspar. Report in Memoria e Documentos  pp.l4l-151.
84. Manuel Barreto. ' JnformacSio do Estado e Consjpista dos Rios de Cuama 
11.12.1667.1 R.S.E.A. Vol.Ill, p.488.
83« Boxer C.R., Sisnando Dias Bayao: Conquistador da 'Mae de Ouro'. la
Congresso da Historia da Expansao Portugu£sa No Kundo, 4a Seccao, Lisbon,1938. 
For a contrary view that Bayao never went to Butua, see Von Sicard's 
polemical correspondence to Professor da Silver Rego 'A Proposito de 
Sisnando Dias Baiao, March 2nd 1963' published in Studia No.16.Nov.1965.
pp.179-186.
Bayao*s conquest of Butua is still an unsettled question. For a recent 
excursion into the controversy see Newitt M.D.D., 'The Zambezi Prazos in 
the Eighteen Century,' (Ph.D.Thesis, London,1967,p.139)• He dismisses 
Von Sicard's argument as 'inadequate'but maintains a non-committal position.
86. Acto de Vassallagem do Rei de Quiteve de 23*10.1644 in Memorias e Documentos..
... Lisbbn.1890, p.122.
87* Garlake P.S., 'Excavations of the Seventeenth Century Portuguese Site of 
Dambarare* in Froced & Trans. R.S.A. Vol.34, Part 1, 1969* pp.23-60.
Garlake P.S., 'The value of imported Ceramics in the Dating and Inter­
pretation of the Rhodesian Iron Age' J.A.H. xl. 1968, pp.13-33*
The increase in the number of feiras and their further development give us an 
idea of how comfortable the Portuguese were in Kanyika in the third quarter of 
the 17th Century.
The number of feiras had not increased. Chipangura was still the
88
most important feira during the second half of the 17th Century , It would seem
89
that it was the only one,with a capitao-mor . The feira of Matuca had 
declined in importance possibly because merchants found it more convenient to 
patronise one place* Also this gave them a sense of security even though there 
was not much fellow-feeling amongst them.
There was a sizeable community of traders at the feira of Masekesa
during the 17th Century. In I696 Fr.Antonio Conceicao, in his(Tratado dos 
>90
Rios de Cuama , had this much to say about the life of the moradores; that 
they were scattered about in the suburbs and were absolutely incapable of collect­
ive defence, their morals were despicable and that they were obstinate.
Feira society then was very individualised. It has been said that they 
preferred this type of life because it made it easy for them to play fraudulent 
tricks on one another, as for example, a morador could secretly have trade 
dealings with a middle man or servant belonging to another morador. The 
annual production of gold and ivory at the feira was estimated at 100 pastas 
in the l690's, worth 100 xerafins in India, compared with its annual production 
of kOO pastas in the past. The difference does not necessarily reflect a decline 
of trade due to Changamire*s wars, but rather a profound change in the method
88. Manual Barreto. »Informacao,....1 R.S.B.A. Vol.III. p.^6£.
89. Ibid.
90. Conceicao Antonio, 'Tratadc. dos Rios de Cuama*
Rivara J.H.da Cunha. 0 Chronista de Tissuqry Nova Goa,l867-69* 
pp.107-111*
46,
of trade. There were fewer people then going to the feira because the 
vashambadzi, as Gomes observed in 1648, went out to remote villages in large 
numbers. Thehe is also evidence of this in Conceicao*s 'Tratado dos Rios de
j
Cuama.’ Traders occasionally went from the feira of Masekesa to Dambarare, a 
distance which took them seven days. This was probably between 1675 and 
168491.
It was Dombo Changamire who helped to stem the tide of Portuguese
aggression in the kingdom of Manyika when he.began his military campaigns
\
\
(l&tff) which culminated in his famous attack of the feira of Masekesa in 
1695* The Portuguese aggressive thrust which effectively began in 1575 had 
at last come to a halt. Thenceforth the Portuguese were on the defensive.
Although the Manyika did not conduct a military defence against 
the expedition of 1575* due to a succession of civil wars, and promised to 
open their mines to the Portuguese and Indian traders, yet they deliberately 
maintained studied silence about the location of the mines; they did not allow 
the Portuguese to build feiras without opposition. On the contrary, they maint­
ained a subtle warfare, which if not always successful, at least deserves to be 
applauded. They hid the location of the mines, sometimes retired in defeat, 
but the moment the Portuguese relaxed, the Manyika redoubled their tactics of 
prohibition, restrictions and, if they judged it politic, broke out into open 
resistance again. It was this policy of resistance, little appreciated in 1575i 
which saved the kingdom of Manyika from being overwhelmed and parcelled out intd
91. Braganqa Pereira A.B,de. Arquivo Portugues Oriental Nova Edicao. Tomo 
IV. Vol.II. Parte II. 1938. p.38.
Botelho J.J.T., Historia Militar  Vol.I. p.251.
Garlake P.S., 'Excavations of the seventeenth Site of Dambarare' in 
Proceedings and Trans. P.S.A. Vol.54,1969 pp.23-60.
Garlake P.S., 'The Value of Imported Ceramics  J.A.E.X.Vol.I.
1968, pp.13-33.
prazos for the land-hungry Portuguese gentry. The situation, which was 
created by the circumstances of 16951 profoundly altered the course of 
Manyika history for nearly two centuries before another aggression, a 
more fatal one of 1890, was launched.
C H A P T E R  III
A PERIOD OF DEFIANT CHIKANGAS 1695 - 1795.
PART 1 - Chikanga-Changamire Relations*
In the period 1695-1795* the Chikangas do not seem to have been 
worried by the Changamires. This is a mere hypothesis as the sources are 
silent on the exact nature of the relationship. A careful study of the
i
available evidence would seem to show that Changamire's suzerainty over 
the Kingdom of Manyika was merely nominal and that his name was invoked
i
mainly as a bogey during succession crises. Changamire was quite contented 
with an occasional tribute, which in fact came from those Portuguese wishing 
to trade in Manyika.
'I
Manyika-Butua relations are datable as far back as the l650fs . 
References to the wars of Changamire before 1695 seem to suggest that the 
nearest Changamire ever got to Manyika was the Kingdom of Maungwe, when he 
waged his famous battle of l68^f • The 1695 war, however, is a landmark in 
Chikanga-Changamire relations. The causes of this war of 1695 are difficult 
to discern. A late l8th Century account claims that it stemmed from the fact 
that the Portuguese had violated an old but venerated practice whereby the 
•Portuguese who lived at Chipangura, alternatively known as the feira of Masekesa 
in Manyika, used to send an annual tribute to Changamire • The nature and
1. See Chapter II infra.
2. Proposta que fizerab os raoradores dos Rios de Cuama a Senhor V.Rey, 
I6.6.I698. Written by Frei de Assuncao in his 'Breve de alguas 
noticias da Custodio de Almeida e Souza, do estado dos Rios de Senna
e Sofala.' MS.51-IX-5* Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon, Conceicao, Antonio. 
'Tratados dos Rios de Cuama' in Rivara, J.H. da Cunha. 0 Chronista de 
Tissuary. Vol.11,1867 (No.17 May) Nova Goa, pp.105,110.
3* Anon. 'Descripcao Corografica ' (1787-179^) Caixa 17• Moc. A.H.U.
^9.
origin of this tribute are not stated, neither do they lend themselves to 
conjecture. The Portuguese are supposed to have stopped sending this tribute 
for several years. The capitao-mor. either for political reasons or because 
he considered the payment of this tribute unfair, had decided to abolish it 
without advance warning to Changamire. Consequently Changamire resented what 
he considered a slighting of his authority, and sent his son to remind the 
capitao-mor about this tribute. The capitao-mor. instead of treating 
Changamire's son as befitted a royal prince, had him flogged. Changamire did 
not react to this. Instead he sent yet another envoy, probably another son, 
with the same mission. The embassy was no more successful than the first.
The capitao-mor did not only ignore this delegation, but ordered the ears 
of Changamire's son to be cut off. When this was related to Changamire, he 
immediately decided to attack the Portuguese. It may we 11 be that the 
economic consequences of the non-payment of this tribute had also begun to 
make themselves felt by this time.
Even if this story is true, the causes of this war, like those
of most wars, cannot be explained by a single factor. Prom the information 
in
available /Rios de Cuama at that time, the war was caused by Portuguese
4'insolence' especially of 'those who were strong and owned African slaves' • 
They 'committed such excesses that the Kings and princes, scandalised, lent
•themselves to disorder 1 These .'Kings and princes' had previously warned
the Portuguese authorities that they would lose their privileges unless they 
governed themselves properly in Rios de Cuama. The Portuguese activities at
*f. See letter from the Viceroy of India to the King, 16.10.169^ in Capello 
and Ivens. Travaux des Portugais au Monomotapa. Lisobon, 1889, p.V*.
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the feira and the court of Monomotapa rendered the ’invasion1 of the feira 
of Masekesa by Changamire inevitable. The Portuguese had been playing the 
game of King-making since the first half of the 17th Century* As in the 
past, they intervened in the succession politics of the Mutapa dominion in 
the 1690*s • They supported Prince Gende, known to the Portuguese as Dom 
Pedro, who had been deposed by his uncle Nyacunimbiri. It would seem that 
the Portuguese gave him asylum in the Kingdom of Manyika because he was in
g
Manyika when Changamire attacked the feiras of Dambarare and Angwa in 1693 •
It was then that he and his brother Chambo left Manyika for Tete with an
n
army of 4-500 soldiers , some of whom were most probably recruited from the 
Kingdom of Manyika. He was then trying, to forge a military alliance with 
the Portuguese in a bid to regain his throne. Changamire’s reading of the 
situation was very correct. What was urgently needed at this time was to 
attack and scatter the Portuguese who lived at the feiras of Masekesa and Sena, 
the then two most important trading posts after the 'destruction' of the feiras 
of Makaranga in 1693* This might be the motive why Changamire attacked Sena 
iSoon after his offensive against Manyika in 1695• He realised, as Conceicao 
points out, that the Portuguese could not last for two years in Rios de Sena 
if their main source of the gold trade was cut off. The feira more than any­
thing else symbolised Portuguese economic power and the garrison at the feira, 
a military challenge to Changamire. Changamire wanted to see both destroyed.
The Kingdom of Manyika was valued by the Portuguese, inter*alia, as a base from
g
which to mount aggressive expeditions to Butua and neighbouring Makaranga •
5, Capello and Ivens. Travaux des Portugais au Monomotapa. Op cit. pp.39-41. 
Conceicpao Antonio, 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama'
Rivara J.H. da Cunha, 0 Chronista..... Vol.11,1867, p.107. Also see 
Newit M.D.D., The Zambezi Frazos in the l8th Century. (Ph.D. Thesis,
Senate House, London), p.173*
6. Capello and Ivens. Travaux..... Op.cit. pp.39-41 
7« Ibid.
8. See Chapter II.
Besides these theoretical considerations, there were more immediate and
practical reasons. It is possible that Changamire was aware of the
Portuguese military preparations which were taking place in Rios cle Cuama
at this time. Changamire is known to have possessed an efficient secret
service system. Besides, Changamire, like most capable military strategists,
which he was, probably possessed a very highly developed intuitive insight.
This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that he did not pay attention to
Nyacunirabiri•s request for military help at this time, but held him off with
\ 9
promises and concentrated on his next move to attack the feira of Masekesa .
It was a timely move, because a newly appointed governor and Captain-General
of Mocambique, Dom Estavao Jose da Gama* son of the Marquis of Niza and
commander of the naval forces in India, had brought help with him from India 
10
in 1695 ♦ A Castellao of Mozambique had also sent to Rios de Sena, a barge
and a galleon, loaded with clothes, powder-shot and a 'voluntary gift' from 
the inhabitants of Mocambique, in addition to a company of 40 soldiers, two 
or three artillery pieces and the necessary ammunitions. All this had given 
a new morale and strength to the moradores of Sena.
Unfortunately for the Portuguese, Dom Estavao Jose de Gama died in 
1695, and while the Portuguese were busily occupied reorganising the expedition 
and also making arrangements for an appointment of Jose da Fonseca Continho as 
a new governor and commander-in-Chief of Rios de Cuama, Dorabo-Changamire 
decided to attack the feira at Masekesa at the beginning of July, 1695*1"1’.
9» Capello and Ivens. Travaux  op.cit.p.41.
10. Ibid.
Rivara J.H. da Cunha, 0 Chronista de Tessuary, Vol.II. No.15* 
March 27th,l868, Goa. pp.49-50•
11. Capello and Ivens Travaux..... op.cit. p.42.
Concei^ao Antonio,'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama'
Rivara J.H. da Cunha, 0 Chronista de Tessuary, op.cit. p.110.
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It is related that Changamire used almost the same military strategy as
in l68*f in the battle of Maungwe in which sorcery, Fabian tactics, trickery,
for example the lighting of a huge fire, were involved, to defeat the
12
Portuguese at the feira of Masekesa .
Changamire used Manyika as his base for further military operations
v
against Sena. He passed through the Kingdom of Barwe without the least 
hindrance. Sena was saved by the inhabitants of Zomba, who ambushed and defeated 
a greater number of Changamire's army and drove numerous survivors back to 
Manyika^.
, The reasons for this defeat, like the causes of this war, are a 
matter of speculation. Portuguese military defence was weak, largely because 
it was not co-ordinated. The Portuguese lived scattered about at the feira 
of Masekesa, and elsewhere in Manyika. Even those who lived in a fairly 
organised community, like the one Conceicao describes at Masekesa at the 
end of the 17th Century, must have found it difficult to form a united front 
because of their personal differences.
»v* /
However, the writer of the Descripcao Corografica..... states 
that the Portuguese defended the feira of Masekesa valiantly, even though 
'a greater part of them was taken prisoner.' The prisoners were taken to 
Changamirefs court, where they were very well cared for • They were given 
pieces of land for their dwelling and were allowed to marry any Rozvi woman 
they fancied, even if she had a family of her own. A death penalty was given
12. Ibid. ,
13* Anon, descripcao Corografica..... Caixa 17* Moc.A.H.U. 
l*f. Ibid.
to any one who tried to attack the women or daughters of the Portuguese 
’prisoners1. It was a duty of these daughters to serve the King and his 
consort in thi royal palace. It is difficult to say wAe relegend ends and 
history begins in this report. But if what has been said above is:reliable, 
then Changamire*s motives for giving such a privileged treatment to his 
Portuguese prisoners of war cannot be easily guessed. It is tempting to 
conclude that he probably derived pleasure from being served by *white*
women. Most likely they were part of his harem establishment. Later
\
'■ 15Changamires were notorious for keeping large numbers of courtesans •
The men were kept, perhaps to ensure continuity of the ’white* race at 
his court.
Changamire*s subsequent dealings with the Portuguese would seem
to suggest another reason why he kept tlio prisoners whom he had captured
during his campaigns in Manyika in 1695• He possibly regarded them as
hostages to be pawned in his diplomatic intercourse with the Portuguese
authorities in Rios de Cuama. For instance the*Descripcao Corografica--'1
cites much later the case of Antonio Cardim Foraes, captain-general of
Rios de Sena from 1726 to 1730, who tried to secure a release of these prisoners 
16in vain • He sent a big present to Changamire but all he got from this 
diplomatic exercise were two vases full of gold, not the Portuguese prisoners 
taken from Manyika in 1695*
15. Accressentamento, to. ’Memoria sobre a adoa^ao do territorio Bandire* 
1.6.1831. Maco 21, Moc. A.H.U.
16. #Descrip9ao Corografica'.....
5*?-
A number of words, which have inadvertently influenced the
vocabulary of this account, like ’raid1, 'attacked', 'sacked1, 'razed'
and 'destroyed' were used by contemporary and later writers to describe 
17
events which took place at the feira of Masekesa in 1695 • None, of these 
descriptions would seem to convey a correct impression of the impact of this 
war on Manyika society and economy.
According to the 'Descrippao Corografica,' only "a miraculous
image" in the Church escaped the destruction of the invasion of Changamire.
\
\
This implies wanton destruction of property. Conceicao describes the impact
of Dombo-Changamire's wars at the feira of Dambarare in Makaranga, as
involving destruction of Church furniture and disinterment of burials. The
destruction of property either at the feira of Masekesa or at the feiras in
Makaranga has been drawn out of proportion by commentators. Peter Garlake's
excavations at Dambarare in 1969^  and Andrade de Freire's work on the ruins
19of the feira of Masekesa showed no signs of demolition which such an up­
heaval would involve. One cannot but suspect t^at some officials who naturally 
had to justify their defeat at the hands of Changamire, influenced some of the 
accounts about these wars. Of course, the consequences of Changmire's attack 
on the feira of Masekesa in July 1695 should not be underrated. The immediate
outcome of this war was that Changamire made himself lord of the Kingdom of
20Manyika and appointed a Chikanga of his own liking • This is the Portuguese 
version. of the story but a knowledge of Manyika politics of the time would
17• Conceicao,Antonio. 'Tratados dos Rios de Cuama'
Rivara J.H. da Crniha^  J3 Chronista  Vol.II.l867, Nova Goa, p.110.
Asstinqao. 'Breve^de ^Tguas noticias..... MS.51-IX-3
Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.
Capello and Ivens. Travaux  op.cit.p.42.
Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens.... 1 in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo.pp.232-332.
18♦ Garlake P♦S.,'Excavations of the Seventeenth Century Portuguese site of 
Dambarare, Rhodesia' in Proceedings and Trans. R.S.a . Vol.54,Part 1,1969*
pp.23-60. ^
19* Carvalho Pires, 'Velha Macequece' in Mocambique Documentario Trimestral 
No.46. 1946, pp. 5-64. 1
20. Manuel Galwab da Silva, 'Diario das Viagens.....' in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. 
Tomo I. op.cit. p.327*
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suggest that probably Manyika princes fought for the throne, and a prince 
who fought on Changamire*s side during the 1693-^ war was approved by him
I \
as King after he had been duly elected by the people in accordance with 
Manyika traditional politics. The arrangements, in terms of tribute bet­
ween Chikanga and Changamire, are unknown at this stage, except that Chikanga 
was ordered "to govern the Kingdom of Manyika and watch over its revolucoens." 
The economic consequences of this war are evident. The Portuguese were
deprived of their main trading post then, and according to a contemporary
2l\
account "not a grain of gold reached the Feira de Manica" Many of the 
traders fled away from the Kingdom and those who remained were heavily in 
debt. The Manyika people, according to Portuguese sources, were so militarily 
weak that they could not effectively resist the enemy. This interpretation of 
events is open to doubt. I do not think that it mattered much to the Manyika 
whether the Portuguese or Changamire controlled the Feira de Manica. If later 
l8th Century history is anything to go by, the Manyika took different positions 
on an occasion like this. These positions were largely determined by the as­
pirants to the throne. It is, therefore, suggested that the Portuguese 
wrongly interpreted Manyika attitude in terras of their own military weakness.
That Manyika trade was not as ’miserable* as the Portuguese suggest, 
but rather that it was shifted to Quiteve, perhaps on a reduced scale, is 
'shown by the fact that Manyika traders still went to trade in the environs
21. Concei^ao A., ’Tratado. dos Rios de Cuama' in 0 Chronista de Tissuary. 
Vol.II, 1867, Nova Goa, pp.110-OAl.
36*
22
of the Portuguese garrison in Quiteve . They traded in amber and gold.
There is an account of the gold trade at the mines of the lands of Inhatona, 
which was eleven days’ journey from the garrison. The gold from 'these mines 
was easily melted. The policy of the King of Quiteve was the only fly in the 
ointment. It is related that a certain Quitevan African discovered a mine, 
but the King immediately ordered this individual to be killed. This did not 
stop the exploitation of the mine. The King, therefore, prohibited further
exploitation of the mine. He regulated trade in his kingdom in such a way
\
\
that a merchant was charged five for every eighty betangis he brought in.
The other commodities were not taxed. Manyika merchants clandestinely 
exchanged their gold for fazendas. They were so successful that they began 
to undermine Portuguese activities in the area. As a counter-attack it was 
suggested that all fazendas must be registered. There was yet another mine 
eight days' journey from the above-mentioned gold mine. The exploitation of 
this mine was controlled and directed by the King himself* Concessions were 
available on payment of presents of fazendas as well as five out of every 
eighty betangis.
22. Pedro Coelho de Carvalho. 'Papel da Noticia que deu da Fortaleza de 
Sofala.' MS 31-IX-3 3*8.1698, 46v-47v. Ajuda.
For details of the results of the wars of Changamire in general see 
Jer6himo de Sa's representation on behalf of the emperor^ Monomotapa 
to Thomas da Roza, Freire concerning a restoration of the feiras of Ongue 
(Angwa) and Masapa. 6.6.1737* Senna. Avulso de Moc. 47-8 fls. Caixa 3 
Moc. A.H.U.
See Thomas's reply, Ibid 1.3*1738.
'Reposta dada pelo Reverendissimo Administrador Episcopal de Mossambique 
e Rios, o Mestre Fr. Manoel de Santo Thomas, da Sagrada Ordem dos 
Pregadores, as Diligencias, que S.Magestade, que Deos Guarde, Manda se 
Fa^ao Nestes Rios de Senna pera se Inquirir a Verdade das Materias 
Contheudas das nos capitulos abaxo.' See Livro das Monqoes No.89,fls.306
in Academia Real da Historica Portuguesa printed in 0 Chronista  op.cit.
Vol.IV. (1869) p.62. He gives what one might call the permanent results 
of the war. After the destruction of Makaranga, the ancient custom of 
coronation, whereby a successor of a Prince took an oath before ascending 
the throne, was no longer observed as early as 1723i because there were 
princes in rebellion, almost all of whom were aspiring to ascend the throne 
and restore imperial power. He who had more power and cloth, infallibly 
became King. This became the pattern of Mutapa politics probably from 
1710 (Codice 1325 Moc. A.H.U.) when Changamire dealt a final blow to the 
Emperor's capital•
$7.-
It was, and still is, an exaggeration to talk of the Feira de Manica
having been razed to the ground, because, as early as 1698, there were still
23references to a "fortress of timber which has a church inside it." Also 
a large quantity of gold was being taken, although more could have been mined 
were it not that the moradores lived in fear of Changamire and did not feel 
secure enough to improve their lot or combat the enemy. All this goes to 
show that, contrary to generalisations about the feira trade having been 
brought to a stand-still, trade movements in Quiteve suggest that because of 
the fear of Changamire in the feiras of Dambarare etc.,Manyika traders turned 
their attention to Quiteve. This was one of the results of the wars of 
Changamire in the Kingdom of Manyika.
Another consequence for Manyika, Butua and Makaranga, of the wars
of Changamire in the 1690*s was that trade was restricted until the Portuguese
2b
concluded peace with him in 1750 . The intervening period was marked by yig-
orous diplomatic initiatives from the Portuguese to discuss the peace terms and
have them duly signed, but when this failed the Portuguese tried to unite
25
as many African potentates as they could against Changamire . Changamire
did not openly refuse to conclude peace with the Portuguese as such, but kept
them half-hoping. This is evident from the correspondence of this period from
26
the authorities in Rios de Sena to the Viceroy in Goa • It speaks of peace 
.having been concluded with Changamire all the time, but later refers to the 
fact that Changamire was not interested in peace but wanted presents in the 
form of clothes for himself and for his princes.
-25* Pedro Coelho de Carvalho*Papel da Noticia....  op.cit.
j / i , , iLivro de Regimentos e Instrucqoes' No.11 fl.104 v. Bragan^a Pereira, 
de A.B. Arq. Port Oriental Tomo IV. Vol.II.fp.172^ /6f.
Op.cit.
25. Livro de Regimentos e Instrucqoes No.11 fl.lOb v in Braganca Pereira, 
A.B>de Arq. Port Oriental Tomo IV,1958, Vol.II. p.172?.
26* Ibid. I7f)
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It is only in 1730 that the correspondence from Rios de Sena refers to the
27fact that Changamire Mour former enemy is without strength” .
The memory of Changmire's wars was remembered for many years 
after the event of 1693* A halo of invincibility surrounded Changamire*s 
name, Conceicao, writing directly after the heat of the battle, says that 
soldiers, who were considered brave in the neighbouring states, trembled at 
the very mention of Changamire*s name soon after the events of 1693-5i and
23
more often than not went to a battlefield conquered before the fight began •
However, Changamire*s control over Manyika seems to have been effective
shortly after the war of 1695* There are indications that, for at least a decade
or more after the 'destruction' of the feira of Masekesa, Changamire exercised
29
some authority over Chikanga , Efforts were made to reestablish the feiras
and Changamire eventually granted the Portuguese the same piece of land they
30
had before the war of 1695 • The condition for this was payment of a brinzo
or tribute which was to be annually paid from a salary of the capitao-mor and was 
to be shared between Chikanga, the princes of Manyika and Changamire. This 
brinzo was to be paid in clothing, glass and beads. The capitao-mor had a bond
written out in the presence of Chikanga and his councillors so that they would
............................... 3 1 ..........................................
not demand more the following year . Despite this precaution by the capitao-
mor other issues often cropped up in connection with the brinzo. Chikanga and
27* Livro de Regimentos e Instruc9oes, No.11 fl.lOW in Bragan^a Pereira, A.B. 
de. A.P.O. Tomo IV, 1938, Vol.II, p.172.'
28. Conceicao Antonio. 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama' in Rivara, J.H. da Cunha.
0 Chronista, Voi.II,l867, p.106.
29. Letter to Antonio Cardim Troes, Lieutenant-general of Mozambique, from the 
Count dom Luis de Menezes, Goa 21.1.1719*
Theal G.M. R.S.3.A. Vol.V. p.50
30. Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens.....' in Anais (195*0 Vol.IX. Tomo I. 
op.cit. p.327*
31* Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens » in Anais (195*+) Vol.IX. Tomo I. p.327*
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his councillors did observe the contract. They used to express doubts,
32
either about the quality or length or both, of the material •
Changamire used to send his envoys ostensibly to collect "this and
other presents but in fact to gain knowledge of the country "to be better able
to invade it” any time he wanted^. It was because of this that Dom Luis de
Menezes suggested that a reestablishment of one feira in Manyika would be
sufficient, because a reopening of several feiras would mean several envoys
from Changamire to study the country. In any case a reestablishment of the
feira of Masekesa had an advantage, it being near Sena where most traders 
3b
lived . Apart from these stray references, which suggest at best a tenuous
i
control over Manyika, there is nothing else to go by until the -l7$0's. There 
are sevirgl reasons to suggest that Changamire's control over the Kingdom of
• li ■
Manyika Was tenuous. Chikanga practised an independent and different commercial
policy from that of Changamire. The Emperor, Changamire, cfealt with the moradores
of Zumbo very severely, allowing only their vashambadzi into the interior of 
35Butua whereas trade at the Feira de Manica was done not only through the 
institution of mushambadzi, but also by resident feirantes.
From 1?80 to 1796 information about Changamire’s relations with 
Chikanga becomesreasonably coherent. Changamire used the Kingdom of Manyika 
as a pawn in his relations with the Portuguese, but there is not a single instance
32. Ibid.
33. Letter from Dom Luis de Menezes to Antonio Troes, 21.1.1719 in Theal G.M. 
R.S.E.A. Vol.V. p . 30
3b. Ibid. ^  mo mo ^  .
33. Instructpao que 0 111 e Ex Sr. Governador e Capitao Mor, General
Balthazar Manuel Pereira do Lago, Deo a Quern Lhe Suceder neste Governo. 
20.8.1768. Codice 1323 Moc. A.H.U..
Ahdrade A.A. Relacoes de Mozambique Setecentista Agencia Geral do 
Ultramar. Lisbon,19551 PP»317-338• ^
, 'Descrip^ao da Capitania de Monsambique, Suas
PovoaQoes e Produces.1
Andrade A. A. 'Pelacoes..... ’ p.*f02.
6o*»
of him taking measures against Chikanga on behalf of the Portuguese despite
the fact that the lands of the two potentates were separated from each other
I 36 !
by the lands of Cisanga in 177o • The Portuguese too found it convenient to
!
deal with Changamire secretly concerning trade in Manyika without first
37consulting Chikanga • An example of this is found in Changamire-Portuguese
relations in the 1780's. The Portuguese wanted to rebuild their fortress,
38which had been accidently gutted by fire in 1780 , in order to defend them-
39selves against a supposedly hostileChikanga • But in order ^ to forestall the
opposition of the Manyika princes and the populace at large, they needed a
show of force* This was easily available from Changamire on a quid pro quo 
4-0
basis . Accordingly a large army, head.ed by Changamire's general, possibly 
General Gumi t was ordered to accompany the Portuguese to the Kingdom of
36. De Montaury Joao Baptista. Mozambique, Ilhas Querirabas, Sios de Sena, Villa 
de Tete, Villa de Zumbo, Manica, Villa de Luabo, Inhambane, C.1778 Ajuda 
52-X-2. Doc.No.7 in Andrade A.A. Relaqoes.....p.363
.Botelho X.S. Memoria Estatistica S6bre os Dominios Portuguezes na Africa 
Oriental, Lisbon, 1833• pp*1^-133*
da Silva, Joao Juli.ao. A Cressentaraento, Bandire 1.6.1831 Ma^o 21. Moc.A.H.U. 
For the size of Changamire's empire during the 17th Century, see some vague 
notions, albeit unrealistic, of the empire's extent based on maps by 
Linschot and Figafeta in a contemporary account by Dapper 0. Africa.
Amsterdam, 1670, p.600.
37* 'Descrip^ao corografica,....1 caixa 17 Moc. A.H.U.
38. Letter from Joze Francisco de Fonseca to Antonio Manuel de Mello e Castro, 
21.9*1781* Cxa.17 Moc.A.H.U. A house of the clerk of the Feira de Manica 
Joze Manuel Pimenta caught fire and the adjacent buildings including the 
fortress; the Church was burnt as well as the records and four people.
Another house was built 60 paces away from the fortress to avoid a similar 
accident.
39* 'Descrip^ao Corografica ' op.cit.
*K). Ibid.
41. General Gumi is mentioned in 1803 as Changamire's ambassador. Changamire's 
confidence in him isdiown by the fact that General Gumi could negotiate 
treaties on behalf of Changamire. See Letter to the Governor Herftnymo 
Pereira from Manoel Francisco de Rosario, concerning the terms of the 
Adjudante sent through his ambassador to be ratified by Emperor Changamire. 
Vila muciriva 19.1.1803 Cxa.^2. Moc. A.H.U. Gumi means ten; this was 
probably a praise name meaning that he could fight ten people at a time 
and this might account for his rise to generalship.
61.
Manyika and to see to it that there was no hostility or military conflict
between the Portuguese and Chikanga. The superb diplomacy of the army*s
leader and the strict discipline of his array on this occasion did not pass
42without a compliment from contemporary Portuguese commentators •
The fact that Changamire regarded the Kingdom of Manyika as expendable 
was demonstrated in his subsequent actions. He requested the Portuguese to 
build him a fortress similar to the one they had built for Monomotapa several 
years ago and in return for this service he would give them all the Kingdom of 
Manyika and the adjacent lands thereof. In addition to this he guaranteed 
them freedom and security of trade in Manyika but significantly enough , 
nothing was mentioned about Butua.
I It has been implied that Changamire had a garrison of his own in the 
k 3
17th Century (I67O) . A second mention of the garrison appears in a 1?80
document in which the Portuguese categorically stated the conditions on which
they would grant him the garrison he had requested .. Joao Almeida, a commandant
of the Feira de Manica, was carefully instructed to head a mission to
Changamire to acknowledge his request for a garrison, sentiments of friendship
*f6
and to determine the type of help he needed for his protection . It was hoped 
that this mission would pave the way forlucrative Portuguese trade, harmony and 
peace in the feiras and bares of Butua and Dambarare. This trade included ivory 
trade too.
4-2. 'Descrippao Corografica f op.cit.
^3* -7*“-* Africa. I67O. op.cit. p.6oi. This is not mentioned in the German
version. (Personal communication with Dr.J.R.Gray).
Mf. Kelaqao que da Joao Almeida, Commandante da Feira da Manica, do que se pode 
consequir do Key Xangamire, e prezidio annual que baixo se declara e as 
propoziqoens que se lhe devem ponderar para delle conseguir o mencionado 
a baixo 11.5*1780 Cxa.16 Moc.A.H.U.
45. Ibid. The expenses of this ambassadorial mission amounted to - a) 26 bares 
of assorted cloths for Changamire and his provinces, the regulos on the way 
and the expenses of the ambassador himself, b) 200 macos of assorted beads. 
All this was without a saguate from the Governor, which was a normal practice 
on such high-powereu missions to princes of the lands. A chair and a low 
stool normally accompanied this saguate.
kS, *Descrip^ao Corografica 1 op.cit.
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Another condition was that Changamire should allow the old feiras
he had destroyed to be opened and restore the same privileges, particularly
the
of erecting fortresses near/feiras for defence purposes as before in the 
neighbouring lands as well as in the Kingdoms which had been, or were still, 
subordinate to him,
A third condition was specifically connected with Chikanga who used
to dominate the feira of Masekesa every year, "commit barbarities" against the
Portuguese, expose the Portuguese to milandos and left the merchants and their
47
vashambadzi unprotected from the molestations of the princes • The Portuguese 
used to pay Chikanga a tribute of 800 panos for his own use, the use of his
48
garrison,as well as for paying tribute to Changamire • Changamire*s secret­
ary, Tumbare, and his envoys went to collect it, but if this were not produced
or if there were complaints about commerce for some time or years, Changamire
49
would, in theory at any rate, bring Chikanga to reason at his own expense .
He would leave for Manyika together with his soldiers. It is said that both
the soldiers and Changamire were of such a temperament, that they could not
endure scorn from any quarter without getting their revenge and complete
satisfaction. But Changamire, in fact, always behaved in such a way that
Chikanga had no cause for revenge or complete satisfaction. It is not stated
50
how much Chikanga paid to Changamire from his 800 panos and a cutonia which 
he received from the capitao-mor and his merchants. The Secretary, Tumbare, 
apparently played an important role in arranging for the collection of tribute.
47* Ibid.
48. Galvao, Diario das Viagens  in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p*327«
49. 'Descripqao Corografica.....* Cxa.17 Moc. A.H.U.
30. Galvao, 'Diario das Viagens.....' in Anais,(1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. A cutonia 
was a fustion, worth 20 cruzados.
According to Robinson, Tumbare was one of the principal servants of the 
51
Rozvi empire • It appears that Tumbare was the name of a particular
individual, which later acquired a dynastic connotation for a family
|
whence tribute collectors were appointed. The role of the Tumbare;
dynasty requires further investigation. In times of succession crisis,
caused by a sudden death of a Rozvi roambo or long drawn out negotiations
among the aspirants to the .throne, a member of the Tumbare family became 
52
regent . His repulse of Zwangendaba (1833) originated a Rozvi praise-song
53 \"Dai asi Tumbare hwana hwaitsve moto" (But for Tumbare nothing would have
been good). It would, therefore, be logical to assume that if anybody were
sent to confirm individual Chikangas on Mgnyika throne, it was Tumbare,
probably accompanied by General Gumi. I must, however, point out that the
only connection I have detected so far, is that Tumbare appears in a document
54-
purport ed to relate Manyika past and culture •
Changamire does not seem to have received tribute in the form of 
grain, cattle or pottery from the Kingdom of Manyika as he probably did from
31. Robinson K.R. 'History of the Bikita District' in NAPA No.34,1935» P«75 
Nenguwo S. 'Oral work among the Rozvi. A few.notes'. The History of the 
Central African Peoples. Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 17th Conference 
Proceedings. Lusaka 19&3» Group III. p.11.
Howraan E.G. 'The Traditional History of the Makaranga (Y/a Rozvi) in Report 
of the 16th Annual Meeting of the S.A.A.A. Sc. Capetown,1919* PP.381-393* 
According to this account, Tumbare became unpopular and the Rozvi people 
burnt him alive. This was undoubtedly as a result of his work as chancellor 
of the exchequer in the Rozvi empire.
52. Nenguwo S. 'Oral work among the Rozwi.' In the History of the Central 
African Peoples, op.cit. pp.1-11.
53. Ibid. _  y
54-. 'Descrip^ao Corografica.....' op.cit.
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55other supposedly subjugated principalities . The decorated type of pottery,
which has been found at Dhlo-Dhlo and has also been identified at Van Nterkek 
56
near Umtali , might be a case of cultural similarity. The only known tribute, 
therefore, Changamire received from the Kingdom of Manyika was some of the 800 
panos paid to Chikanga by the Portuguese, This aptly justifies the title of 
this discussion, 'Chikanga-Changamire relations' because the commonalty of 
Manyika people as such was not involved. The Manyika were not taxed for this 
purpose. Besides, this provides further evidence of the tenuous nature of 
Changamire's control over the Kingdom of Manyika during the l8th Century.
From time to time Chikanga demanded beads, drinks and sundry items,
57besides the annual tribute • In spite of all this, quite often he blocked 
trade routes into the interior without consulting Changamire, inspiring a fear 
which was tantamount to that of Changamire in his lands. The Portuguese, 
therefore, requested Changamire to punish Chikanga, to allow them to build a 
fortress and to allow the Feira de Manica to be governed by a Portuguese or 
a Prince of Changamire who would defend Portuguese fcilandos, punish any 'thefts'
rO
which Chikanga used to condone ,
A fourth condition of this proposed treaty was that this treaty of 
frienj^hip should be so firm and 'perpetual' that no regulos or King would 
molest the Portuguese and get away with it; that should this happen Changamire 
would immediately send military help to the Portuguese and vice-versa. 
Changamire was assured that the Portuguese had prompt military aid. All that
4
55* (Miss) N.Sutherland-Harris thinks that Changamire probably received such 
tribute. See 'Trade and Politics in the Changamire/Rozvi Kingdoms of the 
late 17th Century and l8th Century' Seminar paper. M.A.Area Studies 1967* 
PP.5-^.
56. (Miss)N.Sutherland-Harris, Seminar Paper, op.cit. pp»5-^.
57. Letter from Joze Trindade e Almeida to the Governor of Rios de Senna 
8.10.179^i Cxa.50* Moc.A.H.U.
58. RelacSo qUe da Joao Almeida..... 11.5.1780. Cxa.l6, Moc. A.H.U. op.cit.
65.
was required was to convince them that Changamire was a 'brother*• The 
last, though not least, condition was that this treaty should be ratified 
by an heir to the throne.
The proposed treaty of 1?80 between Changamire and the Portuguese
is a typical example of how the Portuguese tried to manipulate diplomacy in
order to gain commercial privileges in Manyika and Butua by isolating Chikanga.
The merchants* memorials concerning trade in Manyika and Changamire's inability
to rectify the situation, provide another example of the nominal nature of
Changamire's suzerainty over Manyika. At the same time the memorials show
consistency in their effort to build up Changamire at the expense of Chikanga.
These memorials were occasioned by disorder at the Feira de Manica caused by the 
59
death of Chikanga .
I'
In 1795 the commandant of the Feira de Manica reported to the 
governor of Rios de Sena the dissatisfaction and deliberations of the merchants 
who had sent envoys to Changamire to seek protection, improvement of trade and
60
suppression of Chikanga*s insults . The envoys had delayed, but the cause of
the delay was unknown. The desperate nature of the situation is revealed by
the commandants' references to 'intolerable insults' which were estimated to
have caused a loss of 'a hundred per cent* to a considerable amount of good
fazendas and beads which had been introduced, but due to chaos and anarchy at
61
the Feira de Manica, the stock was immediately exhausted without any profit •
59. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor^of Rios de Senna. 
18.7.1795. Cxa.JI. Moc.A.H.U.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
Hence, the capitao-mor1s repeated pleas for more fazendas and a remedy for 
the situation,
A real cause of this confusion was the death of Chikanga and, as long
as there was no successor who could stop "the continuous clamours which
62necessarily follow the division of forces in a Kingdom" , the situation 
would remain unaltered.
Manyika pretenders to the throne in the late l8th Century, trapped
in their own dreams of kings, sent delegations to call Changamire to perform
investiture ceremonies. This analysis of the situation is an echo of a
63
memorial drawn up by the merchants on 5*7*1795 • It was during this decade
that Changamire's name was constantly invoked by Inharugue, to catapult him­
self into the throne of the Kingdom of Manyika.
The situation was vividly dramatised in 1796, when a new King 
called Inharugue ascended the throne of the Kingdom of Manyika. His elder 
brothers rightly contested the Kingship, but in vain. King Inharugue sent 
envoys to call Changamire to confirm the investiture ceremony and, when the 
Portuguese complained about disturbances at the Feira de Manica, Inharugue,
King elect of Manyika, pleaded inability to deal with these complaints until
................................. 6 4 .............
Changamire had confirmed him as King • Unfortunately Changamire had been
62. Letter from the Governor, Joao de Sa Brito to the Commandant of the Feira de 
Manica. Moc.26.11.1795• Cxa.31 Moc.A.H.U.
63. The Merchants’ Advice to the Governor. Manica 5*7*1795* Cxa.31»Moc.A.H.U. 
signed by - Manoel da Silva Gonzales, Cust<4dio de Araujo Braganca, Joao Felix 
de Carvalho, Manoel Ribeiro dos Santos, Joaquim de Moraes Rega Lisboa, Joze^ 
da Trindade e Almeida, Antonio Caetano Vaz, Joze^ dos Santos e Matos, Joze 
Gomes Monteiro, Antonio Joze/ da Costa e Almeida, Pedro Antonio de Araujo. 
Incidentally this list gives us the names of the important traders at the 
Feira de Manica in the 1790’s.
6k, Letter from Francisco Henric^ txe. Ferrao, Commandant of the Feira de Manica, 
to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 3*3*1796. Cxa.17 Moc.A.H.U.
67.
delayed by winter. It would appear that Changamire*s name was used mainly 
as a bogey in order to scare his rivals to the throne. Subsequent;events
do not suggest that either Changamire himself or his envoys ever went to 
Manyika even to witness the ceremony, let alone confirm it. In fact, this 
is the first recorded occasion that a Manyika King ever invoked the name of 
Changamire to obviate obstacles to the throne. Posselt*s generalised state­
ment ’’that the Barozwi Marabo appointed all tributary chiefs irrespective of 
65the tribe” does not stand analysis. Inharugue was the only recorded instance
of a Manyika King during the l8th Century taking recourse to the bogey of an
invincible Changamire. Inharugue*s dependence on the Portuguese suggests that
it was not his own idea, but an idea of .the capitao-mor and his merchants, that
he should summon Changamire to confirm his investure ceremony as King of Manyika.
There are three reasons to encourage this lire of speculation. First, as I have
already pointed out, it was Portuguese policy during the second half of the
l8th Century to over-play Changamire's suzerainty over Manyika. There is
further evidence in 1795 and 1796 of collaboration^ initiated by the Portuguese,
between Changamire and the Portuguese. The commandant of the Feira de Manica,
D. Diogo de Souza, recommended very strongly in 1795 that an annual saguate,
credited to the Boyal Treasury, should be paid directly to Changamire, so that
he might not disregard Portuguese requests which had been made in the various
66
memorials regarding trade and commerce • In fact, as early as 1780 a
suggestion had been made that Changamire should be given a bigger saguate 
67
than Chikanga •
65. Posselt F.W.T. Fact and Fiction - A short survey of the natives of
S.R. Bulawayo. (1935) p.10. ^
66. Letter from Diogo de Souza to Joao de Souza e Brito 16.3.1795* Cxa.31 
Moc. A.H.U.
68.
In 1798 Chan^mire's envoys were expected at the Villa of Tete, 
possibly on a goodwill mission. It is also known that the Portuguese 
described the (jhangamires of the 18th Century as ,fsusceptible to Portuguese
68 I
sentiments” . Ail the evidence available seems to support this assertion, 
that the Portuguese were trying very hard to build up Changamire as Emperor, 
at any rate as far as their dealings with him about the Kingdom of Manyika 
during the 1780's were concerned. The real reason for his evasive policy 
about Manyika will be clear when Butuan internal politics of^  the l8th Century 
are known. Changamire received memorial after memorial from Portuguese
69merchants at the Feira de Manica but there is no evidence that he did
anything about this situation. The only recorded occasion that Changamire
ever intervened, tactfully and effectively, was in the building of the
70
fortress as noted above • The Portuguese had to wait for an answer for a
very long time and sometimes envoys were delayed at his court for as long a
71period as ten months •
A second reason to suggest that Inharugue's policy vis-a-vis Changamire
was formulated by the Portuguese is that the Portuguese merchants believed that
there would be order and safety if a new King were introduced and that this new
72King would rectify "the past as well as future evils” at the Feira de Manica •
Thirdly, the capitao-mor of the Feira de Manica, Francisco Henrique 
73Ferrao, withheld binzo from Inharugue pending his confirmation by Changamire 
as King of Manyika. It seems, therefore, that, in return for Portuguese
68. Ibid.
69* Advice of the merchants to the Governor of Rios de Sena  op.cit.5»7»1795»
70. See this chapter, supra.
71. Advice of the merchants op.cit. 5*7*1795*
72. Ibid.
73. Binzo was tribute paid in cloth, beads and liquors. The commander-in-chief, 
when paying, had a bond written out in the presence of many Manyika so that 
they could not demand more the following year. Even then, arguments about 
length and quality of the cloths cropped up. See Galvao. 'Diario das
Viagens ' In Carvalho Dias. 'Fontes para a Historia.....' Anais X.
Tomo I. Lisbon,193^» p.327*
69*
military help and cloths, Inharugue practised Portuguese policy towards
Changamire. He even sent a massango with a dogado and an ox as a sign
7 4  • r j
of friendship. The dogado was a t* to the Governor to say that he
should send a capitao-mor with another person to make binzo to Changamire
75for purposes of electing a new Manyika King .
Chikanga-Changamire relations can be reviewed strictly from a
trading point of view. The policy dealt with so far covered Inharugue*s
tenure of Kingship in 1795-6. Eis rival successors, Inhagope and Inhamutota
(1796-l8l8), did not invoke the name of Changamire and even Inharugue himself
during his later tenure of office as King(l8l8-l8^5&) never invoked Changamire*s
name in his struggle for Kingship. It would appear that the tenuous and
nominal suzerainty Changamire exercised over Manyika came to an end with the
76
expulsion of Inharugue some time in 1796 .
It would appear that trade links were not affected drastically by
these political upheavals. The earliest indication of an existence of trade
between the Kingdoms of Mapyikg and Butua occurs in the first half of the 
7717th Century • By the late l8th Century African merchants from Butua went 
to sell ostrich eggs at Manyika. These eggs were probably exchanged for the
.......................................7 8 ....................................
copper which the merchants got from Duma , presumably the location of the
present day Mkonde copper mines. The absence of copper and eggs in a list
r 79of commodities exchanged at the Feira de Manica in a document of 1762 might
74. A dogado is a certain amount of gold. 1 dogado = 6 oitavas. The origin of 
the word in Manyika. See Jason Machiwenyika. 'The History and Customs of 
the Manyika People'. MS. 14.1.1 S by.
75* Letter from Joze de Trindade e Almeida to Cust<£dio Joze da Lacerda. 3*8.1795* 
Cxa.30. Moc.A.H.U.
76. See discussion in Chapter II. Infra.
77* Report by Cristovao de Brito de Vasconcellos 20.8.1632. Doc.9* Avulso.
Cxa.l. Moc.A.H.U.
78. Manuel Galvao da Silva. 'Diario das Viagens * in Anais (1954) Vol.IX.
Tomo I. op.cit. p.328.
79- 'Memorias da Costa d»Africa Oriental e Alguas Reflexoes Uteis para 
Establecer Melhor, e Fazer mais Florente o seu commercio.' (Anon).
Sena 21.5*1762 Fundo Geral 826 B.N.L.
See Andrade A.A. *Rela9oes de Mozambique * op.cit. p.192.
Also Anais (1954).Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p.222.
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suggest that trade in these two articles was a later 18th Century development.
80
A 19th Century document refers to well-./<down routes, estimating
distances, from Cisanga, a dependency of Changamire to Manyika.. There were
primarily two routes; one started from Zamve through Cironga, Dirire, up to
the Feira de Manica, and another route started from Inhaozo through Nharaanga,
81
Dovedove up to Manyika . The fact that these routes were well-known by 1831 
surely suggests an earlier origin than the 19th Century, possibly the 18th 
Century, if not earlier.
There is another piece of evidence to suggest trade links between
the Kingdom of Manyika and that of Butua. Changamire used to get guns^iine
82
calaim from Sena and possibly these commodities passed through the Feira de 
Manica. The 'Accressentamento' refers to a mushambadzi who had been to 
Changamire twice and paid all the cloth he had. It is conceivable that this 
was one of the mussambazes who traded at the Feira de Manica, the nerve centre
of Sena trade. A servant of one Barloza also claimed to have met a mushambadzi
O7
who had accompanied another one to the lands of Changamire , possibly not 
Butua, for the lands then stretched as far as Cisanga.
A third piece of evidence is that of Galvao, in 1790* who categorically
stated that the copper he saw at the Feira de Manica came from Duma, a six days'
84
journey away from the Feira • This proves, not only the existence of trade 
between these two Kingdoms, but also that this trade is traceable back to the
85 86
l8th Century. The eggs are cited in I78O and copper in 1790 .
80. 'Viagem a Manica' in Memoria sSbre a adocao do Territorio Bandire as 
Epocas do seu abandono* No.5. 5*8.1831. Maco.21. Moc. A.H.u.
81. Ibid.
82. Accreesentamento. Bandire. 1.6.1831. Maco 21. Moc.A.H.U.
83. Ibid.
84. Galvao da Silva M. 'Diario das Viagens » in Anais Vol.IX. (1954) Tomo.I.
op.cit. p.328.
83. 'Descripcao Corogr^fica ' op.cit.
86. Galyao da Silva M. 'Dietrio das Viagens. ' in Anais Vol.X. Tomo I. Lisbon,
1954, p.328.
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The entire discussion has shown fairly clearly that one Manyika 
King, for a very short period indeed, and even then perhaps at the; instigation
l I
of the Portuguese, deliberately manipulated the impact of the l693j-^ War and 
the Imperial title of Changamire to scare away his rival pretenders to the 
throne of Manyika. The discussion has also shown that the Portuguese, 
without much advantage, encouraged this line of action in order to promote 
their commercial interests. Changamire was quite happy to have his name thus
used, firstly, because this appealed to his ego, in that it tended to perpetuate
\
the myth of empire, power and glory, and secondly, this was good economics any­
way. The Portuguese sent several ambassadorial missions to Changamire bearing
87
presents , and in each case he encouraged Portuguese hopes for a redress of 
their grievances by delaying tactics. Changamire believed in the Aristotelian
doctrine that "method conquers more than power.n He seems to have based all his
diplomacy with the Portuguese on this, whether it was in a battle-field or in 
ordinary day-to-day dealings. This enabled him to negotiate with the Portuguese 
on matters concerning the Kingdom of Manyika, from a position of strength.
There is no instance during the l8th Century when he acted on the complaints
memorialised to him by the Portuguese concerning Chikanga's supposedly hostile 
commercial policy, or even sent his envoy to Manyika to perform an investiture 
ceremony.
Changamire*s administrative machinery over the Kingdom of Manyika 
is conspicuous by its absence in the documents and oral tradition alike. It
87. Letter from Manuel Francisco de Rozario to the Governor, Heronimo 
Pereira, Villa Muciriva 19.1.1803 Cxa.42. Moc. A.H.U.
Rella^ao que da Joao Almeida, Commandante da Feira de Manica, do que se 
pode conseguir do Rey Xangamire. op.cit. 11.3.1780, Cxa.l6. Moc.A.H.U.
is doubtful whether Changamire himself was in a position to coerce any of
his so-called vassals to do anything they did not want. He was himself a
privileged, but, all the same, tribute-bearer to Monomotapa during the l8th 
88
Century . It is questionable whether such a Changamire was in a position 
to control Manyika effectively.
88. Pinto de Miranda A. 'Memoria s&bre a Costa de Africa (C. de 1766)* Torre
do Tombo do reino. Maco 6o*f. in Andrade A.A. Rela^oes....• op.cit. p.307
Pinto de Miranda A. 'Memoria s6bre ' op.cit.also printed in Anais
(193*0 Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit.pll3*
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C H A P T E R  III 
A PERIOD OF DEFIANT CHIKANGAS 1695 - 1795.
PART 2 - Manyika-Portuguese Relations.
The Portuguese attributed the decline of trade during this 
period to Chikangafs alleged hostile attitude and the so-called 'robberies*, 
•thefts* and •milandos* practised by the Manyika princes. It was on these 
mistaken premises that the Portuguese concentrated, on appealing to Changamire 
to restrain Chikanga about what they regarded as his excesses. They did not
bother to examine the weaknesses of their own institutions, e.g. that of
|
mushambadzi, garrison and capitao-mor: • (see appendix) to understand Manyika
customs in the realm of trade, to investigate the means by which they could
I ■
recover their lost feiras and prestige, the'way in which they could win the
friendship of the Chikangasand their princes. It is true that they did send
/
envoys and gifts to Changamire in an effort to bribe him to bring pressure 
to bear on the Chikangas. This was not a new thing. The situation had 
changed after the wars of 1695 and the new circumstances required new 
approaches, a new type of diplomacy altogether and a brutal introspection.
The failure to do that resulted in the Portuguese making one blunder after 
another, which the Chikangas did not allow to go unpunished.
The Chikangas wanted the Portuguese to live and trade in their 
Kingdom, but under their control. The ignorance of the Portuguese of Manyika 
political and social institutions always stood in the way of cordial relations. 
For example, society was more lenient towards certain actions which in normal 
times were tantamount to •robberies1 and ’disorder*, during a period of mourn­
ing than at other times. Violation of Manyika sacred customs resulted in 
milandos and an ultimate ban, albeit temporary, of trade. It was the duty 
of Chikanga, indeed, as of any other sovereign, to vindicate Manyika law. If
7^.
one were to indict the Chikangas of the l8th Century, it would be for 
excessive lenience to Portuguese moradores. This,' of course, was tempered 
by enlightened self-interest. There are several cases to illustrate this 
point"*.
Portuguese defence and security were almost always in a state
of chaos and anarchy, during the second half of the l8th Century (as shown
by the appendix). Information on Portuguese defence is available from 1750
when Francisco de Mello e Castro referred to the existence of a fortress which
2
was constructed for the security of the feirantes • There were in it six
pieces of artillery, one of iron, four of bronze and a stone thrower of the
same metal with the necessary ammunition. There was a capitao-mor, with
twelve soldiers. There was a Church of the Dominican Friars, richly ornamented.
Both the capitao-mor and the vicar received the same pay as an ordinary soldier.
This pay was taken by the Captain-general of M09ambique, either from the salary
of the company of Sena, or from the salary of the garrison of Zimbabwe at
Monomotapa's court. This situation, which was far from being satisfactory,
deteriorated within two years, when Francisco de Mello e Castro became the
3
first Governor-General of an independent Mocambique in 1752 • Francisco de 
Mello e Castro, as shown elsewhere , did not think that it was good economics 
to maintain a garrison at the feira of Masekesa. It was for this reason that 
he did not bother to improve the military state of the feira. There were in 
1752 a capitao-mor, Manuel Cabral de Abreu, four mulatto soldiers, an ensign,
1. See Chapter IV, supra.
2. Castro Francisco de Mello e. ’Hios de Sena: sua descrippao, desde a Barra 
de Quelimane ate ao Zumbo’ in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino Parte nao
of:icial Serie 11,1867? Lisobon. p.108.
5* Lobato A. *Aditadura do Primeiro Governador Geral em 17531 in Bol.Soc.Estud. 
Mocambique Ano XXIX No.125?1960, Section E.pp.1-17* See Lobato A.
Evolu^qb Administrativa - Lisbon,1957,pp.28^-^. B.Mus.Add.MSS.20909.
Letter of appointment 3.9•17^9*
See this.chapter supra.
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two sergeants, a drummer and four artillery men in the Manyika garrison^.
The captain had one cannon, ten or twelve guns, all in a bad state of
I |
repair; ammunition was restricted to a barrel containing one arroba of
j
powder-shot. This sad state of the Manyika garrison was entirely:due to
the apathy of Francisco de Mello e Castro. Abreu reveals that the capitao-
mors of Sena embezzled some of the funds which were intended to improve the 
£
fortress • This was not confined to the Manyika garrison only. Dinizio de
n
Mello e Castro cites a 1763 example • The Company of Sena was supposed to
•\
comprise 40 soldiers, 10 of whom were to go to the Manyika garrison. The 
salary of each soldier was 9 corjas. It is said that the capitao-mor of 
Sena made certain that there were always less than 10 soldiers at the Manyika 
garrison and of the remaining 30, who should have been effectively employed 
at Sena, he had only 13 soldiers. The General pocketed the salaries of the 
remaining :soldiers both at Manyika and Sena itself. It was during this 
period of 'extraordinary administrative confusion' that a precedent which 
had grave implications for the future development of the institution of 
capitao-mor took place. Francisco Manoel do Rosario, of the order of
Letter of Recommendation from the Governor of Rios de Sena to the Viceroy 
of India 11.4.1752. Cxa.3 Moc.A.H.U. Codice 1332,No.30,Moc.A.H.U. Anon '
'Memorias.....1 Fundo Geral No.826, B.N.L.
Also in Andrade A.A. Relacoes de Mozambique Setecentista. Agencia Geral do 
Ultramar, Lisbon,1955* PP*192,539* Manuel Cabral de Abreu was a man of 
considerable experience as a soldier, sergeant, adjutant of expeditionary 
orders, adjutant of the fortress of Manyika, Cabo major of the garrison of 
Zimbabwe. He served in Manyika for 14 years and led Portuguese expeditions 
to Barwe and Quiteve. He is remembered by the Portuguese for both his 
military as well as his religious service. He built two churches, one in 
Barwe and another in Manyika. He was rewarded by the Viceroy of India for 
his services by giving his daughter the prazos of Vengo and Mussambe in Barwe. 
Also see 'Rela^o dos moradores Portugu&ses que assistem em Mocambique e
seus districtos' in Carvalho Dias,L«F. Fontes para a Historia  in Anais
Vol.IX. Torao I. Lisbon 1954,p.l6j6. Abreu is described as a married man 
with ability and prudence besides money and considerable landed property.
The reason why he w^s considered poor was probably that he had few slaves - 
a measure of opulence in those days. *
6. Anon. 'Memorias.....'
AndradeA.A. Relacoes p.192.
7. Castro Dd^iizio de Slello e.'Noticia do Imperio Marave e dos Rios de Sena* 
20.1.1763. In Carvalho Dias L.F. Fontes Para A Historic^ ...• in Anais 
Vol.IX. Tomo I,Lisbon,1954, p.130.
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Predicant Friars, was capitao-mor of the feira in 1752, and Manoel Cabral de
8
Abreu was captain of the infantry • of that garrison . These two men quarrelled
because the latter wanted the post of capitao-mor. The details of this
episode are fragmentary and difficult to piece together, but it would seem
that the quarrel was settled by the Governor-General of Mocambique, who, for
reasons that are not stated, gave an undertaking which bound him and his
successors to appoint Manoel Cabral de Abreu capit&o mor of the feira at a
stipulated salary of five bars of cloth. Abreu became capitao-mor the same 
9
year • This precedent became an established practice and the post of the
capitao-mor was in future occupied by men "without qualities of good behaviour,
nor good administrative ability for public service.....” men who were given to
extravagance and ’’lacking a sense of honour by which the Vassals of His Majesty
would have been encouraged” • This became so much of a scandal that ”men of
capability and ability” did not wish ”to take the office of capitab-rnor of
11
the said Manica” • It is only fair to point out that the appointment of
capitao-mors was also arbitrary in the other feiras in Makaranga and at Zumbo.
The nearest we have by way of pre-requisites was that a capitao-mor had to be
12”an intelligent and zealous Portuguese” without ambition • These subjectively 
abstract requirements were formulated in 1723* when a practice of nominating
8. Codice 1332, No.50, Moc. A.H.U.
'9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. See Livro de Regimentos e Instrucyoes No.11. fl.lO^ f V.. A Regimento for
Agostinho de Barroes Henriques Pato, lieutenant General of Moqambique and 
Rios de Sena,16.1.1723 in Pereira Braganqa, A.B. de. Arquivo Portugu^s 
Oriental Tomo IV, Vol.II, Parte II, Nova edicao, 1938. Bastora. pp.171-172.
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three or four individuals for a single post of capitab-mor was stopped.
This had very often in the past led to sanguinary battles among the contestants.
These conflicts inevitably resulted in loss of cloth, gold and ivory which were
being bartered. The 1723 regimento also put an end to a practice of nominating
13more than one captain for a military expedition . The later history of 
Portuguese administration at the feiras in this region shows that in both 
these limited respects, the regimento succeeded.
As far as the Manyika garrison was concerned, its general wretched 
state did not improve as shown by the maps in the appendix and by references 
to it in 1763^, 1768^, 1778^ and 1788^ .  Manuel Galvao da Silva's
18
observations at the feira of Masekesa in 1790 were no more encouraging •
The entire garrison consisted of 13 patricios under a Portuguese capitao-mor, 
and an ensign. This fortress, which never failed to feature as an annual expense
13. Ibid.
l*f. The personnel ©f the feira comprised 4 people, viz. a capitao-mor, an 
ensign, an adjutant and a vicar. Their sal§ry was 9 corjas each. (The 
salary of the vicar was also stated by Joao Pereira da Silva Barba in 
1763 as 1^0,000 reis per annum. Regista da Provisao passada a Rev.Pad 
Frei Antonio do Rosario (of the Parish of Manyika) 23.3.1763* Codice 
1325. Moc.A.H.U.). A corjar consisted of 20 panos and each pano was 
equivalent to one braca (outstretched arms). Officially each corjar was 
worth 3 maticals and two tangas of gold. This was equivalent to 9/600 
reis. This was an annual salary of a soldier, without uniform, a soldier's 
jacket or food. The 9 corjas were assorted as capotims, ardians, chuambo, 
(from Imbaceira) cutunias, (described as raw) sameters, (cured) Cathavenis, 
Dotins. The officers of the troops earned the same as the soldiers, an 
exception being that of an ensign, who earned three more corjas for 
performing an extra duty of hoisting the flag. See Soldo de urn ano que tern 
soldados nos Rios de Senna. Cxa.l4. (1770-177*0 Avul.Moc.200-2 fls. A.H.U. 
Castro Dinizio de Mello E. 'Noticia....•' Dias, Carvalho L.F. 'Fontes.....1 
p.129* Also see originalmgS.38*+. Azul serie. (Academy of Science,Lisbon)
15* Instrucpao que o 111 Ex Sr. Governador e Capitao General Balthazar
Manuel Pereira do Lago Deo a Quern Lhe suceder neste temp 20.8.1768. Codice 
1325. Moc.163 v - 175 v. A.H.U.
16. M.ontaury Joao Baptista de. 'Mocambique, Ilhas Querimbas, Rios de Sena Villa 
de Zumbo, Manica, Villa de Luabo' (C1778) in Andrade A.A. Relacoes....
pp.36^-3• There were no troops both at Zumbo and Manyika, except for the 
slaves whom the moradores kept armed, in case of necessity. These were a 
source of disorder as private individuals were tempted to engage in a 
terrible war against the moradores.
17. Anon. 'Descrippao da Capitania de Mozambique, suas povocoes e prcducoes' 
(1788). In Andrade A.A. Relacoes  Lisbon,1935, P«398.
18. da Silva Manuel Galvao. 'Didrio das Viagens feitas pelas terras de Manica' 
8/1788 in Carvalho Dias L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... pp.323-332. Also 
see original MS 1013. Asul Serie. bfls. (Academy of Science, Lisbon).
for its repair and which had no inner or outer fortifications to make it
worthy of the name, was a square construction of stone and clay, With straw-
/ ! 
covered walls'which partly crumbled away during winter, so that they continually
needed rebuilding. There was not a single ordinance, no embrasure, not even
a loop-hole from which to fire an arquebus. Barely in one corner did it
have a mast on which to fly a flag. The only use this fortification had,
if any, was that it provided an enclosure for a little church, likewise built
of stone, clay and thatched with straw. The size of the fortress was estimated
\
^ ■rjo \
by the capitao mor of the Feira de Manica as 200 feet long and 148 feet wide,
measured from east to west, and the size of the church was 36 feet long and 18
feet wide, measured from east to west.. At the door was a small house made of
poles and thatched with grass, probably for the clerk, and two small huts where
the soldiers lived. On the sides were three orange trees, and onelemon tree.
There are scattered references throughout the 18th Century concerning the
wretched state^ of repair of the fortress and the need to repair it^. It
is abundantly clear that Chikanga could have expelled the Portuguese, bag
and baggage, from the Feira of Masekesa any time he wanted. The fact that
they lived there in relative peace, albeit full of complaints, argues for
Chikanga*s reasonable treatment of foreigners as well as his cosmopolitan
.19. Letter from Joze da Trindade e Almeida to the Governor Rios de Sena 
8.10.1794. Cxa.30,Moc.A.H.U.
20. See Report of the soldiers who garrison the fortress of S.Caetano of the 
Feira of Manica by Francisco Henrique Ferrao, provisional commandant 
30.12.1795 Cxa.30* A.H.U. The ammunition of the fortress consisted
of 13 fire-arms with their bayonets, 200 bullets, 1 arroba of gunpowder 
(1 arroba = 321bs.) and 50 flints. ^
21. Letter from the capitao mor of Manica, Francisco Henrique Ferrao, to the 
Governor of Rios de Sena (.undated) Cxa.36. Moc.A.H.U. See also letter 
from the Governor of Rios de Sena. No.1931 4.12.1799. Cxa.38, A.H.U.
The capitao mor reported the crumbling away of the fortress, emphasized 
the need for more soldiers. The expenses which the moradores were 
prepared to pay were estimated at 4 bares of cloth.
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outlook. This spirit prevailed in the neighbouring regions, where soldiers
22were quite often described as 'lawless mulattos* or *canarins • in 1766
a company of sipaes had to be brought from Goa to Tette due to the lack of 
23
reliable soldiers , and yet the Portuguese continued to trade in these
regions. Even the so-called Monomotapa guard was largely an imaginary
2h
creature before the reforms of 1771 • Even after these reforms the situation
25
did not improve significantly .
A study of the problems of the Feira of Masekesa brings out clearly 
the strains and stresses of Manyika-Portuguese relations during the l8th 
Century. This is so because most of the trade negotiations, conclusion of 
treaties and occasional fighting took place there. All this rendered the 
Feira of Masekesa a very important rendezvous for Manyika and Portuguese dip­
lomats. As I pointed out in my discussion of Chikanga-Changamire relatione, 
Changamire allowed the Portuguese to reopen their old Feira of Masekesa. The 
reestablishment of this feira was regarded as the most important post 1695 war 
problem to be tackled. The Viceroy of India in Goa set about to look for an 
influential person who might persuade Chikanga to allow the old feira to be
22. . ■ . • ■ ■ ' . v  . • . : . ■ , ■■ ■ ‘ • 
Andrade A.A. Relates op.cit. p.3&4^
25. Ibid.
2^ +. Regimento and Instructions for the captains of the garrison of the Zimbabwe, 
drawn by Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago. Codice 1552. No.50. Moc.A.H.U. 
Tette 19. Jf. 1771.
25. Letter from Alves Pereira to the Governor of Paos de Sena. 6.5*1780.
Tete. Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. This letter lists down the company of the
gipaes, the armament of the company, the armament for the company at 
Monomotapa*s Zimbabwe, artillery etc. Also see Andrade , Jeronimo Jose 
Nogueria de. 'Do Estado em que ficavao os negocios da Capitanla de
Mossambique.....1 (1790) in Arquivo das Colonias Vol.I. Lisbon, 1917*
pp.95-6.
8o.
re-opened. Manuel Goncalves Guiao, who at that time was "the only resident 
who has the power and intelligence for this and similar expeditions," was
recommended bjf the Viceroy of India, despite Guiao*s "insolent and arrogant
26 • 
attitude to him" . Luis de Menezes, Viceroy of India, sanctioned ten bares
27
of cloth for the initial expenses of re-opening the Feira at Masekesa • The
first attempt to re-open the feira was made in 1719 by Captain Joao de Tavora 
28
de Sampayo with a garrison of twenty Portuguese soldiers and some local 
29
Africans • Besides negotiating for a re-establishment of the Feira, Guiao
\  ■
successfully persuaded Makombe, King of Barwe, to allow traders to pass
30
through his lands to the feira of Masekesa • This scheme does not seem to
have succeeded, because in 1720 Luis de Menezes thanked Joao de Tavora Sampayo
again "for the zeal with which he attempted the re-establishment of the feira"
and he trusted that "with a second j o u r n e y ,  this very profitable matter will
finally be settled" • A mention of one Heronimo de Faria Peixoto as capitao-
32
mor of the feira of Masekesa in 1721 would seem to suggest that Sampayo's 
second attempt succeeded. Faria Peixoto is described as a man v/ho had lived 
in Manyika for thirty years, but was at one time a morador of Sena. He owned 
property in Manyika, 'land and villages,* probably in Maungwe where he had 
business connections with his father-in-lav;, Thome Lopes, who used to tell him
26. The 1disorders’ and scandalous conduct of Guiao are referred to in a letter
from the King to Luis de Menezes 23*8.1719 in Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.V.
p.69* For further conduct of Guiao see Letter from Luis de Menezes to 
Antonio Cardim Troes, Lieutenant General of Mo9ambique and the rivers (Goa 
20.1.1720) regretting the appointment of Manuel Goncalves Guiao to a
government post, in R.S.E.A* Vol.V .op.cit. p.93*
27* Letter from Count Dom Luis de Menezes, Viceroy of India, to Antonio
Cardim Troes, Lieutenant General of Mozambique 21.1.1719* In R.S.E.A. 
Vol.V. op.cit. p.3*
28. Letter from Count Menezes to Factor of Sena, Joze de Mello Leite 21.1.1719* 
in R.S.E.A. Vol.V. op.cit.p.34.
Parecer of Conde da Ericeira sobre of Comercio de Mocambique, Lisboa 
4.II.I73O. Avul. de Moc. Cxa.3* A.H.U.
29. Ibid.
30. Letter from Dom Luis de Menezes to Manuel Goncalves Guiao 26.1.1719»
referring to his 11 letters all of which were dated 20.6.1718) in R.S.E.A.
Vol.V. p.34.
31* Letter to Joao de Tavora de Sampayo from Luis de Menezes 20.1.1720 Goa in
R.S.E.A* Vol.V. p.93*
32* Carta do Secretario da Academia Real da ^istoria Portugueza,17*3*1721 in
Rlvara, J.H. da Cunha, '0 Chronista de Tissuary (No.40.April),Vol.IV.
I869, p.43. '
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stories of the often-told legendary Qphir and Solomon, in connection with 
the empire of Monomotapa in semi-historical times.
The history of the feira between 1719 and 1771 is a matter of 
conjecture.
There was an attempt to regulate the salary of the capitao-mor 
33of Manyika in 1753 • This came about as a result of a quarrel between the
then capitao-mor of the feira, Fr. Manoel do Rozario and Manuel Cabral de 
Abreu, captain of the infantry. Probably to spite his enemy, Cabral de Abreu 
asked for the post of capitao mor and told the Governor of the Rios, Manuel 
Lopes Ferreira, not to worry about hissalary. However, when an amount of
1
five bars of cloth was assigned to him as his salary, he refused to accept 
it but
episod^ had tv;o permanent results in the history of the administration of
i
the Masekesa feira. First, the amount of £ive bares, albeit rejected, be-
^ 35
came the standard salary of the capitao-mor of the Masekesa feira and
secendly this set a precedent, whereby a capitao-mor served with men lacking
36
in "manners, character and respect" • These men, who were not carefully 
chosen, were least concerned about good economy and commerce, neither did 
they hesitate to loot the royal treasury whenever an opportunity presented 
itself.
33• Regimento and Instructions for the captains of the garrison of the 
Zimbabwe, drawn up by Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago. Codice 1332 
No.50. Moc. A.H.U. Tette 19.^.1771.
3*+. Ibid.
In the letter of recommendation, cited in footnote 5* infra - Manuel 
Cabral de Abreu was reported as being ’very poor* because he had spent
much fazenda in the service of the Government.
35* Instructions to the capitao-mor of Manica drawn up by Balthazar Pereira do
Lago. Codice 1332 No.50 Moc.A.H.U. 28.2.1771.
This was again mentioned as customary by a factor, Joze Joaquim Correia de 
Semos Sarmento in his letter No.3288 to the Governor. 21.6.1820, Cxa.65.
Moc.A.H.U..
36. Instructions to the captains of the Zimbabwe  op.cit. Codice 1332 No.50.
Moc.A.H.U. 19.1.1771.
34
remained in his post and paid the soldiers from his pocket • This
82.
The rights, duties and qualities of a capitao-mor were not clearly
37 / 3ft
defined until 1?71 • Capitao-mor, Joze Antonio Bravo, (1758) is. a case in
!
point. He was a degradado married to a Chinese courtesan of well-connected 
parentage in Goa. He administered the feira of Masekesa as if itJ were his 
personal property and the result was that two soldiers of that garrison 
defected to Manyika princes. Most of the moradores deserted the feira to 
Sena. He was later accused of insolence and theft. This was but one of the 
many cases.
\
It is important to note that the feira of Masekesa had no formal
status until 1771 when its capitao-mor was paid from the royal treasury, and
39an attempt was made to raise it to the- status of a villa • But even before 
this the importance attached to the feira at Masekesa is shown by the fact 
that its capitao-mor was supposed to earn the same salary as that of the
A/ ifO
capitao of the Zimbabwe •
The fact that the capitao-mors had no fixed regular salary to enable
them to live according to the style of their commission very often obliged
/
them to trade legitimately or otherwise, and attempts by the Chikangas to 
control them generally resulted in clashes. This was the case in 1750 with
37. Ibid.
•38. A report signed by David Marques Pereira 10.6.1758 Cxa,5* Moc.A.H.U.
39* instructions to the capitao-mor of Manica 28.2.1771 op.cit. Codice 
1332,No.50, Moc. A.H.U.
*tO. The captain of the Zimbabwe earned 9 bares of cloth then. Codice 1332, 
No.50. Moc.A.H.Y. 19.1.1771* The two posts of the garrisons at the 
Zimbabwe of Monomotapa and the feira of Masekesa were considered very 
important. See Newitt M.D.D. citing Mauriz Thomans's Reise und 
Lebensbescreibung Ch.7, on p.176 of his thesis 'The Zambezi Prazos in 
the 18th Century* (Phj>. Thesis, London,1967). Letter from Curvetta S. 
Antonio e Almeida Santos to the General of Rios de Sena, David Marques 
Pereira 15*11.1755* Cod.1310. Moc. A.H.U.
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Joze Bravo , mention of whom has been made in the preceding discussion.
He discovered a bar known as 'Bar do Bungo', but before he could exploit
it effectively Chikanga ordered the bar to be closed and all the Manyika
Zf2
who were employed at this bar to be punished . Secondly, the fact that 
the garrison was generally without proper soldiers to defend the feira or 
support Portuguese demands or complaints left Chikanga with plenty of room 
to manoeuvre things as he liked. Hence Portuguese complaints that "the 
regulo of Manica robs everybody who passes by his lands" ♦
The capitao-mor found himself in a dilemma. The King lost what
little confidence and respect he might have had for him, and the moradores
whose commercial interests were harmed did likewise. This was best illustrated
by the death of an influential woman, Dona Ines, who was respected by the
kk
moradores as well as the regulos in 1738 • This turned 'all the regulos
and Monomotapa restless.'
An earlier example of the extent to which personal qualities 
influenced the fortunes of the feira is that of Manuel GoncCtfves Guiao who 
negotiated, and where this was not possible, fought for trading opportunities, 
during the first half of the l8th Century. Chikanga's policy was one of re­
stricting trade and movement within his land. For nearly seventeen years he
’^ 1. Soares Augosto Estanislao Xavier, Descripyao da villa de Sofala. Margao? 
1837* p.50 footnote (a).
42. Ibid. The same source mentions that the King buried his son in that mine.
This is the only instance I have come across of a Manyika prince being 
buried in a mine. It might very well be that the death of this prince 
coincided with the closing of the mine and the King decided to save 
labour of digging a grave, or alternatively there might be some ritual 
connected with it. The chances are that it was a mere coincidence.
43. Letter from the Governor of Mo9ambique, Manuel David Moraes Pereira to 
Thome Joaquim da Costa, Moc. 9*8.1738. Avulso 82-2 fls. Cxa.6. Moc.
A.H.U.
44. Ibid. For a very short biographical sketch of Dona Ines Gracias Cardoso
see Lobato A. Evolucao Administrativa e Economica de Mocambique (1752-
1762) la parte. Fundament os da Cria9ao do Govern o-Geral em 1753* Agenda 
Geral do Ultramar. Lisboa (1957) p.49« footnote 23*
Newitt M.D.D. The Zambezi Prazos in the Eighteenth Century. (Ph.D.Thesis, 
London,1967) pp.130, 132.
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45
did not want the Portuguese to trade in his land and those who defied his
orders had their merchandise confiscated, neither did he allow Portuguese
traders to pass to other Kingdoms through his lands. Manuel Goncalves Guiao spent
46
as much as 100 miticals on saguates to bribe Manyika Manamucates and
provincial governors in the Kingdom to join him in a war against Chikanga.
47
The date of this war is unknown, but it took place between 1720 and 1751 •
Chikanga sued for peace and promised freedom of passage to all Portuguese 
traders as in the past. Opinion was divided at the policy making level of the 
Portuguese administration. The Tenente General of the Rivers, for reasons which 
Guiao calls ’frivolous’ decided against reoccupying the feira effectively, but 
Guiao dashed in and, at his own expense, ’built’ a fortress to defend the 
newly won trading opportunities^.
It is in this light that one should view an offer of ten lands made
49
to Francisco de Mello e Castro by Barbe, apparently a ’regulo of Manica” •
It may very well be that he was one of the manamucates bribed by Guiao during 
the war against Chikanga.
Francisco de Mello e Castro suspected an ulterior motive behind this 
offer and gave an evasive'answer to the emissaries who had brought the message 
containing the offer. He, therefore, recommended that the Governor-General 
of Mozambique should reject the offer for a number of reasons. First, the
45. Memorial do que tenho obrado nestes Rios no servicio de S.Magesta&e, que 
Deus Guarde. Anon. Cxa. Av*3 A.H.U. 7*12.1751. Detailed discussion about 
the author of this document is found in the English translation of Newitt 
M.D.D. ’The Zambezi Prazos in the l8th Century.’ (Ph.D.Thesis,London,19&7) 
This document was probably a reply to a ’Parecer do Desembargador, Duarte 
Salter de Mendonca em que se propoe a autonomia administracao da Conquista’ 
Av.Cxa.4. 7/12/1751.
Lobato A. Evolucao.•..• op.cit. p.125.
46. ’Memorial do que  7.12.1751* Cxa.3* A.H.U.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Letter from Francisco de Mello de Castro to David Marques Pereira 15.11.1755 
Codice 1310, Moc. A.H.U. Copia da Carta em Oct.1755 pellos Patamares ao Gn. 
al de Sena, David Marques Pereira. Oct. 1755* Codice 1310 Moc.A.H.U.
I
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fortifications in the interior were exposed to danger and help could not be 
speedily sent except with an army^0. Secondly, the fortress of the feira at 
Masekesa had earned notoriety for being badly garrisoned, badly constructed 
out of bad timber, and, in his opinion, these ten lands would be in great 
danger of attack, probably from Chikanga. It had been brought to his notice 
that the so-called fortress existed only in name; neither, so those who were 
acquainted with the situation pointed out, was there a good site for 
establishing a new fortress.
51A third reason , which sounded more plausible.than the two already 
mentioned, was that the fortress would have been of use if it were constructed 
near the bares where the Portuguese traders and Manyika miners met, because
here it would enforce respect. But this was hardly necessary because Portuguese
I
interests were maintained by cloth, as was the case in Butua, Mano and the 
remote interior where Portuguese subjects mined for gold without the protection 
of fortresses. He wondered whether it was, "necessary to conquer the lands if
we have all the commerce in our hands and if what we pay for transit to the
52African is insignificant Francisco de Mello e Castro criticised bitterly
a plan of military conquest which had been proposed by a Viceroy of India,
Conde da Ericeira. It was with utter reluctance that he proceeded with the 
re-occupation of the feira of Masekesa. Francisco de Mello e Castro was not 
?ilone in this line of thinking. Martinho de Mello e Castro and DiogO' de
50. Ibid
51. Ibid
52. Lobato A. Aspectos de Mocambique no Antigo Regime Colonial,
Lisbon, 1953» p.23.
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Mendonca Corte Real were more or less of the same opinion. They believed 
that it was not necessary to conquer the interior because possession of the
coast secured/the commerce of the interior. However, as soon as it seemed
i
i
that the Dutch at the Cape would advance into the interior toward:Manyika,
Butua and Makaranga a defence of the interior and re-occupation of Lourenco
53Marques was instantly ordered in 1752 •
There is no doubt that the reasons advanced by Francisco de Mello
e Castro and those of like mind were valid. But it was also true that the
\
\
merchandise which the traders introduced into the feira of Masekesa depended
for their security on the defence of that commerce against interlopers. An
identification of the regulo of Manyika, whom Francisco de Mello e Castro
3b
called Barbe, is fraught with many difficulties • Firstly, this name does 
not appear anywhere again in connection with the Kingdom of Manyika during 
the l8th Century. The name Barbe, however, appears a century later in 
connection with his subject called Doga, who had rebelled against him and fled 
to a prazp'called-Inhacaroro in Barwe. But the same Doga is later referred to 
aS’Baruist.' A possible explanation here is that perhaps Barbe was a 
pseudonym of some Manyika prince who was in charge of one of the Manyika
districts, which shared the same boundary with the Kingdom of Barwe and that
55..................
Doga was a 'Baruist* immigrant who later decided to seekwork on the
Jnhacaroro prazo.
53* Lobato A. Aspectorde Mocambique no Antigo Regime Colonial. Lisobon,1953 
p.23.
For the question of Dutch ambitions to reach the lands of Monomotapa and 
Manyika from Rios de Cuama, see Montez Caetano. Descobrimento e Fundacao de 
Lourenco Marques. 1500-lSOO Lourenco Marques 19^ -8. p.78.
3b. Correspondencia of icial do Governador de Quelimane l8¥+-1852. Letter to 
Francisco Henrique Ferrao ^.10.18^5. Codice 1^68, N0.7I1 Moc.A.H.U.
55* Codice 1^68. No.73> Moc. A.H.U. -
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The case of the ten lands shows how well Francisco de Mello e
Castro understood and appreciated the interests of his fellow Portuguese.
His acceptance of this offer was bound to offend Chikanga and prejudice
Portuguese commerce. It is true that the garrison was in a ‘miserable state*,
but should not this have been the reason why he ought to have set about to
improve the situation? It should have been clear to him that without an up-
to-date garrison to protect the Portuguese name, the day would not be far.
off when Africans would not consent that the capitao-mor and his wretched
56
garrison should reside there , and also it should have been evident to him 
that absence of both would have sounded a death knell to Portuguese commerce 
in the Kingdom of Manyika. It is possible that commerce had been declining
cn
since the beginning of the l8th Century, as estimates made in 1762 proved .
58Gold production in Manyika was estimated at 100 pastas a year, compared to
59Butua whose production varied between 300 to 400 pastas a year in the same
period. Fifty or sixty pastas of the total gold production in Manyika passed
60through Quelimaneand Sena • This was easily recognizable because of its 
quality. There was, however, no difference in the quality of ivory, whose 
sale increased or decreased in proportion to that of gold. The gold and ivory
36. Codice 1310. Moc.A.H.U. 15*11.1755* op.cit.
57* Capitao e Juiz da Manica 13.6.1762, Avulso 106-2fls. Cxa.9* Moc.A.h.U.
58. Ibid.
■59. Letter from Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de Montaury to Pedro de 
Saldanha de Albuquerque. Sena 15*6.1762. Cod.1321. Moc.A.H.U.
Memorias e Documentos  1890 Lisbon, p.185. There is a short extract
relevant to the figures cited in the text on p.39 of Cod.1321. Moc.A.H.U.
See Doc.No.22 p.593* Andrade A.A. Relapoes  op.cit.
60. Memorias da Costa d ’Africa Oriental e Alguns Reflexoes Uteis para
Estabelecer Melhor, e Fazer Mais Florente o seu Comercio. 21.5.1762. fls.
55 in Andrade A.A. Relacoes  op.cit. p.193*
Also in Dias L.F. de Carvalho. Fontes para a Historia, Geografia e 
Comercio de Mopambique (see XVIII) Anais Vol.IX. Tomo 1. 195^* Lisboa, p.222 
Fundo Geral No.626. B.N.L. Noticias dos Dominios PogtuguezesaActuals na 
Costa de Africa Oriental tiradas por Ordem de S.Mad. Fidels, nos annos de 
1762 e 1758. These were copied in the secretariat of *Estado dos Negocios 
da Marinha* in 1765* This copy of 1765 is undated. The original copy 
which was sent from Mopambique is in the T.T. (Ministerio do reino, Maco 
60k). This anonymous memorial has been assigned by Lobato to desembargador 
Morais Pereira.
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61
were exchanged for drugs and wax . Iron, copper, calaim and crystal were 
marketed on a small scale.
Various individuals discovered bares in Rios de Sena as early as
62
1720 and certainly by the end of the first half of the l8th Century several
63
bares were in existence • For example, north of the Zambezi were the bares
of Mixonga, owned by a native of Goa, Raphael de Bragan<pa, the bares of Pemba
and Ambara discovered by Fr. Pedro Trindade and Mano, Joao Pereira Velho, that
6kof Beve by Vitoria Francisca, that of Cassunca by Manoel Roiz Leitao •
65
In his report of July 1762 Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de
66Montaury states that there were 23 bars in the entire ’’Portuguese Conquest” 
of Rios de Sena and North of the Zambezi. These had been once very rich in 
gold from which their individual discoverers made fortunes. This shift in 
Portuguese trade from the South to the North resulted in increased trade bet­
ween Butua on the one hand and Zumbo and Tete on the other, where a sizeable
61. Ibid.
62. Rivara J.H. da Cunha. 0 Chronista de Tissuary Vol.IV. p.*f9» 1869 Nova Goa.
63* Boxer C.R. *A Dominican Account of Zambezia in 17^' Bol.Soc.Estud.
Mocambique Ano XXIX. No.125* 19^0. Section,E. p.11.
6k, •Memdrias da Costa ' Andrade A.A* Relacoes p.281.
65. Montaury Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de. 1Bares.» Sena 15*6.1762. 
Doc.No.22.
Andrade A.A. Relagoes P«993
66. The actual term used is ’Conquista.’ The Portuguese connotation of this 
terra during the l8th Century is best rendered as ”an area over which the 
Portuguese had effective jurisdiction.” Newitt M.D.D. An Account of a 
Journey made Overland from Quelimane to Angoche in 1732 by Francisco 
Raymundo Moraes Pereira. General African Historical Association,
Salisbury,1965 p.33* For the significance of other terms - dominios, 
colonia, cafraria - see Andrade A.A. ”um Caso tipico da Filosofia Politica 
da Historia Portuguesa” in Studia No.9. 1962. For further information 
about bars see, Boxer C.R. 'A Dominican Account of Zambezia in 17kk' in 
Bol♦Soc.Estud.Hoc♦ ano XXIX No.125, Seccao S. i960.
For the nature of trade and Portuguese relations with the local potentantes 
in Mocambique and Goa - Biker I.F. Judice. Colleccao de Tratados de pazes 
queo estadoda India Portugueza fez com os Reis e Senhores, com que teve
relacoes nao Partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde o principio da conquista 
ate ao fim do seculo XVIII. (1Instruepao de el Rey D. Joao V dada ao 
Marques de Gastello Novo* Lisboa 25.3*17^) Vol.VI. 1835 pp.2A-3-62.
Rivara J.H. da Cunha. 0 Chronista de Tissuary.Vol.II,Nova Goa 1867.
pp.156-160, 18^-90.
Castello Novo’s correspondence with the King and Viceroy of India, dated 
10.8.17^ is also found in Arquivo das Colonias Vol.Ill, Lisbon,1918.
pp.225-^0. For mining methods etc. see Lobato A. Evolucao  Vol.I.
1997* pp*^-5» 96, 133-3;+» 138-4o. ‘
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number of people who owned bars in the Maravi Kingdom lived. Butua*s gold
output, probably in 1726 and 1751? when Changamire*s relations with the
67
Portuguese are stated to be cordial , was reckoned as stated earlier to be
68
between 300 and 400 pastas and her market could absorb as much as fifty
69bars of fazendas, 2 - 3*000 raacos of beads • The contrast in the output
*
of gold between the bars in Manyika and the bars in Butua and cis-Zambezi 
may possibly be accounted for by the difference in extent, of the three places.
The sources of information on the gold output of the Manyika bars
differ to a lesser or greater degree. For instance, Montaury, writing in 1762,
70states that very little gold was obtained from Manyika bars • Miranda writes
about infinite gold from the bars of M&nyika which produced in one year 70,000
l 71
cruzados* worth of gold • But subsequently he refers to the territory on
! I
which the bars were situated as belonging to a King of Barwe. This clearly
refers to the Pungwe river, which separates the two Kingdoms, and most probably
72
where Fernandes saw the Manyika collecting alluvial gold in 1314-1313 •
**Also in Manyika” Miranda goes on ’’there are numerous crystals which are 
shaped like topazes.” The author of the 'Descrippao Corografica..•..* 
clearly states that the Manyika bars produced "excellent gold in nuggets,
67. Nicola Sutherland-Harris. ’’Trade and Politics in the Changamire/Rozvi
Kingdom of the late 17th and l8th Centuries” Seminar Paper, M.A. Area
Studies Centre. S.O.A.S.I967* p.8. For collaboration between Changamire
and Portuguese see Lobato A. Evolugao Administrativa  1732-1763.
Agenda Geral do Ultramar. 1937. PP*233*139*
68. Montaury Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de. Bares 13.6.1762. Doc.No.22 
in Andrade A.A. Relacoes  p.393*
^9* Ibid. *
70. Ibid.
Memorias e Documentos  I89O Lisbon, p.187.
71. Miranda Antonio Pinto de. Memorias sobre a Costa de Africa. (C1766)
in Andrade A.A. Relaqoes..JT. Lisbon,193^* p.280.
72. See Chapter I. Infra.
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73folhetas which weighed four pounds" . It would seem, therefore, that, 
despite the organisational differences, the bars in Manyika produced gold 
comparable tJ their counterparts in Rios de Sena etc. The small amount of 
gold cited by Montaury might be due to internal political developments of 
which there is no record during the 1760's. It would appear, from Dinizio de 
•Mello e Castro's description of the bars in Manyika, that the territory 
on which the feira was situated was being disputed by the King of Quiteve
at this time. He refers to the bars of "Manica within the jurisdiction of
lb \
the King of Quiteve" . It is unmistakably clear from his description, that
the area where these bars were found, was the Revue Valley, and that the feira
referred to was that of Masekesa, the only one known to possess a fortress at
this time. There was a fortress, with a capitao-mor, officials, and soldiers.
The motive for maintaining these,according to Dinizio, was to enable the
moradores of Sena to trade with the Quitevans. The King of Quiteve did not
allow the Portuguese to mine gold in the bars around this area. His subjects,
however, could buy cloths and beads from the moradores of Sena. Even in this
trade, the King and his princes are accused of causing 'infinite damage,1
•robbery' and violence to Portuguese merchandise, a good deal of which was
0f PC rtuja/
spent on trying to buy safety. He concludes by urging the King^to improve 
the fortress, its garrison and personnel in order to take advantage of the 
•abundant and excellent gold' which came from the bars of Manyika. Quitevan
73» Anon. Descrip^ao Corografica  Cxa.17.MOC.A.H.U.
Lobato A. Evolucao  1957. Vol.I. p.68.
Francisco de Mello e Castro referred to these blue stones, topazes, 
emeralds, etc. in 1750, but commented that neither he nor any Portuguese 
had seen them. They belonged to the realm of legend and tradition. 
Descripcao dos Rios de Sena. Annaes  Pt. nao official Serie II.
1867. p.100.
Lobato A. Colonizapao Senhorial da Zambezia e Outros Estudos. Junta de 
Investigacoes do Ultramar Lisbon,19^2, p.135* 
lb, Castro D^iizio de Mello e. 'Noticia do Imperio Marave e dos Rios de Sena' 
in Carvalho Dias, Fontes para a Historia  pp.123-^.
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nir
policy during this period was decidedly anti-Portuguese . This occasionally 
contributed to some extent to the small production of gold especially from 
the bars which bordered on Quitevan territory.
However, the differences in the rights to acquire and operate bars 
in the lands of Maravi and in Manyika, gave the former added popularity.* The 
bars which were situated in the North of the Zambezi were discovered and 
operated by individuals who considered them their own property. They had 
for their labour a large number of slaves who lived there as an organised 
community under a capitao-mor, a garrison and a priest. The slaves, the 
majority of whom were negresses, were required to produce a stipulated
amount for their master per day •
i
I The situation was different in Manyika. The bars were operated 
by the Manyika themselves. Chikanga, as we have seen in the case of the
n n
capitao-mor, Bravo, in 1756 , did not allow the Portuguese to own and
exploit bars in his Kingdom. The best-known bars in Manyika, the bars of
Chisco, Xima, Gatoza, Musa and Ximiza, were found on the banks of the Mutare,
78
Revue and Nyamucuarara rivers . The conservatism of the Manyika in trade
75* Xavier, Inacio Caetano. 'Noticias.....» in Andrad A.A* Relapoes..... p.l35»
76. 'Memorias.....1 in Carvalho Dias L.F* Fontes para a Historia  p.229*
Also see Andrade A.A. Relacoes..... Lisbon,1955, pp.198-20^.
. 77• See this chapter - infra.
78, Descrip9ao Corografica...... Cxa.17* Moc.A.H.U. For a complete survey of the
well-known bars in Rios de Sena see Galvao's Report in 1786 to Martinho 
de Mello e Castro,3.12.1781. Cxa.23,Moc.A.H.U.
Lobator A. Evolucao  1957 Lisbon, pp.2^3-247,^6-8. Memorias e
Documentos  1890 Lisbon. Doc.No.76. pp.221, 139-176.
de Andrade Jeronymo Jose^ Nogueira "Excerpto 'Descripcao em que ficavam os
Negocios de Mossambique..... anno de 1790,,!ia Memorias e Documentos....
Lisbon,1890. p.163. Recommendations by Balthazar Manuel Pereira do Lago 
to his successor 12.8.1766 in Memorias e Documentos..... Lisbon,1890,p.196. 
Also see 'Map of the known mines in the district of Sena' by the 
capitao-mor of Manyika, Izidoro Pereira Correa 30»7*1837• Sena in A.C.U. 
parte nao official Serie II, I839-I867.
t
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matters is shown by the fact that the 'ancients' were supposed to have
79carried on their alluvial gold-mining in the above-mentioned rivers •
There are two most important reasons why trade shifted to the 
North; first, the increasing importance of the ivory trade in the North 
during the first half of the l8th Century, and secondly, the power of 
Barwe, especially after Gunguro Makombe had acceded to the throne in
1768. The trade in ivory between Mozambique and Goa was more profitable
go
during the period 1749-1770 than in gold. The bars became less and less 
lucrative; in fact some of them closed down, Montaury gives Mano as the
last bar .to be closed in 175$ due to a severe drought^\ This was certainly
32not the last, because bars were observed by Gamitto in 1830 •
! The popularity of the ivory tra^ de explains, in part, diminished 
trade activities in Manyika since she herself produced very little ivory. 
There are several factors why the ivory tra.de did not make a significant 
shift to Manyika's neighbours in the West. The hostility between Changamire 
and the Portuguese, as manifested by his famous raid of 1,000 pastas (worth
83
800,000 cruzados) of gold belonging to the Portuguese in 1756-7 the
84
succession wars in his Kingdom in 1766 and Mahia threats in 1769 rendered
79* Kuss M.H. 'Communicacao sobre a continuapao Geologia de uma parte da 
Zambezia' in Bol.S.G.L., Seria 6a No.3. Lisbon 1886,pp.178-194.
Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika people' 14.1.1. 
Salisbury. Paup A.E. The Geology of the Umtali Gold Belt. Geological 
Survey, 32,1957, p.8l.
80. Alpers E.A. 'The role of the Yao trade.....' (Ph.D.Thesis, London,1966),
p.108. The Yao alone used to take 400-500 bars of ivory to Mozambique 
annually. According to Francisco de Mello e Castro the gold trade in 
1750, at its best,, produced only I'jfio profit, and at its worst did not 
even yield, 1,000 xerafins in India, which was the value of 1 pasta in 
Rios de Sena. This did not happen in the case of ivory, because 1 bar 
(worth 20 faracolas), the equivalent of 22 arrobas, 16 arrateis, cost 100 
maticals per bar, which was worth in Indian currency 600 xerafins. This 
was sold in Mozambique for 1,000 cruzados which in Indian currency was 
worth 1,333 xerafins, 1 tanga, 40 reis.
e Castro Francisco de Mello. 'Rios de Sena' Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino 
parte nao official serie 11,1867, p.108.
81. Memorias e Docnmentos..... 1890 Lisbon, p.187.
82. Gamitto A.C.P. (trans.Ian Cunnison) King Kazembe and the Marave, Cheva, 
Bisa, Bemba, Lunda, and ocher peoples of Southern Africa, being the diary
of the Portuguese expedition to that Potentate in the years lo31 and lo52 
Junta Investigacoes do Ultramar, Vol.I. No.42. Lisbon,i960, pp.41-42.
/Contd....
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the Butuan ivory market uncertain. The trade routes through the lands of
Makaranga were in the throes of a civil war in the 1760*s, the Munhaes and
85
the princes demanded passage money as they liked • These factors, to a 
large extent, account for the shift in Portuguese trading activities from 
the Kingdoms of Manyika, Butua and Makaranga to the North of the Zambezi.
The power of Barwe is another factor which explains the decline* 
of trade in Manyika during the l8th Century.
There are two aspects to this problem, which must be discussed 
in order to bring out the impact of events in Barwe on Manyika-Portuguese 
relations. The decline of Portuguese trading activities in the Kingdom of 
Manyika during this century can be partially explained, first, by a recovery 
and a re-assertion of its sovereignty by the Kingdom of Barwe, and secondly, 
by Portuguese military weakness to suppress effectively Barwe's irredentist . 
tendencies. The Kingdom of Barwe had compromised her independence during 
the 17th Century. Consequently, Portuguese moradores acquired land. Attempts 
by the Makombes to reverse this situation during the 18th Century severely 
restricted Portuguese commercial activities in Barwe, and quite often led to 
conflicts about the freedom of passage to the Kingdom of Manyika. The
83. Xavier Caetano Ignacio. 'Relacao do Estado presente de Mozambique, Sena, 
Sofala, Inhambane e todo o continente da Africa Oriental1 1738 in Carvalho 
Dias, L.F. Fontes para a Historia  p.198.
84. Sutherland-Harris N. 'Trade and the Rozwi Mambo1 in (eds). Gray J.R. and 
Birmingham D. Pre-Colonial African Trade. Essays on Trade in Central and 
Eastern Africa before 1900. O.U.P. 1970. p.237* Compare her argument on 
p.239* Also there were disorders at the feira of Zumbo. 'Copy of a 
letter of the capitao-mor of Zumbo, Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos to the 
Governor and Captain-general of Mossambique 10.3.1767' in Memorias e 
Documentos  Lisbon 1890, p.l97»
83. Castro Dionizio de Mello e. 'Noticia do Iraperio Marave e dos Rios de
Sena1 in Fontes para a Historia  (20.1.1763) pp.131-133*
9^ .
Makombes are described as hostile in the l8th Century Portuguese documents.
|
Anecdotes ab^ut encounters between the Vashambadzi and their Portuguese
or j
masters were related to Ignacio Caetano Xavier in 1758 • Lions; and monkeys
i
further rendered the passage to the feira of Masekesa unsafe.
As far as the first aspect of this problem is concerned the attitude 
and foreign policy of Gunguro Makorabe toward the Portuguese between 1767 and
1770, best illustrate how events in the Kingdom of Barwe seriously affected
\
Portuguese trade with the Kingdom of Manyika. The conflict between the
87Portuguese and Gunguro Makombe came to a head in 1768 when the latter
tried to retrieve by force lands in the Sungue region, which had fallen
into Portuguese hands, probably during the previous century. Gunguro entered
Sungue with his people and set Portugueses houses on fire, especially those
belonging to prominent moradores like Antonio Joze Pereira Salema, Jose Carlos 
88
Coelho de Campos . He blocked the passage to the feira of Masekesa and 
encouraged his subjects to carry on reprisals on Portuguese merchants who 
tried to take their merchandise secretly to Manyika.
Investigations, which the commandant of the villa of Sena, Jose
89
Caetano da Mota, ordered to be made in 1768 in order to establish Gunguro
• 86. Xavier,Inacio Caetano. 'Noticias dos dominios Portuguzes na Costa de 
Africa Oriental* in Andrade A.A. Relacoes de Mocambique Setecentista. 
Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon 1955> P«175» There is an English 
translation of this account by Newitt M.D.D. 'Ignacio Caetano's account 
of Portuguese East Africa' in The History of the Central African Peoples. 
Proceedings of the 17th Conference. Lusaka. 19o3» P*15«
87. 'Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Inacio de Melo Alvim, to the 
captain General of Mocambique 3*10.1768' in (ed) Caetano Montez. Invent- 
ario do Fundo do Seculo XVIII. Lourenco Marques 1955* pp.208-210.
'Letter from Alvim to Captain-General No.7^3 1.2.1769'.Inventario.....
op.cit. p.113.
88. 'Letter from Alvim to Captain-General 3*10.1768'. Inventario pp.208-
210. The Sungue territory separated the Kingdom of Barwe from both Sena 
and Tete and adjoined them along the interior stretches of Tambara, Tipui 
and Macangano.
89. Ibid.
'Letter from Alvim to Captain General 28.10.1768' Inventario.... pp.222-
225.
95*
Makombe's real motives for his attack on, and expulsion of the Portuguese
from the region of Sungue, suggest three reasons why Makombe did this; first,
that Makombe entered Sungue because he wanted to throw out the Quitevans and
some of the Barwe princes, who had occupied this region soon after the death
of Mutuconha, the previous King of Barwe, secondly, that Makombe wanted to
drive out Changara, a muzinda (deputy) of Chicova, who had allegedly entered
Sungue without the former’s permission, thirdly, that Makombe wanted to
90’consolidate his government' • The first two reasons seem to have been 
the occasion and not the motive for the war. Gunguro Makombe's desire was 
to reassert himself as King of Barwe. His ambition to circumscribe 
Portuguese freedom of movement in his .Kingdom revealed itself in several ways. 
A typical example is that of Miguel Jose Pereira Gaio in 1768 whose
I 91
Vashambadzi v/ere destined for the feira of Masekesa and thence to Quiteve •
These Vashambadzi were prevented from passing through Barwe and had their
merchandise confiscated by the orders of Gunguro Makombe. The fact that
Makombe had tightened up his control over the Portuguese traders in his
Kingdom is further demonstrated by an incident which took place in the same
year. Gaio’s mussambas grandes (great vashambadzi), Zempere , his
Sachicunda (slave-driver), and Zango were forced to pay a saguate when
Makombe heard that they were staying at the house of one of his subjects,
Inhabata. The saguate consisted of one mutore of cloth, two flasks, one
of gun-powder and the other of pepper, and three of nipa.
The respect which a Portuguese delegation showed to Makombe in
observing a Barwe procedure for audience with the King, must be viewed as
a measure of success of Gunguro Makombe's chauvinistic foreign policy. The
mission sought audience with Makombe through Mungari, a muzinda:.!^ charge of
92
the lands of Cavenga in Barwe • This was the normal way of doing it. The
90. Ibid.
91. 'Requerimento de Miguel Jose/ Pereira Gaio,Sena 29*2.1769’ i^ 1- Caetano 
Montez, Inventario.....pp.213-
92. Ibid.
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incidents which have been cited above show that Gunguro Makombe's attack
on Sungue was influenced more by his desire to retrieve the image of Barwe
as an independent sovereign Kingdom than the presence in Sungue of either
Changara or the Quitevans. In fact Gunguro Makombe's line of argument with
the Portuguese mission in 1768 seems to confirm this interpretation of
93Makombe's actions in Sungue in 1768 . Gunguro Makombe contended that he
occupied Sungue because the lands which the Portuguese moradores possessed 
there had been given to them by Mutuconha MakombeT the previous King of 
Barwe, who came to the throne of the Kingdom with the help of the Portuguese,
notably one Bernardo Xavier. Gunguro Makombe maintained that Mutuconha was
I
not a legitimate King and that, consequently, his actions were not valid.
of Mutuconha, because he realised that Mutuconha and his supporters, including
would plunge the Kingdom into a civil war. Two developments prompted him to 
take action in 1768 - the death of Mutuconha and a rupture between the forces 
of Zinheme and Cuvava.
several armed conflicts with the Portuguese, made it difficult for Portuguese 
merchants to trade freely with the Kingdom of Manyika. Portuguese military
necessary calibre 3 or small cannons, grape-shots, bullets, artillery 
men, flints, gunpowder, musket bullets as well as administrative inefficiency 
at the villa of Sena further weakened the Portuguese position at a time when 
Gunguro's exemplary resistance to the Portuguese was being widely imitated
93* 'Letter from Alvim to Captain General 28.10.1768. Caetano Montez.
Invenbario  pp.225 -
9^. 'Letter dated 23.1.1770 from Inacio de Alvim to the captain general
Makombe did not want to take action at the time, until the death
Zinheme, Cuvava, some princes of Barwe and the Portuguese moradores in Sungue,
Gunguro Makombe's patriotic foreign policy, which resulted in
weakness, as revealed by lack of soldiers, ammunition, artillery of the
Qh
by his subjects • For instance one 'Mussito,' otherwise known as Maroa, who
No.760. Caetano Montez, Inventario..... pp.71-72.
97.
lived in Sungue, near Sena, in the lands occupied by Anonio Jose" da Saleraa,
conducted guerrilla warfare from ’’the woods and thick forests” which served
as a strong fortress, ’’for a party of African rebels and the African ’slaves*
who had fled away from their Portuguese master*” They concerted their efforts
and rendered the passage to the interior of Barwe and Manyika unsafe by making
•intolerable thefts,••♦causing cruel deaths,* and carrying out reprisals on
95Portuguese merchants in transit . The Governor on the 23rd January,1770,
referred to'Mussito'as *a powerful African’ to whom many Africans appealed 
their
for a redress of/grievances, ’as though he was their King*’ It was the in- 
j . dependent operations of people like'Husito 'which added to the power of Barwe
| during the l8th Century.
j It must not be assumed, however, that the Portuguese were entirely
! I
finished as a force to reckon with in Barwe internal politics. They defeated 
' Gunguro Makombe militarily in 1768, but did not drive the advantage of their 
victory too far, mainly because they realised their overall military weakness. , 
They merely demanded that the lands which belonged to Antonio Jose Pereira 
► Salema and Jose Carlos Coelho de Campos should be restored, the passage to
Manyika should be open, that the vashambadzi, whom Gunguro Makombe held 
cap:-t&ve, should be freed, that Gunguro should prohibit milandos and con­
fiscation of Portuguese merchandise and lastly, but not least, th<C^Makombe
• should deal severely with any offenders against Portuguese merchants or alt-
96
ernatively send them to the Portuguese authorities •
Luckily for Barwe, the Portuguese were not in a position to press
hard for their demands because of administrative disorders at the villa of
Sena. Inacio Caetano Alvim, Governor of Rios de Sena, had to rush from his
capital, Tete, to the villa of Sena in July,1769* in order to intervene among
97the feuding moradores •
95. Ibid.
96. ’Letter from Alvim to captain General 3.10.1768’. Caetano Montez, Invcntario. 
p.210. TnACtO de Mcf/o e
| 97* ’Letter from^Alvim to captain General No.731* 16.7.1769'» Sena. Caetano
Montez, Inventario...pp,.1^0-2.
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The impact of Gunguro Makombe's attitude towards the Portuguese
has clearly shown how events in the Kingdom of Barwe, whether arising from
civil wars or from conflicts between the Portuguese and the Barwists, reduced
the volume of trade between Sena and Manyika during the l8th Century, as shown
98
by incidents which have been cited in the years 1758, 1768-1770 and 179^ •
It would be wrong to imagine that there was absolutely no trading 
activities in ivory South of the Zambezi in the raid l8th Century. Ivory trade 
did exist in Makaranga and Butua in spite of the political turmoils which were 
tailing place at this time. In his observations of 'Kaffir land* Mauriz 
Thomans points out that Monomotapa's palace "is always surrounded by a
99decorative fence of elephant teeth . The name Manyanga (horns) for Changamire's
court at Dhlo-Dhlo suggests trade in ivory^0. The manner in which these
potentates acquired these tusks is not clearly stated. Both Changamire and
Monomotapa probably sent out their own hunters to kill elephants, or women to •
collect tusks, which elephants lost in their fights or due to old age. In
addition to that, some of the tusks were very likely obtained through a custom
whereby a tusk that first touched the ground whenever an elephant fell from a
shot, was given to the owner of the land, Be that as it may. The superiority
of the ivory trade during this period of the gold trade is shown by the fact
that 'almost every year three large Portuguese ships' left Mozambique laden
with them. The loading usually took place on the 30th June for the ships
101
which departed from Mozambique on the l8th and 30th of August •
98. See section II of this chapter.
For later examples of the importance of Barwe in Mayika-Portuguese trade 
see Chapters IV,(1822) and V, (1833).
99* Thomans Mauriz, Reise und Lebensbeshreibung. Augsburg 1877» Chapter 9*
p.100.
100. Changamire's Throne, erected at the centre of his royal court and on which 
he used to sit when giving audience or presiding over trials, was 
ornamented with ivory. The importance attached to ivory by the Changamires 
is illustrated by a story, that one of the Changamires; conceived the idea 
of catching and taming wild elephants. But of course the scheme failed. See 
Posselt, F.W.T. Fact and Fiction.1935i Bulaways, pp.1^1,153.
Also see Memorias e Documentos 1290, Lisbon, p.l69.
101. Thomans Mauriz. Reise und Lebensbeshreibung, Augsburg,18771 p.106.
$9.
The impact of this shift in trade to the North seems to have had its greatest
effect on the Manyika gold trade during the 1750's. Quite a considerable amount
of trade, which used to be done at the feira of Masekesa through the Kingdoms
of Barwe and Quiteve, was then centred at Sungue,a land which shared borders
102
with all the abovementioned Kingdoms • This trade was so remunerative that
Francisco de Mello e Castro was led to suggest in his description of Rios de
Sena to the Viceroy of India, in 1750, that the fortress at the feira of
Masekesa, in Manyika, should be removed from there to Sungue for the security
of the merchants. The trading post at Sungue was, apparently, rigidly
organised. Nobody was allowed to trade by himself or through another person
103
outside the feira on pain of a death penalty . It is not clearly stated 
whether an 'authority' who lived there was a capita'o-mor or not, but there 
was a priest to administer sacrament and Mass.
It would seem that the desperate state of the feira of Masekesa
did not last very long. The trade fortunes varied drastically from time to
time. We learn from an account of a capit'ao-mor of the feira of Masekesa, in
the'Memorias........1 that only a few years prior to the year of 1762 there
10^
used to be a flourishing trade at the feira • African traders from distant 
lands brought ivory, gold, wax, pearls, honey, crystal rock, probably from 
Maungwe, cotton, skins of different animals, cattle, which were largely 
exchanged for cloth, liquors, arms, powder-shot and beads which the moradores 
of Sena and Quelimahesent through their vashambadzi. These articles
102. Castro Francisco de Mello e. 'Rios de Sena' Annaes Conselho Pltramarino.
Pt. nao of icial 1867, p.115*
105. Ibid.
There is a more detailed description of the Portuguese community in Sungue, 
in 1767, Fr.Placido Atilando, (Religiozo Dominico) was in charge of a 
beautiful chapel. It was well cared for ^ although the curate of the parish
had no stipulated salary. See 'Descripcao Geral 1767' in Memorias e
Documentos.•..1890 p.208. *
10^ f. Anon. 'Memorias...1762' in Andrade A.A. Relacoes....p. 193*
Also in Dias Carvalho L.F. Fontes para a Historia....p.222
were given to Vashambadzi on credit. The capitao-mor and his soldiers obtained 
much profit out of this trade, but due to injustices and extortions practised 
by him, together with the soldiers and their vashambadzi, on African traders 
from the interior, commerce declined as the latter gradually left the feira 
and by 1762 trade at the feira of Masekesa had reached its nadir.
In the last quarter of the l8th Century the situation had changed. 
There is ample evidence of trade activities at the feira of Masekesa, of 
merchants going from the feira to Quiteve, despite Portuguese complaints 
about the decline of trade. The nature of trade commodities had also 
changed.
The author of the ’Descrip^ao Corografica 1 and Manuel Galvao
da SilVa*s travelogue concur on this. Trade was mostly carried out in such
commodities of Indian origin as white glass beads, and a small quantity of blue
beads, fine Indian pewter, machira, which were woven in Rios de Sena, white and
coloured cotton cloths, which the constituted the principal item of the East
105
African coastal trade • Nevertheless, the zuartes and especially the dotins,
which are broader lengths of cloth, sixteen metres long, had a greater sale
throughout the territory of Manyika. Of almost the same popularity were the
precato, sadem acanga, short cured savagagin, the cured .being worn only by the
royal persons and the nobility, the cured sameter being used for sacrificial
10 6ceremonies which were performed in order to appease the vadzimu • There were 
many types of cloth on the market of Rios de Sena, some of which, as described 
by Mauriz Thomans, were "coarse and bad, not fine, and of a black or dark blue
105* Da Silva Manuel Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens.•...* 1790*
Dias Carvalho L.F. Fontes para a Kistoria pp*32$- /.
106. Anon. Descrip9ao Corografica....Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U.
Lobato A. Evoluqao I p.69*
Lobato A. Senhorial da Zambezia. p.136.
101.
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colour" . But the Manyika, according to Galvao1s information in 1790, who
were used to having plentiful supplies of cloth, could judge better its quality
and were able to obtain it 'in a thousand different designs and so have first
pick.' The situation was different in some distant lands which were governed
by Makombe of Barwe, 'where all sorts of cloths are to be found, boosted to
10 8
twice the value they have in Feira..... w. In exchange for these articles,
the Portuguese received gold, ivory, mattocks which were well-tempered and
held in higher esteem than the ones which the Yaos went to sell at Mozambique.
Copper came from Duma which was calculated to be six days' journey from the 
109
feira of Masekesa . The fact that arras and powder-shot were openly sold
' " |
shortly before 1762^^ at the feira of Masekesa in violation of a ban of 
1111719 shows that the control of the feira trade had gone out of the hands
I
of the kuthorities at Sena, but the absence of these two commodities in the
i ' v '  S
items listed in the Descripcao Corografica and Galvao»s account suggests a
greater and more effective control on theadministration of the feira by the
Portuguese authorities at the end of the l8th Century.
of
The method/trade, however, did not change very much. The articles
who
were still being given to the vashambadzi /signed bonds, giving as their
security themselves, the property they possessed and that which they would
112
acquire, which very often amounted to very little or nothing •
107* Thomans Mauriz. Reise und Lebensbeshreibung. op.cit. pp.l02»3«
108. Da Silva Manuel Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens »
Dias Carvalho L.F. Pontes para a Historia  •
109* Ibid.
110. See this chapter infra.
111. Letter from Dom Luis de Menezes, Viceroy of India, to the factor of Sena,
Joze de Mello Leito 21.1.1719 Goa in Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. vol.V. p.5^*
112. Castro Francisco de Mello e. 'Rios de Sena* (1730) Annaes do Conselho
Ultramarino. Pt. nao of/icial serie II 1867, p.108.
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Further evidence about trade activities at the feira of Masekesa, is 
discernible in the complaints of the Quitevans about the introduction of a
large quantity of cheap cloth in their land by merchants resident ;or trading
113 ! 
at the feira of Masekesa . The Quitevans wanted the two bans, which were
passed on 12th April,1751 and 17th August,1738, enforced and the transgressors
to be exemplarily punished. In 1780-1, Antonio Manuel de Melo e Castro, Governor
of Rios, acted promptly and issued a ban to the effect that no moradores from
Sena or the feira of Masekesa should trade their cloth in Quiteve, either by
\
HZf
themselves or through their vas±ambadzi . Quiteve was to remain exclusively 
reserved for the local business community in Sofala, and that even the port of 
Sofala was not to be used by the moradores or the merchants from the feira of 
Masekesa. This ban was put in public places at the feira of Masekesa. But it 
would seem that this ban was not effective because there were complaints about
the trade routes being closed between Manyika and Quiteve during the civil
115
wars in 1793 •
A similar ban was passed in the same year to deal with the unauthorised
fcommissarios volantes1 who secretly came to the feira of Masekesa from Sena and
116
its environs . A noticeable decline in trading activities at the feira prompted 
the Governor of Rios de Sena, Antonio de Mello e Castro to issue an order banning 
"Commissarios volantes” from staying at, or passing to and from, the feira of 
Masekesa under pain of imprisonment for six months and confiscation of merchandise, 
either on its way to or from the Manyika feira. A half of the confiscated
113. Order issued by Jose de Vasconcellos de Almeida, 5»9»1780. Cxa.l6. Moc.
A.H.U. This was a general problem in Rios de Sena. See Letter from 
Francisco de Mello e Castro to the Viceroy of India, 20.11.1752 in
Memorias  E documentos...l890.Lisob. pp.2*fl-2. Only six different
kinds of commodities, known as fato de Lei, were permitted; e.g.
(1) missing a (beads) (2) thick beads from Belgate, (3) calain, (*f) powder 
shot, white clothes, raw and black, (known as chuabos or betangil, 
amandabas capotins and zuartes) (5) chanderes (6) tucurins from Belegate 
and Cambaia. Lobato A. Evoluqao  Vol.l. 1957»PP*257»251.
11*+. Order to all Portuguese settlements in. Rios de Sena dated 16.1.1781 signed
by Antonio Manoel de Mello e Castro.
115. Questao da posse daterra e minas de Quiteve Pasta 6,(l8*+2-3) Moc.A.K.U,. 
This document contains information for the years 1808 and 1795*
116. Ban dated 22*3.1780 and signed by Antonio Manoel de Souza, Sena. Also see 
letter of acknowledgement by a clerk of the feira of Manyika, Joao da 
Cruz, dated 13.5«17oO.
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merchandise was to be used to defray the expenses of administration of the
I!
feira and the^other half for defraying the expenses of the Church^ If any­
one were caught for a second time, the merchandise would be confiscated as
|
stated above and the individual concerned would be imprisoned for a year or
more. Eventually that particular "commissario volante" would lose his rights
to sell goods on credit. The bans remained paper intentions, largely because
there were no means of enforcement. The Portuguese were busily occupied with
more urgent problems of defence and survival on the East African coast. The
117defence of Mombasa from 1698-1730 is a case in point •
This, therefore, meant that quite a number of issues affecting 
Manyika-Portuguese relations had not been solved even by the second half of 
the.l8th Century. Factors such as military weakness, lack of proper personnel 
at the feira, the rise of powerful individuals such as Guiao, who assumed the 
running of the feira into their own hands and made alliances with disgruntled 
provincial governors against Chikanga, desertion of soldiers from the feira to 
join the regulos and the Portuguese policy of by-passing Chikanga to deal with 
his vassals, as if they were independent potentates in their own right, brought 
home to Chikanga the need to control Portuguese movement, commerce, and 
jurisdiction over the Manyika who lived at the feira, and, eventually, to 
define the nature of relations between the capitao-mor and Chikanga himself.
He did not expel them, a thing he could have done easily, and the fact that 
the Portuguese continued to trade in his lands, indicated that, by and large
117. Boxer C.R. and Azevedo, Carlos de. Fort Jesus and The Portuguese in 
Mombasa, 1393-1729• London, 19&0, pp.39-86.
10*K
Manyika commerce was remunerative. The outcries about injustice, etc., 
observable in official correspondence, were probably intended to conceal the real 
profitable na/ure of Manyika trade in order to discourage demands j for remitt­
ances to Mozambique or Sena. It may very well be that these complaints were 
made to impress the higher authorities about the enormity of the problem the 
capitao-mor and his subordinates were about to tackle or had already tackled.
A step to ameliorate this situation at an administrative level was
taken by the Governor of Rios de Sena in 1771* when he drew \up a regimento
\
providing for sweeping reforms of the abuses which had crept into the trade
*18of Rios de Sena as a whole . There are two aspects to this regimento. The
first section was intended to improve the trade situation in Manyika. A
second one, appearing under the same Codice number was intended to (a) regulate
trade between the feira of Zumbo and the lands of Monomotapa and (b) regulate ■
trade between the feiras of Manyika and Zumbo. There is sufficient evidence
119of inter-feira trade between the feira in Manyika and the one in Zumbo .
This regimento was significant in several ways, It provided a chance for the
120
trading post of Manyika and several others to be raised to a status of villa, 
provided a basis for later regimentos; it offers a basis for comparison of
118. Codice 1332, No.30, Moc.A.H.U.
118• Ibid.
120. A villa is a borough or town. It is generally assumed that nearly all the 
important trading posts in Mozambique and Rios de Senna were elevated to 
this category on 9*5*1761. A royal charter, addressed to the then captain- 
general of Mozambique, Cabisto Rangel Pereira de Sa, known as 'Carta de 
Calisto Raugel' is the basis of this error. Calisto Raugel Pereira de Sa 
died before he received this charter. However, this did raise the fort­
ress of Mozambique into a villa. As far as the other places were concerned, 
the text read: "in the ports and villages of Quelimane, Sena, Tette, Zumbo 
and Manica, Sofalla, Inhambane and the islands, the same jurisdiction is 
granted to erect these places into villas, provided they have the 
necessary pre-requisites." Evidently the discretion to erect any of these 
places into a villa was left to the respective regional governors. The 
date, 9*5*176l, applies to Mozambique only; the others are different. For 
example, the date for Zumbo is 27*5*1763) (according to Mario Costa) for 
Sofala is 20.5*1763 (A.X. Soares, Descrippao da Villa de Sofalla. 18571 P*21) 
The trading post of Manica was never raised to the category of a villa 
until 19^6, when the village of Macequecev&s called 'vila de Manica,' 
administered by a local Junta.
De Eca F.G. de Almeida. Ilistoria das Guerras no Zambeza, Vol.I. Agencia 
Geral do Ultrarna/1953i PP• 363-38/+ • For an analysis of the 'Instruccoes' 
for Calixto Raugel Pereira de Sa, dated 7*5*1761, see Andrade A.A. 'Um 
caso tipico da Filosofia Politica da Ilistoria Portuguesa' in Studia 9)
1962, pp. 7-27*
salaries of different officers of the various garrisons and, once again the
capitao-mors of the feira of Masekesa were officially paid from the royal
121 / revenue •
122
His salary was fixed at five bars of cloth (i.e. 2,000 cloths)
800 of which he paid to Chikanga, to be shared between him and Changamire.
The salary of the various officers at the feira was not stated then, but,
123from a report by Diogo de Souza in 1780, this has been established . Be- 
sides^this regimento attempted to regulate the conduct of tlie capitao-mor, 
as many of the ills at the feira were directly attributed to a choice of
A- t°
capitaas-mor. He was not allowed/indulge in any other form of commerce 
besides that of the five bars of his salary. Violation of any of the clauses 
of the regimento was supposed to be punished in accordance with the seriousness
of his offences. He was expected to execute the regimento to the letter. The
capitao-mor's attitude towards African residents or itinerant merchants at the 
feira was not supposed to be influenced by hopes of economic benefit but rather 
by considerations of justice. The regimento's demands on the behaviour of the 
capitao-mor were quite exacting. His conduct was supposed to be exemplary to­
wards the Africans whom he was supposed to civilize.* The capitao-mor was 
enjoined not to punish them arbitrarily, but whenever it was necessary to 
punish any of them, the names of the offenders, together with a list of
121. Codice 1332, N0.3O, Moc.A.H.U.
122. 1 bar of cloth 400 pieces ot corjas., 5 bars = 2,000 panos of 8 'hands’ in
length and a covado (26" in width). Each hand (2 x 22 cm.) was 44cm. and a
covado was 66cm. The captain, therefore, received 2. ,000 panos of the 
above specified measurements. Cf.400 panos he received in 1765* See 
'Rellacao do Pagamento da Capitania de Sena e raais Prezidios da sua 
JurisdiC9ao principiado emabril, 1763.' Cxa.11.Moc.A.H.U. For the basis
of my calculations, see Boleo O.'O Regimento para o novo Comercio de 
Mo9ambique de 16931 in Studia Revista Semestral No.3*(1959) Lisbon,p.9* 
Lobato A. Evolupao  op.cit. p. 45.
123. Diogo de Souza, Capitao Geral. General pay for the captaincy and sub­
ordinated posts. Cxa.3*Av.Moc. A.H.U.cited in Lobato A. Evolucao....
op.cit. p.67* Capitao-mor - 2,000, Captain of the Garrison - 300, Ensign -
240, Quartermaster - I08, 2 Commanders - 134, Drummer - 180, 10 soldiers -
180.
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their offences were to be sent to the Governor of Rios de Sena. The
conciliatory tone of the regimento clearly illustrated a lesson the
Portuguese had learned hitherto, that 'without friendship and faithful 
12k
dealing' with the Kings of the lands, trade would be in danger and
that the best way to achieve harmony was to follow the 'most legal and
the most politic method.' Portuguese official policy towards potentates
in S.E.Africa, as expressed in the regimento, was, thus, one of submission,
probably because they believed that 'as long as the world exists, so will
125
the Monomotapa emperors' • The grandeur of the Monomotapa empire was still
very much alive in their minds. This is evident from the instructions which
j
were given to the capitao-»mor. The capitao-mor was instructed among other
things 'to pay the greatest respect, attention, submission' to the emperor,
J
because'he was 'the legitimate sovereign whom he would serve' and was not to 
take into account -
...the incidental difference of colour, because 
all these are legitimate flings, who are allowed 
by God or the power of the Conqueror or by the 
voice of^jae same God in declamation of the 
people
Further evidence to support the fact that the regimento was one of submission, 
is to be seen in the instructions that -
...since the capitao-mor, as well as the garrison , 
are in the service of the Emperor, they are not 
under anybody's subordination or inspection save 
that of the Emperor..••
12^. Codice 1332,No.30. 19.1.1771* Moc.A.H.U. op.cit. 
123* Ibid.
126. Ibid.
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and "for his three months’ leave" the capitao-mor "must not apply to anyone
but the emperor." In addition to these instructions, arrangements were made
for a "triennial tribute" to the Emperor. This consisted of velvet umbrellas,
127
a large arm-chair, a small stool, a jar made of any metal
The capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa was supposed to enter the
feira with similar ceremonies and customary salutes, and to pay Chikanga the
greatest submission. All capitao-mors of Manyika were supposed to declare to
Chikanga that they were at the feira of Manyika to serve the "very High, the
128
Most Powerful Sovereign, the Most Faithful King of Portugal" . These high- 
sounding epithets did nothing to cow Chikanga. He governed his Kingdom as he 
saw fit and took no notice of them, as will be seen later in the century. The 
capitao-mors were enjoined not to move with their garrison without express per­
mission of the Kings in order to avoid suspicion. They were required to per­
form certain duties, which smacked of espionage. The capitao-mcrs were to take 
the greatest care to be aware of all events, movements, deliberations of the 
Kings, their allies and enemies and immediately communicate the information 
to the Governor of Rios de Sena. It was a duty of a capitao-mor to order the 
soldiers of the garrison to take arms every morning but only for trooping the 
colours as he deemed it fit, to inspect them for cleanliness, enforce discipline, 
arm them properly, teach them good manners and to encourage them to pray. In 
short the troops had to be "the best regulated and orderly in the world’.’
(Baltasar Pereira do Lago forgot to mention that they were, perhaps, the most 
irregularly paid).
127. Ibid.
These gifts signified high status, especially the 'sombreiro'(umbrella).
This word was used by the Portuguese in India to designate an umbrella 
made from expensive material, ornamented, possessing a large shade fixed 
on to a thick long stick. This v/as held by an Indian of low caste, 
known as 'boi* or ’coolie’. This umbrella was a sign of nobility and was 
used during festivals and such occasions as v/eddings, baptisms or funerals 
for children. The Portuguese and other Europeans v/ho considered themselves 
of a high social standing used similar umbrellas. See Pissurencar S.S. 
Panduranga. Regimentos das Fortalezas da India. Bastora Goa 1951» P»123, F. 
note.3*
128. Codice 1 3 3 N0.3O, op.cit.
The regimento, for the first time, laid down the 'qualities of
I
capitao-mors. / The capitao-mors in future, were to be persons with a sense 
I j
of duty, a concept of honour, not only towards the sovereign, butjalso to­
wards their subjects, a quick perception, so that they could anticipate events 
and take precautionary measures in the interests of the state.
This reform act, to a large extent, turned out to be one of those 
•repeated initiatives' from Sena or Tette which were repeatedly frustrated 
by the venality and incompetence of the authorities on the spot.
The high idealism manifest throughout this regimento was out of 
tune with the realities of the situation in the interior. The ideal gentle­
man of the regimento would not make a practical capitao-mor. What v/as 
needed was a real sertanejo who had multiple contacts with the Kings and the 
Princes of the interior.
This discussion of Manyika-Portuguese relations at the feira of 
Masekesa would be incomplete without a close examination of the methods used 
by the Chikangas during the l8th Century, to control Portuguese commercial 
activities in their Kingdom. They used a number of methodsj-
(a) each trader ©r mushambadzi was expected to give the capitao-mor a piece 
a samefcer which the latter passed on to a territorial prince. This arrange­
ment proved inadequate in practice. Princes, provincial governors, the 
Chikangas themselves and their bingas demanded more and more cloth and a
refusal to comply with the requests often ended up in milandos. A milando
\
(murandu) as the Portuguese understood it at the time is best described in
—  129 
Galvao*s words:
129. da Silva Manuel Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens * in Dias Carvalho L.F.
Fontes para a Ilistoria..... pp.323-3^2. For a further discussion of 
milandos see Botelho, S. Xavier. Memoria Estatlstica Sobre os Dominios 
Portugueses na Africa Oriental. Lisbon,1935» pp.224-8. Gamitto defined 
a milando as a 'debt1, an obligation contracted and not fulfilled; an 
offence, a theft, a homicide or any complaint or anything to argue and
defend. See Gamitto A.C.P. (Trans.Ian Cunnison) King Kazembe  Vol.
I. Lisbon,i960, Junta Investigates do Ultramar. No.42. pp.99*
109.
Whatever crime is laid to a person's charge, or 
whatever lawsuit is brought against him, is called 
a milando, the judging of the case is called tongar 
and the penalty inflicted on one v/ho loses the case 
is called chibinga. The Portuguese are harried by 
these milandos, as the slightest thing serves as a 
pretext for the Africans to trouble us and rob us.
It would be a miracle for anyone to enter the Africans' 
territory and get out again without going through some 
milando, as this is a trick they employ for their 
thieving. Among some of the ridiculous milandos I 
witnessed, - some of which I must conceal for the 
sake of decency - was one I saw brought against, an 
African who was a cook to the commander-in-chief, 
and for which he paid a chibinga of several pieces 
of cloth. This cook, who had already been there 
before, was a sworn friend of a Maniqueiro (Manyika) 
who came to visit him one day, bringing with him one 
of his daughters. When the cook saw her, he asked 
j if the child was his daughter, saying how much she 
resembled a daughter of his own who died. This was 
enough to make the Maniqueiro say: 'This very girl is
your daughter, and I was the sorcerer who killed her.
I And as she has come to life again, take care of her 
I and give her food and clothing.' The cook was eventually 
condemned for having compared a living person with a 
! dead one. So I heard told by the Negro Princess of Feira 
by whom the milando was tried in the house of the 
commander-in-chief» .
Milandos were common practice in Rios de Sena. This case reveals what- an 
enormous gap of misunderstanding existed hetween the Manyika and the 
Portuguese. It was small things like the story of the above-mentioned cook, 
which more often than not exacerbated relations seriously.
Travellers often sparked off milandos from the Chikangas, who 
suspected the latters' motives. This was the case with Manuel Galvao da Silva 
in 1790. Galvao tried to hide his identiy as a naturalist, but Chikanga 
somehow learned about his intentiqns to study.the country and its fauna.
130. Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens ' in CarV^/^6iW‘<isFontes para a Historia....
195^, PP.323-332.
Galvao was immediately accused of spying in -
...his territory in order to stir up a war against him 
and cast a spell on, the mines to make gold disappear 
by means of a stone hammer - a tool not used in those 
parts, and which Chikanga had never seen or heard of 
in all his life. ^
Chikanga threatened that he would have a drum of war beaten at the feira
and order his bingas and soldiers to discipline the Portuguese and hurl
Galvao beyond the frontiers of the Manyika Kingdom, unless Galvao paid
him a hundred large pieces of cloth, which were worth four gold pieces
according to the current price at the feira. In his historical account
of the feira, Cirne estimated that almost a third of the goods which
132the feirantes used to bring into the feira were spent in this way .
This was the situation up to 1793-6, when Manyika-Portuguese relations
i
took a different turn altogether.
(b) A second method by which the Chikangas controlled events at the 
feira of Masekesa was to appoint one of the princes to reside within
the vicinity of the feira and to report regularly the events thereof.
133 134
Examples of Manaca in 1790 , the Princes Mossaza in 1793 and 1810
135and Mutema in 1822 , who were reported "dominating the feira" show that
this was a standard practice, in some cases Chikanga put one of his wives 
in charge of the feira. This was the case in 1790. Chikanga's'wife who 
styled herself princess' of that area was in charge of the feira. The fact
131. da Silva Manuel Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens ' in Dias L.F. de
Carvalho. Fontes para a Ilistoria, Geografia e Comercio de Mozambique, 
op.cit. in Anais Vol.IX. Tomo I, op.cit. pp.323-332.
de Andrade,Jeronimo Jos6 Nogueira. 'Do Estado em que ficavao os negocios 
da Capitania de Mossambique nos fins de Novembro do anno de 1789 com 
alguns observacoessobre a causa da decadencia do comercio dos 
Estabelecimentos Portugueses na Costa Oriental da Africa' in Arquivo das 
Colonias Vol.l. Coimbra 19171 Pp.92-93.
132. Codice 1^68 No.76, Moc.A.H.U. op.cit.
133. Galvao. 'Diario das Viagens ' in Fontes Para a Historia....
195^»Lisbon, p.329*
. 13^. Letter to Constantino Pereira from Diogo Rodrigues. Cxa.57» Moc.A.H.U. 
17*7*l8lO. Also Treaty between Inhacompunza and the Portuguese. 
29*12.1795* Cxa.31 Moc.A.H.U.
135* Cxa.71, 3.10.1822. A petition signed by Ricardo da Costa Soares,
provisional commandant and capitao-mor of the feira, Louren^o Manuel 
de Almeida, Joze Joaquim Mascarenhas, Cypriano Xavier de Sa, Andre Manuel 
Fernandes.
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that this woman styled herself ’princess' and not 'queen' leqds one to 
suspect whether this was not one of Chikanga*s daughters. The King's 
wives, according to traditional Manyika practice, were never set over 
districts to rule, but it was, and still is, common practice to give 
princes and princesses some land to govern. The woman whom Galvao saw 
at the feira in 1790 was most likely Chikanga*s daughter.
Be that as it may, she received as her due a piece of sameter, 
which was small to start with but grew in size in time. Every one enter­
ing the feira de Manica had to pay this. A similar practice prevailed in
Quiteve at the feira of Bandire, where an inhamasango (head of the village)
' 136decided milandos and empofias which arose in his raining region . Chikanga's
i
method- of delegating authority to his sons and daughters to supervise the
! i ■
administration of the feira were later copied, perfected and practised by
the greatest and most well-known prazo holder in the Eambezi during the 19th
137Century, Manuel Antonio de Souza .
(c) A third method was cultural. Chikanga used to keep the feirantes under
his eye by demanding that, if they did not’ want the feira to be closed, they
138should attend the King's marriage, funeral and coronation ceremonies •
They were, like his sons and provincial, governors scattered throughout the 
Kingdom, expected to bring presents on such occasions to give to the King's 
bingas, inhamais (pages) and other court officials. Quite often these
136. Baptista J. Renato. Caminho de Ferro da Beira a Manica, Excursoes e 
estudos efectuados em 1891, sob a direccao do capitab de engenharia. 
Lisboa Imprensa Nacional (1892) p.l*f. '
137. Excerpto do 'Relatorio de uma Viagem as terras do Changamire'. in 
Memoria e Documentos acerca dos Direitos de Portugal aos territories 
de Machona, E Nyassa lo90, Lisboa Imprensa Nacional p.313*
Continho Joao Azevedo. Relatiorio official da Campanha do Barwe em 1902. 
Lisboa,190^, pp.16-17.
138. Descrip^o Corografica do Eeino da Minica, seus Custumes e Leis. Anon.
Cxa.17,Moc.A.H.U. Excerpts of this appear in Lobato A. Evolucao....
op.cit. pp.61-70. Lobato A. Colonizacao Senhorial da Eambezia. Junta 
de Investigates do Ultramar, Lisboa 1962,~ pp. 127-137•
methods of controlling Portuguese trade and movement were resented by the 
capitao-mor and other feirantes as insults. i
/ ' !
(d) An effort to challenge Chikanga's decisions rightly or wrongly raised
the question of jurisdiction over Manyika subjects who lived within the
territorial jurisdiction of the feira de Manica. This again gave rise to
milandos. Manyika Kings and princes refused 'that any Manyika' should be
imprisoned without their express orders to that effect. The capitao-mor,
however, could imprison some Manyika within the feira, who had offended or~T" \
\
violated the laws of the feira, provided a payment of eight pieces of cloth
17'9
was made to a Prince, in whose land the offender lived " . Prince Mutangatua's 
decision in 1780 is a case in point • When a certain Portuguese was accusing 
another of plotting to shoot him with an arrow, it was agreed that some Manyika, 
presumably one w^o formed part of this gossip, should be forced to give 
evidence. Prince Mutangatua refused, giving as his reason that no authorities 
could imprison a person in his land without first paying the 'customary 
eight pieces of cloth.'
A milando case which best illustrates the problem of jurisdiction 
was one made against Lionardo da Silveira Monteiro, otherwise known by his 
African name Samba, Who owned much land including the prazo of Gorongoza •
He committed a milando against a Manyika, and a son of Chikanga, whose name
139* Letter from Joao de Almeida to Manoel de Mello e Castro 3*3*1781.
Cxa.18. Moc. A.H.U.
1^0. Ibid.
l4l. Letter from Luis Felix to the Governor 26.7*179^ Cxa.31»Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from the Governor to Custodio de Almeida Braganca, capitao-mor 
of the feira of Manica, 26.7*179^ Cxa.31*Moc.A.H.U. Encl.2b.7*179^*
Ibid.
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was Mweza, threatened to confiscate the fazenda of the capitao-mor and 
to stop all trade at the feira of Masekesa. This episode is worth re­
lating in detail because of the light it throws on the complicated way 
in which a milando was processed, including duration and the number of
people involved. It is related that a Manyika, who lived in the lands
*
of Mweza, Chikanga's son, wanted to 'steal' a woman and take her 'violently'.
A certain Monteiro was around when this happened. He 'punched' this Manyika 
several times. It is not clear whether this was an act of sympathy for the 
woman, or that they fought over her. This reads like one of those complex
Portuguese promiscuous sexual relations which led to a closure of the feira
• 14-2of Bandire, when one of the moradores committed adultery with one of the Queens ,
/ 3
or the case of Joze Gomes Monteiro , a sargento-mor of the villa of Sena,
who was banished to the feira de Manica for a similar reason.
Be that as it may, a milando was made against the captain of the 
infantry, who promised that within four months Monteiro would be brought 
before Chikanga for trial. At the end of four months, King Chikanga sent 
regulo Marazua to remind the captain of the infantry that the period of 
time that they had agreed on had expired. In the meantime, Marazua cap­
tured two cows belonging to a mushambadzi of a Swahili trader at the feira 
of Masekesa and sent one to Chikanga. Chikanga demanded that both the 
•cows and Monteiro should be delivered to him. Fearing the consequences, 
the inhabitants of the feira discussed the problem seriously and agreed 
that since they had no alternative the capitao-morshould meet Chikanga's
14-2. Baptista J. Renato. Caminho de Ferro da Beira 1891. op.cit. p. 14-.
Botelho S. Xavier. Memoria Estatistica op.cit.p./fc 3
'Diario da Viagem de Mo9ambique para os Rios de Sena, Feita pelo 
Govemador dos mesmos Rios' in Documentos para a Historia das Colonias 
Portugu^zes. Lisboa. Imprensa Nacional ICG 9. Estudos Colonias Vol.III. 
p.19.
1demands in two days’ time for the sake of the feirantes and the vashambadzi •
V
The^ arrangement, which never worked, concerning the settlement of 
the milandos, was that the capitao-mor would decide all milando cases
j
brought against the Portuguese or Manyika who lived within Portuguese
jurisdiction at the feira, and Chikanga would decide all milando cases
1^ -5
which were brought against the Manyika • But the decisions reached by
the capitao-mor were of no avail, because the Manyika could always appeal
to Chikanga *who passes judgement as he sees fit and by right of having 
ikG
the stronger handl1 •
\
It should not be assumed precipitately that Chikanga settled 
milando cases in favour of his subjects, regardless of justice. There 
is an example to illustrate Chikanga’s high notion of justice. A Manyika, 
who worked for Joaquira de Moraes, had a milando against another who worked 
for Antonio Joze da Costa e Almeida . This African, who might have been 
either a Barwist or.’ a Manyika, made a request to both the regulos on the 
trade route, Chikanga and Makombe, that they should confiscate the cloth 
of the Muzungos on their way to Manyika. It is related that both Kings 
refused to do this after the case had been investigated by the manamucates. 
Hence it would be an act of partisanship to cast a slur on Chikanga’s idea 
of justice.
lVt. Letter from Luis Felix to the Governor, 26.7*179^i Cxa.31• Moc.A.H.U. 
Encl.28.8.179^.
1^5* da Silva, ’Diario das Viagens.....* in Dias, Carvelho, Fontes para a
Historia   195^ i P*330
1^6. Ibid.
1^7. Letter from Fernandes do Fozario to the Governor, 19.8.1793* Cxa.31• 
Moc.A.H.U.
Some of these milandos were engineered by Portuguese traders in
their attempts to outshine one another commercially. This is suggested,
for instance, by the case of Antonio Jose da Costa e Almeida. The capitao-
mor ordered Almeida’s African servant to be imprisoned for some offence at 
l*f8
the feira but Almeida immediately protested, set his slave free in 
defiance of the capitao-mor’s orders and hurled an avalanche of insults at 
the captain and obstructed him from executing his duties. Almeida took the 
law into his own hands and,, together with all his slaves, the 'prisoner' not 
excluded, challenged Moraes to come out of his house. A fierce battle of 
words took place and the scene was dragged on to the house of an adjudante, 
who ordered that Almeida should be fined. This demonstrates two aspects of 
the Manyika-Portuguese contact. First the Portuguese accepted the institution 
of milando and some of them tried to manipulate it to further their own 
commercial interests. Secondly, this unveils before us the type of personal 
concern which a master had for his mushambadzi. This will be even more 
evident as we go further into this period.
The problem of milandos lingered on up to the end of the 19th 
Century, when an attempt was made by the Portuguese Government to codify 
them"^. Ignorance of Manyika customs, and a resentment of the capitao- 
mor and his moradores at the feira of Masekesa to Chikanga’s attempts to 
regulate Portuguese commerce in his Kingdom and Portuguese jurisdiction over 
his subjects at the feira, brought about milandos and the concomitant complaints
1^8. Ibid /
1^9. Revista de Manica e Sofala. Publicapao Mensal. Illustrada. ed. Jose da 
Grapa Santos. Lisboa,1904. Vols.I-VI.
about Chikanga’s allegedly hostile commercial policy.
There is another aspect of Manyika-Portuguese contact to he 
discussed before I discuss the changed situation in 1796 and after. This 
relates to the commercial policy of a £hikanga, who styled himself Goiera 
III, during the 1780’s and early 1790’s. It is impossible to determine 
his reign accurately, but it would seem that he was King from the 1780*s 
to 1795.
The dejbth of Portuguese resentment to Goiera Ill’s methods of
controlling Portuguese trade and movement in his Kingdom was shown by the
150fact that there was not a single morador , except one merchant, at the 
151 ~
feira of Manica • The capitao-morwas so m  name. Goiera III was,
perhaps, one of the few extremely shrewd Kings that ever ruled the Kingdom 
of Manyika. He was so abstemious that, although he was the owner of the
p
mines in Manyika, he did not indulge in extravagant royal pagean^, neither
152 ^
did he value Portuguese cruzados . If he wanted a capitao-mor to send him 
a gift, he sent him first a dogado, and when he wanted to display great kind­
ness, he used to send the capitao-mor two cows. He valued cows more than 
gold and if this type of gift were not reciprocated ’ten times’ he conveyed 
his dissatisfaction and blamed the capitao-mor as a method of asking for
more presents. He taxed his people only when he needed corn, but even then, 
153
very moderately . This is well-known statecraft, whereby Kings and princes
150. Mappa dos Moradores dos Rios de Sena. Villa Capital Tette, 3*6.1782. 
Cxa.19. Moc.A.H.U. Drawn by Antonio Manoel de Mello e Castro .
131. The’Descrip9ao Corografica.....’ puts the number of merchants at 3
b, Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. This is clearly demonstrated by Map S., in the 
Appendix.^ f
132. 'Descrippao Corografica ’ op.cit.
133. Ibid.
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exact tribute from the villages according to the wealth of the village 
in cattle, goats and agricultural produce. It is some form of redistributive 
taxation. The philosophy behind this is that the villagers cannot be pressed
t
too hard because they can flee to the other Kingdom where they will strengthen 
the forces of the enemy.
Goiera*s subjects were reasonably comfortable and contented .
15^f
during the last quarter of the l8th Century • Vices such as ’ambition,*
’avarice,1 'thievish propensities,' which the author of the 'Descripcao'
ignorantly attributed to African monarchs in general, were noticeably absent 
155in Goiera III • His laws, which were firm and just, earned him unquestionable
i
obedience from his subjects. The tranquility which reigned in his Kingdom,
and the generally high standard of living enjoyed by his subjects, accounted
for a I large population, both indigenous and foreign, in his Kingdom.
I
The tradition of controlling the foreigners' activities was
extended to the mines, especially those of precious stones and gold. The
author of the 'Descripcao Corografica.....' thought that the reason for this
v/as that African traditional doctors had advised the King that the mining of
156
gold on a great scale would end the King's life • This seems to me to be
a metaphorical way of warning the King that, if he allowed foreigners to dig
for gold on a large scale, their rivalries would incite civil wars, which
would engulf his kingdom and consequently destroy it. As a result of this,
any Manyika who discovered a mine was supposed to report to the King.
Failure to do this or divulgence of the information to Portuguese traders
resulted in confiscation of the property, wife and children of the
157individual concerned • It was a common practice of any Manyika who found
15*f. Ibid
155. Ibid
156. Ibid
157. Ibid
118.
a piece of gold to wrap it in a piece of white cloth and to ask a
traditional doctor or 'magician' to put it on the grave of his vadzimu,
/ ! 
who were responsible for the general fertility of the land and prosperity
|
of the clan. Again we see the same fear shaping the King's policy towards 
his subjects with regard to gold mining and owning of mines. If individuals 
were allowed the right to own or operate mines, they would in time acquire 
power derived from trade and the King would not be able to maintain his
rights over the land against the ordinary village headmen. Some of these
\
headmen, with their lineages, would amass a great number of 'voluntary' 
or mercenary armies and challenge the King's authority. One would like to 
think that this v/as the basic objection to individuals operating gold mines 
outside the King's control.
Chikanga's ban on gold exploitation was not as rigid as the
author of the Descrip9ao  pointed out. There is an example of a
158
silver mine which was discovered in 1780 in Chitenga • The silver mine 
referred to closed, mainly because there was very little silver and secondly, 
because Manyika miners sold the silver at the same price as gold, irrespect­
ive of its intrinsic value. Portuguese traders resented this and the 
Africans closed the mines in that area, on their own, and not because of 
Chikanga's orders.
The Manyika Kings needed no magician to convince them about the 
evils of the 'open door policy'. They had seen the empire of Quiteve 
disappear as a result of the merchants who promoted civil wars among the 
Quitevan princes.
Another reason, which shows that the ban on mining was not 
rigid, but was made perhaps to be invoked as and when the situation 
justified it, is the great number of bares which existed in Manyika
/5“£ I b i d
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during the l8th Century.
In conclusion, it must be said that the Portuguese refusal to 
accept the Chikanga's methods of controlling trade activities in their 
Kingdom, the Chikangas' assertion of their sovereignty over Manyika subjects 
who lived within the feira precincts, contributed significantly to the mis­
understanding between the Manyika and the Portuguese communities.
The Chikangas1 methods of controlling Portuguese itinerant trade 
were judiciously moderate. The author of the 'Descripcao Corografica.....' 
went so far as to characterize Chikanga III as an exception among African 
monarchs of his time. Manyika-Portuguese relations, for a greater part 
of the 18th Century were determined largely by the Chikangas' policies of 
moderation and Portuguese inclination to self-pity. The Portuguese attitude 
did not pay adequate attention to both diplomatic niceties with African 
Kings and their own institutional organisation. The African potentates 
in most cases demanded no more than an ordinary piece of cloth.
Francisco de Mello e Castro observed that the profit which the 
Portuguese merchants made after all the payments and presents had been made 
to African Kings was quite considerable and more than amply compensated for
j
whatever inconvenience they might have undergone en route to the feiras.
It was easy to satisfy the demands of African Kings. The Portuguese of
the 18th Century, as an able historian of this period has observed, 'were
159not looked upon with inveterate hostility1 • And the fact that they 
remained in Manyika and Rios de Sena in general despite complaints, is proof
159* Newitt M.D.D. (Trans.) 'Xavier's Account of the East Coast of Africa' 
in 'The History of Central African Peoples.' Proceedings of the 17th 
conference, Lusaka,Vjoj), p. 15•
positive that they had made their peace with the land. Numerous incidents 
have demonstrated how ignorantly defiant the Portuguese were to Manyika 
rulers.
A careful study of this period has also revealed the administrative
inadequacies at the feira of Masekesa and other feiras in Makaranga. In the
majority of cases the garrisons consisted of no more than the officials; the.
arms and ammunitions v/ere incapacitated by climate through carelessness;
powdershot and bullets were perpetually in short supply^^; subordinates
lbl
could by-pass the capitao-mor and communicate with the governor ; a
proper procedure of appointing an officer quite often gave way to sub-
versions and the soldiers at the feira were generally reported as
'a riotous, mischievous, dangerous gang.’ They went without salary for 
163
two or more years • A military readiness of this type was not calculated 
to command respect from the Chikangas, much less resist them if the latter 
thought of expelling the Portuguese. The Portuguese, therefore, traded in 
the Kingdom of Manyika, indeed in other Kingdoms such as Makaranga, Quiteve 
and Barwe, because the Kings of these regions wanted them to do so. The 
incidents which took place between the Portuguese and the Manyika Kings 
occurred because the Portuguese did not bother to study, observe and respect 
Manyika customs; neither were they able to adapt themselves nor choose their 
trade technique, nor cope with the situation created by their own diplomatic 
and organisational ineptitude.
160. ’Letter from Francisco de Mello e Castro to the King, 20.11.1753’ in
Memorias e Documentos  1890 Lisbon,p.171. Also see apendix for the
late 18th Century situation. 
l6l• Representation of Captain Manuel Martins to the Governor. Manica 2/1796. 
Cxa.l8. Moc.^.H.U. Letter from Francisco I-Ienrique Ferrao to the 
Governor of Rios de Sena 2/1796. Cxa 18. Moc. A.H.U.
162. Ibid.
163. Letter from the Commandant of the feira of Manyika to the capitao-mor.
No.5. 2*f.l2.l8o4. Cxa.^6. Moc.A.H.U. See Letter No.6 written by a 
clerk, Manuel Martins Palma, 2^.8.1804, Cxa. -^6. Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.
7, dated 2*t. 8. l8o4. Letter No.9 dated II.3.I805.
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e:-H A P T E R  IV.
MANYIKA-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS 1795-1822. !
/  j
The Era of the Civil Wars and Increased Portuguese Intervention.
This is a period of increased Portuguese intervention in Manyika 
politics. It consists of five distinct phases, including the reign of 
Inhacompu$za, who was styled provisional King , July 1795 to March 1796;
the reign of Inharugue, 1796-1807; the reign of Inhagope, l8o8-l8l3; the
\
reign of Inhamutota, I8l3-l8l8 and Inharugue*s second reign, l8l8-l822.
This period, as the short lengths of the reigns would imply, was 
characterized by succession wars and these wars made it possible for the 
Portuguese to intervene in Manyika political developments. In the first 
phase the succession wars were between Inharugue and Inhacompunza• InhacompuQ_za 
established himself as provisional King with Portuguese support. In the 
second phase, the struggle was between Inharugue on the one hand and Inhagope 
and Inhamutota on the other. These two princes relied on Portuguese military 
support too. But a rupture developed between the Inhagope-Inhamutota alliance 
with the Portuguese, when the latter tried to play a double game by 
supporting both sides. Inhagope and Inhamutota made the Portuguese trade 
under very restrictive conditions. The Inhagope-Inhamutota alliance came 
to an end when the latter, who was regarded by the former as a junior partner, 
tried to exercise effective control of the feira of Masekesa and the 
surrounding region. Inhamutota was expelled by Inhagope. Inhamutota came 
back in 1813 and regained control of the feira with the help of the Quitevans.
He had to fight both Inharugue and Inhagope separately. Inharugue emerged 
supreme in this tripartite struggle for the Kingship of Manyika. He 
reigned in Manyika for the second time, from l8l8 probably to 1838.
The policies of these Kings, except that of Inhacompunza, 
shared one thing in common, and that was an attempt to exercise their 
sovereignty effectively over the Portuguese, who traded in Manyika. But 
in every case each one of them had to modify his policies to suit the 
realities of the succession wars. They all received Portuguese military 
support. This was the course of events from 1795 to 1822.
The frequent changes of Kings brought about a new situation, 
and the dynamics of this new situation were very closely linked with trade 
and control of the feira. For Manyika princes, he who controlled the capital 
also controlled trade and the entire economy, tribute, presents, favours, 
honour and glory. This meant war as each one of the princes tried to assume 
the reins of power. The Portuguese found themselves caught up and exposed to 
the forces of Manyika politics. The new situation also underscored the very 
important nature of the feira, which ultimately determined, in the period 
from l8l8 to 1838, the succession among the Manyika princes. None of them 
could gain control of the situation without Portuguese support and Portuguese 
support was determined solely by their motives to run the feira trade unfettered. 
Various traders supported different princes in the new situation, the 
vashambadzi acquired a new importance as people who knew not only the 
country well but also the customs and politics of their own people. They 
•were part of the social milieu. They could give advice to their masters, 
and manoeuvre politics to promote their own trade. This newly-increased 
importance of the vashambadzi was also derived from the fact that they 
took fazendas to their princes, sons and brothers, who governed the lands 
where they obtained gold. They used to give a prince and his newanji 
(deputy) a piece of cloth for any news the latter gave them. This 
custom is mentioned in a 19th Century document as an old one and certainly
123
seems to have been widely practised in the confused and terrible succession
wars of the late 18th Century* This then was the nature of the new
/ ! 
circumstances created by the frequent changes of Kings between 1795
and 1822* The politics of this period will be reviewed under the policies
of the individual Kings*
1* THE REIGN OF KING INHACOMPUNZA:
Inhacompunza^ policy toward the Portuguese is a striking contrast 
to that of his predecessors in the mid l8th Century, who dictated the terms 
under which the Portuguese could trade* Inhacompunza wanted to impress the 
Portuguese that, with him as King, the era of the millenium would dawn in 
Manyika. His policy, which was deliberately designed to earn him a quick 
diplomatic recognition and military support in order to discomfort his 
rivals, succeeded in its main objectives.
Custodio Manuel Lopes, commandant of Manyika, reported the death
1
of Chikanga on 11th July, 1793 ♦ A succession struggle immediately developed
between Inharugue and his elder brothers, in particular Inhacompunza• There
is ample evidence in a report of 51st Marcn to suggest that the first phase
of the succession struggle between Inhacompunza and Inharugue, whom the
Manyika regarded as a legitimate heir to the throne, continued for at least
2
another eight months • It is in this context of rivalry that the policy of
1* Letter from Custodio Manuel Lopes to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 11.7*1795• 
Cxa*30. Moc.A.H.U* In most cases a commandant was a professional officer, 
whereas a capitao-mor was very often a civilian and a tradarat the same 
time. _
2. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena.
Manica, 51«3.1796. Cxa.52.Moc.A.H.U.
12^ .
Inhacompunza must be viewed. He declared himself King and sent a delegation,
3 —headed by a macango , with presents to the capitao-mor. The presents 
included a dogado for the Governor of Rios de Sena and an ox which was 
to be slaughtered and the meat distributed among the Portuguese residents
5
at the feira as a sign of peace, which Inhacompunza and his party pledged •
The macango asked the capitTo-mor to pay binzo to Changamire in order to
facilitate the 'election* of a new King. It is doubtful whether the delegation
gained anything more than goodwill because the capitao-mor, whose name has not
6 7
been identified, was already very ill and soon died .
The Portuguese did not respond immediately because they were
i
i
preoccupied with administrative internal reforms. The first phase of their
reford scheme was initiated at the beginning of 1795^ when Chikanga was still
! i
alive.I The Portuguese had come to realise that the decline of trade at the 
feira was not entirely due to Chikanga's restrictions, but also to two other 
factors; the credit system and the institution i of mushambadzi. The 
vashambadzi introduced a multiplicity of cheap cloths at the feira. This 
resulted in a devaluation of prices.
This state of affairs compelled the Governor of Rios de Sena to 
issue a ban to the effect that the merchants must declare the quality and 
quantity of their fazendas at the feira, the merchandise coming from or 
going to the feira of Masekesa, the names of senders and recipients. In
3* A macango represented the departed spirit. (Masango - lit.bushes).
*f. Xavier Botelho in his Memdria Estatxstica  p.189 says that a dogado
was equivalent to 6 oitavas of gold, i.e. k maticals.
5* Letter from Lopes to the Governor of Manica, 9»5*1796. Cxa.31»Moc.A.H.U.
6. Letter from Lopes to the Governor, 9*5«1796. Cxa.31* Moc.A.H.U.
7* Letter from Custodio Jose da Lacerda, provisional commandant, to the
Governor of Rios de Sena. 17*8.1793* Cxa.30. Moc.A.H.U.
8. Letter from Joao de Souza de Brito to Diogo de Souza 28.2.1795* Cxa.33*
Moc.A.H.U.
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order to enforce this ban, the governor of Rios de Sena instructed the 
commandant of the villa of Sena to prohibit merchants to pass or send 
their vashambadzi with trade commodities to the feira of Masekesa without 
licence.
The reaction of the aloradores to this ban was quite sharp.
They protested and pointed out that the majority of them at the feira 
did not own vashambadzi; even the few merchants who owned vashambadzi 
generally counted on them to return. The feirantes attributed the decline 
of trade to the activities of the vashambadzi from Sena, whom they scornfully 
referred to as 'legitimate transgressors of commerce, who were scattered 
throughout the interior*. The impact of this bain as a reform edict was
a limited one because none of the feirantes knew the places the vashambadzi
I ii
frequented, the prices for which they sold their merchandise and the people 
with whom they dealt. The African vashambadzi, as the feirantes correctly 
pointed out, could not be expected to obey the ban which operated at the 
feira of Masekesa, issued by a governor whose existence they probably had . 
never heard about.
The Portuguese realised that internal administrative reforms,
which were not accompanied by an improvement in Manyika-Portuguese relations,
would be futile. Also a realisation that Chikanga, who was then very old
and decrepit, would soon die, influenced the Portuguese at the feira to
9draw up far-reaching proposals in 1795 * These proposals were intended to 
achieve three objectives; to form a basis of Manyika-Portuguese relations
9* The merchants' memorandum, 5*7.1795* Signed by the following: Manoel da 
Silva Gonsalves, Custodio de Araujo Braganca, Felizardo Joaquim Tales de 
Moraes Braganga, Joao Felix de Carvalho, Joaquim de Moraes Rega Lisboa, 
Manoel Ribeiro dos Santos, Jose^ da Trindade e Almeida, Antonio Caetano 
Vaz, Joz^ Gomes Monteiro, Antonio Joze' da Costa e Almeida, Pedro Antonio 
de Araujo.
with Chikanga*s heir and successor; to bring pressure to bear on Changamire 
to intervene in Manyika-Portuguese trading conflicts, and should both aims 
fail, to avoid the disaster of the civil wars which they predicted would 
follow Chikanga's death.
The merchants, therefore, unanimously agreed that, in order to 
extort concessions from Chikanga, they should abandon the feira of Masekesa 
and revive that of Aruangua, end, that to make this feira of Arueingua 
prosperous, they should compel Manyika traders to go there by prohibiting 
vashambadzi to take commodities into the interior. This action, they 
believed, would humiliate Chikanga and render him more flexible in his 
dealings with the Portuguese. Changamire too, so the logic went, would 
realise that the change of the feira of Masekesa to Aruangua was due to 
his indifference to the merchants' requests. A fear that Chikanga, who 
was aware that the Portuguese merchants had sent envoys to Changamire, 
would make reprisals, made the Portuguese more determined to move to 
Aruangua. This was the mood of the Portuguese when Chikanga died in 
July, 1795 and Inhacompw£za assumed the ship of state.
The Portuguese did not have to put much pressure on the
provisional King, Inhacompmaza, because, as pointed out earlier, he
10
needed Portuguese diplomatic, as well as military support • He, 
therefore, established contact with the Portuguese without delay. 
Inhacompunza's policy towards the Portuguese was very accommodating, as 
his reactions to Portuguese diplomatic offensive w.ill demonstrate.
10. See beginning of this chapter.
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The Portuguese acted aggressively in order to take advantage 
of the disturbed political situation in Manyika during the eight months
I I
that Inhacompunza was provisional King* The governor of Rios de Sena
—  - ' 11 
appointed Francisco Henrique Ferrao capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa •
He had instructions to deliver to whoever was King of Manyika after the 
death of Chikanga. Ferrao was instructed to go to Aruangua and report his 
presence to the bingas and manamucates through the wives of the late 
Chikanga or any suitable intermediary. His message from the Governor was 
that there should be an increase of commercial activities in Manyika. The 
governor ordered him not to take sides with any of the pretenders to the 
Manyika throne. Instead, he was to follow the nature of the disputes and 
study the parties involved in the succession struggle. This policy of 
neutrality was a child of practical experience, which had shown that it 
was easy to recognise an established ruler orietreat from the feira when­
ever it was expedient to do so* Ferrao was instructed to accomplish all 
the above-mentioned diplomatic niceties before the winter came, because of 
a housing shortage at Aruangua. He finally arrived at Aruangua on 30th 
December, 1795* The newly-appointed provisional capitao-mor communicated 
with Inhacompunza through a junior macango and manamucate who had come 
directly from Inhacompunza*s court. The manamucate assured him that the 
disorders, which used to take place at the feira during the reign of the 
late Chikanga, had come to an end. He attributed these disorders to the 
fact that the late King was very old and, therefore, ineffective as a ruler; 
the princes disobeyed him, neither did they report to him the milando cases
11. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena to the commandant of the feira 
of Manica, Francisco Henrique Ferrao, 26.11.1795* Cxa.31*Moc.A.H.U.
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which used to take place in the remote regions of his Kingdom. Inhacompunza 
promised protection to the muzungos who traded or intended to trade in his 
lands.
Francisco Henrique Ferrao occupied the feira of Masekesa as 
capitao-mor amidst great ceremonial fanfarade. He called all the feirantes 
and warned them against creating disorders and difficulties. The manamucates 
and the macango, together with several highly-ranked councillors, turned up, 
bringing with them a dogado which the provisional King, Inhacompunza, had 
sent, as well as two tusks of ivory and a cow, which the Nebinga and the 
mucaranga of the late King had sent to the capitao-mor. The presents were 
delivered by a macango who afterwards carefully explained that this was a
sociaL visit but he did not forget to ask for cloths which he saw there. The
! I
capitao-mor enumerated the complaints of the merchants and publicly delivered
the Governor's message concerning freedom of trade in the interior,at the
feira and at the bares. It wgs also stated that the capitao-mor should
settle all milando cases; he would again decide what was useful for the
safety of the feira. If these conditions were not fulfilled, the capitao-mor
threatened that the Portuguese would abandon the feira of Masekesa and warned
Inhacompunza that if all the Portuguese merchants departed from the feira
there would be no trade in Manyika. He further pointed out that a new feira
would be established at Aruangua. These threats proved effective. This is
evident from the fact that one of Inhacompunza's princes, Mossaza, who was
then in charge of the feira region in 1795* took his samuranda to Inhacompunza’s
binga to be tried, probably for resisting Portuguese incursions into his
territory. Mossaza left his sister in charge of his Zimbabwe, and the
12
surrounding area, during his absence to Inhacompunza's court •
12. Copia do termo da embaixada que deu Masango, Manamucate do Rey interino, 
Incompunza, sobre que se faz o commandante Francisco Henrique Ferrao por 
Ordcm do 111 • Sr. Governador dos Rios de Sena. Manica,29*12.1795. Cxa.
^l.Moc.A.H.U. Signed by the following: Diogo Rodrigues, Francisco Henrique
/Cont
The provisional King Inhacompunza signed and ratified the above- 
13stated terms • He produced a cow on behalf of the vazimos as a signature 
to the agreement. Ferrao pressed his advantage further and demanded a copper 
bracelet instead of a cow so that his successors would see it long after the 
treaty had been concluded. The ambit of this treaty was extended to cover the 
problems of passage through Barwe. As in Manyika, there was a succession 
question to be settled after the death of Gange, the late King of Barwe. The 
Portuguese exploited this situation to secure freedom of passage to the feira 
of Masekesa, which they had newly reoccupied. It was not enough to re-establish 
the feira. A trade route from Sena had to be guaranteed before Ferrao1s 
diplomatic victory over Inhacompunza could bear fruit. An opportunity to 
do so was provided by Sazua, King-elect of Barwe, who, following an old practice
i i
established by his predecessors, had invited the Portuguese to confirm his 
coronation • The Portuguese, who had been bitterly complaining about the 
supposedly predatory activities of Bondo, King Makombe's brother-in-law, seized 
this opportunity and made a series of demands, centred round the security of 
passage to the feira of Masekesa. The Governor of Rios de Sena sent specific 
instructions to the commandant of the villa of Sena, Custodio de Araujo 
Braganca, to take to Sazua, King-elect of Barwe. The Portuguese envoys were 
instructed not to convey the Aguada Manga (water of confirmation) until (a) a
12.(contd.) x
Ferrao, Fr.Vincent de Sa, Joze Banino e Silva, Francisco da Silva Braganpa, 
Francisco Antonio de Menezes, Daniel de Souza Salvador Fernandes, Luis Felix, 
Joz£ Gomes Monteiro, Domingos Caetano do Rosario, Caetano Correa, Manuel 
Baptista.
13. Ibid.
l*f. Copia do termo do Rey de Barwe, 2.2.1795, Cxa*31« Moc.A.H.U. Signed by 
Diogo Villoso, an interpreter, Daniel Xavier de Remedios, ambassador,
Joaquim da Costa. Signature of new Makombe was represented by a manila 
of copper.
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*good passage* and traffic of merchants to and from Manyika was guaranteed;
(b) Bondo, Nebira and Inhabere, who were allegedly responsible for the thefts 
committed on Portuguese merchants en route to Masekesa, had their villages 
destroyed; (c) Sazua was not to ask for any annual binzo from the capitao- 
mor of the feira of Masekesa, neither would he expect any presents from the 
merchants of Manyika. The binzo and presents would be paid from the royal 
treasury.
Thus the Portuguese had their lucky star in the ascendancy in having 
two Kings, one in Barwe and another in Manyika, who were forced by internal 
political circumstances to adopt policies of appeasement in 1795* Inhacompunza*s 
reign came to an end in March 1796. His reign was dull. It lacked the lustre 
which characterised the reigns of his predecessors and those who came after him. 
He granted the Portuguese every privilege, which the late Chikanga had denied 
them. This encouraged the Portuguese, as the subsequent account will show, to 
intervene more and more in Manyika local politics.
2. INHARUGUE*S REIGN:
The nature of the struggle between Inhacompunza and Inharugue is 
not known, except that the latter faced considerable opposition when he came 
to the throne in March, 1796, and for quite some time after that he remained 
insecure -
...because all his brothers, who are aspirants to 
the throne, go about causing disorder in the land, 
some seeking to kill him and others to wage war 
against him; nevertheless, nothing is certain.
15As for the feira, it was *without safety*. Inharugue*s foreign policy aimed
15* Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
9.6.1796. Cxa.33. Moc.A.H.U.
to keep the Portuguese out of Manyika politics as much as possible. He
sought to exclude the Portuguese by asking Manyika princes to make alliances
with him. It was only after this had failed that he asked for help from the
Portuguese, Occasionally he invoked the name of Changamire, as suggested
16
above in a previous context, mainly as a bogey • It is possible moreover, 
that he might have wanted the Portuguese to realise that he did not have to 
depend on their support to secure himself on the throne. He wanted the 
Portuguese to believe that in case of extreme necessity he could rely on 
help from the emperor Changamire, This is a mere conjecture, but if this 
were the case then why did he not invoke the name of Changamire during his 
second term as King? This flexibility in Inharugue1s foreign policy can be
that he felt threatened. The Manyika who menaced the
shown by the fact that the Manyika had stopped working in the mines and the
movement of people from one region to another was very much restricted.
V  -
Indeed, to judge from Ferrao's report in 1796* there was no movement at all 
because the regulos were in a turbulent mood. Trade at the feira, as well 
as in the interior, had come to a standstill.
The diminished volume of trade at the feira was also due to a
confusion of prices. For example, a traderby the name of Francisco Antonio
de Menezes revealed to the capitao-mor that he knew of some feirantes who used 
to sell a piece of dotin or zuarte for three maticals, and others* two dogados 
for the same piece of cloth. The scale and extent of this clandestine trade 
is not known but it would be reasonable to assume that it was considerable.
feira were not those who lived within it. The seriousness of this danger is
16• See Chapter III infra
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The critical nature of the situation in which Inharugue found 
himself was emphasized by Francisco Henrique Ferrao when he said -
I
....as for the new King, he has sent some to say that i
he is ready to fulfil all that is discussed with him •
according to the instructions of Your Excellence, but 
because of the terror he could not carry it out since
it was still unsafe,  in truth he has shown his
good faith, ordered the regulos that they should pay 
their debts to the merchants. Already he has sent 
some one to demand binzo but I have not yet Paid him
because the supply of cloths is exhausted... .
\
Ferrao estimated that two bars in addition, to his salary would meet
Inharuguefs demands. Between 21st September and 9th October, 1796,
Inharugue fought two Manyika princes, Mazarica and Manaca, who are
described in the document as 'conspirators* against their legitimate 
18
King • He was only able to keep them at bay but he wanted to throw 
both of them out of his land and destroy their villages. In order to 
achieve this end he ordered two regulos, Mutungatua Chirombe, Marase and 
an inhamai (page) from his court to approach another prince, Musaza. 
These three together formed the King*s delegation to the Portuguese 
commandant at the feira of Masekesa, to deliver Inharugue*s call for
military help. The muzungos, with their armed slaves, were to march 
together with the above-mentioned princes against the princes Mazarica 
and Manaca. Inharugue sought the help of two other princes whose names 
are not mentioned, but are described by the provisional capitao-mor of 
the feira of Masekesa as *thieves* about whom the Portuguese merchants
continually complained. These two princes had occupied the region between
17* Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
9.6.1796. Cxa 33. Moc.A.H.U.
18. Letter from Ferrao to the Governor, 21.9.1796. Cxa.33 Moc.A.H.U.
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Barwe and Manyika, the region, as mentioned before, through which Portuguese
traders passed to the feira of Masekesa* The two princes refused to join
Inharugue in hiscampaigri against Mazarica and Manaca, whereupon he tried
to force them to join the battle on his side by threatening that if they
continued to refuse to offer him help he would be compelled to destroy them
with military aid from the Kingdom of Maungwe and one of the regions, Saruchera,
in the Kingdom of Manyika* He put the responsibility for whatever damage
resulted from this war squarely on their shoulders* Inharugue was able to
concentrate on the war, largely because his relations with King Makoni of
19Maungwe were cordidl • The feirantes gathered together to discuss the 
advantages of sending Inharugue the military help which he had requested*
i
1 to throw in their lot with Inharugue* An ensign and a commandant
Pinto, capitao-mor of the terras da coroa at the villa of Quelimane, Domingos
marched at dawn at the head of a large army of armed 'slaves* to join the 
King's army in the lands of Prince Mutungatua Chirombe. The merchants of 
the villa of Sena, who would undoubtedly have benefitted from Inharugue's 
victory, 'supplied ammunitions, gun powder and armament*^. The two princes, 
whose names are not mentioned, anH. who, it would seem were loath to see the 
.country plunged into civil wars, were probably finally cudgelled to join the 
expedition against their will and much to the detriment of the Kingdom of 
Manyika. It would seem that the expedition accomplished its purpose and
19* Abraham D.P* 'The Principality of Maungwe' in NAPA No.28. 1951» P*67
20. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferran to the Governor, 21.9*1796*
together with other officials, including Ignacio Francisco
Caetano do Rozario, Luis Felix de Sa, an adjutant of the auxilliary army,
13^*
burnt the villages of Manaca and Marazica as well as the villages of those
* V
who had joined the ’rebels*• Ferrao maliciously commented that he was
’’happy that the two princes were destroyed by a method that they had known 
21
well” • It seems that the civil wars continued for some years. In 1798,
twenty-one soldiers were reported to have been sent to reinforce the
garrison of the feira of Masekesa, because Chikanga incessantly asked for
22
help ”as a friend and silly of the state” • It was also hoped that more
soldiers would be available from Mozambique, especially because news had
23arrived of peace between France and Portugal .
Another report further indicates that the wars continued after
1798. The capitao-mor of the feira of Manyika, who was still Francisco
Henrique Ferrao, reported at the end of 1801 that he was not yet able to
send back the eleven soldjers who had come from Sena because King Chikanga
2khad told him that some Manyika intended to attack him again • A year
25
later Chikanga sent envoys to Sena to ask for help » According to an
earlier letter in 1801, the wars in Manyika seem to have been a conflict
between several parties in which two Kings, Makoni of Maungwe and Svosve
26
of Mbire, were involved . In the following years the King of Manyika is 
mentioned only occasionally. Probably attempts were made to hurry to his 
assistance in one or two expeditions from Sena, but it is not certain 
whether any of these expeditions arrived in Manyika at all. In a document,
21. Ibid.
22. Letter from Francisco Joze de Lacerda e Almeida to Francisco Guedes de 
Carvalho Menezes da Costa, 30*8.1798. Cxa.35* Moc.A.H.U.
23. Ibid. ^
2*f. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 
12.12.l801. Cxa.37 Moc.A.H.U.
25* Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 
9.12.1802. Cxa.39.Moc.A.H.U.
26. Letter from Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 15.9*1801, Manica. 
Cxa.37* Moc.A.H.U.
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the bottom end of which is badly damaged, Antonio da Costa Almeida was
appointed commandant of the wars to help Chikanga, ftour ally and friend
i ' !
of the state, against others, also powerful, who seek to exlude him from
27 !
the throne1* • This document refers to two other expeditions, one' sent
by the Governor of Rios de Sena, Filipe de Carvalho, in 1803 and again in
1807 by Governor Antonio Noberto de Barboza Villas Boas Truao, who ordered
much money to be "spent on arming the slaves, buying firearms and fazenda
for the safety of Manyika." It is unnecessary to point out that these
\
Portuguese actions represented a marked change from the policy of neutrality 
so piously propounded in 1795* Portuguese efforts to prop up Inharugue as 
King of Manyika in 1807 did not succeed. He was ousted by Inhagope. It is 
very easy to conclude, on the basis of the war accounts, that the diminished 
volume of trade during Inharugue1s reign was solely due to the succession wars, 
that all the Portuguese had to do was to support Inharugue militarily and ex­
tort trade concessions afterwards.
An incident which took place between Dr. Francisco Joze^de Lacerda
28
e Almeida and the colonel of Manica, Jeronymo Pereira, in 1797 strongly 
suggests that the problem of confusion of prices was a continuing one and also 
that the relations between Sena and the feira administration in Manyika were 
strained. Highlighting the nature of this twin problem, Almeida wrote -
 the colonel of Manica, Jeronymo Pereira, who passes
for the most respectable man at Sena, proved himself a 
knave, not only by taking exorbitant prices for this 
cloth but also by supplying this primary necessity in 
cafre travel of so wretched a quality that it is well
nigh useless  I resolved to punish the knavery of
Jeronymo Pereira by directing the factor of Sena to take 
from his warehouse the best cloth, to be repaid in kind 
from Moqambique. I also warned him that he himself 
should be at the expenses of sending back his vile stuffs 
to Tete.
27. Cxa.55. Moc.A.H.U. 1811.
28. Burton R. Trans. Lacerda1s Journey to the Lands of Cazembe in 1798*
London 1873* p*56. A report which Lacerda made about Jerdhymo 
Pereirafs behaviour was lost, together with two other papers, a 
map and a second diary.
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In another context Lacerda calls the colonel of the militia of Manyika,
mad. The above-cited indictment of the Colonel of the Manyika militia
must be viewed cautiously. Lacerda wrote this when he was annoyed because
his journey to Muata Cazembe had been delayed by the Governor-General of 
29
Mozambique . The documents about the state of relations between Sena and
Manyika feira are scanty but it has been suggested that Jeronymo Pereira was
also an enemy of Lacerda. Pereira had been aspiring to be a governor of
Rios de Sena when Lacerda was appointed. He was again disappointed when
the latter was charged with responsibility to lead an expedition to Cazembe.
Both posts had economic advantages. The governorship of Rios de Sena would
enable him to monopolise the trade of the captaincy and its dependents.
However, the Governor-General of Mozambique eventually appointed Jeronymo
50Pereira to -succeed Lacerda as Governor of Rios de Sena in 1797 •
Another instance which vividly illustrates the strained relations
between Sena and the Manyika feira is the attitude of the Sena officials.
They regarded Manyika as a dumping ground for degradados. This was the case
when Jose Gomes Monteiro, a sergeant of the militia of Sena, was punished for
31insubordination and his amorous escapades . His love affair with a wife of 
one of the local potentates caused great bitterness and threatened the peace 
and security of the fortress of Sena. He was accordingly sent to the feira 
of Masekesa in Manyika. Monteiro, against the Governor*s express orders,
29* Alberto Manuel Simoes. *Dr.Lacerda e Almeida. A sua Biografia e para
a Historia da sua Viagem ao Cazembe* in Moqambique. Documentario Trimestral, 
No.63. 1950* pp.89-123. Also see September 1926 publication of Bol.da 
Gencia Geral das Colonias, No.15*
30. Alberto Manuel Simoes. ‘Dr.Lacerda * In Mozambique, 63.1950, op^cit.
31. *Documentos para a Historia das Colohias Portuguezas. Diario da Viagem 
de Mozambique para os Rios de Senna Feito peloGovernador dos Mesmos 
Rios, Dr.Francisco Jozb de Lacerda e Almeida* 30.10.1797* ihSstudos 
Coloniaes. Vol.III.l889. Imprensa Nacional. Lisbon.pp.19-20T Joze 
Gomes Monteiro once held the post of capitao-mor of Manica in 1795 and 
also played a leading role in the negotiations of the treaty of 1795 with 
Makombe of Barwe. Merchants' memorandum, 5*7.1795* Cxa.31*Moc.A.H.U.
Treaty between Makombe and Portuguese, 29.12.1795* Cxa.31 Moc.A.H.U.
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secretly left the feira to meet his mistress when he knew that her husband
had gone to Mozambique. Finally, when this was known, the Governor ordered 
/ ! 
the capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa, who had been there for three years,
to arrest Monteiro and send him back to Sena. But the capitao-mor ignored
the order. On his arrival at Sena, Lacerda was told everything by Monteiro*s
wife and a priest. In the end Monteiro was sent to Zumbo and not to Manyika,
as this would antagonise Makombe, King of Barwe, through whose lands the
merchants had to pass. ' ■
\
A third instance which proves that Sena was out of step with the
administration in the interior is an instance connected with one Joao Manuel,
32
who had won Makombe to his side by presents •
The authorities at Sena had to spend money on presents to buy the 
friendship and goodwill of Makombe in order to secure a free passage to 
Manyika.
These three episodes sufficiently demonstrate that the relations bet­
ween Sena and the administration at the feira of Masekesa were far from satis­
factory. The latent antagonism which expressed itself in several ways in 
1797 must have influenced the attitude of the feirantes towards a ban which
the Governor of Rios de Sena issued concerning the prevailing prices and 
33credit system . This was an attempt to rectify the confusion of prices 
and introduction of cheap quality cloths at the feira. The feirantes 
protested against the ban on economic grounds. The ban raised technical 
problems. For example, the commodities had already been given on credit at
32. ‘Documentos para a Historia das Colonias Portuguezas. Diario da Viagem....
in Estudos ColBniaes. Vol.Ill, 1889, pp.19-20. /
33« Petition to the Governor of Rios de Sena, signed by Joze da Lacerda and 
several merchants 3*8.1793 Cxa.^O. Moc.A.H.U.
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the current prices when the ban was issued. Some Manyika .vashambadzi 
refused to pay for them at the altered price which would give: them less
I i
profit, others did not even return to their creditors when they heard
j
about the ban and its insistence on registration of the fazenda and 
operation of the old prices at the feira. They started business with 
the Portuguese on the prazos. This was indeed a strong case for continuing 
the credit system.
The ban was not carried out because it was soon realised that
the feirantes lost more than they gained by it. For example, it would have
abolished the only method of trading to which the feirantes were accustomed -
the credit system; it would have ruined the merchants of Sena who depended
on Manyika trade and lastly, there was no machinery to enforce the ban. It
is clear then, that the diminished volume of trade which Ferrao ascribed to
34
the 'turbulent regulos1 and the wars that followed should be examined in 
the wider context of feira administration and its relations with Sena. The 
maladministration of the feira was past reform as abortive attempts to improve 
the situation in 1796 have shown.
As far as Inharugue's foreign policy was concerned, it is significant
to note that, despite the military support he received from the Portuguese,
he tried to restrict their activities. This is clearly demonstrated by his
relations with Francisco Henrique Ferrao, capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa 
35in 1796 • Whenever Ferrao wanted to punish defaulting Manyika vashambadzi he
3*f. See the early part of the Chapter
35. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
7.10.1796. Cxa.33» Moc.A.H.U.
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was required to appeal to Inharugue first. This arrangement involved a lot 
of expenses for the cost of apprehending the defaulters. Also, wherever this 
took place, the revenue of the owners of the vashambadzi was greatly pre­
judiced. It was not easy for Francisco Henrique Ferrao to punish Manyika 
vashambadzi despite the fact that very often Inharugue depended on Portuguese 
support•
Francisco Henrique Ferrao*s complaints, although undoubtedly biased,
help to illustrate the intricate nature of Manyika-Portuguese relations during
\
Inharugue*s reign. In 1796, Francisco Henrique Ferrao requested Inharugue‘s 
bingas to arrest some Manyika debtors. The King and his bingas first agreed 
to do this, but after some time gave an order that the debtors should not be 
arrested. The capitao-mor and the creditors agreed to bury the hatchet. A 
few days after that, the King sent word to the capitao-mor to say that in 
future he should not commission him to recover the merchants’ debts from the 
Manyika who had defaulted. It was a matter between the debtor and the creditor 
and he did not want to have to summon his council to settle such matters,
- V *
trivial no doubt, for a King. This episode led Francisco Henrique Ferrao
to conclude rather hastily that not much credence could be put on Inharugue1s
36
word, because he said one thing ’’this hour and another the next” . This, he 
alleged, was typical of Inharugue*s predecessors who, when they were given 
.cloths, said one thing, only to deny it when the stock of cloths had been 
exhausted. In other words his unfortunate experience was that ”nos cafres 
nao ha" palavra senao em quanto dura a conveniencia.” This is, however, a 
typical case of a capitao-mor making up excuses for not communicating to the 
Governor what Inharugue had said. Ferrao unabashedly says that he did not
36. Ibid.
1*K).
tell the Governor everything that the King had said, because then there
37would be two contradictory statements in one day . It was such mis-
I !
understandings that often led to complaints by the Portuguese, and to 
severe measures by Chikanga. !
There are several examples to show that the capitao-mors, 
particularly Francisco Henrique Ferrao, were equally guilty of double 
dealings in which they did not scruple to tell lies. A milando case of
381805 demonstrates two points; the arrogant attitude of Manoel Martins, 
Ferrao*s successor as capitao-mor,to the envoys of the King Inharugue and 
the administrative confusion that prevailed at the feira of Masekesa.
Capitao-mor, Manoel Martins, delayed for a month at the feira 
of Aruangua on his way to Sena. One day regulo Baza, accompanied by an 
inhamai and many bingas, entered the feira and began to pemberar (dance) on 
the verandah, whereupon capitao-mor, Manoel Martins, summoned all the 
feirantes to listen to the reasons for this milando demonstration. The 
inhamai, in measured tones, answered that the delegation had been sent by 
the King, Chikanga, to say that Baza had been expelled, presumably from the 
feira vicinity. The reason for his expulsion was that the capitao-mor had 
reported to Chikanga that Baza had confiscated six mutores which were the 
binzo for Chikanga. Baza and the inhamai asked the capitao-mor before all 
the feirantes as to when he had confiscated the cloths. The capitao-mor 
denied that he had sent such a message to the King, Chikanga. In other 
words, King Inharugue was telling a lie. He committed another milando by
37. Ibid.
38. Letter to the Governor of Rios de Sena, signed by Manoel Francisco do 
Rozario, Pedro Paulo, Antonio Benedito Gracias, Joaquim Pires. Aruangua, 
18.5.1805. Cxa. 5^* Moc.A.H.U
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implying that the King had told an untruth, and the inhamai ordered Baza to 
pemberar again. The capitao-mor was accused of trying to bring bad blood 
between Chikanga and his governor* The envoys demanded a cow, but the capitao- 
mor insolently told them that they could eat cow dung* This brought more 
protestations. The inhamai and his bingas were finally persuaded to put up 
for the night and a piece of capotin cloth was given to them. They refused 
and insisted on having a cow for meat. Pedro Antonio de Araujo was sent to 
fetch a cow from the captain’s danga (kraal)* This was the end of the milando. 
One could quote other such cases, but this sufficiently demonstrates how 
ignorant the Portuguese were of Manyika customs. They treated the King’s 
envoys cavalierly and openly declared Inharugue a liar. Inharugue, unlike 
his predecessor, played real politics with the Portuguese. He tried, under 
very trying circumstances, to uphold his sovereignty. But the realist in him 
occasionally compelled him to seek Portuguese help. In the next reign, 
Inharugue*s policy of circumscribing Portuguese commercial activities was 
further developed.
3* THE REIGN OF INHAGOPE: HIS STRUGGLE WITH INHARUGUE AND LATER WITH
INHAMUTOTA (1807-1813).  _ _
Portuguese intervention further increased during the first few 
years of Inhagope's reign. But this was soon checked. In their struggle 
•for the crown, Inharugue was supported by the Portuguese, but Inhagope was sup­
ported by the Quitevans. Inhagope, supported by the princes, Inhamutota and 
Mossaza, occupied the feira of Masekesa and the surrounding region, while 
Inharugue was holding the binga (royal court) and contiguous areas. Inharugue 
made desperate efforts to dislodge his rivals from the feira, but failed. 
Inhagope n°t himself live at the feira* He lived in Doe, that is N.West 
of Manyika. He put Inhamutota in charge of the feira. The latter, in turn,
1A2.
put prince Mossaza in charge of the feira, This was intended to be a mere 
administrative arrangement. The overall authority lay with Inhagope. But,
I
as we shall see, this created problems.
As in the case of Inharugue and Inhacompunza, the actual 
circumstances under which Inhagope assumed power are unknown. In his letter 
of January, 1808 to the Governor of Rios de Sena, Pedro Antonio de Araujo 
informed the Governor that, on his arrival in Manyika, he had audience with
Inhagope, ’’who took possession of the palace with the help of the Quitevans
\
last year. On the 26th of last month” Araujo continues, "the King^Inhagope?
39invaded Inharugue*s palace, but was repulsed** . Apparently some of the
Manyika, plus his Quitevan supporters, were responsible for this attack. It
is not clearly stated as to when Inhagope actually dethroned Inharugue, but
it was possibly between January,1808 and 30th 0ctober,l809 because there is
a report dated 30th October, 1809 which mentions an *expelled' and a 'present'
King. The former was possibly Inharugue and the latter, Inhagope. The
expelled King was reported to be in binga, that is the royal court. Evidently
the term expelled is used in relation to the control of the feira, which was
under Inhagope's control, "in the region of the Bungis, the people who, in this
40
Kingdom, dispose of the greatest forces" • The records of this period are s
silent about the activities of Inharugue, who was then living at the 'binga'
’(royal court) 'the legitimate place where the Kings lived', and Inhagope* who 
4-1
lived in Doe • The fact that Inharugue was able to keep Inhagope and his 
supporters away from the palace strongly suggests that he must have been fairly
39* Letter from Pedro Antonio de Araujo to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 
7.1«l8o8. Cxa.50.Moc.A.H.U. At that time the capitao-mor had asked for 
20 soldiers but could not get them because Truao had been defeated by 
Monomotapa, at Chicova in October,1807.
4-0. cxa.31. 30.11.1809.
4-1. Doe is a name of a hill, which according to a map in Baptista»J.Renato, 
Caminho de Ferro de Beira....#is situated about 33 Kilometres N.W, of 
Masekesa.
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popular with the majority of the Manyika people who helped him regain 
control of the feira of Masekesa eight years later. The Portuguese referred 
to Inhagope as King, but in fact it would seem that Inharugue was still 
the recognised King of Manyika, despite his loss of control of the feira 
to Inhagope-Inhamutota alliance,
Portuguese policy during this period was ambivalent. The capitao-
mor, Pedro de Araujo, supported both parties, Manyika seems to have been
divided into two main parties during this armed conflict. The word ’expulso’
is to be regarded as a polemic exaggeration. Neither party, it seems, was so
powerful as to expel the other. This may explain why the capitao-mor
decided to take a chance and intrigue with both parties. His successor,
Diogo iuis Rodrigues, was fined 100 panos by Inhagope in return for ’continuity 
I 42
of commerce* • The relations between Inhagope and the Portuguese were strained
in 1810 because it is said that he and prince Inhamutota ’plotted* against the
43 —
Portuguese in that year , Inhamutota accused the capitao-mor of giving aid
to Inharugue, He claimed that he received the information from his samuzinda
(adjutant), prince Mossaza, who was then in charge of the feira. The
details of this case need not detain us but the fact is that even when it
was realised that the capitao-mor had no choice under the circumstances he
44
was still asked to pay 4# gonos of pure gold on the pretext that this was
his credential, as provisional capitao-mor, to King Inhagope, Prince Inhamutota
vaguely assured the capitao-mor about ’facilities’ which he would extend to the
45
feirantes and the vashambadzi , It is interesting to note that although
42, Letter from Diogo Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pereira de Azevedo, 
17,7.1810.
43* Ibid.
44. 4)4 gonos = 2,250 reis (1 gono = 500 reis, i.e. )4 of an oitava).
45* Letter from Diogo Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pereira de Azevedo, 
17.7*l8lO. Cxa.58. Moc.A.H.U.
lMf.
Inhagope was theorectically in possession of the feira region, effective 
control had passed into the hands of Inhamutota and prince Mossaza. The
I •  i
pretensions of Inhamutota eventually led to a quarrel between him and Inhagope.
I
This is mentioned by the capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa, Rodrigues, in
his letter to the Governor of Rios de Sena. It would seem that In&amutota
was expelled from the feira region, and probably from Manyika, between 1810
and 1813* He made an attempt to recapture the feira, but was repulsed by
the
King Inhagope and fled to/lands of Tanga in Barwe. There were rumours
\
that he wanted to settle in Barwe. According to a report, which unfortunately
is partially illegible, the situation developed relatively slowly. First of
all the Portuguese tried to assist King'Inhagope, but Inhamutota was prob-
k7
ably supported by the Quitevans . It was reported that a massacre took
place in the land of (Jhavave. The King, having received news of this, sent
his princes and bingas to ask for military help from the Portuguese. The
capitao-mor sent a lieutenant of the militia, Francisco Roiz, and his companion,
Francisco Royne Tavor, at the head of a contingent of 36 soldiers to co-operate
with King Inhagope*s army. An encounter took place between the Portuguese
contingent and a *manga1 (group), of the enemy in which four of the enemy
*f8
were killed and several were wounded • Typically of war reports, we are 
not told the number of casualties on the Portuguese side.
However, the army of Inhagope and the Portuguese jointly scored 
a partial success and returned to their respective domiciles. Then some
J*6. Letter from Joze/ Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pedro de Azevedo, Bumba
13.11.1813. Cxa.37. Moc.A.H.U.
k?. The King of Manyika is probably Inhagope, although there is no name 
mentioned. ^
48. Letter from Joze Luis Redrigues to Constantino Pedro de Azevedo, Bumba
13.11.1813. Cxa.37. Moc.A.H.U.
princes started negotiating with the enemy, according to the soldiers' report. 
The capitao-mor, therefore, decided to send back the contingent to the feira 
to forestall any intrigues §nd maintain the King in power. The King's princes 
and his bingas supposedly importuned the capitao-mor for military support and 
at the same time advised him to retreat to Miraba without delay. An order was 
issued by the capitao-mor to the effect that every inhabitant must leave for 
Vumba at once. The supply of gunpowder left did not allow any further delay. 
It is reported that, in the confusion and haste that followed, the inhabitants 
left behind their cloths, household utensils, jewels and ornaments. They 
advanced towards Vumba destroying everything before them, "continuing their
Zf9
war of depopulation of the Kingdom" of Chikanga •
i As in a l l  wars, the significance of this war in material terms is
I
difficult to assess accurately. The property and lives of people lost will
probably never be known, but the estimate of Portuguese losses, given by the
^  50
capitao-mor was 100 pastas excluding what was spent on trying to make
alliances with 'other Kings' either for direct help or in order to gain
- w -  51
their neutrality. The capitao-mor himself spent 30 pastas from his own
52
pocket. In another report , it was estimated that the war cost more than 
1,000 cruzados and as much as 230 panos. It is in the same document that 
Portuguese policy to warring Manyika princes was clearly stated. The capitao- 
mor was to be neutral and recognise and sustain the victorious party.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. 15HL
52. As feitas que avido na terra da Manica. This is a report to the Governor- 
General of Mozambique, Rios de Sena and Sofala, Contantino Pereira de 
Azevedo, from Marcos Caetano de Abrio e Menezes, 10.11.1813. Cxa. 57 
Moc. A.H.U.
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Another result of the war was that the feira was changed to Vumba, 
where the capitao-mor spent some cloths on saguates to the King and princes 
of the Kingdom* The feira of Manyika was reported extinct and the entire 
Kingdom was declared unsafe*
It is significant that Portuguese nostalgic attachment to the 
feira of Masekesa, where they had conducted their business for more than a
century, manifested itself in such utterances as 'the feira of Manica is very
important  we ought to preserve it'* Comparison was made with the mines
of America and the feira was declared the best in the captaincy of Rios de 
Sena^.
4* THE REIGN OF INHAMUTOTA:
After the Portuguese had withdrawn to Vumba in l8l3» Inhamutota
tried to get in touch with them from the feira, which was then under his
control as the following report shows:
After our removal to this place, Prince Nhamutota sent 
me two ambassadors with a matical as soon as he had 
arrived at the feira. They requested me to return to 
the feira or, at least, to send some people to guard 
the houses; Nhamutota made war only on the King, his 
relatives, which had nothing to do with the muzungos.
I answered that I could not discuss the problem with­
out having talked to the King of Bumba, because I was 
staying in his territory.54
Two princes, probably supporters of Inhamutota and "others who are
55 ^of the party" waged war against the Portuguese in Vumba. Capitao Trexaunt
intervened and brought about a settlement concerning several issues of trade,
53. _JMd> /
54• Letter from Joze Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pereira de Azevedo, Bumba, 
15.ll.l8l5. Cxa.57. Moc.A.H.U.
55* The other party probably means princes who defected from Inhagope to 
Inhamutota.
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and a milando, which Prince Chiconde, a grandee of Prince Inhamutota, had
56
made against the Portuguese . Apart from the fact that Inhamutota feared
a return of the capitao-mor, Pedro Xavier Velasco, who, at the time
57Inhamutota occupied the feira, was already on his way to Sena .
Inhamutota asked the Portuguese authorities at Sena to attend his
58
coronation and bring with them "agua de manga” . Two moradores, Colonel of 
the militia, lieutenant Francisco, an ensign, Barboza, and the ”lat£captain 
of the militia, Joze de Souza,” who recommended that as many people, and 
probably soldiers, as possible should attend, were nominated to attend the 
coronation ceremony^. The documents are silent about Inhamutota*s reign 
and how he eventually lost control of the feira to Inharugue. It is possible
that tile five years of Inhamutota's reign were taken up by negotiations with
! i
the Portuguese. As noted earlier, Inhamutota himself initiated the dialogue 
about the feira as soon as he cftme to power in 1813. In l8l8, negotiations 
between the authorities at Sena and Inhamutota about the feira were abandoned.
Here again we notice that, whenever there were no wars, Manyika 
Kings put into effect their policy of controlling trade as well as the 
movements of the Portuguese. We are not told what issues were involved here 
but it appears that the Portuguese were given conditions on which they could 
return to the feira. It also appears that they conducted secret negotiations 
with Inharugue, who was at his binga.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid. In l8l6, Velasco tried to go to Manyika again. It is not certain 
whether or not he was successful. The soldiers, however, who had escorted 
him, returned to Sena on 20.9«l8}.6 without any results. Cxa.60. Moc. 
A.H.U. 23.9*1816.
58. Water of confirmation. For the origin and significance of this practice 
see Gamitto, A.C.P. 'Successao e Acclamacao dos Reis do Barwe, Memo'ria 
s&bre um sistema para as colSnias Portuguesas1 in Annaes do Conselho 
Ultramarino, parte nao of icial, Serie 1.Lisbon 1867. There is an English 
translation of this in Vonsicard, H.NADA. No.31.195^*
39. As Feitas que a vido na terra da Manica. Report from Marcos Caetano de 
Abrio e Menezes to the G.G. of Mogambique and Rios de Sena,Constantino 
Pereira de Azevedo, 10.12.l8l3. Cxa.57* A.H.U.
m .
On the l8th July, l8l8, a Portuguese expeditionary force set out
60for Manyika accompanied by the manamucates of Barwe and Bundo’s son • Bundo 
was a regulo of,. Manyika, who should not be confused with Bondo of Barwe* The
61 ^
expedition advanced very slowly and was still at Sungue , near the Manyika- 
Barwe border, on 22*10.I8l8* There are no specified reasons for this delay 
but the political situation in Manyika seems to be the reason for it* There 
exists a letter, dated l8*10.l8l8, that is three months after the departure
of the expedition, in which the commandant at the villa of Sena, Ferrao,
\
\
informed the Governor that:
...the King of Manica, Inharugue, sent his 
ambassadors to this villa to let me know that 
he took control of all the parts of his Kingdom 
and that he had expelled his rival, Inhamutota 
or Bundalo.
Inharugue also sent a present of 3 dogados, that is 2 ounces and 2
62
oitavas of pure gold , and wanted in exchange for this, cloths and sundry 
items^.
It seems to me very probable that Inhamutota or Bundalo is to be 
identified with Bundo, whose 'son* accompanied the expedition in July, l8l8. 
They seem, at first, to have negotiated with the wrong party. This could 
also be the cause of the delay*
In November, l8l8, the feira was set up, not at Masekesa but at 
Aruangua, and by 1819 the Portuguese were on good terms with Inharugue, King
60. Cxa. 61. Sena 26. l8l8. Moc.A.H.U.
6l• Ibid. This place is probably the Muzinda Sungue or'Prazo Gorongoza.
62. See Lobato, A. Evolucab  op.cit. p.63.
63. Cxa.6l. Sena, I8.10.l8l8.
1^9.
6k
of Manyika • The same Inharugue, who was mentioned in 1796, who was 
expelled in 1807 by Inhagope and who had to fight his several rivals 
until 1818, is very probably the same Chikanga who was mentioned in 1801 and 
1802 without further names.
5. SECOND REIGN OF INHARUGUE:
It is interesting to note that this Inharugue, in about 1822, is
called 'Mutaca1 for the first time. Mutasa is a dynastic title by which the
Kings of Manyika were and are known. Still in 1822 Inharugue had to fight 
65
against Bundo , his nephew, a claimant to the throne of Manyika, who up to 
then was doing all he could to see that he came to the throne. Nevertheless, 
due to lack of help and especially that of cloths, he had not been able to 
get help from any of the neighbouring regulos. The result was that he was 
very desperate. He began attacking traders who were on their way to the 
feira and seized whatever he could lay his hands on, provided it belonged 
to the Portuguese, and burnt villages. This is understandable. The Portuguese, 
according to his logic were the real enemies of the Kingdom and Inharugue was 
nothing short of a traitor®
Bundo's activities were not entirely in vain. Trade at the feira 
became unprofitable as a result of his activities. He limited his attacks 
•to the feira, the seat of Portuguese economic power - power which they used 
in the game of King-making. It was reported that commerce elsewhere was 
normal, mainly because Bundo had no supporters with whom to co-ordinate his 
activities. It would appear that the Manyika people were tired of wars and
6k, Cxa. 6k, 21.10.l8l9.
65* Letter to the Governor of Rios de Sena from Thomas Francisco Trexaunt,
10.8.1822. Manica, Cxa.65. Hoc. A.H.U. Cxa.71• Aruangua, 19.3*1822.
On the war reports see a letter Ibid. dated 2.2.1822 and on the famine, 
Ibid. *f.10.1831.
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were longing for peace. However, Bundo did obtain some support from some
Barwists. The net result of the wars and predatory activities of the
various frustrated princes was a great famine which occurred towards the 
cc
end of 1822 •
Until the year 1833» there are no further reports on dynastic
conflicts. In 1831, 'Rei Mutaca* is mentioned but there were also complaints
67
that some of the princes did not obey the King • It is not certain whether
68or not this disobedience signified further conflicts. According to a report , 
this King died before October, 1838. The policies of Inhargue and the 
Portuguese deserve a careful examination during the conflicts. The dynastic 
wars which took place between 1796-l8l8 and the sporadic fights which took 
place after that determined the foreign policy of Inharugue and the 
Portuguese alike.
69Inharugue paid great attention to the Portuguese • He permitted 
them to exploit the mines, a thing they could not do during the l8th Century, 
encouraged his subjects to trade at the feira and ”up to now (1822) it does 
not appear that there are any complaints.’1 There is a striking contrast with 
the situation during the l8th Century. The merchants complained a lot, but 
the Manyika needed no encouragement from the K^ng to trade at the feira as 
was the case in 1820. The only complaint the capitao-mor had was about ’’the 
continuous requests for cloths for the muzimo” (midzimu)• But Inharugue
66. Ibid.
67. Maco 23* Manica 4-. 10.1831.
68. Cod.1^73• f.250v. ^
69. Instructions to the commandant from the capitao-mor, circa 1822. This 
document must be dated to about 1822, because it refers to Prince Mutema 
as the one in charge of the feira. Prom other documents, we know that
. he was there in 1822. Otherwise the document exists in a wrong place, 
Maco l*f, Moc.A.H.U., and the date is torn off. The document contains 
a lot of useful information.
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care fully explained the necessity of doing this. Visitors, had to offer
cloths to Manyika midzimu to ensure that all the mines would produce a
70 ■
lot of gold • The midzimu were and are responsible for the nation*s
I
prosperity and tranquility, and for the fertility of the land. The demands
for cloth were so incessant that the capitao-mor eventually, but erroneously,
concluded that: ’'Africans are persuaded that the whites always have cloths,
71that their supply never ends and because of this they ask" • In spite of
all this, the capitao-mor was quite happy with Inharugue and reported that
he had not received a single complaint from either the African or 'Moorish*
traders or their vashambadzi since he arrived at the feira. For the
prosperity of Portuguese commerce in Manyika, he recommended that Inharugue
72
should be maintained in power , first, because he regarded the 'Portuguese
as his brothers' since they gave him help and secondly, he regarded the
Manyika princes, his kinsmen, as enemies because they waged war against 
73him . From 1796 to 1820 the Portuguese referred to Inharugue as a friend 
of the state, as an ally on two occasions, and once as a brother. It would 
perhaps be too much to describe him as a proto-Chombe of the l8th and early 
19th Centuries, but his sycophantic propensities towards the Portuguese can 
not be explained purely in terms of his military weakness and the support 
he expected from them. I think he was lacking in patriotism. He was a 
clever King, but not a wise one. However, later events prove that he learned 
from his mistakes and made some half-hearted efforts to revive the traditional 
spirit of resistance to foreign encroachments.
70. Letter from Francisco Trexaunt to the Governor, 27.3*1820. Cxa.65.
Moc.A.H.U.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73* Jfcid.
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Portuguese policy between 1813-1822 was pragmatic. The Portuguese 
had learned from bitter experience of the danger of flirting with one prince 
this moment and another the next.
74They avoided any dealings with Bundo during the reign of Inharugue .
Bundo, probably at the end of 1822, was a spent force, dejected and a fugitive,
together with his father-in-law, his sons and various other princes in the 
75
Kingdom of Quiteve • The Portuguese had learned that any cloth spent on 
Bundo would be used to finance wars to destroy the feira as had happened in 
the past; they had also learned that the King of Manyika had spies throughout 
his Kingdom, who would report any dealings between the Portuguese and any of 
his enemies. Their policy of supporting different princes from time to time 
was expensive, especially when it is realised that the benefit they got from 
one prince was the same as that from the other. It was these considerations 
which helped formulate Portuguese policy towards Inharugue. The authorities 
at Sena took great care to instruct their commandant in 1820 to observe a
76
policy of ’neutrality* between the warring parties because ’’they are kinsmen” • 
He was also instructed to observe the customary diplomatic etiquette, by 
announcing his arrival and establishing a dialogue between him and an 
inhamai, a massango with his council, one or two princes and the King’s 
binga, whether it be the ordinary binga or one of the Chicundas (princes).
This commandant was also to pay attention to the Kingdom of Barwe and Prince 
Mutema, who was then in charge of the feira. The instruction ran as follows:
74. Instructions from Sena to the Commandant at the feira 1822, Cxa. 6 5 , 
Moc. A.H.U.
75* Ibid.
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  you ought to see Prince Mutema who lives
in that feira, and ask him for a piece of munco 
(white gold extracted from a mine of white quartz - 
see Galvao) which is worth a piece of zuarte and he 
ought to give you a cow from Machona. The piece of 77 
Munco comes from the muzimo of the feira, Inhabinga.. .
The King's ambassadorial mission was expected to bring from the King a small 
gift, a gesture which the commandant was expected to reciprocate* However, 
on an occasion like this, one Prince Mabota, described as "a poor wretch,* 
generally turned up and, in.all likelihood brought nothing, but it was 
essential to give him a piece of cloth, because the Portuguese got timber and 
bamboo from his land . It was highly recommended that he should enquire of 
the King's health and he was to maintain the lie that he came from Goa. The 
belief of most Kings inthis region, if Portuguese sources are to be trusted, 
was that the Governor lived in Goa and only the officials lived at Sena or 
the feira. Inharugue was to be told that the capitao-mor would not return 
to the feira unless the wars between him and Bundo came to an end* Even then, 
Inharugue was to write to the Governor to ask for the capitao-mor to return, 
and the Governor would stipulate the conditions to be fulfilled before the 
capitao-mor returned*
In the 1820's trade at the feira of Masekesa was particularly
profitable to the vashambadzi, but not for capltaes-mor* The capitaes-mor were,
as it were, sandwiched among rival princes who needed cloths to finance their 
79wars • The King's ambassadorial missions to the feira were generally big 
and frequent* Inevitably the capitaes-mors' expenses became considerable.
77. Jbid
78. Ibid.
79* As feitas que avido na terra da Manica 
op.cit*
15^.
Inharugue's policy between 3.10.1822 and 30.11.1822 was one of 
self-assertion. He was still dependent on Portuguese support, no doubt
/ I
because the Portuguese, even at this stage, still referred to him as
I
!
'our ally', but his attempt to take possession of the feira underlines a 
feeling of recovery of confidence and independent action. He sent his 
inhamai, Musipa Chemucence as a masango, Prince Conzuma as his personal 
representative and Prince Mutema of the feira, to tell the commandant and 
the Portuguese businessmen that the the King had taken over the feira of
8o
Manyika • The reason for this resistance is not clear. The chances are 
that this was done in order to win over support from his rival, Bundo.
Inharugue had no doubt in his mind that his policy of dependence on the 
Portuguese was anathema to most Manyika. He was probably, all along, look­
ing for a chance to escape from it and the lull of the early twenties 
deceived him. But it was significant that for the first time since l8l8, 
Inharugue felt confident enough to remind the Portuguese, despite protestations 
of 'brotherhood', that it was he who determined where the Portuguese could 
trade in his land. This independent policy was short-lived.
The threats of a war by Prince Bundo, sometime in 1822, account 
for the somersault that took place in Inharugue's foreign policy. It is 
possible that the Portuguese, who had come to regard the threats of war by 
Bundo as Damocles sword hanging over the head of Inharugue, manufactured 
rumours in order to restrain him from further independent action.
However, after what was termed 'protracted negotiations' between the 
bingas and the Portuguese, Inharugue reassured them that they could go and
80. Terms of Possession 3*10.1822, Aruangua, signed by; Antonio de Araujo 
Braganpa, Louren^o Manuel de Almeida, who acted as a clerk, CXA.71* 
Moc. A.H.U.
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settle at the feira of Masekesa. It seems that towards the end of these
81
'protracted negotiations' , Inharugue's inhamai and the bingas were 
imploring the Portuguese to go and settle at the feira, probably to fore­
stall its invasion by Bundo, and when they were reminded about the destruction 
of the houses and property which took place in l8l3» they responded that it 
was Bundo and not Inharugue who did so. AsJhr as Inharugue was concerned, it 
was up to them to make uptheir minds whether or not they wanted to return to 
Masekesa. He was quite prepeared even to donate an alternative site in his 
land.
j The preceding discussion has shown that the feira of Masekesa was 
a very important institution from the last decade of the l8th Century on­
wards. Rival princes fought for control of the feira in order to get Portuguese
i -----
i
support whichvas considered essential to maintain oneself in power. Princes
i
were appointed to control and limit Portuguese commercial activities at the 
feira. This was undoubtedly prompted by elements of patriotism and jealousy 
about their sovereignty.
The discussion has also shown that Portuguese policy of neutrality 
often gave way to that of expediency. The niceties of legitimacy were thrown 
overboard. ^
Thirdly, the discussion has demonstrated that Inharugue depended 
on Portuguese support for his safety on the throne, and also that, whenever 
he felt secure, he tried to resist Portuguese pressure for greater freedom 
at the feira, and that only threats of war or an actual act of war from his 
rival, Bundo, forced him to fall back on the Portuguese for military support.
8l. Letter to the Governor, signed by Lourenpo Manoel de Almeida, Ricardo 
da Costa Soares, provisional capitao-mor and commandant, Jozd^ Joaquim 
da Silva, Felix Mascarenhas, Cypriano Xavier de S^ f, Andr^ Manoel Fernandes,
20.11.1822. Cxa.71. Moc.A.H.U.
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C H A P T E R  V.
MANYIKA-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS 1822-1835.
A marked shift in Manyika foreign policy can be discerned during 
the second quarter of the 19th Century. In contradistinction to the practices 
of the Chikangas of the late l8th Century and early 19th Century, the Chikangas 
became more and more assertive between 1822 and 1835* Bondo, who had been 
largely responsible for the instability of Manyika foreign policy, became 
less and less important as a factor in Manyika-Portuguese relations. There 
is only one case of appeal to the Portuguese for military help, and that was 
when the feira of Masekesa was attacked by the Ngoni in 1833* Nothing seems
to have materialised. This is a pointer to the fact that the Chikangas were
I i
aware that tli3 Ngoni had no quarrel with them. They were seeking Portuguese 
wealth in the form of cattle at the feira. The Ngoni impact has often been 
accused of a destruction of Portuguese interests in Manyika. This picture 
must be radically altered by the experience of the previous decade. The 
Ngoni attacks in the 1830*s were directed against the feira of Masekesa and 
the' feira of Aruangwa and not against the Manyika people, nor even the 
Portuguese as such. Very few people were killed. Both Manyika and Portuguese 
within the feira, and the records covering this period, give no evidence of a 
single eye-witness account to the effect that young Manyika men and women 
were taken away by the Ngoni between the period 1822-1835* There is, however, I 
one instance pertaining to Quiteve, and this will be dealt with later.
Besides this, a careful survey of the records reveals that the 
1 destruction* of the two feiras in Manyika was a gradual process which probably
j
began in 1829 and continued up to 1835i when a new set of circumstances was 
created. The ultimate fall of the feiras cannot be attributed solely to the 
Ngoni invasions; other factors were equally at work and, in terms of 
chronological sequence, they deserve first mention.
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Administrative anarchy, which noticeably undermined the Portuguese 
defence system and trade at the feira during the first decade of the 19th
A
Century, had made confusion worse confounded by the l830*s. A ban , intended 
to correct the situation at the feira, reveals a lack of control by the 
capitao-mor over the merchants and consequently his inability to rise to the 
occasion* The feirantes dealt directly with the various princes, *saguating* 
them with presents, independent of the capitao-mor. Such articles as calcas 
(trousers), jackets and bonnets, which only the capitao-mor was allowed to 
give to Kings or princes as presents, were given by the individual merchants 
living within the feira without the knowledge of the capitao-mor. The 
increasing tendency of this practice aroused legitimate fears that sooner 
or laier the feirantes would vie with^another in giving presents to the
I I 2
local princes • The net result of all this would be jealousy and consequent 
internecine wars among the princes themselves. This would ultimately lead to 
an *invasion1 of the feira of Masekesa. As a result of these fears a ban was 
imposed by the Governor of Rios de Sena, Joze/ Francisco Alves Barboza, to the 
effect that, however much it was profitable to individual feirantes to 
establish independent relations with the princes of the feira and their 
neighbours, in future this practice would not be allowed. The commandant 
of the feira was instructed to exercise great vigilance and to act promptly 
whenever news of a violation of this ban reached him. He was to confine the 
culprit within the feira precincts and, if he continued to violate the ban, 
he would be expelled from the feira altogether. This ban was, of course, 
indirectly imposed upon the Manyika princes. The feirantes at Masekesa, as
1* Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Joze*^Francisco Alves Barboza to 
Antonio de Araujo Braganca, commandant of the garrison of the feira of 
Manyika, 11.5.1824. Cxa.75* Moc.A.H.U.
2. Ibid*
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at Aruangua, were forbidden to receive presents from Manyika Kings or 
3princes .
Another administrative abuseto be corrected was that of weights. 
Ricardo da Costa Soares, who succeeded Antonio de Araujo Braganca as
A
capitao-mor , reported that one could rely on the system of weights up 
5
to four gonos , but beyond that the weights were confused. According to an
old instruction, which he found in the archives of the feira, Francisco
Henrique Ferrao had been instructed during the l8th Century to see that the
proper weights were used. A piece of zuarte then cost five maticals, but
6
this had been altered to cost a dogado • He reported the feira to be safe.
In fact, for the first time the King himself is reported to have visited the
7feira Iwith his bingas , Soares*s complaint was the usual one of too many
' I
frequent visits by the bingas, who had to be given fazendas each time they
g
came • The situation was further aggravated by the fact that very few pieces 
of cloths had been sent to him as his salary.
3* Letter from Ricardo da Costa Soares, captain of the infantry and provisional 
commandant of the garrison of the Feira de Aruangwa, to the Governor of Rios
de Sena, Joz£ Francisco Alves Barboza, 3*#«1&2A. Cxa.7A, Moc.A.H.U.
A. Antonio de Araujo Braganca died on 15.8.182A. See Letter from Ricardo da 
Costa Soares to the Governor of Rios de Sena,25*8.l82A. Cxa.7^* Moc.A.H.U.
5* Letter from Ricardo Soares da Costa to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
1.10.182A. Cxa.7^. Moc.A.H.U. A gono was a small weight of gold, which
corresponded to one quarter of an oitava. It was worth 500 reis at the
end of the l8th Century. See *Descripcao Corografiea * Cxa.17* Moc.A.H.U.
6. 1 dogado = A maticals, i.e. 6 oitavas of pure gold. See Xavier Botelho,
Memdria Estatistica.....p.l89. Lobato A. Evolugao..... Lisbon,1957* P*65.
7* Ibid.
8. An example of the expenses incurred in connection with Mutasa and his Bingas 
can be found in a letter from Ricardo da Costa Soares to the Governor of Rios 
de Sena, 25.8.I82A. Cxa.7^. Moc.A.H.U. Ill cloths were paid to the King and 
Bingas, 6 cloths were paid in order to secure freedom of passage..
10 cloths were paid to a Manyika who accompanied the Binga.
9 cloths were paid to princes Mutema and Mabota. Also see Letter dated 
20.9.182^, this being an account of expenses incurred in connection with 
the payment of the soldiers and at the same time a request for more fazenda. 
See Letter dated 26.lO.l82A, reporting peaceful and friendly relations with 
the King of Barwe.
See Letter dated 25*8.I82A, relating that immediately after the death of 
Araujo Braganca, capitao-mor of the feira de Manica, Soares sent Prince 
Mutema, who is described as Mutasa*s cabo, and was in charge of the feira, 
together with his envoys and a Portuguese soldier to report the Captain's 
death to Chikanga. The expense for this was 1 zuarte.
Similar expenses were incurred in connection with Bondo, also described as
/Contd
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Starvation added another dimension to the problem. Reports about
starvation form a lively topic in the correspondence between the officers
at the feiras and the Governor of Rios de Sena. According to a report which
the Governor of Rios de Sena wrote in 1829« the general decline of the villas,
that of 'Manica' not excepted, was due to a famine which had been raging for
six years. This had resulted in wars in the Kingdoms of Barwe and Quiteve
and the slaves of the moradores in these places, rather than starve to death,
abandoned their masters and devastated large areas near the margins of the
9Zambezi and in the vicinity of Sofala •
Footnote 8 Continued....
Mckombe's Grande Cabo* This was largely intended to secure freedom of 
passage to the feira. 25.8.I82A, Cxa.7A. Moc.A.H.U. For other expenses 
made to Ricardo as capitao-mor of the Feira de Manica. See Santana,
Francisco. Documentaqao Avulsa Moqambicana do Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, 
Vol.I. . (Macos 1— ;i0) Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos, Lisbon
1967, pp.A89,513.
2,29A cloths for the military uniform of the garrison of the feira, from 
1.8.1825 to July 1826. These figures must be read with caution because 
sometimes they remained on paper only. For/^''examples see Letter from 
Antonio da Silva Baptista, factor of Sena. Also see Santana F. Documentacao.. 
op.cit. Vol.I. Lisbon,I96A, p.513* 128, 5*9.1827. It would appear that even 
the practice of paying soldiers who did not exist was still in practice, 
though in a modified form, See letter from Antonio da Silva Baptista to 
Francisco Henrique Ferrao.
Santana F. Documentaqao Vol.I. Lisbon, I96A. A5/26/H/I828. p.689.
9* Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sean, Manuel Joaquim Mendes de
Vasconcellos e Cirne, to Conde de Basto, Minister and Secretary of State 
and marine and overseas affairs, 7.12.1829. Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto, 23.10.1829. Maco 20. Moc.A,H.U.
Letter from Antonio da Silva Baptista to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 
3.8.1829. Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from Severico Joze^ de Abranches to the factor of Sena, l8.11.l829»
Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U. ^
See summaries of these letters in Stantana F. Documentaqao  Vol.I.
Lisbon,196A. 38/1 and 38/2. p.772.
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de \fysCos>cefleS
Manuel Joaquim . Mendes^e Cirne1s observations were supported
10by Izidoro Manuel de Carrezedo, who dated the famine to 182? . The results
I |
of this famine, according to him, were not visible until 1832, when trade
routes to the feiras of Zumbo and Manica1, dependents of Tete and Sena
respectively, could not be traversed "due to continuous attacks, and robberies,
which the princes and regulos made on the Portuguese merchants." The interior
of Barwe and Quiteve, where the merchants used to go, had been reduced to a
state of anarchy, King Tica of Quiteve died in 1830 and the. Queens and rival
11pretenders to the throne found themselves in a succession crisis •
In Barwe, the King had also died and Prince Inhamaguada had
12
succeeded him as King, but not without a trial of arms and confusion and 
a consequent, if only temporary, halt to normal commercial activities. The 
feira of Masekesa had been isolated from Sena for two years. The Kingdom of 
Barwe had been without a King for four years and during this interregnum, 
the Barwists had nobody to obey. Rival princes supported by their parties 
fought for the throne. It was this which rendered the passage to Manyika
13
unsafe. The Portuguese at Sena were not.in a position to remedy the situation •
10. Letter from Izidoro Manuel de Carrazedo to Francisco Simoens Margioch,
Minister and Secretary of State and Overseas affairs. Queliman 13*9.1835* 
Cod. 1*4-77* Moc.A.H.U. x
•11. Letter from Francisco Roiz Nunes to Paulo Joze Miguel de Brito, Governor 
General of Mozambique. Sofala, A.8.1830. Maco 12. Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from Nunes to Brito, l4.12.l830. No.1156. Maco 21. Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from Nunes to Brito, 7*12.1830.
12. Letter from Fortunato da Silva to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de 
Sena 10.6.1830. in Santana F. Documentacao  Vol.II. Lisbon,1967. p.3A6.
13. Copy of a letter from Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Conde de 
Basto, 23.10.l829 in Santana F. Documentacao Vol.I '• Lisbon, p.1082.
There were eleven filhosda terra instead of the required sixty Portuguese 
soldiers, the rest having fled away with their food supplied .
Vasconcellos e Cirne*s immediate task as the new Governor of Rios
de Sena in 1830 was to restore contact between Sena and the feira of Masekesa*
He, therefore, organised auxiliary troops of armed Africans and a detachment
of fifty soldiers, a senior official and two officials of lower rank from
15Tete to go and reinforce the Sena detachment * This expedition included 
forces from private individuals, presumably of the moradores, who had 
commercial interests in the Kingdom of Manyika. The commandant of the 
expedition was given instructions to open the trade route between Manyika 
and Sena either by persuading the African princes and regulos who commandedIthe passage to the feira or by force* Instructions were also sent to the
'I
effect that the commandant should look for fazenda to supply the garrison
I
of the feira of Masekesa. Traders who wanted to send their fazenda for
16trading purposes were encouraged to do so • That the task of the
expedition was a difficult one is shown by the fact that an expedition which
left Sena at the beginning of April was not able to accomplish its mission
until the end of June. It would seem that the results of the expedition were
fairly satisfactory. Vashambadzi were reported going to the feira with
17
fazendas in the same year .
1*U Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto, 2^/6/3/1830• in Santana F* 
on.cit. pp.165-166.
15. Letter from Vasconcellos e Cirne to Conde de Basto 28.6.1830 Maco.l^. 
Moc.A.H.U*
A copy of this letter is also found in Maco 20 Moc.A.H.U, Also see 
Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne. Memoria s3bre a Provincia 
de Mozambique Documentos para a Historia das Colohias Portuguezas, 
Ministerio dos Negocios da Marinha e Ultramar. Lisboa Imprensa Nacional
(I89O). Santana F. Documentacao  ii, pp.l65-l66, 24/6/5/1850.
I60 Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto, 28.6.1830. Maco 20, Moc.A.H.U*
17» Ibid*
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It was clear to Vasconcellos e Cirne that if the way to the feira 
was to remain open it would be necessary to have a firm undertaking from 
the King of Barwe to that effect. Hence he sent a high-powered mission to 
participate in the investiture ceremony of King Inhamaguada. Accordingly a 
treaty was concluded providing for opening of the way to all the vassals of 
the Portuguese King, to transport their goods to Manyika and the interior 
in general and guarantees that not even the slightest hostility would be 
shown to any passer-by. Henceforth no milando case could lead to reprisals 
or blocking of the passage; payment of madontos (passage presents) by the 
merchants was stopped and Portuguese-protected persons were assured of cont-
i
inued and extended hospitality from Barwe princes. There is every likelihood
i
that t|he well-documented famine of the mid-l820's and early l830's is the one
! i *18
echoed ;in Manyika tradition • The details of the story, which were undoubtedly
19influenced by a reading of the story in the Bible , point to the fact that this
famine was due to lack of rain and that this was so severe that even when the
rains came, seeds were not easily available. The effects of this long famine
seem, to have been exaggerated from the archives and as remembered from
tradition, because there is evidence that trade was still being carried on.
The seeds, which the Manyika used when the rains came, were obtained from
20
vashambadzi, who apparently had come from a long distance . This is evidence 
•that some form of trade was still continuing.
18. Machiwenyika Jason. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People'.
MS l^/l/l Sby.
19* Genesis 42, 1-6.
20. These seeds are listed as: Cow Peas, Peanuts and Groundnuts.
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In his attempt to locate the origin of the general decadence into
which all the villas without exception had fallen, Vasconcellos e Cirne
vehemently attached what he called administrative corruption and inefficiency
21
in general. His targets were the Canarins , in particular Francisco Henrique 
Ferrao, who was nominated provisional Governor of Rios de Sena by the Governor
General of Mozambique, Sebastiao Xavier Botelho, ’a monopolist1, through
22
bribery • This provisional Governor cared more for his business than the 
interests of Portuguese merchants in the various villas.
His vashambadzi defied the authority of the capitao-mor at the
23
feira of Aruangua do sul (of the South) and refused to pay the customary
21. For a detailed discussion of the Canarins see Boxer C.R.A Relations in the 
Portuguese Colonial Empire 1^15-1825. Clarendon Press, Oxford,1963«P* 73• 
There is a controversy about the precise meaning and origin of this word.
A 'Canarin' is described by H.Michaels, (A New Dictionary of the Portuguese 
and English Languages. London 1893) as a peasant in the neighbourhood of 
Goa. This is nearer the truth, because strictly speaking a Canarin is an 
inhabitant of Canara and not of Goa as is generally assumed. At first the 
word was also applied indiscriminately to Hindus, especially if they were 
not Brahmins. (Pyrard II,p.32,2nd ed). Afterwards the word was applied 
exclusively to native Christians of Goa. As Cunha Rivara (Viagem de 
Francisco Pyrard II, p.32)correctly points out, the word should have no 
derogative connotation* However, its derogative nature, linguists point 
out, arises from the fact that it is derived from 'Canaddi,' which means 
in the Maratha language, coarse, unpolished or savage. See Pissurlencar 
Panduranga SS. Regimentos das Fortalezas da India. Bastora-Goa. 1951iP*39*
22. Joaquim Manoel Vasconcellos e Cirne. Memoria sabre..... Lisbon,l890, 
pp.20-22. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to 
Conde de Basto 28.6.1830. Maco 20 Moc.A.H.U. See Maco Ik for a copy of 
the same letter.
23* The Use of the term 'South* is significant, although it will not be re­
peated in this discussion. It differentiates this feira from another one 
by the same name, Northj/gL the Zambezi - the feira of 'Aruangua do Norde'
, .  established in the/l&20's. The reasons for change from the feira of 
Zumbo were similar. The Portuguese were being driven North by King 
Cazembe. See letter from Manoel Correa Monteiro, commandant of the feira, 
to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique, Sebastiao Xavier Botelho, 
20th October,1828. Maco 3» Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.29 from Jos^ Manoel 
Correia Monteiro to the Governor of Rios de Sena, Francisco Henrique 
Ferrao, 15.6.1828. Aruangua Maco 3> Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.32 from 
Monteiro to Ferrao, Letter No.36 from Monteiro to Ferrao, both dated 
15.6.1828, Maco 3t Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.60.from the Governor and 
Captain of Rios de Sena, Manoel Joaquim de Vasconcellos e Cirne to 
the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique, Paulo Jose^Migo®! de 
Brito, 23.2.1831 Quelimane. Maco 25. Moc.A.H.U. Also see the v/ell-known 
'Relatorio acerca da feira do Aruangua do Norde' Docn*No,179 in Memoria 
e Documentos I890 Lisbon, pp.3^-35^. There is an extract of this
report in Annaes do Consellio Ultramarino, Parte nao official Serie II 
1859-07 Lisbon, pp.^u3-^uo. ' ' ""
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piece of zuarte, on the pretext that they worked according to the orders of their
2/+ ^  
master . Francisco Henrique Ferrao obviously indulged in ’intrigue',
•perfidy* and »chicanery*. It was not always possible, but the authorities
expected that a man in his position should have seen to it that his vashambadzi
behaved in an exemplary manner. Vasconcellos e Cirne reviled Botelho for his 
25
prcP-Canarin policy , for a licence racket which existed among the moradores.
The general unrest caused by famine, the succession wars and lack of 
protection on the part of the moradores since 1820 led to desertion of Sena, 
on which the Manyika feira administration was dependent for its defence and 
supply of fazendas by the moradores. The number of rich and influential
moradores who either died, went away or mortgaged their property has been
!
estimated at thirty,
I •
I The greatest single factor in the misfortunes of the Portuguese in 
the 1820*s and l830's was military weakness, which characterised nearly all
26the 'companies* of Rios de Sena • This state of affairs tempted the Chikangas
27to enter the feira premises and to demand tribute from the commandant as well
24. Letter from Manoel Joachim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne, Governor of the 
Captaincy of Quelimane and Rios de Sena to Paulo Joze7 Miguel de Brito, 
Governor and Captain-General of the State. 26.8.1831. Cod.1468,No.27*
Moc. A.H.U.
25* Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto 28.6.1830. Maco 20, Moc.A.H.U.
26. See General Map of the five companies which garrisoned Rios de Sena in 
1827* (Santana F. Documentaqao 13/30/12/1827* p.3l£). Some of these 
were not complete. The total strength was then 301. These five companies 
were of the infantry of the line of Sena, Tete and Zumbo (the company which, 
in remote times, served as a guard at the Zimbabwe of Monomotapa) and some 
incomplete companies of Zumbo and Manica. These two were supposed to have 
20-30 pracas each, and the other three, 50-60 pracas each. For a short but 
depressing historical account of the military of Rios de Sena. See Cirne, 
Memopia Sobre  op.cit.p.23.
See Letter from Jo£o Antonio Rioz Fereira to the King of Portugal, 31»l«lS32, 
emphasising the the importance of Cirne*s letter and urging prompt attention. 
Mac 20. Moc.A.H.U.
27* Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Paulo Miguel de 
Brito, 26.8.1831. Cod.1468, No.70. Moc.A.H.U,
163.
as from the feirantes in general. It must be stated, however, that this did 
not significantly interfere with commerce. Factors beyond the Chikangas' 
control were responsible for the 'decline' in trade. Starvation had made 
a change in the nature of articles of trade inevitable. The Portuguese 
businessmen bought grain from wherever they could get it and exchanged it
28
for gold during winter . It appears that gold-mining was then limited to 
29
the winter season . The scarcity of rain perhaps explains this new develop­
ment in the mining industry. In the past, fazendas worth more than 600,000 
cruzados were sent to the feira of Masekesa in the form of missanga, panos etc.
but according to Cirne this was no longer the case due to lack of population and
I
security. Cirne's observations were incorrect in this respect. The cases of 
the clnarins and the racket in licences, both of which have already been cited,
! 1
suggest that a fairly lucrative business was being conducted at the feira of
!
Masekesa and probably in the interior even though the feira had been officially
changed to Aruangua. This was not altogether a new site. Manoel Galvao da Silva
described this site in 1790 as showing "signs of having formerly been better
defended." There were still then in existence "two pounder-guns, mounted on
fork-rests, one of these mortar-guns having a separate chambers" This point
was roughly a day's march distant from the vicinity of Masekesa. The grandees
30of Quiteve and Barwe continued to make attacks on this new feira •
28. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes e Cirne to Conde de Basto,28.6.l831.
29. Ibid.
30. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Fortunato 
Ciriano da Silva, commandant and capitao-mor of Manica, 25*8.1830.
Santana F. Documentaqao..... Vol.I. Lisbon,1964. p.1082. 6/1 letter 
sent on 7*12*1829 by Cirne to Conde de ^asto. 6/2 letter sent on 
23.lO.l829 by Francisco Henrique Ferrao to Manoel Joaquim Mendes de 
Vasconcellos e Cirne. These two documents describe the situation in 
Rios de Sena, in particular the military strength of the various villas. 
Also see Cod.1468, No.76 Moc.A,H.U. op.cit.
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Their attacks were so effective that they have been described in the records
31as 'depopulating,' ’assaulting1 and 'robbing' the feira • The precariousness
of the new site of Aruangua as a feira was demonstrated by the fact that there
were very few people there, including one or two officials and three' or four 
32
Africans • The 'defunct' feira of Masekesa was still popular with the business
community* The traders, merchants and vashambadzi from Sena passed by the
feira of Aruangua and did not bother to give the saguate which they were
3 3
obliged to produce, of one piece of sameter • This was supposed to be
34
done by every merchant or mushambadzi who entered the feira • This was
meant for a prince of the feira, MutQma. In order to keep the feira open, the
capitao-mor gave the King some of his own fazendas, but the infringements at
Aruangua continued, and, as the traffic to Masekesa gathered momentum, the
into
feira of Aruangua paled/Insignificance as a commercial post* The Quitevaas
were not only directly responsible for the ruin of the site of Aruangua as a
trading post but, indirectly, they also enhanced the popularity and value of
the old feira of Masekesa* A brief survey of Quiteve-Portuguese relations at
this feira will best illustrate this point. The Quitevan attacks on the
35
feira were, so the Portuguese claimed, motivated by envy and rivalry • The 
King of Quiteve demanded large quantities of fazenda from the traders who 
passed by on their way to Masekesa.
His argument was that the Portuguese had re-established the feira 
of Aruangua on his land and a capitao-mor with troops. Quite often the prince
31* Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios 
de Sena, Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U* See Santana F* Documentagao...*0 14/10/6/1830. 
Vol*II. Lisbon, 19^7» p.346.
32* Cod.1468. Moc.A.H.U.
33• Letter from Fortunato to Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 10.6.1830
in Santana F. Documentaqao  Vol.II Lisbon 1967iP*346.
Letter from Cirne to Ciriano, op.cit. Cod.1468. No.76. Moc.-A.H.U.
34. Letter from Fortunato Ciriaco to Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena,
10.6.1830. In Santana F. Documentacao  Vol.II. p.346.
35* Codice 1468 No.76. Moc. A.H.U.
of Quiteve would notify the capitao-mor that he would go and attack him.
He demanded what the Portuguese described as exorbitant amounts of fazendas,
and any delay in paying this usually evoked the wrath of the King. The
capitao-mor's stock became exhausted. He fell back on the Portuguese
mercantile community at Masekesa to satisfy Quitevan demands. His appeal
36
in 1831 for a joint action went unheeded . The change of the feira of
Aruangua was not entirely due to Quitevan attacks. The local princes, as
well as the neighbouring princes, also made incessant demands on the limited
37
resources of the capitao-mor • The inhabitants of the feira were "dying of
38hunger and had been reduced to the last degree of misery" • The businessmen
II
who conducted their trade very much like absentee landlords had to rush down 
to Aruangua to see their houses which were reported in danger of being 'robbed1
! 1 39 -
by their captives .
The attitude of the local potentates and the Quitevans was probably
■influenced by the hopeless defence arrangements of the feira. It had no
munitions, armament or such weapons to deter the enemy. It was entirely with-
40out any means of defence • The commandant could not even have sufficient 
soldiers to escort a company of porters to fetch soldos and ammunition from 
Sena * Some of the supplies took twenty-nine days to arrive at the feira
■36. Codice 1^68 No.76. Moc.A.H.U*
37* Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Factor of
the Royal Treasury of the villa of Sena, Joze Diniz, 25.8.1830.
Letter from the commandant of Aruangua to the Governor of the Captaincy,
17.11*l830. Maco 20.Moc.A.H.U. Santana F. Documentaqao  7/17/11/1830
Vol.II. pp.3^3-3^. Codice 1^68 No.76. Moc.A.H.U.
38. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Factor of
Sena 23.8.1830, Cod. 1^68. Moc. A.H.U.
39* Letter from the commandant of the feira of Aruangua to the Governor of the
Captaincy, Maco /^, Moc.A.H.U* Also Santana F. Documentaqao....
19/16/12/1830, II, 3^9.
40. Letter from Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the factor of the 
villa of Sena, 23/8/1830, Cod. 1^ +68. Moc.A.H.U.
4l« Ibid.
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from Sena. The reason for this delay was not explained, but the Governor of 
Rios de Sena, in the same letter, instructed the commandant of the feira to
I 4.2
tighten up things and punish any dereliction of duty exemplarily; . The
I
maps which were produced for the Governor's perusal reveal lack of 
population at the feira and that the few Portuguese who were in Manyika,
43
were scattered about •
It must be pointed out, however, that the situation at Masekesa was
somewhat brighter than the one which has just been described at Aruangua.
44The feira was reported quiet, safe, peopled and without starvation o The 
general feeling at official level.at Aruangua was that the feira of Masekesa, 
which had been changed between 1810 and l8l6 "in order to humiliate the King 
of Manyika," should be abandoned indefinitely. This is evident from the 
commandant's letter of IO/6/I83O in which he proposed to the Governor of 
Rios de Sena, that he should pass an order to the effect that all traders 
should leave Masekesa to settle at Aruangua, and that if they all did that, 
then they would be better able to defend the feira against the Quitevans and 
that after a while these traders would like the feira at Aruangua as much as 
they liked the feira of Manyika. Security, lucrative trade and respectability 
would crown their efforts. Discussions between Vasconcellos e Cirne and a big 
council of the moradores and traders of Sena, held sometime in November, 1830
46
concerning the commandant's memorandum, yielded negative results • It
42. Letter from Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Commandant of the 
villa of Sena, 25.8.1830. Codice 1468. Moc.A.H.U.
43. Ibid. Also see Appendix.
44. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the factor
of the villa of Sena, 25*8.1830. Codice 1468, Moc.A.H.U.
45. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
10.6.1830 Maco 20 in Santana F. Documentaqao..... Vol.II. Lisbon,1967, 
p.346. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to 
Paulo Joze Miguel de Brito G.G. of Mocambique, 26.8.1831. Cod.1468,
No.76. Moc.A.H.U.
46. Letter from Cirne to the commandant of the garrison of Manica, 25*8.1830. 
Cod.l468, Moc. A.H.U.
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was decided that "for the convenience of the Royal Treasury, the general 
interests of^commerce of this captaincy and the referred to businessmen who
inhabit and are scattered throughout Macequece” it would be better to change
|
the feira from Aruangua back to Masekesa until the feira of Aruangua was
useful commercially. In this way all would be better able to defend it,
11 for the individual good of that feira and the general utility of the 
if7
colony” ,
\
It is evident from the preceding account that starvation, 
administrative inefficiency and the attacks which the Quitevans made on the 
feira of Aruangua had seriously weakened the feira before the Ngoni attacked 
it in 1833. The element of administrative inefficiency operates throughout 
this period as we shall note later. Two reasons- envy and rivalry, have been 
given for Quitevan attacks on the feira of Aruangua in the l830's. But were 
these attacks solely due to reasons of traditional hostility, envy and rivalry? 
Ah answer to the root cause of this is to be sought in Quitevan internal 
politics. It appears that two princes died in I83O; Prince Maveneca, who appar­
ently was in charge of the region of Bandire, known as High Quiteve, and Prince 
if8
Boi . Queen Nengomanha also died in the sameyear.
As pointed out, only the first two Queens of the Kings in this
49
region of Rios de Sena counted during a succession crisis • As far as 
Quiteve was concerned, the choice of the Queens could not be defied with
47, Ibid*.
48, Letter from Francisco Miguel Roiz Nunes to Paulo Joze Miguel de Brito, 
Sofala 4.8.1830. Maco 12. A.H.U.
49, In Manyika the first two Queens out of Chikanga's 64 wives, during the
last quarter of the l8th Century, were known as Nhabinga and Nemanhica.
These names were clearly derived from binga (royal court) and Manyika.
Their ceremonial funcion is difficult to identify. See Descripgao
Corogr^cica..... Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. Dr. Liesegang suggests that the
custom of having four Queens is ’possibly due to Islamic influence.’
He is incorrect in his figure of four to start with; because the Chikangas 
had one or two Queens at a time. This applied to most Kings in this 
region, as Marquez de Castello-Novo correctly observed. Biker I.F.
Collecqao de Tratados  Vol.VI, IS83. pp.243-62. For the tradition
in Quiteve see Joao dos Santos, ’Ethiopia Oriental' in R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. 
pp.193*378,381. Cape Town 1964. Joao Juliao da Silva. Resposta das 
Questoens sobre os Cafres (Maco).0.4.Moc.A.H.U.) edited^by G.Liesegang. 
Junta de Investigacoes do Ultramar. Estudos de Antropogia Cultural No.2. 
Lisbon 1966, p.20.
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impunity. The remaining Queen, Nemaunga, sent a hoe to Prince Nimara 
Cubacundua to deliver to a Portuguese adjutante as a symbol of the delivery
Ngoni hostilities and secondly due to the fact that one of the pretenders 
to the throne, Caringa, invited Ngoni Warriors* to make his ascent to the 
throne short, certain and effective. This in part explains the aggressiveness 
of the Quitevan foreign policy. This was the oft-practised tactic of deviating 
a nation*s mind from acute and embarrassing domestic problems by indulging in 
adventures abroad. The other possible and most likely explanation is that the 
Ngoni exploited their assistance to Prince Caringa during his succession crisis 
and influenced him to mount an offensive attack on the feira of Aruangua. As
Masekesa and Aruangua in the Kingdom of Manyika. It does seem that Quitevan
50. Ibid. dated 4.10.1830.
For the history of this feira see Questao da posse da terra e minas de 
Quiteve. Pasta 6 (1842-3) Moc.A.H.U. Also the followings 
Botelho, Sebastiao Jose Xavier. Memoria Estatistica sbbre os dommios 
Portuguezes na Africa Oriental, Lishon,lb33» pp.163-1^4. — — —
Boralo Francisco Maria. Provincia de Mozambique (Ensaios sobre a 
estatistica da possessors Portuguezes no Ultramar, Ila. Serie, Livro IV) 
l839»Lisbon, p.231. Membria sobre a ado^ao do Territbrio Bandire ks 
epocas do seu abandono. 5*8.1831, Maco 21. A.H.U. This gives a detailed 
account of the episode which led to the closure of the feira.
Baptista J. Renato. Caminho de ferro da Beira a Manica. Excursoes e 
estudos effectuados ein 1891 sob a dirreccao do Capitaode engenheria. Li; 
Imprensa Nacional 1892. pp.14-15*
Santana F. Documentapab..... Vol.II. op.cit.pp. 110,166, 214, 216, 218, 
243, 384, 949.
31. Copia do T'brmo do Emprdstino que esta Feitoria da Fazenda fez de 600 pani 
ao Principe de Quiteve, Maromo, eleito aclaimado Rey de Quiteve pa sis 
despezas de sua Coroapao. 8.12.1831. Pasta 17 Moc.A.H.U.
50
of the territory of Bandire • This did not materialise, first because of
show subsequently, it was Ngoni policy to attack mainly the‘feiras of
foreign policy, as well as internal policies, were formulated in such a way
51that they accorded with Ngoni interests between I83O and 1833 •
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In a confused situation such as existed in Quiteve in 1830,
it is important to examine the party which attacked the feira and its motives.
A third motive for these attacks was to obtain cloth and such property as
could be used to pay the soldiers to fight in the civil wars of succession.
This seems to have been the case in 1831. The attackers were led by two
52
princes, Musito and Dambangera •
The population of the feira of Aruangua then consisted of an
53ensign of inferior rank and four soldiers . The Quitevans took advantage 
of this hopeless defence situation to ’rob* and ‘exterminate’ the establish­
ment. The Governor of Sofala sent Portuguese envoys to Queen Gomana, who 
was then reported to be the sovereign of Quiteve, to seek protection. The
capitao-mor left the post of Aruangua to join the vashambadzi and businessmen
54.
who had gone to settle at the old feira of Masekesa • The Governor of Rios
de Sena acquiesced in this, but positively instructed the capitao-mor to
fulfil, as a matter of obligation, the instructions which were in that feira,
to the effect that capitaes-mor were to conduct themselves as circumstances 
55 ~dictated • The capitao-mor was to address himself to the "interests of the 
royal treasury, the promotion of commerce, by means of prudence and respect 
reflected from the Portuguese nation”. He was instructed to look for 
”circumstantial information” about the actual state of the feira, commerce 
and whether or not the manner of dealing with the King of Manyika was still 
advantageous. He was again to study the behaviour of the businessmen, the
52. Letter from Joaquim Mendes e Cirne to the Governor of Sofala, 11.6.1831. 
Cod.1A68. Mo c.A.H.U.
53. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Fortunato 
Ciriano da Silva, Commandant and capitao-mor of Manyika, 11.6.1831.
Cod.1A68. Moc.A.H.U.
5^. Ibid.
55* Ibid.
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56vashambadzi, and the state of the garrison and armament •
I
The only problem at Masekesa affecting Manyika-Portuguese relations
I i
was that of the Mambos (rulers), who were encouraged by Portuguese military
i •
weakness to demand more and more cloths and occasionally threatened the very
57existence of the feira • The Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena 
sanctioned an advance of six months* soldos in order to satisfy the demands 
of the King and his Princes, but there were no porters to fetch this from 
Sena. The authorities at Sena had to rely on an ensign from Manyika, who 
happened to be there at that time, despite the fact that he was a reputed 
drunkard and debauchee. In fact he was on probation and the commandant at
Sena had been instructed to keep an eye on him and to send him to Quelimane
immediately if he committed another offence, and from there he would be 
sent to Mozambique. The short-age of fazendas to saguate the Mambos was 
generally due to administrative delays at Sena and scarcity of reliable 
personnel to escort porters to fetch it. On this particular occasion it 
was due to a combination of factors such as lack of fazendas to pay the porters.
This problem always cropped up when fazendas belonging to the royal treasury had
to be transported, otherwise it was not a serious problem for the individual 
merchants.
There was another problem connected with that of porterage, and this 
was the question of the trade route. The change, between 1810 and l8l6, of the 
feira from Masekesa to Aruangua had resulted in an increasing use of the 
Gorongoza trade route. Apparently traders encountered the same old difficulties 
of payment of madontos. The inhacuavras of the prazo Gorongoza seized some 
mutores of cloth as madontos. The Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena,
56. Ibid.
57. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the 
Commandant of the villa of Sena, Jo/-6 Diniz Alfonso, 14.10.1831.
Quartel do Governo em Prazo Boror. Codice 1468. Moc.A.H.U.
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therefore, instructed the capitao-mor to seize the inhacuavas* families 
gni imprison them or 'castigate them rigorously'. It is interesting to 
note here the comparative severity with which the potentates in the prazos 
were sometimes dealt with when they tried to assert their authority as 
traditional sovereigns.
Portuguese administrative inefficiency, rather than external 
threats from either the Mambos in Manyika or without, was at the root of 
their misfortunes. The old problem of trading without licences, cases of 
insubordination and pilfering of arms intended for the defence of the feira
were not uncommon features in the l8j>0's. For example, there was a case of
i
Miguel Homem, a trader, whose behaviour was described as 'rebellious, 'criminal',
I 58
'infamous,' 'insulting' and 'insubordinate' when he appeared at the feira
i i
of Masekesa with a large quantity of fazendas. In all fairness to Miguel
Homem, he had obtained a licence from the commandant of the villa of Sena*
59
But, of course, this was outside the established procedure . Cases of thefts 
of the soldiers* pay by senior officers and insubordination by the military
6owere also reported in 1830 • A lieutenant of the militia, Francisco de
Almeida, was dismissed from the office of capitao-mor due to incompetency, 
and the feira was without a capitao-mor for some time. There was not any 
suitable person for such a post among the officers of the militia. As a 
deterrent to further relaxation of discipline, Manoel Joaquim Mendes a Cirne, 
Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, ordered Fortunato Ciriano da Silva,
58. Letter from Cirne to Ciriano, capitao-mor of Manyika, 11.7.1830. Cod.
1468. Moc.A.H.U.
Ibid.dated 11.6.1831*
59* Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the commandant 
of the villa of Sena. Cod.1468. A.H.U. 9*1*1830.
60. Letter from Cirne to the commandant of the feira of Manyika. 9*1*1831.
Cod.1468. Moc.A.H.U.
a new capitao-mor, to discipline a commandant of the garrison for stealing
61
the arms . These were probably sold to Manyika princes. This is, however, 
mere speculation. The commandant was to pay for the arms or else have his 
property equivalent to the cost of the stolen goods confiscated. If the 
property, for some reason or other, could not be seized, then the man was 
to be sent to Sena with proofs of the robbery and ”of his criminal behaviour” 
regarding misappropriation of the soldiers'salaries. All this was to be done 
publicly so that others could learn from this case.
The situation was further complicated by internal developments.
There was another attack on the feira of Aruangua in 1831, but probably this
62was not anything different from the previous ones • The robbery of *a mine'
which was ’’committed by thieves who left nothing in the house except a box
carrying a ban on payment of madontos and some images”, was probably con-
63
nected with Chikanga's son who had rebelled against his father . He stationed 
himself with his party somewhere on the trade route and whenever he received 
news that traders or vashambadzi would pass by he came out and demanded cloth, 
probably to enable him to pay for the soldiers to sustain his rebellion. In 
one instance he seized 'a piece of mutore worth ten pieces of cloth' from an
61. Letter from Cirne to capitao-mor of Manyika, Fortunato Ciriaco, 11.6.1831. 
Cod.1^ -68. Moc.A.H.U. Dr. Newitt in his 'Zambezi Prazos in the l8th 
Century” (J?h.D. Thesis,1967, p.l?6. Senate, London) seems to imply that 
the garrisons were places where chiefs got arms. This was probably the
case in other garrisons, but as as that of Manyika is concerned, I
have not come across such cases in the l8th Century. This is the first
recorded case of arms being stolen.
62. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of the Captaincy, 
l*f. 12.1831. Maco 23. Moc.A.H.U.
63. Letter from Ciriano da Silva to the Governor, 9*3*l831 also signed by - 
Joz6 Andrade de Lorna, Clerk; Manoel Francisco de Almeida, provisional 
Lieutenant; Luiz (?) Augusto Cezar, an ensign; Joao Manoel Fernando; 
Martins da Conceipao; Domingos Madeira; Joao Vaz; Cruz Francisco Cravone; 
Cruz Manoel Sacrava; Cruz Caetano da Lima; J. da Silva Baptista; Felix 
Masarenhas. Macequece, 1^.3.1831. Maco 23. A.H.U.
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ensign of the garrison of Manyika on his way there from Sena. It would 
appear that equal demands for cloth were made by other sons of Chikanga.
m r^ > I I 6kThe capitao-mor described the shortage of fazendas as 'desperate' •
The actual state of affairs regarding Manyika-Portuguese relations 
at the feira of Masekesa was vividly described by Fortunato Ciriano da Silva,a 
new capitao-mor of this feira. It will be recalled that he was required, in 
1830, to establish himself at Masekesa, to live with the businessmen, 
moradores and vashambadzi under his control, to collect information relating 
to the actual state of affairs at the feira and its commerce, to find out the 
most advantageous way of dealing with the King of the land, the manner in which
65
the businessmen and vashambadzi behave themselves . As usual, his first
concern was about an extreme shortage of fazendas to make presents to
Chikanga, who arrogantly left the capitao-mor in no doubt that he was not
satisfied^. The vashambadzi too had nothing better to offer to Chikanga^
and naturally the King felt himself under no obligation to honour past
✓
treaties concerning commerce and trade. The principe, presumably of the
feira, would order his envoys to present the capitao-mor \sj;ith a cow of
inferior quality at the feira and demand three times as much besides what was
spent on cloth for wearing, and if the Portuguese did. not pay for it to his
68
satisfaction, they were threatened with immediate expulson from his land •
As for commerce, it had greatly diminished because mining was 'done on a 
very small scale.' He gave as a reason for this that the Manyika tended to
6k, Ibid.
65. Letter from Cirne to Fortunato, 11.6.1831. Cod.1^ -68, Moc.A.H.U.
66. Letter from the capitao-mor of Manyika, Fortunato Ciriae.o da Silva 
to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Manoel Joaquim Mendes 
de Vasconcellos e Cirne, 5/10/1831. Maco.11. A.H.U.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
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agriculture because they feared the injustices of the princes who, when­
ever they heard that a mine had been struck, issued a decree obliging the 
miner to deliver the piece of gold. In most cases the mine did not even 
recover the cost of production. The capitao-mor*s representations in this
69respect were of no avail • The King curtly told him that it was the duty 
of the King, together with his sons, to preserve the Kingdom. Da Silva*s 
analysis of the complicating factor in Manyika-Portuguese relations was 
that of the King's sons, who deputized for him as independent potentates in 
remote parts of the Kingdom during the King's lifetime. They demanded
tribute. They too paid tribute to their father in the same manner the
| 70
Portuguese paid tribute to them • Under normal circumstances, if the
capitao-mor or any of the feirantes differed with any of his loyal sons,
I ; 71he automatically incurred thedispleasure of the King himself • However,
this was not always the case, because there are cases during the l8th
Century to show that the King sometimes took a stand against his own sons
72
if he believed that they were wrong • Da Silva's line of argument is not 
convincing. To explain the small flow of gold to the feira in terms of the 
Chikangas* erstwhile policy towards mining and also to attribute it to lack 
of harmony between Chikanga and his sons on the one hand and the Portuguese 
on the other, and also to the federal structure of Manyika polity, is to 
beg the question. These factors had been in existence for over three 
centuries of Portuguese contact with the Chikangas. The real reason, it 
would seem to me, is to be found in the capitao-mor's subsequent remark.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. See Chapter VI.
177.
"They say” he reported, "that unless I give them cloths to put on they will
73give gold to whoever gives them cloths11 . It does seem that the problem 
was not one of gold being mined on a reduced scale but rather one of in­
sufficient supply on the Portuguese side to meet Manyika demands. The 
capitao-mor further referred to these demands as importunate. This short­
age of cloth, which was chronic, was probably rendered acute by the exigen­
cies of the Ngoni invasion of Quiteve and its neighbourhood in 1830-31.
It is related that Chikanga demonstrated his dissatisfaction with
his presents of cloth from the capitao-mor by confiscating a small cow,
which the capitao-mor had sent to be exchanged for provisions • Chikanga
complained that his neighbours received from the same capitao-mor better
75pieces of cloth, such as paninhos,chittas and len^os, and that because the
capitao-mor did not send the quantity of cloth he had asked for, the
muzumgos should not bring cloth from outside into any of the regions of his
76
Kingdom for trading purposes . Any form of communication between the capitao- 
mor and the princes was forbidden. Chikanga demanded seven mutores of cloth.
73* Letter from Ciriano to the Governor 5*10.1831. Maco 11. A.H.U.
7^o Ibid.
75. Ibid
76. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva, commandant of the Feira da Manica 
^.10.1831. Cxa.7^ Moc.A.H.U. also signed by the businessmen who gave
the capitao-mor Credit:- Miguel de Menezes;
Franziao Jacinto da Silva Baptista;
Manoel Francisco de Almeida;
Antonio Joaquim de Andrade;
Miguel Fernando;
Felix Mascarenhas;
Joao Manoel Fernandes.
178.
These were positive royal orders, to be obeyed unconditionally, and until 
Chikanga's demands had been fully met, no trade could take place in any 
part of his Kingdom.
The businessmen at the feira, therefore, decided to loan the capitao-
77mor cloths to the amount of six months' soldos but emphasized in their 
memorial to the Governor of Qielimane and Rios de Sena that this loan should 
be repaid as soon as possible. The businessmen did the same thing with the 
cloths demanded by Makombe, King of Barwe.
Manyika-Portuguese relations were no better either at the feira of
Aruangua. Mucipa, an inhamai (page) of the King, was involved in a milando
*78
case with the capitao-mor when he went there • Apparently Mucipa had been 
sent by Chikanga to demand cloths.
The food situation was critical at the feira. The feirantes 
incurred considerable expenses in buyingfood which was going at very high 
prices. It was this policy of self-assertion practised by the Chikangas in 
the 1830's which compelled the capitao-mor to review Manyika-Portuguese 
relations and to bring forth concrete suggestions as to how they could be 
improved. His suggestion to the Governor of ,Quelimane and Rio s de Sena was
77* These soldos came the following year. See Letter from Severino d'Almeida, 
provisional commandant of the garrison of Manyika, to the Governor of 
Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 28.9*1832. They were described by the
commandant in the above correspondence as 'a ridiculous assortment....
damaged and gnawed.' The gun powder which was supposed to be an arroba 
was in a very bad condition and 83 cartridges for the musketeers, 
including three Mautes which were damaged. The total of the damaged 
ones was 83^,i.e. 166 short of the 1,000 declared in the report. Enclosed 
together with this report was another one, signed by a sergeant-major, 
which contained a list of madontos (passage) expenses for Prince Sazua of 
Barwe. These were incurred in crossing Prazo da Coroa, Gorongoza, 
Tambarara and Inhaquava prazos. The expenses in this connection were 
characterised as 'horrible' and included cloth which was damaged as well 
as porterage.
78. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 
6/10/1831. Moc.A.H.U.
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that he, as well as all the feirantes, should retire from ,the feira 
until a new basis for lucrative commercial activities had been created.
I  i
This could be done by concluding new treaties, providing for a stipulated
j
amount of fazendas to be always paid. The practice hitherto had been that,
each time the capitao-mor and his feirantes signed an agreement with the
King or any of his princes, they spent an unspecified amount of fazendas
79and this led them into debt •
However, these suggestions do not seem to have been accepted.
Mutasa*s ambassadors were reported at the feira demanding more cloths
because the King was not satisfied with the mutores which had been sent to
him. The capitao-mor had nothing to give them because the soldos had not
arrived. He needed about two hundred and two panos to defray the feira
g0
expenses and to ensure continuity of commerce • A general inventory of 
the garrison of the feira of Masekesa produced by the capitao-mor in 1832 
revealed a great shortage of arms. There was not even a storehouse. The 
poverty of the feira from an administrative point of view is portrayed by 
an inventory which was taken in l832^\ This proves that the princes were 
not entirely to blame for the chaos which reigned at the feira. The garrison 
was noted for relaxation of discipline, lack of respect from the neighbouring
79.
80.
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Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
5.10.1831. Maco 11. Mo c.A.H.U. - ^
Letter from Fortunato. CiriaC.o da Silva, capitao-mor and commandant of 
the Feira de Manica, 5*9.1832. Maco 26. Moc.A.H.U. To the Governor of 
Quelimane and Rios de Sena.
Ibid.
A copy of the inventory of the archives of Feira de Manica - 2 books which
served as registers and from which some folios are missing.
1 bundle of l*f official letters from Governors Cirne, Barboza and Ferrao, 
and Instructions from the gov’t of Mogambique, and articles of a treaty 
with Chikanga, Letters from the commandant of the villa de Sena.
2 official letters from the Juiz and the alderman of Sena. 8 terms per­
taining to the Church.
1 gilded silver cup without a stand.
1. 1 gilded silver paten 5« 1 botta and a square board laid
2. 1 prayer book upon the chalice.
3. 1 Roman Ritual c r . ,
«/ t-* t 6. 6 Exercise books.Jfe Eagle-Stone.
7* A minute book, 
signed by Joze Maria da Roza and Aguiar, Lieutenant and Commandant of 
the garrison, 3*9.1832. Maco 26. Moc. A.H.U.
i8o.
potentates and princes • A report, which was submitted together with the 
general map of the feira, showed that there was no improvement in the state 
of commerce. The internal situation was probably partially responsible for 
this and may also explain the constant demands for cloth on the part of 
Chikanga.
This report is_ worth citing in extenso because it throws much light 
on the way trade was conducted as well as on the internal situation.
There is no increase in commerce because of the 
violence which the King and princes practice con­
tinually; they are a caravan of twenty and all 
want tribute because there is not a part of this 
land in which there is no prince, and all are in 
such a position that they could do some favour to 
the muzungos as well as to themussambazes, 
especially Prince Mucucuzi, who is in the land of 
■ Chavave, who commands all the routes from Aruangua 
i into the interior, and this prince has conspired 
against his father Chicanga; when a muzungo 
arrives there he brings one or two old cows, a 
title of visiting, and he takes any portion of 
cloth he wishes, and for that matter, the better 
part of it. He seizes cloths belonging to the 
muzungos from the mussambazes. He gotnothing 
the previous year because he had broken all the 
articles of the treaty. 83#
Apparently Chikanga complained about Portuguese dealings with his rebellious 
son. He, therefore, decided to send frequent delegations which were *always more 
than ten or twelve people* , and each one of them expected clothes to put on.
The princes who governed lands contiguous to the feira made similar demands.
The capitao-mor certainly exaggerated the picture of the stresses in 
Manyika-Portuguese relations as well as the plight of the feirantes. He had
82. Letter from Severino de Almeida, provisional commandant, to the Governor 
of Rios de Sena, 12.9*1832, Maco 26 Moc.A.H.U.
83. Ibid.
8*w Ibid.
l8l.
suggested to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena that the feirantes
should move from Masekesa to Aruangua, but the feirantes decided io remain
85 I !
at Masekesa • The internal political situation certainly made trade less
11
lucrative, but not any more than it had done on other occasions in the past, 
Chikanga*s actions in the 1830*s were calculated to recover royal prestige 
which had been lost during the wars of the previous decade. He looked upon 
the Portuguese at the feira as his protegees and any violation of his laws
or interference, implicit or. overt, in his domestic affairs which mightresult
\
in lawlessness was not calculated to go unpunished.
This was the state of the feira and the nature of Manyika-Portuguese
relations when news reached the capitao-mor, sometime in 1832, that the 
86
*Mabzites* (Ngoni) had arrived there and that the feirantes could do nothing.
87 88
The landins are first mentioned in a report of 22,6.1832 on two occasions, 
firstly when they attacked the feira and the moradores fled away to other lands. 
This event was described by the capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa, F.Ciriano 
da Silva, in the following manner:
•••two years ago a nation called Mabuzites came and 
invaded this Kingdom, robbed some cattle and retired; 
now they returned in three divisions and besieged the 
whole of Manica, The whole population retired into 
the mountains where we too decided to retreat in order 
to see what they would do. On the 31st of last month 
they invaded the feira, and when they saw that they 
did not find anything, they retreated and attacked 
Mutasa. (King of Manyika). But they were not success­
ful as he had built a wall, distrusting this nation.
There they made a speech saying that they would return 
in the time after the grass fires 89,
85. Letter from Severino de Almeida to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
28.9.1832. Maco 26. Moc.A.H.U.
86. For an interpretation of the word Ngoni, see Ch.VII.
87. See Chapter Vii supra.
88. Letter from Severino d* Almeida to the Governor of Rios de Sena,
22.6.1832. Maco 2&. Moc. A.H.U.
89. Ibid.
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The leader of this Ngoni group is not mentioned but most likely 
90
this was Nxaba •
A second mention of the Ngoni appears in a report of 11.8.1832, 
when.they attacked the feira, but did not do much harm. They attacked a 
prince of the feira ChampanZe in the morning and the Prince immediately 
sent an inhamai and two bingas with an axe, an arrow and a cow as his emblem, 
asking for fire-arms and soldiers from the capitax>-mor. It would seem that 
the capitao-mor was not in a position to conclude an agreement with the 
Prince. The highest military officer who was then at the feira was a 
lieutenant, and such officers were not considered competent to do this. As 
a matter of fact, there was very little by way of military, due to lack of 
soldos[ Ciriano da Silva accordingly communicated his inability to offer
! I .!
help to the prince and returned his emblems. He found it difficult to decide
what to do because there were no instructions in the archives of the feira,
neither did his predecessor leave any instructions. He too had left for
Manyika with very few instructions. The King and his princes continued to
ask for cloth on the pretext that they wanted to quieten Changamire or the
Landins in order to secure their wives and children • The King insisted
that these dues should be paid by the vashambadzi ’’from the north^ whom he
described as ’thieves’, as well as the businessmen who also came to the feira 
92from the north . It is not stated whether Changamire, v/ho was in even greater
90o Liesegang G. ’Nguni Migrations between Delagoa Bay and the Zambezi* in 
African Historical Studies, 2, 1970? P*317 ff»
91. Ibid. dated 26.9.1«32. Maco 26. Moc.A.H.U. Letter from Almeida to G.G. of 
Q,_ Tbid,. /Rlos de Sena.
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danger at this time, had sent emissaries to ask for cloth. It may well 
be that he did this in an effort to pool the resources of what he probably
I !
still considered a part of his empire. However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that he received anything from Chikanga on this occasion. !
The capitao-mor, advised the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena 
to satisfy Prince Champanze's demands or else the traders would have their 
merchandise confiscated ’’because the King says that he is the lord of the
land ” in spite of a ban of 9*12.1771* which was passed when Jose
Francisco was capitao-mor. This ban described any payment to a prince of the 
feira as 'robbery1.
This first reported instance of an attack on the feira, which was 
followed by others of a similar nature, is significant in three ways. First, 
it suggests that the arrangement which was made in the l8th Century of sending 
Changamire binzo through the Chikangas was theoretically still operative 
although no mention of it, indeed even of Changamire, was made since 1795*
Secondly, the incident throws light on what some historians have 
unhesitatingly called 'raids' - a term which implies predatory activities 
resulting in chaos and anarchy. It appears that the prince of the feira was
93* After his defeat by Manikuse in 1830, Nxaba fled to Changamire's lands.
(see Ch.VIII). Letter from Francisco Miguel Roiz Nunes to Jose' Miguel de 
Brito G.G. of Mopambique, Sofala, 4.10.1830. Maco,12.Moc.A.H.U. Copia 
do Termo do empr£stino que esta Feitoria da Fazenda fez de 600 panos ao 
Principe Maromo eleito aclamado Rey de Quiteve pa. dis despezas de Sua 
coroapao 8.12.1831. pasta 7 Moc.A.H.U.
Otnrat'-Cooper J.D. The Zulu Aftermath. A Nineteenth Century Revolution in 
Bantu Africa. Longmans 1966. p.ks"” Changamire was reported old and senile 
(Acresentamento 1.6.1831. Maco 21. Moc.A.H.U.) with probably very excessive 
drinking habits, caught up in the skirts of his courtesans and wives instead 
of organising intelligently the vast resources and manpower of his empire to 
combat what was perhaps a few hundred Landins with limited resources. 
Posterity has not forgiven him for this cowardice at a time when valour was 
most needed. Apparently his ammunition consisted of four pieces of artillery 
and two old cannons. 'Trade and the Rozvi Mambo' by N.S.Harris, in Gray and 
Birmingham (ed) Precolonial African Trade.... op.cit. p.259* footnote 7*
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aware that what the Landins wanted was some kind of tribute or protection
money. Hence his attempts to buy off the Landins from his land.j Thirdly,
I . \
the Landins directed their attacks on the feira and even then they confined
their activities to looting property. They did not attack the Kingdom of
Manyika at large but rather the feira. They did the same thing with the
94
feira at Zumbo in 1832, Louren^o Marques and Inhambane •
The report, though based on first-hand knowledge, is silent on the
question of young boys and girls being forcibly taken away^ We shall see
\
\
this pattern of attacks directed against property at the feira, and nothing 
else,repeated in the subsequent years.
The attacks of the Landins on the feiras of Manyika were aggravated 
by a new development in Barwe - Portuguese relations. A treaty, which was 
signed at the feira of Masekesa on 9th April, 1833 between the capitao-mor,
Severino de Almeida, and Chimombo, Makombe's Ambassador, shows that the rift
95 - —was about non-payment of madontos • The previous capitao-mor allowed the
94. Letter from Augusto Cesar Rodrigues Sarmento, provisional Governor General 
of Mozambique. (Paulo Joze Miguel de Brito died on 28.1.1832) to the 
Minister and Secretary of State, of the Marine and Overseas Affairs,
17.9*l880 in Arquivo das Colonias, Vol.Ill, Lisbon 19 , p.55* This
was reproduced from some documents in the archives of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. For Lourengo Marques, see Lobato A. Quatro 
Estudos e Uma Evocaqao para a Historia de Lourenco Marques. Junta de 
Investigates do Ultramar. Lisboa,1961. p.162.
Admiralty I.D. II89. A Manual of Portuguese East Africa, London,1970* P*365* 
’95* Copy of the Terms. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. 9*^*l833» signed by:
Severino de Almeida, Joze" Maria da Roza Aguiar, Lieutenant Luis Frederico 
Augusto Cesar, Joao Manoel Fernandes, an ensign, Antonio Joaquim de Andrade 
Signature of Francisco Carbone. Quarters of the commandant of the feira de 
Manica. Ibid. dated 11.4.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.
Copy of the Terms. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. Expenses incurred with the princes 
who dwelt on the trade route from Aruangua to Vunduze - Barwe to 
Gorongoza boundary. 3 dotins, 28 ardins, 5 Tucurins, 1 sameter, 9 talles,
12 capotins, 1 macqs'eof missanga (beads). The total amount was 583 clothes 
de lei besides missanga and cabaya bought for 6 maticals 3 lopas bought for 
11 maticals, 3 garras bought for 12 maticals, 1 pie of lemos, bought for 6 
maticals, 4 pains of calain bought for 4 maticals, 1 bottle of brandy bought 
for 12 maticals, 1 garrafa of gunpowder bought for 1/2 matical, 1 gun bought 
4 maticals. Signed by: Severino d* Almeida, provisional commandant of the
feira, Luis Frederico August Cesar, Francisco Carbone, Manoel Ricardo,
Jozd' Pereira Ramos, 1st sergeant, 26.9*1833* Maco 30 Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from d1 Almeida to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena,
30.9.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. Ibid. dated 20.7*1833* Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.
/Contd....
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vashambadzi to pass by to the feira of Masekesa without paying anything to 
Makombe, and what was worse, each time he was reminded about this he raised 
the King's hopes by telling him that a new capitao-mor, reportedly at
' "U
Gorongoza on his way to Masekesa, would clear all the arrears. The capitao- 
mor was remindedtwice but on a third occasion Makombe ordered a sanzo (lit. 
branch of a tree) to be put on the passage leading to Masekesa. The deliberat-
V*
ions of an extraordinary council meeting of the feirantes, which the capitao- 
mor summoned, resulted in a treaty with Makombe providing for freedom of 
passage to the feira. It would seem that Bondo, alternatively described as 
a slave leader or son-in-law of Makombe, had resumed his activities of inter-
11
cepting Portuguese commerce between the Kingdom of Barwe and the feira of Mase­
kesa.
concluded in a land controlled by Bondo'
It is perhaps a measure of his importance that the treaty was finally
96
A second reported attack on the feira of Masekesa took place 
between the beginning of the negotiations with Makombe and the conclusion of 
the treaty already referred to. This probably explains why the Portuguese 
accepted a treaty seemingly disadvantageous to them. A body of Landins, 
estimated at between two hundred and three hundred,arrived at the feira at
95 Continued... Letter from Mariano da Cunha to Severino d* Almeida,
Tete, 22.5.1835. Cod. 1469. No.82. Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from Mariano da Cunha to the commandant of the villa of Sena,
Tete, 22.5.1833. Cod. 1469. No.83, Moc.A.H.U.
There was no fazenda even in the factory of the villa of Sena from which 
the capitao-mor could buy freedom of passage to the feira. The moradores, 
Conselmo Henrique Ferrao, Antonio Joze" d'Almeida, Jozd' Alves Barboza 
Loaned the factor soldos equivalent to six months' pay. This is a 
very important correspondence for Barwe-Portuguese relations in 1833.
96. Copy of the Terms, Maco 30* Moc. A.H.U. 26.9.1833*
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97night and set fire.to the houses . Some people were burnt to death and 
others were 'robbed* of all that they had. The prince in charge of the 
feira was desperate. The feira of Masekesa was on the verge of ruin. The 
capitao-mor and other feirantes, who are described in the report as 'victims', 
asked for strong, effective military measures to be taken as a precaution 
against kandin attacks. Alternatively they asked the Governor to help 
evacuate them to a safe place, possibly Aruangua, where they would remain for 
as long as the Landins continued to threaten the feira of Masekesa.
It is not surprising that the Landins had such an easy time at the
feira. An episode, that took place, best illustrates this point. There were
two soldiers and two officers, a sergeant and a lieutenant at the feira. Even
98
these two officers were at loggerheads • A tussle developed as to who was to1 1
make out the papers of the garrison. Normally this was done by a lieutenant,
1
but he refused and argued that it was the duty of the sergeant. This 
lieutenant even defied the orders of the capitao-mor, because being of the 
first line, he resented the status of the capit'ao-mor, a man whose category 
was that of segunda linha. The capitao-mor, therefore, had no choice but to 
dispense with the lieutenant's services of trooping the colours. This man, 
who was in charge of the garrison, was 'an official without shame, neither 
has he fear; in short he was a refined drunkard, all his desire was to go 
to the villa to drink*. It is related that almost every feirante was aware 
of this sergeant's excessive drinking habits. When an alarm was raised with
97• Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Mariano da Cunha, to the
Commandant of the villa of Sena, 13*7*l833i Cod.l440. No.107. Moc.
A.H.U.
98. Letter to the Governor of the captaincy of Quelimane and Rios de Sena,
Antonio Mariano da Cunha, from Severino d' Almeida, provisional capitaol
mor and commandant of the Feira de Manica, 9*5»l833» Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U*
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news'of the landins approaching the feira, he was sleeping, drunk, at the door
of Felix Mascarenhas. This was the man who was charged with the custody of
ammunitions and armaments, indeed of the entire defence of the feira of Masekesa
on the eve of a second landin attack on the feira. The capi£ao-mor, therefore,
appealed to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena because he did not want
to be Responsible for two well-known drunkards who were insubordinate.*
99Apparently the ensign shared the vices of his superior . The military
situation at the feira was also discussed in a report of 8.i2.l833^<"). Twelve
European soldiers were sent to the feira; some from the villa of Sena and others 
101
from Mozambique • Even this reinforcement was of no avail, because there were 
no armaments, no magazines, nor even a prison in which to lock up offending 
officers. The soldiers of this detachment remained in their houses and if it 
should happen that some fled away, no one knew, as once happened when four or 
five solders of the garrison fled away one morning. The commandant of the 
villa of Sena was alerted so that he could catch these soldiers and send them 
back to the feira to earn their soldos which had just arrived, in order that 
they might pay for the cows of the prince which they had eaten on credit. The 
result of this desertion was that it was soon followed by another. All these 
soldiers were armed when it was learnt that the landins were in the neighbour­
hood of the feira and they had fled away with their armament during the landin 
102attack • The disadvantages of having 'European* soldiers were subsequently 
regretted by the capitao-mor. European soldiers did not know the language and
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid. dated 8.12.1933 Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.
101. Tbid.
102. Ibid.
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customs of the land. They could, therefore, only be effectively employed 
within the premises of the feira. They inadvertently violated the customs 
of the land whenever they went out and accordingly incurred milandos which 
greatly risked their fazendas.
The Manyika did not rrecognise this hardship because they say .all 
the muzungos are brothers." The capitao-mor recommended that it should be a 
matter of policy that every soldier who left the villa of Sena for the feira 
of Masekesa should first be initiated into the customs of the land. He further 
recommended that the two soldiers, filhos da terra, who were with the garrison 
at the feira, should be retained because of their knowledge of the language and 
practices of the Kingdom. They would be employed particularly in diplomatic
missioiis to the King or his princes, as well as to the neighbouring kingdoms
! i
This could not be done by European soldiers without serious repercussions.
i
The second attack on the feira of Aruangua was reported on 9«5»l833*
The Landins came through Quiteve, down to the site of the river Zindue which
10*f
commanded the passage to Manyika, and destroyed the feira • These attacks 
were reinforced by those of Chibindinga, commonly known as Bondo, who was then 
living in the land of Mussambe in Barwe. He crossed the Zindue in order to 
attack the vashambadzi on their way to the feira of Aruangua, with the intention 
to come down to the feira of Aruangua and join the King of Quiteve in attacking 
the feira.
The immediate result of these attacks on both the feiras of Masekesa 
and Aruangua was that the pet scheme of removing the feira of Masekesa to 
Aruangua was abandoned. It is probable that there was collaboration between
103. Ibid.
10*f. Letter from Severino the Governor, 9»5*l833* Maco.30. Moc.A.H.U.
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the Landins and Barwists in attacking the feira. Some Landins had settled
in Barwe, where they lived for nearly five years10^. Be that as it may, these
attacks rendered theAruangua site equally unsafe. The moradores of both feiras
then toyed with another idea. They suggested the site of Sungo in Gorongoza.
The moradores and businessmen of the villa of Sena deliberated the issue at a
meeting convoked by the commandant on the orders of the Governor of Quelimane
and Rios de Sena. They immediately came to the conclusion that the feira
should not be removed to Sungo, rather, more capable soldiers should be sent
107
to Masekesa to improve the military situation . The feira of Masekesa was, 
therefore, not removed. However, both feiras were threatened by an imminent 
famine and Landin attacks; business was. almost nil; the troops of the garrison 
were sk
to discharge their military duties
:eletal; the officers were confirmed drunkards and too irresponsible
108
The closing of the way to the feira of Masekesa, Bondofs hostile 
activities and the Landins1 attacks on the feira of Aruangua, the attacks on 
the same feira by the Quitevans and the cool relations subsisting between 
Chikanga and the Portuguese, compelled the Portuguese community at the feira 
to buy food supplies from the Kingdom of Vuraba. The businessmen used to send 
the King of Vumba a saguate whenever they sent their agents to his Kingdom. 
Later, this practice produced the same problems of madontos. In the year 1855;
105. LiesegangQ.j. BeitrMge zur Geschte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni in slldlichen 
Mozambique. 1820-1895* p.y^?*
106. Letter from Cirne to the capitao-mor of Manyika, 10.ll.l855* Cod.lMk).
No.7. Moc.A.H.U.
107. Letter from Severino to the Governor, 10.11.1855* Cod.lHO. No.l95» 
Moc.A.H.U.
108. Letter from Severino to the Governor, 8.12.1855* Maco 50. Moc. A.H.U.
A letter written the following year refers to much indignation about the 
behaviour of a lieutenant of the company, lack of respect and obedience. 
This lieutenant was to be held incommunicado for two months; if this did 
not achieve the required effect, he would be sent to Tete and from there 
to Zumbo, where he would be punished according to local customs. This 
was probably an African or a Canarin from Zumbo.
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the King of Vumba closed the ways leading into his Kingdom. His complaint
was that the capitao-mor did not give him binzo. The capitao-mor was at his
wits1 end as to what to do with twenty-four soldiers who continually made
representations because they had no salary or food, and he had no more cloths
109
to loan them as he used to do in the past .
110
A similar demand for saguates was made in 183**
The Landin-Barwe-Quiteve attacks on the feiras had another very
significant result. Lack of resources on the part of the authorities at
Quelimane and Sena forced them to relax the ban of l82*f, which sought to
111
tighten the administration of the feira • The businessmen at the feira 
were complimented for having by-passed this ban and dealt directly with 
Chikanga without prior permission of the authorities at Sena or Quelimane. 
Chikanga demanded cloths as usual and the businessmen got together and sub­
scribed sufficient fazenda for his saguate. This should normally have come
112
from the capitao-mor, that is to say from the royal treasure • They altered 
prices which had been operating for years to suit the changed circumstances.
It would seem that very little procedure was being followed. Apparently 
individual businessmen dealt with the King and his princes directly; the 
system of weights was not observed, clandestine trade was the order of the 
day. This suited Chikanga and his princes. The fact that quite a number of 
officers were in debt to the Manyika shows that this form of trade was more
109. Letter from Severino to the Governor, 30.9.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.
110. Letter from Marino da Cunha, Governor of Rios de Sena, to Severino d* 
Almeida. Macequece, 8.3.183**. Cod.lMK). No.195. Moc.A.H.U.
111. See p.3. infra.
112. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Mariano da Cunha, to Severino 
d 1 Almeida, 8.3.183** • Cod.lM+0 No. 195*
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115
advantageous to the Manyika than the feirantes ".
The capitao-mor was also complimented by the Governor for his
discretion for not enforcing the provisions of the ban of 1824 and other
previous regimentos rigidly, A rigid enforcement of these would have brought
about a clash between the Chikangas and the Portuguese, and ultimately the
closure of the feira. In order to improve the situation at the feira, the
Governor positively instructed the capitao-mor not to allow the vashambadzi
to bring cattle into the feira, since these were the motive for the Landins 
114
entering the feira 0 But, of course, once they were in the feira, they 
helped themselves to whatever was of interest to them. Only cattle which the 
King or his princes or any of the neighbouring potentates gave as courtesy 
presents were allowed to stay in the feira, Hence, the Landin attacks 
brought about a change in the nature of trade commodities.
The discretionary powers of the capitao-mor were further increased 
by the Governor’s letter of 24.3.1834, as a result of these Landin attacks, 
Furthermore, the capitao-mor was instructed to handle firmly soldiers who 
tried to desert the garrison ’’because they are traitors to the State”; to
115
maintain peace with the Kings, businessmen and the moradores of the feira . 
In the case of an unexpected and sudden attack, the capitao-mor was to act 
promptly ’’for the good of the Royal Treasury” and convoke a council of 
resident businessmen and moradores to deliberate on a joint action. In short, 
thanks to the Landin invasions, the regimentos and bans of the l8th Century
113* Letter from Severino to the Governor, 20,6.1833* Cod.l440. No,195« 
Moc.A.H.U.
114. Letter from Severino d ’ Almeida to the Governor, 20,6.1833* Maco 30. 
A.H.U.
115* Letter from Antonio Mariano da Cunha to Severino commandant of the 
feira of Masekesa, 25*3*1834, Cod.l440.No.222. Moc.A.H.U.
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and early 19th Century were to be interpreted rather liberally.
It would be misleading, however, to exaggerate the impact of the
I !
Landin invasions during this period. The Governor, in spite of his abject
military state, did not give up control of the feira, as these very wide
discretionary powers might suggest. The capitao-mor was not to allow any.
businessman to trade at the feira without a licence, and the commandants
of the villas of Sena and Quelimane were not to issue forged licences, as
1 *16
the ex-commandant of Sena, Caetano da Costa Matozo had done, • In future
\
\
great care would be taken to ensure that the capitao-mor would be a man of hon'
esty and understanding, "who has the means to circumvent the obstacles from
117the respective Kingdoms" .
The belated attempts at reform did not save the Portuguese from a
disastrous defeat the following year. The feira of Masekesa was again
118threatened by the Landins, otherwise known as Vatuas, in 1835 • The
Governor of Quelimanetook measures to reinforce the defence of the feira.
He ordered some citizens of Quelimane to march with their military equipment 
to Sena. As a precaution, the armazens .in the three villas of Sena, Tete and 
Manyika were well provided with armament. A detailed plan for three divisions 
was drawn up, "to march, attack and defeat the enemy"; and this plan was given 
to a colonel and commandant of the first division. The plan provided for 
a march on 2^ .11.l835i armament, munitions and guides; rigid instructions to
116. Ibid. He was sent to Mozambique to be tried for this.
117. Letter from Antonio da Cunha, Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena,
to the Governors of the City of Mozambique, clarifying what the 
provisional commandant of the feira of Manyika, Severino d1 Almeida,
had written about the situation in the interior, 29»3«lS3^* Cod.l^^fO
No.13, Moc.A.H.U.
118. Instructions to the commandants of the divisions, 23*H.l835» Cod.1^73* 
Moc. A.H.U.
193.
the effect that a misunderstanding among the slaves of one division against an­
other must be avoided as this would render the enterprise futile* The march
/
was to be undertaken in the mornings to avoid tiring the solders, this being 
a hot summer season; tents were to be pitched to accommodate armament and 
ammunitions in case it rained* The Landins had retired to their lands either 
in Quiteve or Barwe immediately after they had attacked the feiras in 1833*
Some of theffllived in the vicinity of the Kingdom of Jindwi* Apparently the 
slaves or vashambadzi of Francisco Henrique Ferrao were willing to serve1 as 
guides in locating the Landins.
With regard to tactics, the first division was to occupy a central
place as soon as they were near the Lahdin stronghold, the second division
and the third would flank the sides of the first division in such a manner
that, when the attack began, the divisions would form a semi-circle in order
to catch the enemy in a cross-firing. But, of course, they were to ensure that
they would not hurt one another. They were to manoeuvre according to the
119
nature of the terrain • The commandants of these divisions were enjoined 
to maintain harmony among the officers, military forces and the slaves 
"because it is neither the occasion nor the place to remember past differences." 
Each commandant would be held individually responsible for any violation of 
the above-mentioned provisions. The march was calculated to take two or three 
days and such emotive phrases as "defence of the mother land", Portuguese duty 
to the continent and all the captaincy which has been lost for a long time" 
were evoked in order to galvanise the soldiers into action. Lastly, the 
instructions exhorted the commandant who was already -
119. Ibid*
19*+.
...•aware that the fulfilment of these instructions 
is the first duty of military men, obedience is, a 
motto, doubt is a mistake, delay is a transgression 
and opposition to the same instructions is a capital j 
ci^ime. 120 •
The circumstances, that is the course of the battle, the number of soldiers
involved, are not available in the records, but the feira was attacked in 
121
1835 and the Portuguese were driven out of the feiras of Aruangua and 
Masekesa. The reasons for this defeat must be sought in the maladministration
of the feiras as well as in the strained relations between the Manyika and
\
the Portuguese.
I have argued in the preceding discussion that the history of
the administration of the feira shows that it is not only the invasion of
the Landins which led to Portuguese disaster in Manyika, but also cases of
insubordination on the part of the soldiers who were there, lack of capable 
—  122
capitaes-mors, poor communication and co-ordination between the authorities
123
at the feiras and those who were at Sena , and also a condition of lawless­
ness which seems to have started round about 1827 and to have developed 
124
rapidly after 1830 • The Barwists and the Quitevans had rocked the feira
of Aruangua before the Ngoni invasions.
It is also possible that the internal discontent which seems to 
have existed by 1832-33 might have been more important in weakening the
resistance of the feira than is generally assumed. It was a policy of the
Chikangas to purse a policy of self-reliance. There is not a single instance 
of appeal to the Portuguese to intervene in Manyika internal politics. There
120• Ibid,
121. Ibid?
Omer-Cooper J.D, The Zulu Aftermath, op.cit. p.58.
Botelho J.J.T. Historia Militar e Politica dos Portugueses em 
Mozambique de 1833 aos nossos Dias. Lisboa, Centro Tip.Colonial 
(I95f>) p.151*.
122. See this chapter infra.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
is one case of a prince of the feira and not Chikanga himself who 
appealed to the Portuguese for military help when the Ngoni attacked 
the feira in 1832® The Chikangas made no secret of their discontent 
about the tribute and other courtesy gifts which they received. The 
internal political situation as we have seen on two occasions, in 1830 
and 1832, stepped up the demands ibr saguates. This situation was 
further complicated by similar demands from the Kingdoms of Vumba and 
Barwe. The Portuguese could exist at the feiras in Manyika only through 
the good-will of the Chikangas, They had been given land which was 
absolutely necessary for their houses and a fortress. They were divorced 
from the land and consequently the traditional economic order of subsistence 
agriculture. Only the Manyika and their neighbours could supply this need.
The dissatisfaction of the Chikangas expressed itself in another way. They 
did not make common cause with the Portuguese at the feira against the Ngoni, 
Barwists or Quitevans. It would not be surprising if some of these princes 
joined the foreign enemy, considering the threats often hurled at the 
feirantes to throw them out of the land. When all this evidence is noted, 
it does not seem that the Ngoni were the deus ex machina who brought the 
existence of the feiras to a sudden end.
Three other points of departure from orthodox historiography remain 
to be elaborated. First, the destruction of the feira, as has been shown above 
was a long drawn out process. The Ngoni attacks were initiated from 1832, and 
the feira collapsed in 1835* In all, five attacks were made between these 
two dates, an average roughly of two attacks a year. Secondly, the attacks 
were directed at the feiras. This is corroborated by the captain*s report 
of 183^, that what the Landins wanted at the feira were cattle.
196.
Thirdly, the Ngoni attacks have always been assessed from the 
debit side. It is forgotten that there was, or there could be, a credit 
side to this historical episode. These invasions led to a great liberal­
ization of the regimentos, to a greater participation by the moradores 
in policy-making, as was shown by their refusal to change the feira to 
Sungo in Gorongoza in 183^. In short, the Landin attacks, in a limited 
sense, democratised Portuguese administration at the villas as well as 
the feiras of Manyika and Zumbo.
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C H A P T E R  VI.
I PART 1 - MANYIKA-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS 
 _______1835 ~ 1863_____________
"The old Kingdom of Manyika was devastated and the Portuguese
abandoned their trading posts there for about fifty years,n writes Omer-
1Cooper in his The Zulu Aftermath . The above characterisation, which derives
from neither documentary nor oral evidence, should not be t^ken seriously
\
because all the available evidence goes to show that the relations between 
the Portuguese and the Manyika were not completely broken off after the 
Portuguese had been expelled by the Ngoni from the feiras of Masekesa and 
Aruangua in 1833• Nor was the Kingdom devastated in any permanent sense.
Only the post of capitao-mor was abandoned, but even then, only for a period 
of i n &tc&O years, (l833~l85^)» Trade continued, albeit in an extenuated 
form, between Sena and Manyika. Subsequent events also show that the relations 
assumed a more commercial character, due to an increasingly important role play­
ed by the moradores of Sena in the determination of policy. It was the 
moradores who were largely responsible for the re-establishment of the feira 
of Masekesa. Two developments in the politics of Rios de Sena probably explain 
the reasons for the moradores* greater participation at an administrative level. 
First, the Portuguese authorities paid more and more attention to the activities 
of Bonga at Massangano and its neighbourhood during the second half of the 
19th Century.
Secondly, Sena itself, on which the administration of the feira 
of Masekesa depended, and the neighbouring prazos were threatened by the 
Ngoni more often than the Kingdom of Manyika. The expenses for the expeditions
1. Omer-Cooper J.D. The Zulu Aftermath. A Nineteenth Century Revolution.
Bantu Africa. Ibadan Series, (ed) Dike K.O. Longmans (1966) p.58.
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against Bonga, the expenses incurred in defending the villa of Sena and 
other Portuguese settlements could only be met with the willing ;co-operation
of the moradores. A greater participation by the moradores in the running
I
of affairs, not only in Manyika but also in the entire region of Rios de Sena, 
was the price which the authorities at Sena had to pay.
The idea of re-establishing a feira at Sungo in the Gorongoza region 
to replace the feira of Masekesa was mooted again in. 1837 by Antonio Joaquim
de Andrade, together with other influential citizens who knew Sena and other
\
■ 2 ' 
districts well . The parecer which they drew up suggested that the feira of
Masekesa should be built near the margin of the river Vunduzi, the river
which served Quiteve, Sofala and Barwe. An estimate of ten bares of cloth
was considered sufficient to meet the initial expenses.
There is further evidence to the effect that contact still existed 
with the interior. The Portuguese were involved in the succession politics 
of the Kingdom of Barwe in l8Mf • A high-powered mission headed by Thomas 
Francisco Trexaunt, MOne of the first and oldest moradores of Rios de Sena,* 
whose opinion had to be "consulted in matters of such gravity," was sent to 
Barwe. Trexaunt had performed similar services in 1830. Apparently the 
trade route into the interior could still be used. There was no news about 
the threats of Landin invasions. The Governor-General of Mogambique attributed
2. Letter from the secretariat of the Government of Mogambique, signed by 
Joao Antonio Lobao, Major Secretary General, to the Governor of Quelimane 
and Rios de Sena, Joao da Costa Xavier, 28.3.1838. Cod.1^77* No.3« Moc.
A.H.U.
3* Letter from Fernando Carlos da Costa, Governor of Rios de Sena, to Galdeno 
Faustino de Souza, lieutenant-colonel and provisional commandant of the Villa 
of Sena, 9»3«l8^40 Cod. 1^52. Moc.A.H.U.
Ibid. Letter No.32 regarding the expenses incurred in connection with the 
envoys of King Chipatata of Barwe. Also see Letter No.29 from a naturalist 
from the villa of Tete, Doutor Guilherme Peters dated 29.6.184^.
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the lack of vigorous commercial activities in the province to 'apathy* .
I
There is more,than a hint in the Governor's letter of 1844 that some form
/ I
of trade and diplomatic contact existed between themoradores of Sena and
' |
Chikanga, King of Mwiyika. In March,1845, people from Manyika were expected 
in Sena. The purpose of their mission, according to a Portuguese account, 
was to ask for a capitao-mor and a Portuguese flag^. They never arrived, 
due perhaps to internal disturbances.
In October, 1845, the Governor of Rios de Sena instructed the
commandant of the villa of Sena to find out whether the businessmen or
their vashambadzi, and the inhabitants of the prazos da Coroa, who went
to Manyika to trade, encountered any difficulties on the way; further, he
was to find out when the Manyika started going to Sena to buy articles 'of
absolute necessity* and whether there was any opposition from the Manyika 
6
princes • This was a new initiative in response to the abolition of the feira.
The commandant accordingly sent emissaries to Chikanga to make proposals about
7
the re-establishment of the feira of Masekesa • It would seem that the 
primary concern of the Portuguese authorities at Quelimane and Sena during
g
these years was the re-establishment of the feiras of Masekesa and Zumbo •
4. Letter No.4 from Fernando Carlos da Costa to Anselmo Henrique Ferrao, 
military commandant of the villa of Sena, 5*1.1844. Quelimane. Cod.l480. 
Moc.A.H.U. Letter from Joaquim Pinto de Magalhaes, G.G. to the Minister 
and Secretary of State and of Overseas Affairs, No.l800. 5*2.1844. Pasta 
7 Moc.A.H.U.
5. Cod.l480 Moc.A.H.U. No.24, 25.
6. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Galdeno Faustino de Souza, to 
the commandant of the villa of Sena, ff.10.1845. Cod.l480. No.72. Moc. 
A.H.U. Letter from the Governor to the commandant dated 5*10*1845. Cod. 
1480. No.75. Moc.A.H.U.
7. Instructions for the provisional Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 
Major of the Portuguese Army, Antonio Alves de Azevedo Campos, from the 
Governor-General of Mozambique, Rodrigo Luciano d'Abreu de Lima, 2.6.1846. 
Cod.1477. (p.127-9)» Mo c.A.H.U.
8. Ibid.
This attempt to re-establish the feira of Masekesa in 1845 was 
frustrated as I have just mentioned by external political developments. These
I
developments were closely linked with events in the neighbouring Kingdoms of 
Makoni, Vumba and Jindwi. The relations between the Kingdoms of Maungwe and 
Manyika were affected by an internecine succession war which took place in
Q
Maungwe in 1845 . Mukunyadze murdered his brother Zendera, King of Maungwe,
and usurped the Kingship and ruled with the support of his younger brother,
Mukwengere, for nearly five years. A rival claimant to the throne, Nyamanhindi,
10
was living in exile in Manyika • He made a bid for the throne with the support
of Mudemberwa, the King of Manyika, who immediately sent his brother, Matida,
at the head of an array to invade the Kingdom of Maungwe and secure the throne
of Maungwe for Nyamanhindi. The army achieved its objective amidst terrible
11
incendiaries and carnage • The situation was aggravated by the hostility 
which existed between the Kingdom of Manyika and her two Southern neighbours, 
the Kingdoms of Jindwi and Vumba. It would seem that this hostility had been 
existing long before the event of 1845. It is related that, as soon as the 
Kings of Manyika had gone out to fight the Maungwe, they organised a joint 
expedition to invade the Kingdom of Manyika. The joint expedition invaded Manyika, 
killed Mudemberwa, whose only means of defence at this juncture was probably 
a small guard, and looted the place. Matida, who had been delayed by 
investiture ceremonies in Maungwe, rushed back to drive the enemy out of 
the Kingdom. The Jindwis and Vumbas, apparently, put up no resistance,as
9* Machiwenyika J. ’The History and Customs of the Manyika people*. MS. 
14.1.1. Sby.
Abraham D.P. ’The Principality of Maungwe. Its History and Traditions* 
NAPA. 28, 1951, p.69.
10. Ibid, p.74.
11. Machiwenyika J. ’The History and Customs of the Manyika People* op.cit. 
Abraham D.P. The Principality of Maungwe. op.cit. p.69.
often happens in oral tradition. Matida did not pursue the enemy further 
beyond the frontiers of his Kingdom. This is probably indicative of his 
relative military weakness.
However, Matida ascended the throne of Manyika on a wave of popularity
and Manyika-Maungwe relations remained cordial until 1865, when Vumbi brought
12
about another succession crisis . The course and causes of these feuds are 
merely outlined. One would probably be correct to interpret Manyika-Maungwe 
conflict in the context of their traditional rivalry. This rivalry in part 
involved the larger issues of trade and commerce vis-a-vis the Portuguese and
the ’Moors' during the 16th and 17th Centuries. The Kingdom of Maungwe was a
13stronghold of the Moors while the Kingdom of Manyika was not only a strong- 
ho ldjjujt a springboard of Portuguese commercial activities inland, including
i  i
the Kingdom of Maungwe itself. The affluence of Manyika Kings, an outcome of
I ■
the Kingdom’s contact with the market-orientated long-distance trade, incited^ 
the jealousy of her neighbours. The attitude of the King of Vumba towards the 
capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa, Portuguese businessmen and vashambadzi, 
in general tends to support this view. He emulated the Chikangas and the Makorabes 
in demanding saguates during the l830’s and, in fact, employed the tactics of
Makorabe by blocking the passage to the feira of Masekesa, pending payment of
14
saguates by the traders •
This war between the Kingdoms of Manyika and Maungwe was significant 
in two ways. It seems that only the region of Nyamhuka, whose people were noted
12. Machiwenyika J. ’The History and Customs of the Manyika People' op.cit.
13. Report on State and Conquest of the Rivers of Cuam to the Viceroy of India, 
Joao Nunes da Cunha, by Manuel Barreto, 11.12.1667, in Theal G.M. R.S.5.A. 
Vol.III.p.487.
14. See Chapter 4, infra.
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for their military prowess, was called upon to render military service to the
central authority by intervening in Maungwe succession politics. This
projected the personality and underscored the importance of this region.
as against other Manyika regions. It was the army from Nyamhuka which finally
destroyed the resistance of the Maungwes and drove out the Jindwis and the
15
Vumbas. As a rule, the Chikangas dealt with the region cautiously
Secondly, it was as a result of this war that an alliance was
16
made between the two kingdoms . This meant that the Kingdom of Manyika 
could then concentrate on solving other problems such as the re-establishment 
of the feira and the new element, the Ngoni, which was affecting their 
society.
/
i There is a hint to the effect that the negotiations about the
re-establishment of the feira failed, not only because of the external situation,
but also due to internal political developments. The evidence for this is
scanty and controversial. A certain Doga, apparently, a subject of Barbe,
is said to have rebelled against him and, in 18^5» asked the Portuguese to
17
allow him to live in the prazo of Inhacaroro . Barbe had been described in
18
1755 by de Mello e Castro as a King of Manyika who offered him ten lands •
This was probably another name for the Bundo dynasty. It is probably that 
Bundo had once again renewed his predatory activities. Bundo*s activities 
do not seem to have had any impact on Manyika politics at the time.
15. Machiwenyika J. ’The History and Customs of the Manyika People* 
££.»-Cit.f
16. Ibid. Abraham D.P» The Principality of Maungwe. op.cit. p.69.
17* Letter from the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Manoel d’ 
Abreu Madeira, to Anselmo Henrique Ferrao, commandant of the villa 
of Sena, ^.10.1^-85, Cod.l480. No.71« Moc.A.H.U.
18. See Chapter III.
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Matida»s reign was a relatively peaceful one after all the Maungwe,
who had been living there as exiles, had returned to their homeland. It
appears that the periods of famine which had been a regular feature of these
19regions for several years had come to an end . An incident, which best
illustrates the fact that trade links were not completely broken off with
20
the interior, took place in 185^ . The King of Manyika, as well as the
King of Barwe and Maungwe, seized some ivory from Portuguese traders.
Makombe's grievance was that one Antonio Maria de Sa e Magalhaes, commandant
21
of the villa of Sena, had not paid in full for the ivory which he had 
taken. Apparently the authorities at Sena did nothing to restore the ivory.
The Governor of Quelimane sent emissaries to Chikanga, King of Manyika, and 
Makoni, King of Maungwe, to find out the motive of these reprisals. Emissaries 
were also sent to Mamane, King of Quiteve, who was described as an ally of the 
state, to request him to use the influence and prestige which he enjoyed 
among his neighbours to intervene. The Portuguese were not certain of 
Chikanga's reaction. This was unnecessary, as 30 envoys were,reported at 
Sena from both Quiteve and Manyika to ask for a capitao-mor. These envoys
19* Abraham D.P. The Principality of Maungwe. op.cit. p.70.
20. Letter from Anselmo Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Quelimane and Bios 
de Sena, 28.1.183^. in Annaes do Conselho do Ultramarino parte nao of/idal 
la Serie. (1867) Lisboa, pp.241-2^2.
•21. Antonio Maria de Sa e Magalhaes was dismissed from his office because of 
insubordination and embezzlement of public funds. He is described in the 
documents as obnoxious and prejudicial to the province, and he was once 
imprisoned. When he was an alcidor at Inhambane, he fraternized with the 
soldiers, ate from the same plate as they did and incited them to rebel 
against central authority. Several soldiers deserted to join African 
chiefs. See officios do Governador Joaquim Pinto de Magalhaes (1853)
Moc. Governo Geral, No.172. 2a via. 9*6*1853• P^sta 12 Moc. A.H.U.
were given shelter as a sign of friendship and the message from the authorities
22 * 
at Sena was well received . These envoys were maintained at great expense
because there was a shortage of food supplies at Sena.
The ivory was restored. King Chikanga gave as a reason for having 
seized it, that this was intended to remind the Portuguese about ’ancient 
relations of friendship and commerce,' which existed between them. This was 
the only effective means he could employ to bring about a dialogue which 
subsequently took place. Chikanga appointed his son at the\ head of a delegation 
of porters, who carried the ivory to Sena, and highly-ranked councillors, who 
were carefully chosen to accompany them in order to impress the commandant of 
the villa of Sena about the urgent need to appoint a capitao-mor, and to re­
establish the feira of Masekesa. The Portuguese were assured of the old
guarantees and privileges of commerce. The prince and his delegation had
— 23been instructed not to leave without a capitao-mor •
The Governor of Quelimane gave a fantastic explanation as to why 
Chikanga sent such a delegation.
The natural state of the Negro is war, robbery; and might 
is right; it is recognised that the establishment of the 
Portuguese among them is an element of stability and peace, 
advantageous and satisfactoryPcommerce,-and it is for this 
reason that they come to the Whites.
Recent research into the trade pattern of East and Central African societies 
has shown the 'harmful effects' which trade could sometimes have on previously 
flourishing kingdoms. (See Gray and Birmingham).
It is not worthwhile entering into an argument with a Eurocentric- 
minded, dead Governor, who knew next to nothing about the dynamics of Manyika
22. Letter from the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Jeronimo Romeiro
to the Governor General of Mozambique, Joaquin de Santa Anna Garcias de
Miranda, 28.1.185^. In Annaes do Conselho do Ultramarino 1 Serie parte 
nao of icial. Lisbon 1867, pp.2^1-2.
23. Ibid.
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society. All the available evidence shows that the initiative came from the 
moradores of Sena. The views of the same Governor, which I shall quote, prove 
that the re-establishment of the feira was regarded by the Portuguese moradores 
and authorities as vitally important and a matter of great urgency. The view 
that the initiative to re-establish the feira came from Chikanga is evidently 
distorted. There was no doubt that the Chikangas greatly valued trade with the 
Portuguese, but all the evidence that I have cited hitherto goes to show that
2k
trade was going on as usual . The Chikangas probably benefitted more . '
from direct contact with the merchants, whom they could play one against another 
and eventually get them to compete in giving presents in the hope of obtaining
i
I ^
better trading privileges. The Chikangas could not have yearned for a capitao-
mor who would operate under very rigid instructions.
I
! It is not possible to determine how often attempts were made to re-
l
establish the feira of Masekesa, but it was the ardent desire of the govern­
ment of Mocambique in general to have it operating once again. Marquez de 
Aracaty de Souza Memoria, Governor General of Mozambique, wanted to re-establish 
the feira but he died before he could do so. A council, which governed 
Mogambique in the interim period, gave the question a great deal of thought 
and sanctioned nearly 60 fumbas of fazendas exclusively for the expenses of
re-establishing the feira. The result was disappointing. Another attempt
25
was definitely made in 1853 • 'Perhaps the arrival of new circumstances did
26not permit that business' wrote Anselmo in 185^ -• This could only refer to
either internal political developments, about which there is no hint, or to
27
threats of Ngoni attacks
2k• Letter from Joaquin Pinto do Magalhaes to the Secretary and Minister of 
State and Overseas Affairs, 31.8.1851. The entire province was reported 
quiet, despite leick of officers, soldiers and armament. The exception 
being that of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, where news about commerce was
discouraging. Pasta 12. Moc.A,H.U. Letter No.183.
25. Letter from Jeronimo Romeiro to the Governor General of Mocambique,
28.1.l8yk. in Annaes. op.cit.
26. I-bid.
27. See Part 3 of this chapter, Supra.
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The re-establishment of the Portuguese in the Kingdoms of Manyika
and Quiteve was regarded as a necessity. The Governor hoped that perhaps
this could be done during his lifetime and that "we shall see a new California
23
and Australia as a result of the mines which we could possess there." The 
colonos, soldiers and scientists were ready to go into the interior, and all 
they needed from the government of Mogambique was permission. This is 
conclusive proof that the initiative came from the moradores of Sena, who 
in turn influenced the government to give these attempts an official blessing.
Another event which lends support to the view that the moradores 
were behind all these moves to re-open the feira is the fact that envoys from 
both Quiteve and Manyika were at Sena at the same time. I suspect that the 
moradoires of Sena engineered this 'coincidence1 in order to impress the
authorities at Sena about the need to act urgently. The Quitevans were well-
I
known for their hostility towards Portuguese commercial activites in their 
Kingdom. It is unlikely that they would have taken the initiative to re-open 
a feira which they had closed down on their own.
The Manyika case is' further clarified by the preamble to Pereira's
' V
letter of nomination to the post of capitao-mor. "The King of Manyika agreed 
to the solicitations of some moradores of the villa of Sena, entertained and 
welcomed with great demonstrations of pleasure, satisfaction, an envoy who 
had been sent there."
However, the commandant of Sena communicated to the princes of 
Manyika and Quiteve.(sometime before 1st April) that a colonel of the militia, 
Izidoro Pereira, had been nominated capitao-mor. The princes were reported 
satisfied with the choice. Pereira was expected to go to Manyika in August
280 Letter from Jer6nimo Eomeiro to the Governor-General of Mogambique, 
1.3.185 .^ Annaes... op cit. pp.2^1-2.
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of the same year. The request of the ambassadors of Manyika, and the appoint­
ment of Pereira, were perhaps not quite co-incidental, for the latter had
29
made a request for the prazo Gorongoza . He suggested establishing a fort-
30ified feira there, which was to be protected by 80 armed men • As far as 
one can see, Pereira did not get this prazo, which was given to his successor 
ten years later. A patent letter of nomination shows that Pereira was appoint-
-'V—
ed capitao-mor of Manyika and Quiteve "because he possesses numerous armed
slaves, enjoys great prestige among the neighbouring regulos and among the 
31
citizens." He was to enjoy the honours, liberties and exemptions which 
directly derived from that office. His immediate task was to make a report
to the’government of Mozambique as to how the Portuguese could re-establish
I 32
themselves "securely in such distant places." Detailed instructions were
sent t6| him to the effect that every merchant who intended going to trade in 
Manyika or Quiteve had to subject himself to Pereira’s orders; to fly a 
Portuguese flag with all customary formalities; he was to maintain neutrality 
in the disputes of the Chikangas with their princes, and in thoseof neigh­
bouring Kings; he was to allow only those persons who were resident in Sena 
to trade either personally, or through their vashambadzi, in the Kingdoms of 
Manyika and Quiteve; he was not to allow too much liberty, as experienceiad 
shown that this tended to destroy commerce in general; he was to employ 
great wisdom in maintaining friendship and harmony with the regulos and, for
29* Petition of Izidoro Correa Pereira. See enclosure, dated 21.3.1853* 
Letter from Governor-General of Moqambique. 171 1 Via. 27.6.1853* 
Pasta 12 (1852-3) Moc.A.HoUo
30. Ibid.
31. Patent letter of Nomination. Cod.lA65« No.506. Moc. A.H.U. 9«3.l65^. 
signed Joaquim Pinto de Magalhaes. Approved in Lisbon on 23.3*1857.
32. Instructions to the capitao-mor of Manica, lA.10.185^* Codice 1^ -51? 
No.130. Moc.A.H,U.
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as long as the military force was still too small to protect the three villas 
effectively, he was not to deploy them in long distances. He was to 
concentrate on the ivory trade because, as in the previous case, experience
had shown that the ivory trade was not so strongly affected as the gold trade
33 34by political upheavals • The advantages of the ivory trade were obvious •
It did not require possession of a particular site to the same extent as
did mining, and therefore there was no need to build a long-term defence
system such as a mining community would require. Ivory trade had another
advantage over gold trade. It was less subjected to central control of the
Chikangas, because only 'a flexible and semi-nomadic association was required,
and not a territorially determined fief.*
/ It was possibly these advantages which induced the moradores of 
Sena to send their vashambadzi to buy ivory from a place of more than one 
month*s march beyond the feira of Manyika. The expulsion of the Portuguese 
from the feira of Masekesa brought about a change in the political fortunes 
of the Portuguese. This affected the pattern of long-distance trade and 
probably inter-regional trade too. The emergence of new groups, Mzilikazi 
and Manukuse, must have confronted experienced Manyika gold traders with 
strong commercial rivals. Competition between the Ndebele and Shangani in 
matters of trade was observed by Erskine during his journeys from 1873-4.
Mzila was * jealous and adverse to any trade communication* passing to
35Mzilikazi. His aim was to *keep the gold produce of Manica to himself* .
33. Ibid.
34. Gray R. and Birmingham D. 'Some Economic and Political Consequences of 
Trade in Central and Eastern Africa in the Pre-Colonial Period* in Pre- 
Colonial African Trade. Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa 
before 1900 (ed) R.Gray and D.Birmingham, Oxford University Press,
(1970) p.17.
35* St.Vincent Erskine. 'Third and Fourth Journeys in Gaza or Southern 
Mocambique, 1373-1874* in R.G.S. No.48, 1878, London, pp.32-40.
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The new groups had two advantages over the Manyika gold traders. They were 
the best hunters and lived in an area where elephants abounded . The dis­
advantages attached to this trade were that Mzilikazi was *a hard merchant 
37to deal with.* He was the only one with whom barter could be effected; 
every tusk of ivory was his and no one dared dispose of one. He demanded 
a high price for this ivory for two reasons. First, he knew that no one 
could under-sell him in his extensive dominions and secondly, he supposed 
that ivory must be precious considering the distance which people travelled 
to buy it.
Another difficulty was that the Matebele chiefs demanded extra­
vagant tolls and taxed the merchants s e v e r e l y 1 for the slightest service 
obtained, before they are able to purchase a single pound of ivory.1 Thirdly, 
Mzilikazi instituted game laws so that only his own people could hunt eleph­
ants. A fourth disadvantage was that of horse-sickness, which commenced as 
early as September. A combination of these disadvantages gave little induce- 
ment to hunters and traders to take advantage of this ivory trade.
Three questions remain to be answered in connection with the 
ivory trade, which gathered momentum soon after the collapse of the gold 
trade economy at the feiras. Would it be that the so-called raids, which 
were carried into Manyika by the Ngoni, were also hunting expeditions?
Would it also be that the Ngoni, who lived in Manyika, were invited by 
Manyika princes and traders to sustain the ivory trade after the collapse 
of the economic structure, which rested on the gold trade? These questions
33* St.Vincent Erskine. ’Third and Fourth Journeys in Gaza or Southern 
Mozambique, 1873-1874' in R.G.S. No.48. 1878. London, pp.32-40.
36. The Matebele Journals of Robert Moffat, 1829-1860 ed. J.P.R.Wallis.
Vol.II. London,1943. p.233.
Sunderland-Harris N. ’Trade and the Rozvi Mambo’ in Gray and Birmingham 
(ed) Pre-Colonial African Trade op.cit. pp.232-233*
37* The Matebele Journals of Robert Moffat, 1829-1860 Vol.II. op.cit. p.2_7&
will remain unanswered until more is known about the nature of Ngoni 
ivory trade.
The third question is, how do we know that the place to which
!
the moradores of Sena and of the feira of Manyika sent their vashambadzi 
was Butua?
The first evidence is that the 'Abutua' of the l8th Century was
70
also a month's march from the Kingdom of Manyika • The place is described 
as beyond the feira. The vashambadzi would have no need to\pass through the 
feira of Manyika from Sena, if this trade had been conducted north of Manyika. 
The distance cited in 1780 and in 1834 is exactly the same, and the evidence 
cited in Chapter III in connection with Manyika-Butua trade strongly suggest 
the place to be present - day Matebeleland.
Secondly, Izidoro Pereira sent a party of traders sometime before 
i860 to buy ivory from Mzilikazi"^.
Thirdly, the articles of trade found at Mzilikazi's court by 
Robert Moffat in 1854 are definitely of Portuguese origin and possibly 
got there from the feira of Masekesa soon after it had been officially re­
established in 1854. Some could have come ftom Zumbo, He saw "blue prints
4q
and white linen stored in Mzilikazi's waggon" j  and much of the blue linen, 
which was extremely strong and coarse, "appeared to be from Goa, Surat,etc." 
Robert Moffat was told by"a good-natured, unsuspicious soul" that these
38. 'Descripcao Corogr^fica do Reino de Manica, seus custumes e Leis.'
Cxa.17* Moc.A.H.U. (Anon).
39* Documentos Referentes k Soberania Portugu&sa na Manica e Quiteve. 
Arquivo das Colonias Vol.II. Coimbra. Imprensa Nacional,1918, p.99 
Cod.l46l. Moc.A.H.U.
40. The Matebele Journals of Robert Moffat, I829-I86O. Vol.II.op.cit.
p.80.
cloths were obtained from the 'Mashona who purchased them from tribes be­
yond or east of them.* Besides cloth Robert Moffat saw muskets which
I !
were said to have been purchased from Englishmen on the Zambezi, ! These
were 'old English Tower musket' stocks which resembled the ones he had
41
seen in the possession of the Hottentots • These muskets were probably 
sold to Mzilikazi by hunters from the Boer Republic, It is also very likely 
that some of these, and perhaps the ones which he did not see, came from
Portuguese sources. It would appear that the use of fire-arms was rapidly\
increasing between 1836 and 1848 in Rios de Sena, A ban on the use of fire­
arms without licence was passed on 1.7*1848 by the Governor of Rios de Sena,
42 43Antonio Alves de Almeida • Subsequent .bans of 1854, 1861-64 and 1867
testify to an increasing demand for guns to hunt elephants. The capitao-
mor of the feira of Masekesa, Izidoro Pereira, acquired a licence for 150
guns in 1848 and £00 guns in 1854 for his elephant hunters and defence of
his prazo and luane (country estate). Most experienced businessmen, both
Manyika and Portuguese, adjusted their entre-preneurial skill to meet the
demands of altered circumstances.
There is also evidence that ivory trade was carried on between
Manukuse and the Portuguese, probably from the feira, long before it was
officially re-established. In 1842, Manukuse sent envoys to the Portuguese
in Quiteve to the effect that they should send merchants to trade in his 
44Kingdom , He sent them a sample of the trade commodity he wanted and this
41. Ibid, p f
42. Register of Arms. Cod.l46l. Moc.A.H.U.
43. Ibid. ^
44. Correspond£ncias de Governadores. Cofcia dos Termos Processos Accorridos 
com o Potentado Manicusse e os do Quiteve, Segundo TeWo, 22.6.1842. 
Pasta 7. Mocambique (1842-1845) Moc.A.H.U.
was black missinga and coral falso. It would not be unreasonable to conjecture
an interlocking pattern of trade, which spread its tentacles from Sena via
Quiteve to Gazaland and from Sena via the feira ; ofManyika to Matebeleland.
It is possible that Inharabane, also served Gazaland. The preceding description
of the ivory trade which partially replaced the gold trade lies behind
instructions given to Isidoro Pereira in 1854 to concentrate on the ivory
trade. He was also instructed to maintain a full garrison, to keep arms
and ammunitions in good condition, to enter into a book all the expenses
45
and the presents which he received from African chiefs ,
| These instructions show that the Portuguese had learned that the 
secret of success in the interior was harmony with the Kings and good ad­
ministration of the feira. This regimento has idealism and yet is also more
! 46
realistic and practical than its predecessor of 1771 « which was slightly
modified by the instructions of the 1830*s.
The Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Joaquim de Azevedo 
Alpoem, put his finger on the problem when he told Pereira that 'the 
instructions, which the ancient governors of this district gave to the 
capitaes-mor of the feira of Masekesa and Quiteve are today not in harmony 
with the liberty of commerce.'
Pereira's immediate problem as capitao-mor was to obtain fazendas 
for saguates to the Kings of Quiteve and Manyika. The amount of saguate 
which had at first been moderate had grown large by a practice which was 
started in the l830's of sending saguate to several princes, including that 
of the feira. He estimated that these expenses could comfortably be met if the
45. Instructions to the capitao-mor of Manica, 14.10.1854. Codice. 1451. 
No.130. Moc.A.H.U.
46. See Chapter III. infra.
salary of the capitao-mor was raised from 2,000 cloths, as stipulated 
in the regimento of 1771, to 5,000 cloths annually. It does not seem 
that this was done. Rather, he was asked to meet these expenses from 
his own sources and submit a claim through the normal procedure. Pereira 
had the intention after his appointment to advance to Manyika in August, 
of 1854. This was not done. We learn, however, that before 29th November 
of that year, he had a skirmish with the Ngoni in the -prazo of Souza.
(West of Sena). The Ngoni, whom he defeated, had allegedly tried to 
penetrate the Kingdom of Barwe by aggression. They were beaten off and 
some of them crossed the Zambezi to the north.
j
Even in 18551 Izidoro Pereira did not have the possibility of
advancing towards Manyika -
I  i 
I
..because there have been altercations between the 
1 pretenders to the throne in that Kingdom; one was
deposed by the Landins and another put in his place; 
and it is said that the people are not even satisfied 
with this one and expect to find a real heir who will 
succeed and take office within a short time; then the^7 
march of the capitao-mor can begin in greater safety.
The phrase 'was deposed by the Landins' suggests that the Landins had con­
siderable control over Manyika succession politics. This is not borne out 
by tradition as I shall show later. Pereira presumably lost interest in 
the founding of a base in Manyika, but still sent messengers, probably
48
in i860 or 1861, to buy ivory • The trade of Sena with the interior as
pointed out earlier consisted largely of ivory. FerraTo's son used to
49frequent Manyika every May . However, the fact that the journey used to take
47. Letter from Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Joaquim d’Azevedo 
Alpoim, to the G.G. of Mozambique, Vasco Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes, 
Cod.l463. Moc.A.H.U.
48. 'Documentos Referentes....' op.cit. in Arquivo das Colonias. Vol.II. 
Coimbra, 19lo.f>p?j- ? Cod.l46l. Moc.A.H.U.
49. The Zambezi Journal of James Steward, 1862-1863. (with a section from 
his correspondence) ed. J.P.R, Wallis. London, 1952, pp.150— /
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Ferrst6 six weeks'^ instead of ten days^1, makes one suspect that Ferrao’s 
son went to the same area as the vashambadzi of the moradores, that is 
’a month’s journey beyond the feira1, or alternatively spent the rest of 
this time trading in Manyika.
I have argued in this discussion that Manyika-Portuguese contact 
was not completely broken off after 1835* The pattern of trade changed, 
necessarily, because the feira which used to act as a rendezvous and 
clearing house was no longer functioning. Consequently, the gold trade, 
which could only flourish under the feira system, also dwindled and gave 
way to ivory trade. I have again argued that the re-establishment of the 
feira was largely due to the initiative of the moradores of Sena, who in 
effect possessed the material resources and the personnel for such an 
enterprise. Admittedly the Chikangas responded readily, largely, I 
suppose, because they anticipated great benefits to be derived from direct 
contact with the moradores. These hopes do not seem to have been fulfilled.
It must have proved difficult for the Chikangas to control the movement of 
the Portuguese traders who went about searching for ivory beyond the frontiers 
of Manyika. Certainly, it was much easier to demand saguate from an 
organised community at the feira, with a capitsto-mor who could be held res­
ponsible for an infringement of Manyika laws and customs or any delays or 
shortages in the payment of tribute. The internal succession crisis hinted 
at earlier might also have influenced Chikanga to react favourably to Port­
uguese overtures to re-establish the feira, not because Portuguese presence 
would be an element of stability, but rather a source of supply for the
30. The reason given is that the road^is hilly and difficult.1 The machila
could not be used.
31. Conceicao A. ’Tratado dos Rios de Cuama1 in Rivara J.H. da Cunha.
0 Chronista de Tissuary. Vol.II (No.l3|Jan.) 1867. Nova Goa. p.45.
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cloths which he needed to quell the rebellion
The moradorestoo must have been disappointed by the ivory trade.
They probably incurred large transport charges. This should explain their
eagerness to have the feira re-established.
Lastly I suspect that some amount of gold trade, besides ivory,
was carried on at the feira or within its vicinity. Old habits die hard.
It is inconceivable that the vashambadzi would have given up trading there
•V/
because of the Landin attacks or the absence of a capitao-mor. This was not 
a new thing at all. They traded at the feira of Manyika in the 1830's under very 
similar circumstances and quite often without a capitao-mor.
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C H A P T E R  VI.
PART 2 - MANYIKA-AMATSHANGANA RELATIONS 
1835 -  1863
I have argued in the previous discussion that the Lgndin invasions 
of the feiras can be dated with certainty to 1830. There are indications, how­
ever, that one or two attacks might have been made earlier. It will be argued 
in this discussion that the name Landin is applied to the first Ngoni intruders, 
that is, the groups of Ngwana, Nxaba and Zwangendaba, and the name Vatua was 
applied specifically to the Manukuse intruders. These names are not inter­
changeable, although the general tendency is to use them indiscriminately.
! i
! Secondly, the view put forward in the previous discussion, that
Manyika-Ngoni relations were cordial, . will be further developed, with
concrete examples. Thirdly, it will be shown that the results of this contact
development
had far-reaching consequences for the future /6f Anglo-Portuguese relations in
S.E.Africa.
A meaningful study of Manyika-Ngoni relations must include a general 
survey of the activities of these groups in the neighbouring regions of Manyika, 
in particular Quiteve and Cisanga, where they were based for some time.
The homeland of the Ngv/anas was probably the valley of what is now
Swaziland • Nxaba, whose land of birth was more to the South, fled to Swaziland
and when both he and Ngwana were threatened by Chaka*s army they left the
country together, but soon separated. Ngwana stayed for more than two
2years in the Venda country • Again he fled from there to the territory
1. Liesegang C.J. BeitrMge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im 
Sudlichen Mocambique, 1820-1895* p s
2. Ibid. p ^  ^ " *
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t.
of Changamire where he crops up in oral tradition as 'Muchecheyani' , He 
died there and one of his brothers, Magadlela, became Regent. This group 
seems to have remained there for several years in the territory lying to 
the north of the Rozvi. He probably conducted the attacks which were made 
on the feira of Masekesa in the early l830’s. Eventually they v/ere beaten 
by Zwangendaba, who had followed them there, and they fled to the east where 
Nxaba was.
Nxaba had moved north and probablycrossedthe Sabi River in 1826 
b
to settle in Cisanga , one of the territories under the influence of Chang- 
5
amire • He spent almost one year wgndering about in the neighbouring lands, 
demanding taxes especially in the form of cattle. These were obtained from
long distances. From there he compelled the colonos of these lands to obey
1 i
him. Hd is alleged to have •robbed*, killed men and women, including children, 
in order to strike terror into the population at large^, In this way he
of" ( ftfi/'i.r’JjLSS Z** r* ^  .sc f^ii'*/
3* Liesegang got this identificationA from D.P.Abraham footnote,11^)
but Nenguwo,S. identified him as Muchechenyana. I prefer the latter.
See ‘Oral Work Among the Rozvi. A few Notes’ in The History of the 
Central African Peoples. Papers presented at the 17th Conference of 
the Rhodes Livingstone Institute for research, Lusaka (1963) p*7* 
k* Copia do T^rmo do Emprestino que esta Feitoria da Fazenda N.R. fez 
de 600 panos ao Principe de Quiteve Maromo eleito aclaimado Rey de 
Quiteve p as despezas de sua Coroagao, 8.12.1831. Pasta 7* Moc.
A.H.U.
Botelho Sebastiao Xavier. Memo'ria Estatistica sBbre os Dommios Portuguezes 
na Africa Oriental. (1833)• Lisboa, pp.167-172.
Lie^ang. p.30.
6. The Invasion of the Vatuas from the coast of Natal, doc.dated 8.12.1831,
Pasta 7, Moc.A.H.U. Copia do Tetmo do Empr</stino que esta feitoria da 
fazenda Nossa Real fez de 600 panos ao principe do Quiteve Maromo eleito 
aclaimado Rey de Quiteve p as despezas de sua Coroacao, signed by:
Sebastiao Joze^ Rodrigues de Nascimento 
Francisco Miguel Rodrigues Nunes 
Scipio de .Andrade, feitor da Fazenda.
Joao Felix Antonio Goncalves, A.bdula Grecar.
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achieved his goal, because everyone who heard about him trembled and fled
away. He reached Cisanga without much opposition. He killed the King of
Cisanga and committed the same cruelties as he did in the Sabi region,
including robberies, seizing of cattle. It is related that from there
"he ordered his people to rob and destroy all the neighbouring Kingdoms such
7
as that of Chicanga, 'Xangamire*, up to the interior" .
From there Nxaba went to Quiteve, where he invited every prince 
with his family to his quarters. It is related that he killed every one 
of them except two grandees, who were wedded to his opinion.
Apparently Murivane, a kinsman of the mentioned princes, who
8aspired for Kingship, engineered this tragedy in order to assume power •
After some time Murivane attacked the two princes referred to above.
An arrangement was made whereby Murivane and others paid tribute 
to Nxaba as King. He himself went to live in High Quiteve, that is in Bandire, 
and left behind some of his followers.
When Manukuse, King of the Gaza, heard that Nxaba had established 
himself in Cisanga he marched there in person in the year 1830, with a great
army of Vatuas. He is alleged to have committed the same ’robberies' and
9.................................
hostilities sis Nxaba did in the transit lands • He defeated Nxaba. Nxaba
retired to the lands of Changamire with an army and Manukuse established him­
self in Cisanga where he ordered "every African of that land to be disciplined
7. Ibid.
8. In 1830 the Landins supported a rival party, Caringa. See letter from 
the Governor of Sofala, Miguel Roiz Nunes, to the Governor General of 
Mozambique, Joze Miguel de Brito, *1.10.1830. Maco 12. Moc.A.H.U.
The main purpose f>r the Landins going into Quiteve, according to this 
letter, ms to 'seek the mines of copper and trees which produce missanga'• 
9* The Invasion of the Vatuas from the Coast of Natal, 8.12.1831. Pasta 7* 
Moc.A.H.U.
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and armed with assegais and shields and taught them to fight according to
Vatua tactics. Afterwards he ordered these people who had been trained,
10together with some of his Vatuas, to attack the villa of Sofala in 1836 •
Probably Nxaba, in alliance with Magadlela, leader of the Ngwana
group, had previously attacked Zwangendaba and beaten him, Zwangendaba, who
clearly had the intention to settle permanently in the territory South of the
Zambezi, decided to cross the Zambezi after his defeat, an event which took
11
place during an eclipse of the sun in 1835 •
It would appear that in 1840 Nxaba and his supporters were des- 
12troyed on the upper Zambezi . According to tradition, Magadlela fought
on Nxaba1s side against Manukuse but did not accompany Nxaba on his way to
the Upper Zambezi, rather he remained in Barwe, probably for four or five
13years, before he crossed the Zambezi in 1839 •
10. Ibid,
11. Most writers are agreed on the year 18351 hut differ on the dates,
Barnes J,A, Politics in a changing Society. A political History of the 
Ft® Jameson Ngoni. London. Oxford University Press. (195*0 gives the' 
date as 20.11.1835 P*5. Cf.Poole. Crossing of the Zambezi, p.290. He 
gives the date as 19.11.1835* Barnes thinks that this calculation was 
based on a misrepresentation of the astronomical, as distinct from a 
civil date. Young agrees with Barnes. Cf. Nautical Almanac 1835* 2nd 
ed. p.470. See Gray R. Annular Lxlipse Maps in J.A,H, Vol.IX. 1, 1968. 
pp.147-157* citing G.Lancaster’s ’Tentative Chronology of the Ngoni; 
genealogy of their chiefs and notes’ in Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute XVII (1957) ?8, Dr.Gray gives the date as 20.ll.lb35*
Caentano liontez and d’Crvellas dispute the above date. They give 1825*
See Montez C. ’As Invasoes dos Mangunis e dos Machanganas*. Mogambique. 
Docuraentario Trimestrar. 19 ^ \yres d ’Orvellas. Racas e Linguas Indigenas em 
. Mogambique. Memoria apresentada ao Congresso Colonial Nacional. LM 
Imprensa Nacional 1905* P*36»
12. G.J. Beitrage zur Geschichtedes Reiches der Gaza Nguni im Sudlichen 
Mocambique l820-l895» op.cit. p.49*
13. Ibid.
These groupswhich allegedly specialised in raiding their
neighbours' cattle are often indiscriminately referred to as Landins.
This confusion may be solved by raising two questions: Who were these
Landins? What was the nature of their relationship with other African 
*
potentates with whom they came into contact, particularly in Manyika?
Answers to these questiors should help differentiate the Landins 
proper and the Vatuas.
Sebastiao Xavier Botelho defined the Landins as the people who 
invaded and usurped power from the Thongas 'of all the lands along the coast.' 
These were easily identifiable by their robustness and propensity to 'kill' and 
'rob* • The invasion of the Landins started in Louren^o Marques to the North 
through Inhambane.
This clearly refers to the Ngoni groups of Nxaba, Ngwana and Zwangend-
aba which followed the above-described route. No mention of the word Vatua is
made at this stage until the emergence of Manukuse; a clear indication that,
although the two names were later confused, they, in effect, referred to two
different entities of intruders. The former is quite often referred to as
15
Mabvites or Mapxittes in the Portuguese records • This name was later
l*r. Botelho S. Xavier. Mera<4ria Estatistica op.cit. pp.132, 17^-5,176.
Also see Smith A. 'Delagoa Bay and the Trade of South Eastern Africa' 
in Gray and Birmingham Precolonial Trade... 1970. pp.267-9*
15* Letter from the captain of the militia to the Provisional Governor of 
Rios de Sena and Quelimane, 22.6.1332. Maco 27. Moc.A.H.U. Letter 
from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Mariano da Cunha, to the Governor General 
of Mozambique, 10.11.1833. Codice 1^40,No.7* Moc.A.H.U. The same Governor 
uses the term Landin in his letter to the commandant of the villa of Sena, 
Tete 13o7«l833* Cod.4^0. No.107 Moc.A.H.U. The Portuguese used these 
terms inter-changeably, 'Mapzites ou Landins'. See letter from the 
Governor of Rios de Sena to the Governor General of Mozambique, 8.12.1833. 
Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. Letter to Mariano da Cunha from Severino d'Almeida, 
Commandant of the feira of Hacequece, 20.7.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A,H.U. He 
uses 'Mapxites ou Landins.'
applied by the shona to the people of Manukuse and later of Mzilikazi. It
is now used in a derogatory sense.
A fconsiderable amount of controversy rages round the origin of 
the word Vatua for the people of Manukuse, who should otherwise be known 
as Amatshangana^.
The nature of the Landins' relationship with the Chikangas has 
been dealt with in the previous discussion and only that of the Amatshangana 
remains to be dealt with. As in the case of the Landins, the raids which, 
were allegedly committed by the Vatuas were not as destructive as they have 
been painted. They were probably an occasional affair which took place as 
an economic necessity or when tribute was not forthcoming or some problem 
to be urgently solved had arisen.
It does not seem that Manyika-Amatshangana relations were as
clearly defined as was the case in the neighbouring Kingdom of Quiteve.
There is a tradition that Manukuse sent his emissaries to capture cattle
in Manyika but, because the cattle kraals had been removed to the mountain
tops during the invasion of Zwangendaba, they then returned empty-handed to
17
Manukuse, who had established his palace at Madhlakazi in Musapa •
16. It is clear from the discussion that the feiras were attacked by
people who invaded Lourenco, Inhambane and entered the Bofala region. 
These were referred to as mapxites or Landins and the word Vatua does 
not appear until 1835* It was used to designate ManUkusds group. 
According to Dornellas it was derived from Mutua-ba-tua, a Zulu or the 
Zulu in Ronga. Batua v/as a designation for a Bushman. Thus, the 
invasion came from a region which these inhabited, and the invaders 
had in their language a cracking noise which characterised it. Perhaps 
these were the reasons why the name was given to them. D'Ormellas p.36. 
For another view see Caentano Montez. 'As Invasoes dos Mangunis e dos 
Machanganas' in Mog&mbique, Documentario Trimestral (10) 23-551 1937*
17» Tsamba Ye China. 'Rusape' Reader No.2 Masoko e Va Mambo Ve Kare Ve 
Nyika i no ne Ngano Shoma. S.P.C.K. Sby. Lovedale Press, 19^9, P«59*
Manukuse devised a plan whereby he sent 'an army of occupation'
to demand taxes from the Manyika people from time to time. Another tradition
/ ! 
is even more Specific about the nature of this relationship. Some;Vatuas lived
j
at the King's Court, others lived scattered about in the various regions of
18Manyika, Jenya, Zindi, Samanga, Nyamhuka, Karombe and Murahwa • They married
the local Manyika girls and sometimes even daughters of highly-placed councillors 
19
and princes • Both traditions are silent as to the exact nature of the tribute
paid to Manukuse and the manner in which it was paid. In 1891 there was a
\
\
suggestion that 'Manica, ever since the date of its conquest, has always had
a Vatua Governor, whose name was Magurguana, in the time of Manicusse and of 
20
Mzila'. Historial facts and Vatua practice of vassal<&^£'do not support this 
21
statement » Tradition records Magigwana as 'Ngungunyana's Commander-in-Chief 
22of the Armies' • Magigwana was not a resident Vatua governor at the Court of 
Chikanga, He features much lgter in Gaza politics.
The system of vassalage as it was practised in Quiteve with Murivane
in 1830 and in 18^ -2 with the regulo of Ampara, was that these two paid tribute 
to an army which was sent there from time to time. This was ^onequite often.
An example of this may illustrate this system of tribute as it was operated by
, 23Manukuse •
18. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People.' MS l^/l/l 
Sby.
19* Ibid.
20. Letter from Senhor du Bocage to Sir G.Petre, Foreign Office, Lisbon, 
3.7.1891. P.R.O. CP6086. Enclosure in No.23^, p.250.
21. For the process, much later in the Century, see P.R.O. Confidential 
Print,5970. 1888-9. Letter from Vice-Consul Drummond to the Marques 
of Salisbury. L.M. 17*11.1888.
22. 'The History of the .matshangana as told by Ingwagazi and Mazikwabo to 
Wilson Mhlanga'. in NAPA No.25. 19^ -8. p.73* ^
23. Correspondencias de Governadores. Copia dos Termos Processos accoridos com 
o lotentado Manicusse. 20.6.18A-2. Signed by Cipriano Baptista, Monteiro 
etc.
22^.
On 20.6.1842 Manukuse cent a delegation to the Portuguese authorities 
at the fortress of Sofala to announce that all the lands to the south of the 
villa had been conquered and that he intended to advance into the interior, 
northwards and westwards. Manukuse demanded four hundred pieces of cloth 
and that the regulo of Ampara should pay tribute. Compliance with these de­
mands would be rewarded by friendly relations. Two businessmen were sent to
give Manukuse presents and to make sure that the trade route was open from
24
Quiteve up to Sofala • The businessmen in Quiteve subscribed pieces of cloth
for this purpose. Two days later, Macate, commander-in-chief of the forces of
Muzila, Manukuse's son, occupied the lands of Mambone after committing a terrible
carnage, and demanded that all the regulos should obey him. The use of the word
obey possibly implied tribute. Whether it was in Manyika, Quiteve or Sofala,
it would appear that this was the nature of tribute, an extension of the
protection racket of their pastoral southern origin. This protection racket
was in the case of Manyika paid in the form of cattle, sheep, goats, skins of
genetta felina nzudzi and other animals. Manukuse?thereforOj does not seem to
have had a resident at any of the chiefs' courts. He certainly charged the
chief of the army staff oi? his subordinates at the head of small parties, with
the duty of collecting tribute and conducting negotiations on his behalf. Such
25
was the duty of Maputumana, his chief of staff, between 1842 and 1845 • A
look at the manner in which Manukuse obtained tribute from Sena and the 
neighbourhood will confirm the above-mentioned conclusion. According to 
reports of eye-witnesses, there were not more than 40 Landins in Chupanga in 
1844 who used to receive cloth from the administrator of the prazo, and had,
24. Ibid.. 
25* Ibid.
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at the beginning of October at the latest, retired to the vicinity of
26Sofala 'on account of the coming winter' • They had also been present 
in the vicinity of the mouth of the Zambezi and had requested cloth as gifts 
to their Kingo These requests were resented by the Governor of Rios de Sena, 
who made an attempt to stop payment of tribute to the Landins, who claimed 
"that they have been sent to fetch cloth to clothe their King, Manukuse, who 
lives on the other side of Inhambane." In December,1846, and again in 1850 
he promulgated orders forbidding payment of tribute. In a report of 1858, we 
learn something about the amount of tribute paid to the Landins. Richard 
Thornton saw as much as $400 (£80) being paid to the Portuguese administration 
by a prazo holder of Chupanga and about $500 to the Landins. It would be mis­
leading, however, to read all these figures purely as tribute, because it would 
seem that the Landins earned some of their money by settling disputes among the
villagers or by coercing, at the request of a prazo holder, reluctant colonos 
27to go to work •
Tradition records two waves of tax-collecting expeditions into Many­
ika, one during King Matida's reign (1845-1865) and another during King Bvumbi’s
28 ~ 
reign, (1865-I87O) • This tradition should not be taken too literally. It
probably refers to two memorable episodes rather than tribute collecting exped­
itions. However, Selous, in a retrospective account, implies that the Vatua
incursions were concentrated on the countries of 'Mtoko, Mangwende, Makoni,
29
Svosve and Makwirimba'• The Kingdom of Manyika was left out of the list.
This probably refers to Kzilikazi and his people. In any case it seems that 
once settled in Manyika, the Amatshangana identified themselves with the local
26. Liesegang (1967) p.69.
27. Ibid.
28. Machiwenyika J. *The History and Customs of the Manyika People.1 MS.14/1/1 
Sby,
Kasoko S. Manyika Ne'dzimwe Nzvimbo. Kwa Tsambe Series No,5 London. The 
Sheldon Press 1952• PP 16 and 19•" Samuel Hhlanga, Tsamba Ye Cina, 'Rusape' 
Reader, Series No.2 Mascko e Vamambo Ve Nyika i no ne Ngano Shoma. The 
Lovedale Press (1949) pp.57-80.
29* Colquhoun,A.R. Natebeleland: The War and our Position in South Africa, 
London, The Leanhall Press Ltd.. p.21. Also see Selous F.C. Travel and 
Adventure in South Hast Africa, London, I89I, p.545.
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people. Arrangements for collecting tribute must have followed the pattern 
which the Vatua practised in the neighbouring regions, that is small parties 
were occasionally sent to the chief to collect it and in some cases cattle 
or goats might have been paid in gratitude for their expertise or mercenary 
services.
Tradition records an episode which took place when the Amatshangana
30
were suspected of trying to stage a coup d 1 £tat • The details of this event,
on which two traditions are agreed, have an authentic ring;\a woman communicated
\
to Mutasa's councillors what her husband used to say to her under the influence
of liquor, about the Amatshangana*s plan to destroy all Manyika male population
and leave women only*, how the King ordered a general brewing of beer in most
villages of his regions', the giving of a sign for a general massacre of the
Amatshangana present at these beer drinking parties. Only two are said to
have escaped extinction. On a second occasion it would appear that a fixed
31sum of 100 head of cattle annually was stipulated • This was not much when 
the size of the Manyika Kingdom is taken into account and when it is considered 
that the wealth of an African King, generally speaking, was reckoned in cattle.
It is evident from the preceding account that Manyika-Vatua relations 
were on the whole as cordial as any between sovereign and vassal, despite the 
fact that this relationship was vaguely defined.
The imprecise nature of Vatua suzerainty over Manyika gave rise to 
the Anglo-Portuguese imbroglio of the last quarter of the 19th Century. Vatua
30. Machiwenyika J. ’The History and Customs of the Manyika People.1 op.cit.
31. Khlanga S. Tsamba ye Cina, op.cit. p.60.
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suzerainty over Manyika was contested by the British and this in turn involved 
questions of boundary demarcation, particularly of the auriferous region of 
Manyika. This was later settled bn the battlefield on the very grounds of 
the 'Feira de Manica.*
The economic consequences of Manyika-Vatua contact must be evaluated 
from the point of view of Manyika trade relations with Sena. It was from Sena 
that the opulent moradores sent their vashambadzi to the interior of Manyika.
It was Sena that bore the brunt of the defence of the feira of Masekesa. The
collapse of Sena economically directly affected the market-orientated trade 
of the Kingdom of Manyika. An attempt which was made to locate the root causes 
of the decline of Sena revealed that the attacks of the Landins and Vatuas were 
some of the causes but by no means the only ones. The defence situation was 
described by Stewart in 1862 in this way:
..in the N.E. corner of the town stands the fortress.
This is a mud creation forming an oblong square of 
about l80 yds. by 120 or 130 yds. The walls are from 
12' to 14’ high. At the four angles are four bastions 
with embrasures for five guns; that is to say, where 
the embrasures can be seen. The fort, however, is in a
state of ruin, though some effort is being made to re­
pair it;.... on one_bastion were three old rusty guns 
and on another, two.
The fortress had forty soldiers, probably all Africans. It is not 
surprising therefore, that the Vatuas felt encouraged to demand more and more 
cloths to the tune of ’thousands of reis.’
How far was the ordinary Manyika influenced culturally by the Vatuas? 
This is not easy to assess since there are no records about this. Nevertheless 
the Vatuas, at a later stage, seem to have recruited soldiers; from the local 
population. It is not reported whether or not these recruits ever returned
32. The Zambezi Journal of James Steward (ed. Wallis J.P.B.) op.cit. p.150.
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home after assimilating the culture of the Vatuas. I have not had 
evidence to this effect, but I strongly suspect that these recruits 
served as porters, vashambadzi or hunters to promote the ivory trade 
between Manukuse and the Portuguese moradores at the feira of Masekesa 
and elsewhere.
Tradition, as well as written records, suggest, as I have 
shown in this discussion, that Manyika-Amatshangana relations were 
cordial. The picture drawn by Livingstone, which has been generally be­
lieved and applied to all lands where the Vatua were found, of *a scene 
of great desr.o/,ation* with ’nothing to be seen but human skeletons or
i
33putrid bodies of the slain* , is misleading and mischievously unhistorical.
33* Letter from D.Livingstone to Tweeder, 2.11.1861. MS.7792 National Archives 
of Scotland. (Communicated to me by J.M. Chdrjenje).
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6 H A P T E R VI.
PART 3 - TIPS END OF TEE VATUA INCURSIONS 
AND REASSERTION3 OF PORTUGUESE AUTHORITY 
IN THE HINTERLAND OF MANYIKA
The rise of Manuel Antonio de Souza as capitao-mor of the 
feiras of Masekesa and Quiteve was an inevitable development of a trend ' 
which had started between 1836 and 185^ ? whereby public affairs were de­
cided by eminent citizens among the moradores of the villa of Sena. This 
was so, as has been shown in the previous discussion, because of the in­
fluence they had derived from their wealth and power. Attempts, as we have 
noted, .to alter the situation in 185^  remained, by and large, paper intentions. 
The new capitao-mor, Izidoro Pereira, did not even know the feira of Masekesa,’ 
even though it was his direct responsibility. Portuguese authority at the 
feira dwindled to almost vanishing point during the period 1836-1863* Manuel 
Antonio de Souza was appointed to restore Portuguese influence and trade at 
the feira of Masekesa and the interior in general. But, before he could 
settle down to tackle the problems of the feira, he had to contend with  ^
the Vatuas.
The fceisk of putting an end to the Vatua incursions and the duty of 
reasserting Portuguese authority at the feira of Masekesa was left to this 
Goan, Manuel Antonio de Souza, who succeeded in opposing fearlessly the
'I
'warriors1 from the South • This, among his other military exploits, con­
tributed to his prestige and reputation'as a man of 'indubitable courage', 
extraordinary ambition and, above all, as a distinguished politician-dip- 
lomat, who studied fruitfully the erstwhile African political scene. An
1. CoMtinho Azevedo J. Relatorio do Barwe, Lisboa (1902) p.6.
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analysis of the circumstances leading to his rise as capitao-mor of
the feiras of Masekesa and Quiteve is essential if we are to appreciate
I p I
the truths and half-truths which have been said about him . The decadence
of the institution of capitao-mor and consequently of the feira, and his
knowledge of the interior, coincidentally contributed to his rise as
* V “
capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa.
It is difficult to assess how much he knew of African politics,
but there can be no doubt that he had a fairly reasonable contact with the
African traders of Manyika before he was appointed capitao-mor of the feira
of Masekesa. He arrived, in M^cambique in 1833 to inherit a legacy, which
his uncle,Felix Mascarenhas, had left in Mozambique, and his property in 
3Manyika • He first settled at Sena, but later, after marrying his uncle?s 
daughter, Maria Anastasia Mascarenhas, went to settle near the banks of the 
Pungwe River (Aruangua), where he constructed an aringa and devoted himself 
to commerce and elephant hunting. His activities in hunting and in the ivory
2. He was born on 10.11.1833 at Mapuca in Bardez. He went to a seminary
of Rachol in Salute, where he lived up to the age of 16 years. His
tendencies were otherwise. From youth he exhibited his inclination 
for arms and hunting. These tendencies revealed themselves in his 
active and adventurous spirit. He felt the blood of his ancestors 
boiling in him. The tranquility of his birthplace did not suit his 
temperament and he took advantage of a legacy left by his uncle in 
Mocambique and Manyika to look for adventures and opportunities for
a vast field of action. See Tenente Barinhas. Manuel Antonio de Souza 
Capitao-mor de Manica e Quiteve. (1833-1892) Regiao Kilitar de Mozambique 
e Scola de Applicazao Military Noticia Historia, 1982.
Homenagem a M.de Souza pelo 1 Centencirio do seu Nascimento in Manuel 
Antonio de Souza, Heroi de Hassangano. Lourenco Marques. 1938. p.l7»
3. Felix Mascarenhas was an important businessman**inManyika. His signature 
% appears frequently in the petitions of the 1790’s. See Chapter III.
4. For definition, Kev/itt M.D.D. and Garlake P.3.»'The Aringa' at Hassangano1 
in J.A.H. VIII, 1, 1987, p.133* footnote 1.
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trade took him to Manyika, Quiteve and Barwe where he is known to have 
hired women and, probably, children to collect alluvial gold on the banks
I 6 I
of the Ruenya River , and controlled strategic routes to the regions of
I
Inhangone, Mussongue and Parigara, which produced wax. It seems that he 
got involved in the local politics of these Kingdoms and probably extorted 
obedience from some of the parties.
In 18^3 the Governor of Quelimane asked for help from Manuel Antonio
7de Souza in order to pacify his area • Souza immediately sent auxiliaries.
\
This was the beginning of his era of cooperation, which he gave to the 
authorities of Mozambique until his death. His ability to give military 
succour to the Governor soon after his arrival suggests that Souza, inter- 
alia, inherited a large number of armed 'slaves1 from his uncle.
The Vatuas used to cross the Pungwe on their way to the hinterland
g
of Sena and Manuel Antonio de Souza, with his aringa on the bank of the 
9
Pungwe , was strategically placed to observe and to gain a clear knowledge
10
of their activities • In this way he knew, as no Portuguese did, the in-
IItrigues of the interior, the customs and psychology of the people and he
3. Documentos Eeferentes a Soberania Portuguesa na Manica e Quiteve in
Archivo das Col8nias, Vol.II, 1918. Coimbra, Imprensa Nacional. pp. 
99-102.
.6. Manuel Antonio de Souza, Heroi de Hassangano, op.cit. p.17*
7* Barinhas Manuel Antonio de Souza, op.cit, (the pages of this booklet are
not numbered).
8. Liesegan& G.J. Beitr&ge Zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Kguni im 
SUdlichen Mocambique. op.cit.1820-1695> 19&7 pp.68,198. (footnote 199)
9. Barinhas Manuel Antonio de Souza, op.cit.
10. Manuel Antonio de Souza, Heroi de Hassangano. op.cit. p.17*
11. .Ibid.
utilised intelligently the prestige which he had acquired to befriend 
12
Afican Chiefs • His later dealings in Barwe politics, involved his 
marriage with the King’s daughter and also his role in a conspiracy which 
overthrew Makombe.
The second factor which contributed to his rise to the post
of capitao-mor is connected with institutional changes in the post of
capitao-mor* It has been stated elsewhere, that, during the second half
of the 19th Century, the capitao-mor of the feira of Masekesa and Quiteve
13never went to Manyika'in-person . Instead he sent his agents to trade on 
his behalf. His example was immediately followed by the moradores of Sena,
i 1
who began to send large quantities of fazendas to the interior* Their
vash badzi were escorted by armed slaves under their command or' that
sargentos-mor maintained a certain authority, largely because of the prestige 
which derived from the amount of force they could muster* As a rule a 
capitao-mor limited himself to arming the sipaes, whom he called together 
in times of danger16.
were the only authorities charged with the important responsibility of keeping
12. Ibid.
13* Documentos Referentes.... in AraWLvo das Colinias, Vol.II. op.cit.
pp.99-102. v
Ik, Ibid.
13» Manuel Antonio de Souza, Heroi de Hassangano• op.cit. p.l6.
16. Ibid.
I Ik
of an employee • This seems to have been the standard practice in the
I »jr ^
Portuguese villas of Quelimane, Tete and Zumbo • The capitaes-mor and
There was another development which changed the character of the 
institution of capitao-mor. For centuries, the capitaes-mor and sargentos-mor
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the Portuguese flag flying in the interior and along the East Coast of 
• VAfrica » Their appointment was not governed by a rigidly defined formula.
I ! 18Very often these were officials of what was knov/n as segunda linha , who 
grappled under great difficulties - I
...with little success, frequently without energy, 
hampered usually by illness, lack of means to re­
store order, difficult communications, lack of 
soldiers worthy of the name, lack of incentive, 
lack of necessary preparations or protection and 
almost always ignorant of the language and dia-
lectsQof the local people with whom they had to \
deal • \
The functions of capitaes-mor were, at the beginning of the institution, 
exercised by suitable persons from an accepted social class and with the
necessary qualifications, such as military qualities and a knowledge of the
' 20 21 
interior, or being a 1white businessmant They performed various functions •
Their power and prestige enabled them to give orders to Africans who lived
within their areas of jurisdiction, to the sipaes, regular and extra-ordinary,
and to mobilise the manpower of the region in which they lived. They exercised
*despotic powers and real authority*, during the 19th Century. With such
forces at their disposal, they vrere able to utilize them for good or for 
22bad * This was possible, especially when they worked under minimum super­
intendence. Their authority, when civil, was limited exclusively to business 
•with the indigenous population and could be advantageously used only when the
17. Ccuntinho Joao Azevedo de,Manuel Antonio de Souza. Urn Capitao-mor da 
Zambezia. Pelo Imperio No.20. Lisboa (1936) p.3*
18. The post or title of Segunda Linha (second line) was generally 
honorific. It was given to ex-soldiers or people who had performed 
meritorious service, other than military service, to the State.
19. Countinho J0S0 Azevedo de, Manuel Antonio de Souza, op.cit. p.3*
20. Ibid. p.6.
21. See Cha.pter II, infra.
22.- Countinho (1936) p.60
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persons invested with such power had ’conscience and prestige’• Some 
capi£aes-mor used it to advantage, others to disadvantage, especially after 
the beginning of the 19th century. Gradually this old generation was re­
placed by a new one, very often of ttestlcos, who did not maintain the
traditions of their families, neither did they care much about the de-
23
corum appropriate to their status •
Joao Azevedo Countinho's view about the degeneration of this 
institution of capitao-mor is that 'permanent contact with the inhacuanas’ 
and colonos turned (cafrealizam-se) these^nestlcoQ into Africans and conse­
quently this led to a loss of all notion of dignity, to a practice of the
2k
'hideous secret rituals of mysterious indigenous societies’ , Countinho
writes as if a notion of dignity were a prerogative of the Portuguese and
to be African, a total negation of dignity and honour. He forgets that it
25
was the Africans who manned Portuguese garrisons and that it was the Africans
26who fought most of the Portuguese wars in this region • Countinho's thesis
cannot be accepted, because a study of the history of the prazo system shows
that it was these mesticos who, in spite of their Ritual ceremonies and
superstitious 'abuses4, retrieved Portuguese fortunes in Rios de Sena and
27
north of the Zambezi • In fact, Portuguese failure in Rios de Sena was
25. Ibid, Letter No.339 from Pinto Basto to the Governor of the Territory of 
Manica, 8.12,1889, Copia Reservada de Documentos officials Trocados entre 
companhia de Mozambique e o Governo.*.1900 Lisbon. 1901. pp.130-1.
2k• Countinho (1930) p.6.
25* Sena was a typical example. There were kO soldiers in 1361-2, all of whom 
were probably Africans. See the Zambezi Journal of James Steward (ed.J.P. 
R.Y/allis) op.cit. p. 151.
26. For the role played by Africans in these wars, see Joao Azevedo de Countinho.
Relatorio do Barwe. Lisbon,1902. Botelho J.J.T. Hist6ria Militar da Desc- 
oberta a 1333. 195^. Botelho J.J.T. Histdria Militar da Descoberta aos
Nossos Dias. Castilho A. Relatorio da Guerra da Zambezia em 1888.
Lisbon,1891. -E$a D. Hislforia das Guerras no Zambeze. (1933) Vol.I and II.
27. See discussion by Allen Isaac. 'The Prazos da Coroa 1752-1830. A Functional 
Analysis of the Political System' Studia No.26. 19&9. P«l68.
The Bongas, Pereiras, Matequenha (Mariano Vaz dos Anjos) and Manuel Antonio 
de Souza, the most successful 19th Century prazo holders, 'underwent an 
extensive culture change.'
Newitt M.D.D, The Zambezi Prazos in the l8th Centurv. (Ph.D Thesis,
London 1987)
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precisely due to their inability to relax this over-bearing sense of imagined
28
superiority and personal dignity • The secret of success, which they never 
grasped, lay in acceptance of these African rites, ceremonies and super­
stitions. , Some kind of Luso-tropicology, and not racial fanaticism, was
29
all that the situation demanded
Another factor, which, according to Countinho, undermined the
institution of capitao-mor and, therefore, contributed to the rise of Souza,
vas that the capitaes-mor, during the 19th Century, thought of themselves as
miniature Kings and behaved despotically towards people under them. In some
30
families the office and functions of the capitao-mor became hereditary • 
Quite often they were interested in amassing v/ealth and abused the resources 
and prestige attached to their post, employed Africans without paying them to 
hunt elephants and to trade in gold dust, pastas maticais, penas in distant 
places and to build caravans. Others were employed as porters •
The fact that the capitaes-mor served in the remote interior or 
far away from supervisory authority meant that the latter was powerless to 
take any effective, corrective measure. These were the circumstances which 
led to an appointment of Manuel Antonio de Sousa. He possessed in abundant 
measure two of the three qualities of capitao-mor - military and knowledge of 
the interior. He certainly was not a 'negociante branco1, neither was he
28. For a penetrating analysis of Portuguese attitude toward the indigenous 
population in Mozambique in general see Boxer C.R. Race Relations in 
the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1^15-1315. Clarendon Press, Oxford,
19b5, pp.41-45.
29• For a concept of Luso-tropicology see: Freyre, G. Portuguese Integration in 
the Tropics. Lisbon,1961.
30. Countinho pp.6-7
31. Ibid. * <
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a 1filho da terra1, A capitao-mor normally was a rich resident of Sena.
The legacy which Manuel ^ntonio de Souza inherited from his uncle rendered 
him an eminently suitable candidate for the post.
' 32After the death of Izidoro Correa Pereira in 1863 , Souza was 
nominated capitao-mor of the feiras of Masekesa and Quiteve by the Governor- 
General of Mozambique, Joze^ Tavares de Almeida. He was instructed to take 
positive steps to rectify the abuses which had crept into theinstitution of
capitab-mor, to restore commerce in the interior, particularly that of gold
33 -v-
and ivory trade in order to rectify a situation in which the capitao-mor,
(Pereira was a notable example) functioned very much like an absentee land- 
33lord . Souza was instructed to reside for a part of every year m  Manyika
and Quiteve, to build a house there, to build a fortress and to see to it
35that it was properly garrisoned *
The size of the garrison was increased from the official figure of 
12 to 20 or 30 soldiers with one officer. This was to be complemented by the 
usual paraphernalia of sovereignty - the flag. The relationship between the 
capitiTo-mor and Mutasa was clearly defined as of old, that is, whatever went 
on between the King and the capitao-mor had to be ultimately sanctioned by 
the authorities at Sena.
The Portuguese repeated one of their pious utterances concerning 
the prosperity of their commerce and their dependence on the goodwill of 
Mutasa. Hence, Manuel Antonio de Souza was instructed to promote peace in
32. Codice 14-61* Moc.A.H.U*
33* *Documentos Referentes...* in Arquivo das Colonias. Vol.II. Coimbra 1918
pp.99-102.
34-. See Section 1 of this Chapter.
35. *Documentos Referentes...1 Vol.II in Arquiveo das Colonias. op.cit* 
pp. 99-rl02 •
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the interior with the Kings and princes. He could retarliate an attack
only in cases of extreme necessity. Even so, he had to exhaus<t' all
36conciliatory means before resorting to arms •
The presence of the Amatshangana in the neighbourhood of Sofala
dictated a closer coordination of the defence of the villas. To this
effect Souza was intructed to keep in close contact with the governor of
Sofala, to see that harmony existed between them, to give him all the moral
and material support he needed. This was to be done with any other villa
37or Portuguese establish cent • Special care was also taken to cultivate 
friendship with Mzila. Both parties had recently signed a treaty whereby
..the said chief will impose on all his subordinates 
the utmost respect and esteem towards all muzungos 
j (Portuguese) in transit throughout his dominions;
I and whenever there may be a breach of this rigorous
duty, he, Kzila, shall immediately order the culprit 
to be severely punished. As an example, the privileges 
of this clause (2) are extended to all the negroes from 
the dominions of the Crown, who may visit Mzila*s terr­
itories in public or in private service, whether by order 
of the government or of any inhabitant of that country.
The respect and esteem 'imposed* by Article 2 applied in specific
terms to Inhambane, Sofala, Bazaruto, Manyika, Sena, Tete and to the Portuguese
39'brethren' at Lourengo Marques .
Manuel Antonio de Souza was, accordingly, instructed not to 
antagonise the forces of Mzila. Every effort was to be made to make him
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. P.R.O, Confidential Print. Inclosure in No.99* Gaza-Sofala and Manica 
Treaty with Mzila. Dec.2nd.l36l. 'Territorio de Gaza, Sofala e Manica' 
Documento llo.^ f in Terrnos de Vassallagem nos Territorios de Machoua, 
Zambezia e Nyassa, 1636 a l839« Lisboa.Imprensa Nacional. I09O.
• p.12. 'Condicoes de Vassallagem do regulo Kuzilla 'territorio de Gaza**.
Doc.No.92. in Hemoria e Qocumentos Ac^rca dos Direitos de Portugal aos 
Territorios de Machona e Nyassa, 1890^  Lisboa. Imprensa Nacional p.2^7• 
Botelho J.J.T. Historia e Militar  aos Dias. Lisbon,1936• P*80
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understand that the Governor, the moradores of Lourenjo Marques, Inhambane, 
Sofala, Sena, Tete and Quelimane were all subjects of His Majesty, the King 
of Portugal, and that he could not be in peace with some and in war with 
others, because,
..all are brothel and sons of the same King and for
that reason it is necessary that he should maintain
peace with all And that he should make peace with - ■
all dependent subject regulos, unless Mzila wishes
that everybody should make war on him, which will
undoubtedly take place if he doefjnnot respect all
the Huzungos from whatever land •
Apparently, Isidoro Correia Pereira, the previous capitao-mor of 
the feira of Masekesa, did not succeed-in officially re-establishing the 
feira. The treaty I have cited refers to Portuguese residents in various 
settlements as being brothers. The fact that none is mentioned incconnection
. j
with Manyika probably implies that there was, at this time, no Portuguese 
resident at the feira of Masekesa.
\-
However, when the newly-appointed capitao-mor of the feira of 
Masekesa and Quiteve was in Quelimane for his investiture ceremony, the 
Landins, estimated at 3i000, attacked his aringa on the bank of the Pungwe
r
and looted his property to the tune of 36,000 reis • Some of his servants 
fled and others died in these attacks. He returned from Quelimane with 
merchandise valued at 13,000 reis to start trade again and to recapture
kz
his authority and popularity among the Portuguese' • He defeated them and 
occupied the principal points, and also reconstructed the old aringa. He
39* P.H.O. Confidential Print. Inclosure in No.99« op.cit.
*f0. ’Documentos keferentes.•..1 in Arquivo Das Colonias Vol.II. Coimbra 
1918, pp.102-99 
4-1. Barinhas Manuel Antonio de Souza, op.cit. 
kZ. Ibid.
j
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could not hold his own very long because the Governor of Quelimane delayed 
in sending him the fire-arms he had promised. He retreated first to Chemba,
lf3
and finally established himself at Gorongoza where he organised his sipaes.
In these moves, Manuel Antonio de Souza showed good military sense by occupying
Gorongoza - a natural barrier against the Amatshangana incursions into Qame^
Massangano and Tete. He combated the 1Vatuas* and the Landins on a number of
occasions. It is on account of this that he acquired great prestige among
the Portuguese community, because it was then free from the attacks of its
kk
so called implacable enemy • ,His fame as a warrior spread out into the 
interior as a great chief. It is not the purpose of this discussion to give 
an account and assessment of Souza»s life, but this much can be said, that his 
defeat of the Amatshangana should not necessarily mark him out as a military 
genius. They were a tired nation, which started and sustained this march 
into the neighbouring territories long before Souza was born.
4-3* Prazo Gorongoza was named after Mt.Gorongoza, whose altitude is more than 
6,000 ft. (Andrada P. Commissao 1882, unpublished MS) and situated about 
100 miles South west of Sena. (Robin Series No.^ f. The Zambezi Papers of 
Richard Thornton ed.E.C.Tabler,1963 Vol.II.p.2!73)• It was bounded in 
the South east by the lands of Barwe through which one had to pass on 
the right side in order to get to Manica from Sena. The River Vunduzi, 
an affluent of the Aruangwa, separates Gorongoza from Barwe and ' - •
from Manyika. It was in this angle, formed by the Pungwe and the Vunduzi 
Rivers, that many problems of passage arose. The Prazo of Gorongoza was 
often attacked by the King of Barwe.
For the strategic importance of Mt.Gorongoza in the subsequent history of 
this region see: Countinho Joao de Azevedo. Memories de urn Velho Soldado 
Marinheiro e Soldado de Africa. Lisbon,19^1. pp.331-33^.
Manuel Antonio de Souza repelled these attacks and installed four cannons 
and 30 men to guard the place which was in any case naturally impregnable.
See: 'Expedicao a Manica* Villa Gouveia, 9*2.1883 in Das Colonias Portuguesas, 
Lisboa, ano 33* No.51» pp.48-^9*
¥f. Manuel Antonio de Souza, Heroi de Massangano. op.cit. p.17.
Souza did not transfer the old feira from Masekesa to Gorongoza 
as his predecessor, Pereira, wanted to do • It would seem that he re­
established it in the same place, but, like his predecessor, he does not
seem to have frequented the feira. The remants of the building which- Paiva
*f6
de Andrade saw when he visited the place in 1882 suggest that a number of 
moradores went to settle at the feira of Masekesa. It was more or less 30 
metres long, with four small bulwarks at the sides. Some of the houses were 
still intact. They were made of stone and mud. The stones, which were 
generally big and well placed, remained in their places and the mud had 
been washed away by the rains. It seems, therefore, that Souza re-established 
the feira with a few modifications.
Souza's rise to power as capi£ao-mor of the feiras of Masekesa 
and Quiteve was significant in that it restored the old contact, which had 
been lost, between the Manyika Kings and the capitao-mor. Manyika-Portuguese 
relations henceforth centred round the personality and activities of Manuel 
Antonio de Souza.
Soon after his return from Quelimane, he sent Mutasa . presents of
cloths, beads, copper or brass wire in exchange for gold and ivory. These
presents were immediately followed by some guns of various descriptions.
Mutasa reciprocated these gestures of friendship by sending his sons with
Zf7
gold and ivory to Souza , It is not clear from Machiwenyika's account
45* See Section 1 of this Chapter infra. w
^6. Andrade P. Communicacao e Proposta do Socio e Parecer da commissao 
Africana da S.G.L. 1882 (an unpublished MS of l^ fpp). 
k7, Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People*, op.cit.
2kO, ,
whether this exchange of gifts was a business transaction or courtesy gifts 
of the old type, which I have mentioned in several places. The fact that 
Mutasa1s son was at the head-of this delegation lends a diplomatic character 
to the mission and these articles were most likely in the nature of gifts.
Manuel Antonio de Souza's rise to power as capitao-mor' of the 
feira of Masekesa and Quiteve also marked the beginning of effective checks 
to Amatshangana incursions into the hinterland of Sena and probably Manyika.
I have argued in the foregoing sections of this discussion firstly, 
that Vatua attacks and the explusion of the Portuguese from the feiras of 
Manyika in 1835 did not destroy completely the commercial contacts between 
Sena and Manyika; that there was no period of Vatua domination of the King­
dom of Manyika in the sense of a defined relationship between vassal and sov- 
• I . *
ereign. The political impact of the Vatua presence in Manyika was not very
'  0.
great. The 'deposition* of a Manyika King, which was alluded to in 185 ,^ 
must be looked at in terms of possible shifting short-term alliances bet­
ween the various Vatua residents and partisan Manyika groups, very much 
diicj
like the PortugueseAin the l8th Century and later in the 19th Century. There 
is no evidence that Manukuse, or any of his sons, ever approved or rejected 
an investiture of a Manyika King, as he did in Quiteve. It is possible that 
the Vatuas, who lived in Manyika, might have attended audiences and ceremonies 
on invitation but they remained essentially aloof. Neither do we get from 
tradition, nor a reading of the literature of the period, an impression•that 
the King and the Vatuas in general interested themselves in succession 
politics of the Kingdom. It is possible that some individual Vatuas might 
have intrigued with a rebel prince of Mutasa or any of his councillors, but in­
trigue does not seern to have been used as a consciously-calculated policy for
zk±.
gaining political ends.
Lastly, I have argued that the influence of the moradores of Sena
I i
increased as the Vatuas stepped up their offensive against the Villa of
-I----
!
Sena and its hinterland. The authorities needed money, ammunitions, man-r 
power and ideas. They were nearly all agreed on one thing; a re-establishment 
of the feira of Masekesa, but did not have the material resources to execute 
this scheme. The result was that they turned to the moradores of. §ena for
help, and the latter capitalised on Sena’s impotence . -^0 r^se to the
\
occasion. The logic of such a situation was the rise of one of the 
moradores to a position of prominence. It was a timely availability in 1863 
of both such a man and the conditions,’ described earlier in this account, 
which made a real difference to the course of Manyika history in particular 
and the entire region of Rios de Sena in general. • Manuel Antonio de Souga’s 
rise to an eminent position in 1363 had important results for Manyika and the0
V
Portuguese community. To start with his multiple alliances with Africans 
became an effective means of disseminating and consolidating Portuguese 
influence in the interior. His treaty with Muzila in 1363 is a typical 
examples Succinctly put, the Portuguese authorities depended on Souza to 
maintain their authority at the feira of Masekesa. He revived the role of 
the capitao-mor, studied Manyika customs, advised the Portuguese authorities, 
for example Paiva de Andrade in the lo80's, and extended Portuguese influence 
into the neighbouring Kingdoms, for example Maungwe, Mtoko and Mangwende. But 
where this could not be done amicably and peacefully, he used force on Mutasa 
in I89O, which led to his short imprisonment, war and ultimately partition of 
the Kingdom of Manyika between the English and the Portuguese.
2^ 2.
C H A P T E R  VII.
EPILOGUE
Certain issues have emerged from the previous discussions.
First, it has been argued that Portuguese commercial unreadiness, rather 
than civil wars among the Kingdoms of Makaranga, Manyika, Madanda and 
Quiteve, was responsible for the small volume of trade during the first 
half of the l6th Century; and that the period 1575~^^^haracterised by 
Portuguese^gression, not only in the Kingdom of Manyika, but also in. the 
neighbouring Kingdoms in the West and East. It was during this period that 
the institution of the Feira developed fully. The feiras were used by*the 
Portuguese as jumping-off points for further incursions into the interior. 
However, the feiras performed other functions both then and in the sub­
sequent centuries.. They acted as clearing centres for trade commodities, 
both Manyika and Portuguese. The feiras not only contributed to the im- 
provement of economic and juridicial relations among the Portuguese and 
Africans in Rios de Sena, but also constituted an important addition to the 
social and cultural aspects of life. In an era when almost every community
r
in the empire of Monomotapa lived attached to the land, the normal gregarious 
instinct, inherent in men, ought to have found in these meeting points a 
unique opportunity to expand itself. It was in these feiras that news of 
what happened elsewhere was diffused among traders from Butua, Makaranga,' 
Barwe and Quiteve. It was again at these feiras that merchants from outside 
these Kingdoms recounted the marvellous and terrifying stories of their 
adventures. A mushambadzi (middleman) became a vehicle of legends and 
ideas which he collected in his perambulations and disseminated in the
regions which ho frequented. The feiras, by bringing together people who, 
though they lived near one another in geographical terms, were politically 
and culturally alienated, fostered a spirit of solidarity, recognised common 
interests and, to some extend, promoted a sentiment which transcended tribal 
and local loyalties.
The pattern of the feiras varied considerably, very often due to 
the absence or presence of the vashambadzi and merchants, but occasionally 
the variation was due to wars and/or bad relations subsisting between a 
territorial prince and a Portuguese capitao-mor and his fellow residents.
The smooth functioning and the pattern of the feiras depended on. the nature ' 
of the relations between the King of Manyika, his princes and traders on the 
one hand, and the Portuguese community on the other, throughout the period
j
of Portuguese-Kanyika contact. In the l8th Century, the feiras began to 
lose their importance as vantage-points of 'conquest.' Nearly all the other 
feiras disappeared except those of Masekesa and gumbo, whose administration 
was reformed during the second half of the century. This time, however, the 
Portuguese were unable to dominate the African Kings, and were even unable to 
repeat successfully their King-making exploits of the previous Century. In 
fact, they were themselves hardpressed to survive and to make the feiras pay. 
The question then is: why did this change in Portuguese commercial activities 
' take place at a time when the North of the Zambezi was being subjected to the • 
same sort of 'conquest' and 'anarchy' that the South bank had experienced 
in the l?th Century? The answer to this may not be the power of Changamire 
as is normally maintained, but, first, the lucrative nature of the ivory 
trade North of the Zambezi; secondly, the discovery of, and scramble for, 
the bares by the Portuguese; thirdly, the power of Barwe. The reports of
2H .
Francisco de Kelo e Castro, Governor of Rios de Sena from 17V? to 1750, and
j
the results of recent research into Maravi history show conclusively that
I !
the ivory trade north of the Zambezi had become very important during the 
18th Centuryo In order to draw conclusions, on the third aspect !of the 
problem, the power of Barwe, one must ask; what happened to Barwe during 
the 17th Centyry ? As yet very little is known of Barwe-Portuguese relations 
during the 17th Century, but the scanty evidence available suggests two things;
first, that the Kingdom of Barwe came under Portuguese control and influence,
\
\
probably after its 'conquest1 in l659» In the l8th and 19th Centuries, Barwe 
regained independence, although retaining close ties with the Portuguese. The 
relations between the Portuguese and Manyika were, to sonre extent, dependent 
on what was happening in Barwe* In theyear 1769, the Portuguese conquered 
part of Barwe for a short time, but were forced to give it up. In the 19th
0
Century, the Portuguese fomented discord between two rival claimants to the 
Macombeship. The change in the fortunes of the feiras may be partly explained 
by Portuguese dependence on the Kings of Barwe to allow passage through their 
lands to the feiras of Masekesa, Makaranga etc. I have also argued that this 
shift in Portuguese trading activities in Manyika and her neighbouring kingdoms 
was relative. A considerable amount of gold was obtained from the bares of 
Manyika during the l8th Century. De Pereira's 'Noticias' and Galvao's 
•'Diario das Viagens...' are eloquent testimonies. Portuguese lamentations 
about a 'decline' in trade due to the hostitlity of the Chikangas'ahd.Makombes 
occur occasionally in the first half of the l8th Century and become increasingly 
commonplace during and after the second half of the l8th Century. The admin­
istrators did this for the tactical reason of dramatising their difficulties, 
real and imaginary, in order to elicit appreciation and admiration for their 
work.
2^5.
I have also maintained that the political and economic control 
which the Chikangas exercised was limited to certain mines; the Portuguese 
minas de graos e palhetas, These mines produced the best type of gold.
In this connection it. has also been noted that the Portuguese were not' 
allowed to own or operate bares in Manyika, as they did North of the 
Zambezi,
The impact of Portuguese trade on Manyika economy remained one of 
subsistence, though market-orientated, with each household responsible for 
the supply of the group's needs. Three Manyika units of currency, the 
dokodo (dogado), gono and hoe, were constantly used, but equated to the 
Arab-Portuguese mitical, pasta and cruzado. Internal trade was not a -
specialised occupation, although there was a tendency on the part of traders 
to neglect agriculture in favour of trade. It has also been argued that the 
role of the mushamb&dzi became increasingly important during and after the 
civil wars of the last quarter of the l8th and the first quarter of the 19th 
Centuries, .
I have also tried to show that the basic conflict between the 
Portuguese and the Manyika throughout this period, 1575-1863, was founded 
on Portuguese ignorance and consequent violation of Manyika social customs 
and political traditions. It was, for.example, this lack of understanding 
which led them to solicit in vain for Changamire's intervention in Manyika 
affairs. Neither did the Portuguese realise the true policy of Changamire, 
for the latter did not want to. antagonise the Chikangas. The efforts of the 
successive Chikangas to determine and restrict the sphere of Portuguese 
commercial activities in Manyika often led to conflict. The Chikangas
t
suffered from two obvious limitations in their attempts to achieve complete
246.
control over the gold-mining industry. They valued Portuguese trade as an 
important source of royal income, without which it would have been difficult 
to pay the men who fought for them in times of war. This meant, therefore, 
that there was a limit beyond which they would not impose punishments, sanctions 
and restraints upon the Portuguese community, if only to keep trade alive. 
Secondly, in spite of their vigilance, gold found its way to the Portuguese 
traders through individual Manyika vashambadzi, traders, etc., who were 
scattered about in the Kingdom and about whose operations little or nothing 
was known by the Chikangas.
I have further maintained that the Ngoni attacks during the first 
half of the 19th Century were neither 'directed against the Manyika nor the 
Portuguese per se. Initially the Ngoni wanted the cattle which were being 
sold at the feira of Masekesa, but once the attacks had started, it was 
not easy for them to confine their actions solely to cattle raiding. The 
Ngoni responsibility for the destruction.of the feira of Masekesa has been exag­
gerated by historians. The collapse of the feiras of Masekesa and Aruangua 
can only be properly explained in terms of Portuguese relations with the 
Kingdoms of Barwe and Quiteve. It was the Barwists and Quitevans who dealt 
crushing blows to Portuguese trade at the feiras of Masekesa and Aruangua 
in the late l820's.
It has also been shov/n that the relations between the Manyika and
the Portuguese persisted after the explusion of the latter. This period,
\
1835-1863, of administrative breakdown of the feira of Masekesa, which re­
sulted in non-official contacts between the tv/o communities, witnessed a 
greater participation by the moradores in the affairs of. Pios de Sena-. It 
v/as this trend which culminated in the rise of a 'strong man', Manuel Antonio 
de Souza, in 1863. His emergence, however, did not constitute a complete
' r
2 4?.
break with the past. He did not' introduce social and institutional innovations. 
He utilised the old structure of capitao-mor, mushambadzi and feira. There 
were, at this time, only two feiras South of the Zambezi, those of 
Masekesa and Quiteve. The latter existed only in name. The feira of Masekesa 
Was, therefore, the only important Portuguese foothold worth speaking about 
in the interior. There are a number of reasons why it escaped the fate of 
extinction suffered by the other feiras. The destruction of the feiras of 
Makaranga in the previous century by Changamire Dombo; his successors' 
controversial policy of 'exclusion'; the proximity of the.feira of Masekesa 
to the outlet to the In.^dian Ocean; and, most important of all, the successive 
Chikangas' policies of encouraging trade between their subjects and the 
Portuguese gave the feira of Masekesa a unique and lasting vigour.
The Portuguese used it again with very limited, success in the late 19th Century 
as they had done in the 17th Century, as a jumping off point to conquer the 
interior and the neighbouring Kingdoms West and East of Manyika.
2*f8.
A P P E N D I X .
The following tables are intended to give an example of the 
military strength, population etc. of the Portuguese community in Rios 
de Sena in general but in particular at the feira of Masekesa in the 
kingdom of Manyika. I would have liked to give an example of this type 
Jbr each of the periods I dealt with in the Chapters but such tables are 
not available. As the Tables show, the problem of military weakness and 
lack of permanent Portuguese residents at the feiras was not peculiar to 
the feira of Masekesa. It also applied to the entire Portuguese administ­
ration in the Rivers of Sena.
Table 1 (R£y^) Table showing the settlers in Rios de Sena*
See Manyika especially.
Table 2 (P25"o) Portrays the military situation in terms of 
personnel, arms and ammunition.
Table 3 (P257) Clearly brings out the problem of lack of
personnel to run the trading posts efficiently. 
Attention is drawn to the feira of Masekesa in 
June, 1782.
Table k (P252) General picture of the Portuguese military
preparedness at the feira of Aruangwa in the 
Kingdom of Manyika, (1824) in theory.
Table 5 (P25i) Shows the actual state. Note that there
were only two registered soldiers who lived 
in their own houses and not in barracks.
Table 6 (P2iP/-) Garrison of the feira of Masekesa in 1803.
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Ardian
Arratel (p-eis)
Arroba
Bar
Betangil, bretangil
Binga
Cafila
Calaim
Capitao-mor
Capotin
Chuambo
Colono
Corja
Cruzado
Danga
degradado
Dogado
Dotin
Estado da India
Faracola 
Fazenda 
Fazenda de lei 
Feira 
Feirante 
Filhos da terra
G L O S S A R Y *
A blue cloth 
a pound i.e. 16 ozs.
A measure of 321bs.
Mining camp, a measure of weight of 16 arrobas 
i.e. about 518 lbs.
A cotton, cloth , usually blue,red or black,
\
Manyika Royal Court.
Caravan
Very fine Indian tin.
Administrative authority of a territory.
A blue cloth.
A fathom of cotton cloth
A farmer especially one settled on land belonging 
to someone else.
20 pieces,, e.g. of cloth; i.e. half of a bar.
Portuguese coin, originally of gold worth ^00 reis 
in 1517* and worth half a crown in 1710.
Cattle kraal
A transported criminal
From Cimanyika dokodo (gold) a traditional Manyika 
unit of weight.
An uncoloured cotton cloth
State of India, a name applied to the Portuguese 
possessions East of Cape of Good Hope; of which 
Mocambique formed a part until 1752.
Weight of about 18 Portuguese Pounds.
Merchandise
Monopoly goods
Market
Merchants resident at a feira 
Sons of the land.
Fumba
Inhacuaua
Inhamai
Luane
Machila
Machira
Madontos
Makoroftata
Mambo
Manamucate
Milando
Moradores
MukarangaI
Mussambaze/Mushambadzi 
Mussito
Mitical, matical, mithqal
Mutore
Muzimo
Mozungos
Muzvare
Mukaranga
Muzinda
Negociante Volante
Nehanda
Oitava
Parecer
Pasta
A large load of cloth worth 456 panos
Chieflet
Page
Country Estate
Palaquin, or travelling hammock
Indigenous coarse cotton cloth
Payment made to secure passage.
Councillors
High Ranking ruler
Ambassador
Law-suit, complaint
Settlers
Junior wife
Middle man or hawker
Stronghold of escaped slaves.
The word was sometimes applied to the leader 
of the 'rebels'
A weight of gold equivalent to about .155 oz. 
worth at the beginning of the 17th Century,
1-g- Xerafin •
It is equivalent to a third of fumba, i.e.
152 panos.
This word is derived from a Shona word mudzimu - 
departed spirit
Europeans, Portuguese
Princess
Title by which a second wife of Chikanga 
was known
Deputy
Wandering merchant especially an unlicenced one 
Son in law of a chief 
One eighth of an ounce 
A recommendation
About 16-g- ozs: a sheet of gold weighing
100 maticals
Pataca
Patricio
Pemberar
Poderoso
Prazo
Reis
Regimento
Regulo
Sachikunda
Saguate
I
Sameter
Segunda linha
Soldo
Tanga
Tocurin
Velorio
Xaile
Xerafim
Zuarte
Zimbabwe
This was a Brazillian silver coin worth 320 reis 
also Spanish silver coin worth 800-900 reis.
Anyone of mixed racial origin.
To dance about as a demonstration of joy or 
anger.
Powerful, influential 
Landed estate in Zambezia.
A small Portuguese coin of low value which was 
abolished in the l6th Century, but its multiples 
were retained to use as money of account.
A Royal or Vice regal set of instructions
Chief
Leader of slaves.
Courtesy gift.
A rough and ordinary white cloth used as a sign 
of mourning.
Honorific title bestowed on eminent citizens. 
Basic pay.
Gold measure of twelve grains, equivalent to 600 
reals.
A cloth like Botiam but inferior.
Large porcelain beads 
A red. cloth
An Indo-European coin, originally gold and later 
of silver, with a face value of 300 reis, but 
which varied greatly in weight and consequently 
in value.
A blue cotton cloth 
Head kraal of a King.
Addendum of a glossary of Portuguese/Shona words*
Aringa - a stockade made of wooden stakes, it surrounds a whole
settlement, often of a great many huts and families but 
sometimes only of one.
*
Bazaar - Markets.
Botonga (of gold) alluvial gold.
Binzo (sometimes spelt brinzo). - tribute to a king.
Cabaya - a sort of Chinese silk; a Turkish tunic,
soldier.
penalty imposed on one who loses a case..
(Sometimes spelt chitas) - printed calico.
a fathom (Portuguese braca) of cotton cloth, the valve of a 1 
fathom of cloth or 500 weak reals; 20 strings of beads; a 
fortified capital.
C o t t o n  v H \  m a d e  i n J- ^  t ^  •
emperor.
Erapofias - fines.
Feira de Manica Market of Manyika (this referred to the market of Masekesa).
Garrafa - bottle.
Gondos - thick but short cotton cloth made in Sofala.
Gono - small weight of gold (handful)• worth 500 reis.
Inhamasango - head of a Village. • ' • "  ’ c :
/Wag
Inhabinga - Manyika ancestral spirit which/responsible among other things 
for the welfare of the traders at the feira.
Lenoos - linen; handkerchiefs.
Loucas - table plates.
Macango - an envoy who represented Manyika ancestral spirits. Not
the same as Manyika spirit medium.
Macos - bundle's of letters.
Manga - a group of fighting men.
Missinga - beads.
Cabo
Chibinga 
Chittas - 
Chuambo -
Dimity
Mussambas grandes - great*middle-men.
Muzungos - European, Portuguese.
Nhabinga and Nemanhica were titles by which the first two wives of the
Chickangas were known during the 18th century. •
Negociante branco - white business man.
Nipa - Sap taken from wild palms and distilled into larger
quantities of a dring; it has the same effect as 
very strong brandy. *
Nzudzi - fairies.
Paninhos - pieces o^linen (as used in this context Chtkanga probably
referred.cambric linen.)
Penna - quill. . '
r .  f  • <* * • < ‘ J «> . « p • 1
Pracas . - the merchants of a town. , o ‘
Principe - prince, the eldest son of a prince.
Rei - king.
Riosde cuama - Rivers of the Zambezi.
Sabone(s) ;soap. .
Samuranda - follower.
Sertanejo - inlander.
Sipaes - native soldiers.
Talher - spoon, knife, fork cover (for each person at a table).
Testoon - equivalence of pence (6d) in 1553*
Trado - a large auger, wimble or piecer.
PRIMARY SOURCES
I ' ..........
Arguivo Historico Ultramarino Caixas - Boxes.
This is a series of 77 boxes which cover this period 1600 - 1 8 2 6 , 
generally there are documents for one or two years in one box*
Soon after the Caixas come the Macos (bundles) these contain documents 
dating from 1824 to 1834.
Codices - (ancient copies of books with manuscript notes)
" 11 \
Only a few of these codiCeswhich were transferred from Moqambique 
are; available in the A.H.U. **
Pastes j- (Portfolio of a Minister)
This is a series of correspondence of the governors - general and other 
officials of Mozambique from 1834 to l8 8 l.
I found this series very discouraging for my purpose*
(a) Caixas:
1 , 2 , 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7, 9, 1 1 , 14, 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 2 5 , 3 0 , 31,
32, 33, 36, 37, 42, 4 5 , 54, 55, 57, 5 8 , 6 0 , 64, 6 5 , 71, 73, 77-
(b) Macos:
2, 3, 11, 12, 14, 15, 23, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, D.0.4.
(0 ) Codices;
1 3 2 3 ; 1 3 1 0 5 1468; (Nos.2 8 , 3 2 , 7 1 , 7 6 ), 1317; 1307; 1321; 1473; 132V; 
1440; (Nos.7 , 220,222, 193* 13,) 1469; (Nos.82,83) 1477; (Nos. 14,24,) 
1451; (Nos.16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 103, 212, 218, 123, 308, 249, 191, 163, 
2 5 0 , 251, 226, 227, 23*0 1450; 1452; l4S0, 1313; 1413; (No.3l6) 1500; 
1465; (No.506) 1463; (Nos. 3 8 8 , 434, 453) 1460; (N0 .1 6 9 ) 1459; (No.2 6 5 ), 
1462; 1332; (No.50)*
(d) Pasta 6
Questao da posse da terra e minas de Quiteve 1842-43.
Pasta 7
Copia dos terraos dos processos occoridos com o potentado 
Manicusse, e com os de Quiteve (184-45)
Pasta 12(1852-53)
Letters of Joaquin Pinto de Magulhaes, Governor-General of 
Mozambique*
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2. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon. ,
Treslado da certidao doe ensayos que fizerao das minas de ouro do Reino
de Manica. (Written by Thome de Barros Pauelas de Palvora), Documentos Remeti
dos da India 55$ Fol.227-8, 3*2.1655* I
3. Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.
MS IX - 3, 3.8.1696, Jf6r - V7r.
(i) Pedro Caelho de Carvalho. Papel da Notica que deu fortaleza de 
Sofala
(ii) Proposta que fizerao os moradores dos Rios de Cuama ao Senhor v.
Rey, I6.6.I698.
(iii) Resumo breve de algumas noticias que da Custodio de Almeida e 
; Souza do Estado dos Rios de Sena e Sofala, 16.6.1698, 39r - ^2r.
(iv) Papel que deu Antonio Pereira para o Senhor Rey, 12.8.1698.
Lista dos homens de poder que ha moradores nos Rios. *f8r - 
^9r.
(v) Breve informapao dos Rios de Cuama que da o padre Frey Phelipe 
de Assuncao por andar nas ditas terras catorze anos, e estado 
e modas das feiras e ter larga noticia destas e costumes della.
(vi) MS. 52 - X - 25
Jose Francisco Alvares Barboza analyse estatistica, Topographica, 
e Politica da Captania de Rios de Senna, addressed to the Cortes 
Gerais e Extraordinarias e constituites da Nacao Portugueza.
Academia Das Ciencias, Lisbon.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
5* Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa.
Fundo Geral 826,
Codice, 29.
Estatistica da Captania de Rios de Senna do Anno I806. MS. Serie 
Azul 1788. Tete 1807, 57 fls.
Memorias sobre os Rios de Sena 1810, MS serie Azul 6*f8 No.16.
Esboco de alguns Artigos relativos a Capitania de Mocambique,
MS serie Azul 6^ 8 No.l7t fls.
Estatistica da Capitania dos Rios de Sena feita o anno de 1810 MS 
1788 Serie Azul No.20. fls.58.
Memoria acerca do Estado decadente do Capitania de Mocambique no 
comeco do seculo XIX, by Dionisio de Lemos Pinto. (Estado das 
relapoes comeciaes da Capitania de Mopambique alt o cha 21.8.de 
1829 dada pelo Juiz de fora D.I. de Lemos Pinto em sua.
British Museum.
British Museum additional Manuscripts.
20902
(i) Relacao das naos e armadas da India com os successos dellas
que as se puderam saber para noticia e Instruccao dos curiozos, 
e amantes da Historia da India. This is arranged as -
(a) according to the commanders of the expeditions from.
Vasco da Gama 1^97 to Luis de Mendonca, Furtado in 
1653;
(b) List of Viceroys from 1505 to l6^ f0. This manuscript 
is part of a series of kQ manuscripts, BM. Add.Mss 
20861 - 20900 containing copies of laws, royal decrees 
letters, patents etc. relating to the Portuguese 
settlements in the Estado da India (1518-171^) entitled 
*Collecam authetica de todas as Leys, Regimentos, Alvaras 
e mais ordens que se expediram para a India desde estabeleci 
mento destas conquistas, ordenada por provizam de 28 de Marco 
de 175^.*
20906
(ii) Livro das cartas que escreveo o conde de Ericeyra Dom Luis de 
Menezes, no tempo, foi Vice-Rey e capitao Geral da India, sobre 
negocios mais importantes daquello estado 1717-20* (together 
with the letters which he wrote to the Kings and regulos of the 
Orient or their Generals and Ministers, also portarias and letters 
written to the Secretary of States^  dezembargador Joao Rodrigues 
Machado by the order of the King of Portugal).
25^19
(iii) Reformacao da militia e Governo do Estado da India oriental Dirigida 
a Serenissima Infanta Margarita Lugar Tehente Delrey Catholico Nosso 
Senhor. By Francisco Roiz Silveira, 296 fls.
(iv) 197 (Sloane MS) - ^26 fls.
Bocarro, Antonio do Estado da India, coloured plans of Mocambique 
(p.96) Goa (p.2^8), Cartographical description of Rios de Cuama 
(p.8^-84) and boundaries of Sofala (p.8l).
The second part of this MS on that State of India contains plans 
of all the fortresses between the Cape of Good Hope and Chaul, 
with a description of them all and of the whole East Coast, the 
Kingdoms upon which they border, and any relevant information 
thereunto with the revenue and expenses of each in detail. For 
a printed text or references of this MS see A.B.de Braganca 
Pereira Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e 
prodttcoes do Estado da India Oriental por Bocarro, 5 parts.
Bastora - Goa, 1957-^ A.P.O. Nova edicao Tomo IV Historia 
Administerativa Vol.II, 1600-1699*
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Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.II, Cape Town, 1898, pp.378-420
F.F. dela Figaniere, Catalogo dos Manuscriptos Portuguezes 
existentes no Museo Britanico 1&53, p.l62.
A ^
7* Instituto Superior, de Ciencias Sociais Politica Ultramarina
Technical University of Lisbon.
Joze^Marcia Teixeira de Cruz, Presenca Portuguesa no Nyassa 
1798-183^. This is an M.A. documentary dissertation - in 
two parts A and B. the B part is a systematic collection 
of documents relating to Portuguese trade and other act­
ivities north of Zambezi.
8. Methodist Missionary Society
I found one large bundle consisting mainly of correspondence between 
the Rev. Isaac Shimmin and Bishop Marshall Hartley, this bundle 
contains useful historical accounts of Manyika’s contact with the 
outside world.
9• National Archives of Rhodesia.
Manuscript 14/1/1 (Shona) 14.1.2. (English)
Machiwenyika Jason, ’The History and Customs of the Manyika People’ 
this MS (132 ’chapters’) is a result of oral tradition collected in 
the 1930's and covers a much larger geographical area than that dealt 
with in this thesis. It must be used cautiously because very little 
or nothing is known about the manner in which the data was collected 
and collated.
3.0. P.R.O.
CO. 879/35, CO.879/42, CO.879/93, Co.417/14.
Papers printed for the use of the colonial office. Africa Nos.44-447
11. Senate ^ouse Library, London.
Unpublished Theses
Newitt M.D.D., The Zambesi Prazos in the l8th Century, Ph.D. 1967* 
London.
Alpers A.3. The Role of the Yao in the development of Trade in 
East-Central Africa I698-I85OC, Ph.D. 1966.
262.
12. Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa:
MS 1 Pasta A - 19 (Sofala)
Vizinhos 1755 - 1884 fls.
Catalogo dos Governadores distritais desde 1755 em que a Provincia de Mocam­
bique ficou desmembrada dos Estados d*India a esta parte 1884 com as 
notas dos acontecimentos que na administracab de cada urn tiveram lugar.
15. The Archives of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel;
London.
The material in this archive deals mainly with the situation in the 
1890's, Occasionally one comes across useful retrospective historical 
information relating to Manyika and Masbonaland in general, particularly 
the 1896-7 upheaval, the files which were being reorganised when I 
consulted them were classified under the letter D and E. The D series 
were annual reports and the E Series were sundry letters of correspondence.
Important MS.
E27718, 1907* Yearly report from the S.P.G. in Foreign Parts, Reports 
oif the years, 1900 in Vol.I. and 1902 in Vol.II.
The Rev.V/.H. Robin1s diary, ‘Through Gorongoza and the Land of Barwe'
E.1900 Vol.I.. It throws a good deal of light on trade and attitude 
of the people vis-a-vis the Portuguese.
Printed Primary Sources
Most of the Bishops’ correspondence was published in either of the 
Missions periodical publications:
The Masbonaland Quarterly or The Mission Field.
G.W.H. Knights Bruce's voluminous correspondence is largely found 
in the ’Journals of Mashonaland’ edited by L.K.B.
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PRINTED DOCUMENTS.
Andrade, A.A. Relacoes de Mocambique Setecentista, Agekcia Geral 
do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1933*
de Andrade, J.Nogueira TDescripcao em que ficaram os Negocios da Capitania 
de Mozambique em fins de 1739 e consideracoes sobre 
a decadkncia do seu comercio1, Arquivo das Colonias 
Coimbra 1917-18. Parts II, IV. and V. of Arq. das 
Colonias. Contain descriptions of the commerce of 
Rios de Sena. Documentsqao Ultramarina Fortuguesa, 
(Lisbon,i960, in progress). This series, published 
by the Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos, 
Lisobon, draws together manuscripts pertaining to 
the entire Portuguese Ultramar, from various archives 
in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Vol.11,1962. Documents 
NO.70, 373-4; 82, 410-11; 98,44-3; 111,466-7; 178, 
349-530; 182,552-6.
Documentos sobre os Portuguses em Mozambique e no. 
Xfrica Central,1497~i64o . This serie^ is edited 
under the auspices of the Centro de Estudos Historicos 
Ultramarinos in Lisbon and the National Archives of 
Rhodesia, the six volumes hitherto published cover 
the period 1497-1537* For the plan, division of res­
ponsibilities and other technical details of this 
project see Studia No.9* 1962,Lisbon,pp.402-3
Vol.I 
Vol.II 
Vol.Ill 
Vol. IV 
Vol. V 
Vol. VI
1497
1507
1511
1515
1516 
1519
1506 1962 
1510 1963
1514 1964
1516 1965 
1518 1966 
1537 1969
All these volumes are bilingual (English and Portuguese)
Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, Lisbon. 
1 9 5 4 . In progress, this series, which contains summarie? 
of material from the microfilms which were made in the 
various archives, those of Goa and Mocambique not 
excluded, is well indexed. This is ]3roduced under 
the directorship of Professor Antonio da Silver Rego 
at the Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos. I 
found Vols.l - 3 useful for my work.
Copia de Documentos officaes Trocados entre a 
Companhia de Mocambique e o Governo de sua Hagestade. 
Lisbon, 1691. There are 8 volumes of this series, 
(21.2.1888 - Dec.l897)» although, these documents 
cover a much later period than that dealt with in this 
thesis, they contain some backward looking accounts 
about Manyika - Portuguese relations.
Documentos Relativos a Concessoes de Minas em 
Mocambique, published by the Minister of Marine and
Overseas Affairs, Lisbon, 1891. Documents No.25, 
P.90; 57, p.1^95 38, p.153; 39, p.l5*M 68,p.233;
91, pp.27^-5.
This source, to my knowledge has not been exploited 
to any great extent. It adequately compensates for 
several documents, now missing but cited by Eric 
Axelson in^his Partition of Africa, I875-I89I. 
Johannesburg, 1967*
Termos de Vassallagem nos Territories de Hachona e 
Nyassa, 1858a 1859, Lisobon, 1890.
Hemoria e Documentos Acerca dos Direitos de 
Portugal aos Territd>rios de Hachona e Nyasa 
Lisbon, Imprensa.Nacional, 1890.
de Andrade, Joaquim Carlos Paiva,
Docume ntos Relativos aos Acontecimentos de Manica 
(Sept a Dez) die 1890, Lisbon, 1891.
*Cartas de Paiva de Audrade’ in Mocambique, 
Documentario Trimestral, No.25, ly^l, pp.75-135*
Relatorio de uma Viagem as terras do Changamire, 
Lisbon, 1866.
Relatc>rio de uma Viagem hs terras dos Landins, Lisbon,
I885.
Baptista, J.Renato 
Boleo, 0 
Boxer, C.R. (ed) 
Boxer, C.R.
Burton, R.F.
Caminho de Ferro da Beira a Manica Excursoes e estudos 
efgctuados em 1*391 sob engenharia, Lisbon, 1892.
*0 Regimento para o Novo Comercio de Mocambique de 1673 
in Studia No.3, 1959, Lisbon. '
*A Dominican Account of the Zambezi,* Bol.Soc.Estud Hoc. 
Anno XXI No.125, Nov-Dee.i960, Lisbon.
Sisnando Dias Bayao Conquistador da Mae d t0uro, 
no mundo Vol.III. Lisbon, 1938,
The Lands of Cazembe, Lacerda's Journey to Cazembe in 
1798, London, 1873*
Carvalho, Jose Guedes de Menezes, ,
Relate orios dos Governadores Geraes das Provincias 
de Cabo Vede, Mocambique e Estado da India referidos ao 
ano l8?5i apresentados as Cortes pelo Hinist^rio 
D tEstado dos Negdcios da Marimha e Ultramar na sessao 
. legislativa de 1878. Lisbon,I878. This source contains j 
much information on Manyika - Portuguese - Gaza relations
265.
e Castro, Francisco de Mello j
I 'Descripcao de Rios de Sena, sua descripcao desde a
barra de Queliraane ate ao Zumbo.' in /frnnaes do 
Conselho UltramarinQ, Parte nao oficial, serie II, 
Lisbon, 166?.
e Cirne, Joaquin Mendos Vasconcellos
Memoria sobre a Provincia de Mozambique, Lisbon,1890.
Correia, Gaspar Lendas da India, Livro Primeiro, Tomo I, Lisbon, 1858.
Coutinho, Joao Azevedo Relatorio Oficial da Companhia do Barv;e em 1902,
Lisbon, 190yf. "
I • '
| Memorias de urn velho Marinheiro e Soldado de Africa,
Lisbon, 19^1.
d'Eca, Filipe Gastao de Almeida
Historia das Guerras no Sambeze, Chicova e Massangano 
(I8O7-I087) 2 Vols. Agenda Geral do Ultramar, 185 ,^ 
Lisbon,
de Carvalho, Dias, Luis Fernando
Durao, Antonio
Fontes para a Historia, Geografia e Comercio de Moqambique 
(Sec.XVIII) Anais Vol.IX. Tomo I. Lisbon, 195^*
Cercos de' Mozambique, Prefaced by Edgar Prestage'and 
annotated by •C,R. Boxer. This is an important published 
manuscript concerning the events of the Dutch attacks 
on Mozambique in 1607. For an analysis of and commentary 
on the manuscript, see Antonio Meireles do Souto.
Historia dos cercos de Mozambique. Urn Manuscripto dis- 
conhecido. Also see Anaii II slerie Vol. 15, P»33» 1962.
Gamitto, A.C.P.
Gomes, Antonio
Guerreiro, Alcantara
Homem, Fernandes
King Kazembe and the Marave, Cheva, Bemba, Lunda and 
Other Peoples of Southern Africa, Being a Diary of
the Portuguese Expedition to that potentate in the 
years 1831 and 1832. (Trans.Ian Cunnison) 2 Vols.
Junta:-,1 de Investigacoes do Ultramar. Centro de Estudos 
Politicos e Sociais No.^3, Lisbon, i960.
'Viagem que fez o Padre Antonio Gomes da Companhia de 
Jesus, ao Imperio de de(sic) Manomotapa e assistencia 
que fez nas ditas terras de alguns annos. (V/ith notes 
by Eric Axelson) Studia,3,1959, pp.155-2^2.
'As Kinas de Prata da Chicova em urn relatorio do 
seculo XVII* in Moqambique, Documentario Trimestral.
No.39, 7-91, 1 9 ^ 7 ^
0.*Carta de Vasco Fernandes Homem p Luys da Sylva em que 
lhe da conta de tudo e sucedido na empreza de Monomotapa1 
in Axelson E. South East Africa 1^98-1530 Longmans,19^0, 
Appendix V.
Livingstone, D. ■ The African Journal,1853-1856, 2 Vols. edited by
I. Scliapera, London, 1963. I
I !
Livingstone, D. The Zambezi Expedition of I858-I863, 2 Vols. edited by
J.P.P.Wallis, London,1956. Central African Archives 
Oppenheimer Series,No.9* i
da Luz,Francisco Paulo Mendes (ed)
Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da 
India, e mais cargos que nellas ha e da importancia 
dellas, Lisbon, 1960. A facsrnile of this important " 
manuscript is found in Studia, No.6, 3-107,1960.
Moffat, R. The Matabele Journals, of Robert Moffat, 2 Vols.London,
i . 1 9 ^
Montez, Caetano 'Inve&tario do Fundo do Secu.lo XVIII1 Arquivo
j Histcfrico de Mocambique. Mocambique, Documentario
Trimestral, No,72, 1958.
Ogilby, John Africa - being an accurate description of the regions
of. Egypt, Barbary, Lybia and Billedulgerid with all 
the adjacent islands belonging thereunto, collected and 
translated from the most authetic authors and augmented 
with later observations; illustrated with peculiar : and 
proper sculptures by John Ogilby. (This work is mainly 
a translation of a German work by Olfert Dapper 
Naukerrge beschrijvinge der Africa enschege VJesten
van Egypt... met lantkaerten en afbeeldingen....
inkooperges neden etcJ Amsterdam, 1676.
Pereira, Braganca A.B.de Arquivo Portugues Oriental, Nova edica'o, Tomo I.
Historia Politica Diploma'tica e Militar, Vol.III.
1 Parte II, 1700-1708, 1939, pp.59,76,1^9,168,212,
551,359,388.
A.P.O. Vol.Ill,Parte III, 1709-1719,pp.59,331,359-360.
. A.P.O. Vol.Ill,Parte III, 1720-172.6,19^0, p.37*
Pereira, Francisco Raymundo Moraes.
An Account of a Journey made Overland from Quelimaneto 
Angoche in 1755. edited by M.i;.D. Hewitt*
Pissurlencar, Panduranga S.S. ^
Regimentos das Fortalezas da India, Bastora, Goa, 1951.
Pyrard, F. The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the West
Indies, the Maldives, The Moluccas and Brazil. 
Translated into English from the third French 
edition and edited with notes by Albert Gray and
H.C.P. Bell. Vol.II, Part I, Hakluyt Society,London,
1887-9.
26?.
Rivara, J.H. da Cunha
It
I
The Portuguese edition of l6?9» Viagem de F. 
Pyrard...as Indlas Qrientaes...l6oi a 1611, 
was edited and annotated by J.H. da Cunha 
Rivara. Nova Goa, I858-I862.
Arquivo Portugues Oriental, The documents which 
constitute this serie,s^ inainly with the administ­
rative and commercial problems of the 16th and 
17th Century Estado da India. This series of doc­
uments can be analysed in the following manner-
a) Documents published by Cunha Rivara in Arquivo 
Portugues - Oriental (A.P.O.)
Fasciculo 1.2a edicao Nova Goa,Imprensa Nacional 
1877, Period 1595-1609
b) A.P.O. Fasciculo IB 1857*
Contains letters from the Kings of Portugual to 
the Viceroys in Goa.
c) A»P.O.Fasciculo 5°2 Parte Nova Goa,l86l,
(Period I568-I6OO). This contains letters, 
instructions and alvaras from the Kings of 
Portugal to the viceroys and governors of India 
during the l6th Century. These documents were 
extracted from the archives of the entire govern­
ment of the State, of India. This fascimile of the 
Arq.Port.Orient^contains what is generally 
known as Livros das Moncoes (the books of the 
monsoons) consists of original letters and j
papers exchanged between the Kings' governments < 
in Lisbon and the Estado da India, which in- , 
eluded Mocambique until 1752, I'he name derives 
from the fact that it was only during the mon­
soons that the despatches and receipt of letters 
wenedone. No documents are available before
158^  except two, one of 1568 and the other 1585. 
The documents covering the first sixty years of 
Portuguese activities in the Estado da India 
are missing. It is related that they were sent 
to Lisbon in 177^. In spite of a decree which 
was later passed to the effect that they should 
be returned to Goa, it does^cseem that this was 
done. This information which was gleaned from 
an Alphabetical Chronological Index (1568-1311) 
written by Diogo Vieira Tovare Albuquerque,
Chief Secretary of State, was confirmed by 
anotherSecretary of State in 18^1,Claudio 
Lagrange Monteiro de Barbuda.
d) A.P.O. 1862, This contains documents on 
religious problems relating to Goa. It has 
little information on Mocambique although the 
bishopric of Mozambique was subordinated to that 
of Goa. (This subordination probably began 011 
12.2.1562, but was severed on 21.1.1612,and 
resumed in l6Vj. Lima,DurvalPires de. Oriente E 
Africa desde a restauracao a Ponbal. Agencia 
Geral das Colonias, 19;+6, p.207).
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e) A.P.O. Fasciculo 3° (1865)
This is divided into three parts. The first 
part contains:
i) Livro de Registos Antigos 
ii) Registos de casa dos contos. 
iii) Livro do pay dos Christaos.
The second (1863) and third (1866) Parts 
contain sundry documents of the l6th Century.
f) A.P.O. Fasciculo 6 contains documents of the 
16th century with two supplements, one of the 
16th century dealing with religious problems, 
and another 'Supplement© Segundo1 of the 
XVIIIth century. It contains little that is 
revelant to Mozambique.
0 Chronista de Tissuary, 4 Vols. Nova Goa,1867- 
69* This was a monthly periodical to which ad­
ministrators of the State of India,contributed 
articles concerning events in their respective 
areas. •
a) Tratados dos Rios de Cuama feito por Fr. 
Antehio da Conceipao, administrador da 
Christandada de Mozambique e Rios 1696, 
pp.29 etc.63 etc.84 etc.,105 etc.
b) Vol.II,Chapter II,p.92,(1693-1698) 1867, A 
India no goverao do vice-rei of Conde de 
villa Verde. Causas de-Mozambique.
c) Vol.II, 1867. J
Companhia do comercio,No.8 June,l867« pp.123- 
131 No.19, July,1867, pp.147-155.
• No.20. Aug.pp.174-183. Vol.III.
No.17. May.1867, pp.99-104.
d) Rios de Cuama pp.132-138.
e) Vol.4,1869, pp.14-13, 42.
Academia Real da Hist<£ria Portuguesa, Carta 
do Secretario de Estado,Diogo do Menonca, ao 
Vice-Rei sobre as noticias que se pedem para 
a Academia, 17.3*1721. (See Livro das 
Moncoes No.87. fls. 234).
f) ’Reposta dada....* p.43»46,6l-66.
g) Intruccao de S.M. dada ao Marques de Lourical 
Quando Veio por Vice-rey da India,pp.77-80, 
89-92.
A voyage to Abyssinia and Travels into the 
interior of that country; executed under the 
Orders of the British Government in the years 
1809 and 1810 in which are included an account 
of the Portuguese settlements on the East Coast 
of Africa visited in the course of the voyage, 
London, l8l4.
Santana, Francisco
Soares, Augusto E* Xavier 
Steward, James
Theal, G.M.
i
Thomans, Mauriz 
Thornton, Richard
Tracey, H.
Truao, Antonio Noberto de 
da Costa, Viega A.Botelho
Avulsa Mogambicana do Arquivo Historico Ultramar- 
ino - 2 vols. "
Vol.I. Macos 1 - 1 0  1824-1830 Lisbon,1964.
Vol.II. Macos 11-20 1830 Lisbon,1967.
These two volumes constitute very important 
summaries of Portuguese contact withrthe Africans 
in Mozambique during the first three decades of 
the 19th Century. The value of these two 
publications will undoubtedly go on increasing 
as most of the documents cited in them rapidly 
disappear from the Haco boxes.
Descripcao da Villa de Sofala, Nova Goa, 1857*
The Zambezi Journal of James Steward: with 
a selection from his correspondence ed.J.P.R. 
Wallis, London, 1956. Oppenheimer Series 6, 
(1862-63).
Records of South East Africa, 9 Vols, Cape 
Town, 1964.
Reise und Lebensbechreibung, Augsburg, 1738.
The Papers of Richard Thornton, Geologist to 
Livingstone's Zambezi Expedition, London,1963* 
Robins Series No.4, 2 Vols. ed* E.C. Tabler.
Antonio Fernandes,Descobridor do Monomotapa 
1514-1515, 19^ -0* Lourenco Marques, this important 
document was first discovered in the Torre do 
Tombo (Lisbon) by Dr.Eric AxeIson. He studied 
it and produced Antonio Fernandes ,Southern 
Rhodesia's First Pioneer,1314-1515* (Alexander 
Lobato has disputed the point that Antonio 
Fernandes was a Pioneer into the. interior, s®e 
his Sobre Cultura Moqambicana, Reposicao de uma 
problema e resposta a urn critico, Lisbon,1952)• 
This work was given in a manuscript form to 
Caetano Mofltez, then Chief of the Statistical 
services of Mocambique, who translated it into 
Portuguese. He adorned the translation with 
valuable notes.
Barbosa de Vilas Boas.
Estatistica da Capitania dos Rios de Sena do ano 
de 1606, Lisbon, 1889. .
'Plano para um regimento ou nova constituicao 
economica da Capitania de Rios de Sena' etc. 
in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte nao 
oficial 1857, p . W .  ' !
Relacao das plantas e descripcoes de todas as 
fortalezas, cidades e povoacoes que or portugueses 
tem no Estado da India, Oriental, Lisbon,1955* 
(B.N.L.Fundo Geral, No.29).
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